Sustainable initiative: Northern bluefin tuna

Transcription

1 Sustainable initiative: Northern bluefin tuna

2 Prologue past week news: (Sources: Intrafish; Greenpeace website)

3 1. Overview FACTS #1 a) Northern (Atlantic) bluefin is one of the highest priced fishes worldwide. b) The fishery is managed by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic tunas (ICCAT). ICCAT receives scientific support from one of its Committees the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS). SCRS is responsible for stock assessment and advice, namely, adequate annuals amounts of quotas. c) Bluefin is currently assessed as two different Atlantic stocks: Western and Eastern and Mediterranean (which accounts for the major proportion of production). d) Commercial interests have played historically a much greater role on the management dynamics of bluefin than on the management of other Atlantic tuna stocks (Webster, 2009). e) ICCAT has consistently not followed the advice by its own scientific Committee (SCRS) and have set the TAC much above the advised levels. Currently (2009) advised catch levels = 15,000t; set = 22,000; e.g., back in 2006 advised = 15,000t; set = 32,000. f) Currently 48 contracting parties exerting influence upon the adoption of management measures for the stocks by ICCAT. Huge cleavage between western (US, Canada) and Eastern (now EC, Morocco) and between these and countries operating foreign fleets (Japan, China). 2. The Problem: the critical sustainability status (Focusing mainly on the Eastern stock) a) Stock is at very low levels at about 17% of Bmsy, the level which support long-term catches at MSY and in a collapsing pathway. b) Severe overfishing is occurring: the fishing mortality rate F is estimated to be over three times Fmsy (the value that relates to Bmsy). c) Illegal fishing (IUU) is occurring, particularly in the Mediterranean by purse seiners and related to farming activities. The most recent estimates of IUU were as high as 100% of official landings. d) There are also environment and biodiversity problems (e.g., IUCN Redlisted species impacted by the fishery) but these may be regarded as secondary with the stock being near collapse. e) More on FishSource (a Program by SFP on the sustainability status of fisheries and seafood supplies worldwide). FishSource has a comprehensive fishery profile live for bluefin addressing the key issues on Management, Stock status and Environment and biodiversity. August, / 8

4 3. Anticipated threats: what will happen if no action is undertaken? a) Bluefin becoming enlisted on CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) advanced as with high probability. Market sanctions will depending on which of the three CITES Appendices to be enlisted. There may be side effects of having one tuna species on CITES by expanding hindrances to other tuna species trade where market exchange involves already processed fish and thus unable to be excluded as bluefin. b) Stock collapse; compulsory closure of the fishery with unknown timeline for recovery. Huge impacts upon the whole market but particularly harsh to fleets and markets less flexible on sourcing options (e.g., Japan). 4. Immediate required measures a) Management: ICCAT must set TACs in line with the advice by SCRS. b) Illegal fishing must be severely banned ICCAT member states should conduct accordingly to ensure this compliance problem is overcome. 5. Measures Background Facts #2 a) Bluefin has accounted for more management measures then any other fishery managed by ICCAT yet none included setting TACs at advised levels. b) With regard to the Eastern stock Spain and France are regarded as the most influential member-states. c) These countries, joined by Italy, have a substantial proportion of total quota (51% in 2009) (Table I appended). d) 44.7% of the total TAC has been attributed to non-eu countries. Among these, Morocco, Japan, Tunisia and Algeria altogether have a share of 31% of total TAC. e) About 85% of the total catch is due to purse seiners fishing on the Mediterranean; the estimates of IUU are also most related to purse seine gears in connection with farming destinations for the fish caught. f) Domestic markets and farming and transhipping operations have been reported as potential catalysts for fishers to either cash in on illegal or undersized catches or circumvent trade documentation schemes (Webster, 2009). Complexity at ICCAT (/ probable factors for failing to reach consensus about bluefin) set at a higher degree when: h) ICCAT implemented the two stocks division / boundary: i. East (Spain, France) vs. West (US, Canada) issues: West blaming the East for mismanagement of the Eastern stock which in turn affected the western stock); ii. East+West members vs. foreign fleets (e.g. Japan) for harvesting central areas believed to serve both stocks. 4 /8

5 i) in 1997 the farming activities began, affecting market balance by providing fish at a much lower price. 6. Creating leverage for the required change External actions a) How many stocks and where to draw the line. Mixing issues between Eastern and Western stocks have always been a central point of contention with Western countries (US, Canada) blaming mismanagement of Eastern bluefin to be hindering the condition of the western stock. Over time proposals were drawn to go back to the single stock approach (Japan) and to shift eastward the boundaries between stocks extending the Western stock area (US, Canada). Both of them were not approved by the Commission but their existence highlighted the need to proceed with stock differentiation studies (ICCAT, 2008a) using genetic techniques. b) Quota shares and transfers. Western (US, Canada) are anticipated as allies for the adoption of strong management actions on E Bluefin management because they believe that bad management of E bluefin is affecting the condition of the western stock (related to the stock differentiation issue above). In practice, historically, US and Canada have supported the SCRS advice. Spain and France have historically been reluctant to accept the reduction of their quotas (which put together comprise about 35% of total TAC in 2009) claiming higher relevance of other issues such as enforcing compliance to non-members. On the other hand, US and Canada are not catching E bluefin; Spain and France (and Italy) have currently over 50% of quota these countries would therefore be severely affected by loss of income if the production by their fleets / farms were blocked out from the buyers level up. No member-state wishes to see their historical proportion of quota reduced compared to others owing to compromising their future relevance in the total share, although recently EC has been slowly leaving hand of substantial parts of their quota to, e.g., other Mediterranean countries (Webster, 2009) currently, among the non-eu members Moroc, Japan, Tunisie and Algerie sum together 6,812 t of TAC for 2009 (31% of total) (check Table I appended). The bottom line is setting the quota lower in line with SCRS advice is the least that can be done to prevent stock collapse (other conjoint measures are highlighted by SCRS). According to Webster (2009) who deeply analyzed the dynamics of ICCAT management and the only way to make that happen is through changing the actual total quota sharing proportions. c) Improvement of the quality of data for assessment. The lack of quality of available data and its unavailability per se are highlighted by SCRS as the major factor hindering stock assessment and the accuracy of estimates of biomass and fishing mortality, among others, especially for the Mediterranean, where the great majority of the catch takes place (ICCAT, 2008a). The EC has used in the past the lack of quality of data argument not to support the SCRS advice on the behalf of socio-economic factors that should rather be taken into account 5 /8

6 (Webster, 2009). Improving the quality of data for stock assessment to a point that all members states would reckon the reliability of estimates of stock condition would thus probably be a step towards achieving support from EU countries which have not in the past been aligned with the ICCAT SCRS as US and Canada have been. Recognizing beyond any doubt how bad the bluefin fishery is would definitely be a step towards implemented conjoint measures to prevent stock collapse. d) Enforcing and supporting the legality of all actions involved with farming. Monitoring bluefin farming activities has been of special relevance since 2003 when the Commission developed an official declaration of caging, later strengthened in 2005 by proposals from EC and Turkey (Webster, 2009). General data reporting on farms and data on size and structure of farmed individuals is carried out overall (ICCAT website at but together with the 2003 action by the EC there was a clause to have 10% of vessels catching tunas for farming monitored by inspectors that was later removed due to pressure from the EC and other EC-affiliated countries joined by Morocco. Having such premise back in force would most probably improve legality of fishing operations aimed at farming. Internal actions e) Traceability. Ensure total understanding of sources and of any sourcing related matter; specifically, i. For wild fisheries identify fleets (countries, fishing gears) buyers are working with are those small-scale (local-mediterranean) or largescale? Does purse-seine comprise the majority of the trade? (I.e., purse seine is potentially affected both by illegal fishing and farming problems). ii. For farms (if applicable) check provenience from purse-seines which have a high probability of illegal catch back on the source farming process. Check farm compliance status on the ICCAT website. [Note: EC members will be especially reluctant to reduce farming because they benefit doubly from domestic cages and through foreign investment in farms in other Mediterranean countries]. iii. What is the proportion of sourced product farmed / wild? f) Seasonality plays an important role as there is a strict calendar of closure seasons by fishing fleet and area in place (Table II appended); tracing back the sourced product to both the fishing gear and the date of capture and crossing these variables in a second step may provide high relevant information. 7. SFP: who we are, how we may help 6 /8

7 References EC, COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 43/2009 of 16 January 2009 fixing for 2009 the fishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Community waters and, for Community vessels, in waters where catch limitations are required. FishSource, Northern Bluefin Tuna (e Stock) profile. URL: ICCAT, 2008a. Report of the 2008 Atlantic bluefin tuna stock assessment session. Madrid, Spain June 23 to July 4, URL: ICCAT, 2008b Recommendation amending the recommendation by ICCAT to establish a multiannual recovery plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. 27 p. Documents_Recs_compendiopdfe_ e.pdf Webster D.G., Adaptive Governance. The dynamics of Atlantic fisheries management. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 391 p. 7 /8

8 Annexes Table I Northern bluefin tuna 2009 TAC share (absolute and in percentage from total) by member-state. Sources of the information: ICCAT, 2008b; EC, EU Member-state 2009 TAC % 2009 share (t) TAC EU affiliated Spain France Italy Portugal Malta Greece Cyprus EU Total (excluding bycatch) Non-EU Moroc Japan Tunisie Algerie Libya Turkey Croatia Korea Chinese Taipei China Albania Egypt Iceland Norway Syria Non-EU Total Table II Northern bluefin tuna: closed commercial fishing seasons in place. Source of the information: EC, Commercial fishing When prohibition set 1 Where for Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Large-scale longliners E Atlantic, Med. 1 Jun 31 Dec Purse seine E Atlantic, Med. 15 Apr 15 Jun Bait boats, trolling boats E Atlantic 15 Jun 15 Oct Pelagic trawlers E Atlantic 15 Jun 15 Oct 1 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 43/2009 of 16 January /8