Hazards Associated with High-Speed Rail (HSR) Operation Adjacent to Conventional Tracks

Transcription

1 Slide 1 Hazards Associated with High-Speed Rail (HSR) Operation Adjacent to Conventional Tracks Chen-Yu Lin Dr. M. Rapik Saat Dr. Christopher P.L. Barkan 4 th June 2015 NURail Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL

2 Slide 2 Outline - Approaches to developing high-speed rail (HSR) and shared-use rail corridor (SRC) - Hazards associated with operating high-speed rail on shared-use corridor - Hazard assessment - High-risk locations - Influencing factors - Potential risk mitigation strategies - Fault-tree analysis of hazards - Ongoing work

3 Slide 3 Two Key Decisions in High(er)-Speed Rail Development Approach to HSR Incremental upgrade of existing line New dedicated line Track and right-of-way (ROW) usage Shared Shared right of way Shared corridor Each has different implications regarding speed, performance, cost, operational, institutional, regulatory and safety considerations

4 Slide 4 Shared-Use Rail Corridor (SRC) Shared & shared ROW Shared : s shared between passenger and freight or other service Shared right of way (ROW): dedicated high-speed passenger s separated from freight or other service s up to 25 ft Shared corridor: dedicated high-speed passenger s separated from freight or other service s by ft High-speed rail service Adjacent centers 25 Shared corridor Freight or conventional passenger rail service Adjacent centers >25 and 200

5 Slide 5 Shared-Use Implementation Challenges Safety Adjacent accident (ATA) Loss of shunt problem Pedestrian risk Highway/rail grade crossings Infrastructure and Rolling Stock Wheel-load characteristics Track structure and components Special work Track geometry Vehicle- interaction (VTI) Stations Signaling systems and train control technology Planning and Operation Host railroad negotiation Train scheduling Capacity planning Train control and operations Economic Capital cost sharing Passenger operation sustainability Freight level of service preservation Institutional Regulatory compliance Performance incentives/penalties Grant agreement structure Liability Saat, M.R., and Barkan, C.P.L. Investigating Technical Challenges and Research Needs Related to Shared Corridors for High-Speed Passenger and Railroad Freight Operations:

6 Slide 6 Safety Issues of Operating High-Speed Rail (HSR) Adjacent to Conventional Tracks The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) set out to develop a guidance document for SRC The document combines existing and proposed research to aid in the proposal, design, and evaluation of planned HSR alignments The document provide risk assessment capabilities for potential hazards of HSR operations on SRC as well as potential risk mitigation strategies

7 Slide 7 Safety Issues of Operating HSR Adjacent to Conventional Tracks Development of the document and its final contents consider the following issues: Minimum and Right-of-Way (ROW) spacing from adjacent railroad s without the use of additional protection Use of intrusion detection or protection devices and proper system characteristics and installation locations Use of physical barriers or crash walls; what conditions warrant use and basic design characteristics Other relevant considerations such as aerodynamics, effects of grading and heights, and protection from activities along ROW access roads, etc

8 Slide 8 Derailment on adjacent s Shifted load on an adjacent Aerodynamic interaction between trains on adjacent s Ground borne vibration and its effect on HSR geometry List of Hazards Associated with Operating HSR Adjacent to Conventional Tracks Intrusion of maintenance of way staff and equipment working on the adjacent Obstruction hazard resulting from an adjacent (non-derailment and grade-crossing collisions) Drainage problem affecting either the HSR or the adjacent Evacuation of passengers from trains on the adjacent Hazardous materials on the adjacent Fire on the adjacent Electromagnetic interference between trains and wayside equipment on adjacent s

9 Slide 9 Hazard Framework

10 Slide 10 Hazard Assessment Process Conduct comprehensive literature review (internationally and domestic) on identified hazards Conduct survey to gain input from public and private sectors Identify high-risk locations for individual hazard Identify influencing factors affecting the likelihood and consequence of individual hazard Identify potential risk mitigation strategies for individual hazard Prioritize hazards and conduct risk analyses Develop and evaluate risk mitigation strategies Figure on the right adapted from: Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the International Space Station (2002)

11 Slide 11 High-Risk Locations of Hazards Hazard Locations 1 Derailment on adjacent s Along a shared-use rail corridor with multiple s 2 Shifted load on adjacent s Along a shared-use rail corridor with freight train services 3 Aerodynamic interaction between trains on adjacent s Along a shared-use rail corridor with multiple s, tunnels and stations where trains operate at high speed 4 Ground borne vibration and its effect on HSR geometry Along a shared-use rail corridor where trains operating at high speed especially at locations with subgrade and infrastructure conditions susceptible to 5 Intrusion of maintenance of way staff and equipment working the adjacent s 6 Obstruction hazard resulting from an adjacent s (non-derailment collisions) 7 Drainage problem affecting either the HSR or adjacent s 8 Evacuation of passengers from trains on adjacent s 9 Hazardous material transportation on vibrations, and at special locations (e.g. switches and turnouts) Along a shared-use rail corridor where maintenance activities are frequently taken place and locations with limited clearances (e.g. bridges, tunnels) Along a shared-use rail corridor close to other rail or highway vehicles (e.g. yards, grade crossings) Along a shared-use rail corridor especially at high-precipitation/snow areas, vegetation and with insufficient drainage systems Along a shared-use rail corridor with multiple s Along a shared-use rail corridor with freight trains transporting hazardous materials adjacent s 10 Fire on adjacent s Along a shared-use rail corridor with freight trains transporting flammable liquids and/or gases, and other locations near fuel-based activities (e.g. power stations, gas stations) 11 Electromagnetic interference between trains and wayside equipment on adjacent s Along a shared-use rail corridor where the high-voltage overhead catenary wires present

12 Slide 12 Key Influencing Factors of Hazards Hazard Key Influencing Factors 1 Derailment on adjacent s Track center spacing, train speed, human factor, geometry, type of rail infrastructure, train control systems 2 Shifted load on adjacent s Track center spacing, train speed, human factor, geometry, train control systems 3 Aerodynamic interaction between trains on Track center spacing, train speed, train equipment design, wind adjacent s Major common condition influencing factors: 4 Ground borne vibration and its effect on HSR Track center spacing, train speed, geometry, type of rail - Track center geometry infrastructure, soil foundation/subgrade characteristics 5 Intrusion of maintenance of -way Train staff and speedtrack center spacing, train speed, human factor equipment working the adjacent s 6 Obstruction hazard resulting - from Human an adjacent factor Track center spacing, train speed, human factor, geometry, s (non-derailment collisions) - Track geometry train control systems 7 Drainage problem affecting either the HSR or Track center spacing, soil foundation/subgrade characteristics, adjacent s - Train equipment geometry, type design of rail infrastructure 8 Evacuation of passengers from trains on adjacent Track center spacing, train equipment design, human factor s 9 Hazardous material transportation on adjacent Track center spacing, train equipment design, hazardous materials s traffic volume 10 Fire on adjacent s Track center spacing, train equipment design, human factor, flammable product traffic volume 11 Electromagnetic interference between trains and Train equipment design, type of rail infrastructure, train control wayside equipment on adjacent s systems

13 Slide 13 Proposed Risk Mitigation of Hazards Hazard Potential Risk Mitigation Strategies 1 Derailment on adjacent s Proper center spacing, installation of intrusion detection systems, building physical barriers, improved employee training 2 Shifted load on adjacent s Proper center spacing, installation of intrusion detection systems, building physical barriers, improved employee training on cargo securement 3 Aerodynamic interaction between trains on Proper center spacing, installation of intrusion detection adjacent s systems, building physical barriers, reduced train speed 4 Ground borne Major vibration and potential its effect on HSR risk Proper mitigation center spacing, strategies: reduced train speed geometry - Proper center spacing 5 Intrusion of maintenance of way staff and Proper center spacing, installation of intrusion detection equipment working - Installation the adjacent s of intrusion systems, building detection physical barriers, improved employee training, reduced train speed 6 Obstruction hazard - Physical resulting from an adjacent barriersproper center spacing, installation of intrusion detection s (non-derailment collisions) systems, building physical barriers, improved employee training, - Improved employee grade crossing training protection 7 Drainage problem affecting either the HSR or Proper center spacing, soil improvement, improved drainage adjacent s - Enhanced rail equipment design 8 Evacuation of passengers from trains on adjacent Proper center spacing, installation of intrusion detection s systems, building physical barriers, improved employee training on safe passenger evacuation, enhanced rail equipment design 9 Hazardous material transportation on adjacent Proper center spacing, building physical barriers, temporal s separation, enhanced rail car design to prevent hazardous material release 10 Fire on adjacent s Proper center spacing, building physical barriers, temporal 11 Electromagnetic interference between trains and wayside equipment on adjacent s separation, enhanced rail equipment design Improved employee training, better rail equipment design to prevent or reduce electromagnetic field effect

14 Slide 14 Shared-Use Rail Corridor Risk Management Risk management planning Risk identification Risk assessment Qualitative and quantitative Development and evaluation of risk mitigation strategies Risk monitoring Figure on the right adapted from: Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the International Space Station (2002)

15 Slide 15 Fault-Tree Analysis A deductive process to break down a top event into basic events and all possible paths and elements for this event to occur are systematically deduced A graphical representation of the various contributors of s that lead to the occurrence of the top event (SRC hazard) The probability of the top event can be calculated by calculating the probabilities of basic events

16 Slide 16 Fault-Tree Analysis Configuration Event symbols - Basic event - Intermediate event - Conditioning event - Undeveloped event - External event Gate (Logic) Symbols - And - Or Transfer Symbols - Exclusive or Top Event - Priority and - Inhibit A B C D E F G

17 Slide 17 Fault Tree Analysis for Adjacent Track Collision 3-2 Collision between trains on two adjacent s 1. Initial derailment 2. Intrusion from derailment equipment 3. Train presence or the adjacent Initial derailment Intrusion from derailed equipment Train presence on the adjacent Infrastructure (T) Miscellaneous (M) Signal and control system (S) Equipment (E) Human factor (H) Crash wall Excessive lateral displacement toward adjacent Containment Failure to stop clear of the initial derailment Direct presence of the train on an adjacent M1 S1 Track geometry Broken rail or welds Rail Turnout Buckled Roadbed Other and structure Common Locomotive Railcar Lack of crash wall Damaged crash wall Damaged containment Lack of containment Intrusion detection Failure to brake T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 E1 E2 E3 Crash wall damaged before intrusion Crash wall destroyed by intruding train Containment damaged before intrusion Containment destroyed by intruding train Equipment Failure Human Error Failure Radio error Brake operation Train overspeed Failure to obey or display signal Switches/ switching rules Mainline rules Other human factors EB H2 H1 H2 H4 H6 H7 H8 H5 Employee condition Shared-use rail corridor hazards Intrusion hazards Other hazards H3 MoW intrusion The intrusion of MoW equipment/ personnel an adjacent when on duty The present of another train on the adjacent Shifted load hazards The intrusion of shifted cargo on an adjacent The present of another train on the adjacent Adjacent accidents Initial Initial collision on Direct side derailment one collision/ raking collision on multiple The The s intrusion of intrusion of derailed derailed equipment equipment Hazardous material transportation A train carrying hazmat derails Release of hazardous material Obstruction hazard Grade Cargo falling crossing off accident The intrusion The intrusion of collided of fallen railcar or road cargo vehicle Passenger evacuation Evacuation situation The intrusion of passenger onto an adjacent Train aerodynamic interaction Two trains on adjacent s passing each other Excessive suction force dragging two trains close to each other Ground Drainage EMI Train fire borne problem vibration Train Passenger Subgrade control Subgrade and system casualties due to and geometry malfunction train fire geometry problem problem Other hazards Risk assessment Raking collision between MoW equipment/ personnel and the train 1 Raking collision between the intruding rail car and the train 2 The The present of present of another another train on the train on the adjacent adjacent Collision Collision between between trains on trains on two two adjacent adjacent s s 3-3 The presence of a passenger train on the adjacent Passenger casualties due to released hazmat - Poisonous - Flammable - Explosive - Radioactive The present The present of another of another train on the train on the adjacent adjacent Debris Debris collision collision between the between the train and the train and the collided fallen cargo railcar or road vehicle The present of another train on the adjacent Passenger casualties due to the collision between the train and the passenger Raking collision between trains on two adjacent s

18 Slide 18 Fault Tree Analysis for Adjacent Track Collision 3-2 Collision between trains on two adjacent s 1. Initial derailment 2. Intrusion from derailment equipment 3. Train presence or the adjacent Initial derailment Intrusion from derailed equipment Train presence on the adjacent Infrastructure (T) Miscellaneous (M) Signal and control system (S) Equipment (E) Human factor (H) Crash wall Excessive lateral displacement toward adjacent Containment Failure to stop clear of the initial derailment Direct presence of the train on an adjacent M1 S1 Track geometry Broken rail or welds Rail Turnout Buckled Roadbed Other and structure Common Locomotive Railcar Lack of crash wall Damaged crash wall Damaged containment Lack of containment Intrusion detection Failure to brake T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 E1 E2 E3 Crash wall damaged before intrusion Crash wall destroyed by intruding train Containment damaged before intrusion Containment destroyed by intruding train Equipment Failure Human Error Failure Radio error Brake operation Train overspeed Failure to obey or display signal Switches/ switching rules Mainline rules Other human factors EB H2 H1 H2 H4 H6 H7 H8 H5 Employee condition H3

19 Slide 19 Conclusion and Future Work Holistic risk assessment is able to identify the potential hazards for the shared-use rail corridors operations, including their eminent locations, influencing factors, and potential risk mitigation strategies Fault tree analysis is an essential method in both qualitative identification and characterization and quantification of SRC hazards The risk model developed can provide the industry both quantitative result from fault-tree analysis and risk assessment procedure Future work includes complete fault-tree analysis on hazards and quantitative risk model development as well as the development of an integrated risk assessment framework

20 Slide 20 Acknowledgement National University Rail Center (NURail Center) A Tier-1 University Transportation Center (UTC) under the US Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research & Technology (OST) program.

21 Slide 21 Thank you! Questions and comments are Welcomed! Chen-Yu Lin 林陳佑 Graduate Research Assistant Rail Transportation and Engineering Center (RailTEC) University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL

22 Slide 22 Updated Fault Tree for Passenger Train Derailment Initial derailment Infrastructure (T) Miscellaneous (M) Signal and control system (S) Equipment (E) Human factor (H) M1 S1 Track geometry Broken rail or welds Rail Turnout Buckled Roadbed Other and structure Common Locomotive Railcar T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 E1 E2 E3 T7 Radio error Brake operation Train overspeed Failure to obey or display signal Switches/ switching rules Mainline rules Other human factors H1 H2 H4 H6 H7 H8 H5 Employee condition H3

23 Slide 23 Updated Fault Tree for Freight Train Derailment Initial derailment Infrastructure (T) Miscellaneous (M) Signal and control system (S) Equipment (E) Human factor (H) M1 S1 Track geometry Broken rail or welds Rail Turnout Buckled Roadbed Other and structure Common Locomotive Railcar T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 E1 E2 E3 T7 Radio error Brake operation Train overspeed Failure to obey or display signal Switches/ switching rules Mainline rules Other human factors H1 H2 H4 H6 H7 H8 H5 Employee condition H3