Conservation and sustainable use of coastal fishery resources: examples of bottom-up approaches of ocean governance

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1 Conservation and sustainable use of coastal fishery resources: examples of bottom-up approaches of ocean governance Nobuyuki Yagi, Associate Professor Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences The University of Tokyo Main topics of this presentation: Coastal fishermen in Japan, under the right based-management scheme (or TURF: territorial use right fishery), are good at adopting new conservation measures proposed by members of their own groups. But they show strong resistance against external requests or new problems caused by outsiders. Why? By answering this question, we will find conditions for the stability of conservation and sustainable use of natural resources. Case 1: Shiretoko World Natural Heritage Site Japan Hokkaido 3

2 January 2004: Japan proposed Shiretoko for nomination as a World Heritage site. August 2004: IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources) raised concerns over the conservation status of walleye pollock (prey species of stellar sea lion and the major target species for local fishery). November 2004: Japan responded by saying that the fishery activities were restricted under the government licensing system and fisher s were implementing self-imposed controls. It added that new control measures would be considered based on the fishers self-restriction. (negotiation between fishers and gov t) Office of local fisheries cooperative association in Rausu (Shiretoko) 5 6 February 2005: IUCN sought the possibility Walleye pollock fishery in the area of substantially extending the marine component of the nominated site. March 2005: It was agreed in Japan that (1) the government would issue an official document, saying that it would not impose further fishing restrictions, and (2) in return, the local fisheries cooperative association would accept the extension of the marine component of the site (1km 3km). Japan responded to UNESCO on the development regarding (2) above. July 2005: UNESCO accepted Shiretoko as a new World Natural Heritage Site. 7 出典 : 羅臼漁協 8

3 Self-imposed seasonal no-take zones set by fishermen after 1997 The no-take zones 出典 羅臼漁協 9 出典 羅臼漁協 10 Kunashiri island Fis h in g gr Sh pe ire ni tok ns o ul a ou n d 出典 羅臼 漁協 11 Japanese walleye pollock fishing vessels 12

4 Russian walleye pollock trawlers Japanese fishing control schemes Most of the local rules are undocumented, and therefore difficult for outsiders to observe. These are considered responsible for the stock decline. 13 Different practices inside Japan 14 Bottom-up management of Japanese coastal fisheries Wide variety of species Central government cannot control the details of fisheries Catches in Hokkaido Top-down Bottom-up Bottom-up approach More relevant rules Speedy decision-making Easy enforcement But Little transparency 15 Catches in Okinawa 16

5 Nature of self-imposed regulations Self-imposed regulations are agreed among members of the walleye pollock gillnet group in the local fisheries cooperative association regardless of the application process of the Heritage site. The regulations include seasonal no-take zones, mesh size, temporary cessation rotations, vessel decommissions. The regulations are not published or documented outside of the group because they are considered to be of no concern to outsiders. Case 2: Notsuke Peninsula 17 In 2005, the site was registered under the Ramsar Convention 18 Eelgrass (amamo) provides habitats for various marine species including commercially harvested shrimps Picture:Courtesy of Notsuke fisheries cooperative office 20

6 Shrimp vessel in the bay Area 7 Shrimp management areas and no-take zones 野付湾の面積 5,898 万m2 アマモ場面積 3,591 万m2 Area 5 Area 3 Area1 Area 4 Area 2 Area 6 blocks Storm in October 2006 Eelgrass washed ashore during the storm.

7 Blocks are placed to calm the waves produced by storms Fishers working to reinforce the wave blocks 新所の島 (1,850m) Self-imposed regulations in Notsuke Self-imposed regulations are agreed among members of the shrimp groups in local fisheries cooperative associations regardless of the Ramsar application process. The regulations include seasonal no-take zones, mesh size, gears, and so on. The regulations are not published or documented outside of the group because they are considered to be of no concern to outsiders. 27 Costs and benefits of the Shiretoko regulations Conservation costs are shared by the members of the pollock fisher groups, and the benefits (increased future catches or higher product prices) are also shared by the same stakeholder groups. That s why the self-imposed rules are effective and stable. If the government takes outsider s voices into account when imposing new regulations, the conservation costs have to be paid by the fishers but the benefits go to the Heritage promoters. Such rules may cause disputes. Local fishers may not be the main cause of the decreased walleye pollock catches (Russian trawlers or rising sea temperatures). If so, imposing new regulations would be difficult under a situation where the victims not the polluters are paying. 28

8 Free Riders (external players): Russians or climate change future uncertaintie s still exist. Government Free Riders (external players): Russian fishers Conservation (or tourism) groups promote the World Heritage registration Groups of Shiretoko fishers recover walleye pollock population to increase their future catches Conservation (or tourism) groups promote the World Heritage registration Groups of Shiretoko fishers recover walleye pollock population to increase their future catches Resistance Dispute settlements are easier in a framework like this. 29 Dispute settlements will become complicated. 30 Costs and benefits of the Notsuke regulations Conservation costs are shared by the members of the shrimp fisher groups, and the benefits (increased future catches or higher product prices) are also shared by the same stakeholder groups. That s why the self-imposed rules are effective and stable. If the government takes outsider s voices into account when imposing new regulations, the conservation costs have to be paid by the fishers but the benefits go to the Ramsar site promoters. Such rules may cause disputes. Local fishers may not be fully responsible for the decreased shrimp catches (storms due to rising sea temperatures). If so, imposing new regulations ld b diffi lt d it ti h th External players : Hokkaido Farmers (deforestation) and world people (climate change) Conservation (or tourism groups) promote the Ramsar registration Groups of Notsuke fishers recover shrimp populations to increase their future catches Future uncertaintie s still exist. Dispute settlements are easier in a framework like this

9 Government Conservation groups who wish to promote their own agendas Free Riders (external players) Fisher groups who have to pay the costs of conservation Resistance Dispute settlements will become complicated. 33 Lessons learned When we come across a conflict between conservation and development, we need to analyze the interests (cost-benefit) of the various stakeholders. If the costs of conservation are properly shared by the various interest groups, conflict settlement will become easier. 34