66 Jones (1988) Scullard (1974). 68 Livy 10.28; Arr. Anab

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1 battle 417 interactions far broader than in the heavy infantry clashes of the hoplite era. Each troop type had its own strengths and weaknesses relative to other troop types, giving the interaction a rock, paper, scissors dimension for example, light infantry could generally outshoot light cavalry, but could be caught and ridden down by heavier cavalry unless they had their own heavy infantry in support. 66 In this part of the chapter, I will outline what we know or can surmise about this wide variety of tactical interactions, by considering each troop type in turn and how it fought its various possible opponents. 1. Exotic weapons This period of antiquity was the golden age of exotic weaponry going beyond the enduring matrix of heavy and light infantry and cavalry. Chariots, though now largely replaced by cavalry as the dominant mounted arm, still retained some battlefield role, especially the notorious scythed vehicles. The newly invented catapults, although designed primarily for siege warfare, also had some utility in the open field. But above all, this era was characterized by the rise and fall of the war elephant, which spread from its Indian roots and was adopted by all the major Mediterranean armies at one time or another between 350 and 150, before falling into disuse until its revival by Sasanid Persia over four centuries later. 67 I will discuss the tactical employment of each of these exotic instruments in turn. Two- or four-horse chariots continued to serve alongside cavalry in Indian, Punic and Gallic armies, but we have nothing comparable to Caesar s later eye-witness account of British chariot tactics (B Gall. 4.33) (fig. 13.2). The chariots in our period seem to have operated mainly in conjunction with friendly cavalry. At Sentinum, this worked, and a chariot counterattack was instrumental in routing the whole Roman left, but at the Hydaspes, Porus chariots got stuck in the mud and were countered by horse-archers whom they were too unwieldy to catch. 68 At the Crimisus the Punic chariots protected the deploying infantry from Timoleon s cavalry by threatening to break up their formation (Plut. Tim. 27), while in the later battle against Agathocles, both chariots and cavalry are said by Diodorus (20.12) to have launched an unusual frontal charge against the Greek infantry, being countered by missile fire and by the opening of gaps in the line. It appears that these traditional forms of war chariots added little to the combined arms mix once true cavalry were available, and it is hardly surprising that they died out over time. Slightly more enduring were the specialist four-horse scythed chariots employed on occasion by Achaemenid Persia, the Seleucids and later the 66 Jones (1988) Scullard (1974). 68 Livy 10.28; Arr. Anab

2 418 the hellenistic world and roman republic Figure 13.2 Gravestone from Padua showing a Celtic chariot with a double-hoop side, c. 300 bc. kingdom of Pontus. These were designed as expendable weapons to be deployed in front of the fighting line and intended to charge headlong into the enemy in order to break up their formations, with the drivers bailing out before contact. 69 However, they were almost universally unsuccessful, being defeated (as at Cunaxa and Arbela) by a combination of missile fire and the opening of lanes to allow them to pass harmlessly through the line. 70 Had the chariots been followed up immediately by more conventional troops then it might have been possible to exploit the temporary disruption, but as it was, any troops deployed in the vicinity were themselves vulnerable to these double-edged weapons getting out of hand. This happened at Magnesia, where the panic of the scythed chariots under a hail of missiles was instrumental in starting the rout of the entire Seleucid left (Livy ). The final indignity came at second Chaeronea, where Plutarch tells us (Sull. 18) that Sulla s men not only saw the vehicles off in short order but then laughed and clapped as if they were at the races, exhorting the enemy to Bring on more!. Catapults were a much more potent device, which changed the face of siege warfare through their impact on the attack and defence of cities. 69 Head (1982) Xen. An. 1.8; Arr. Anab

3 battle 419 Figure 13.3 Decadrachm minted in Babylon showing Alexander attacking Porus on an elephant. However, they were too unwieldy and immobile to be used more than very occasionally in field battles. Polyaenus (Strat. 2.38) records how Onomarchus beat Philip II by emplacing catapults overlooking a hillside up which he lured the Macedonians by a feigned retreat, but at third Mantinea, Philipoemen seems to have foiled the Spartan use of catapults at intervals in front of their line simply by launching a rapid attack (Polyb ). Catapults were more useful in static situations such as the defence of mountain passes, and one of the most inspired uses of them in the field was by Alexander at the Jaxartes, when he employed their superior range to drive the Saka horse-archers away from the opposite river bank, allowing his own men to cross and seize a bridgehead. 71 War elephants were much more potent battlefield weapons than either chariots or catapults, and they were present in one or both armies during over half of the major battles in this era (fig. 13.3). They were generally deployed in a single line in front of part or all of the army, with 50 to 100 feet between each beast. 72 This was the same location as the light infantry, and the two arms seem often to have worked closely together, with each elephant being guarded by around fifty light infantrymen. 73 However, there 71 Marsden (1969) Arr. Anab. 5.15; Polyaenus, Strat Bar-Kochva (1976) 82.

4 420 the hellenistic world and roman republic was no question of deployed elephants withdrawing through the main line as unaccompanied skirmishers did, so armies instead sometimes placed them initially in reserve just behind the fighting line, as seems to have happened at Asculum and Magnesia. 74 If both sides had elephants, as at Paraetacene and Gabiene, they seem to have rather cancelled each other out, leaving the battle to be decided by other arms. 75 We know most about duels between opposing elephants from Polybius account of Raphia ( ), where Ptolemy s African elephants (the small forest variety) were easily defeated by the larger and more numerous Indian elephants on Antiochus side. 76 However, this did not prevent Ptolemy s right-wing cavalry from seeing off their counterparts, by the simple expedient of riding round the flank of their own intimidated pachyderms and charging the enemy horsemen in flank and rear. It was when elephants did not face enemy pachyderms and fought directly against infantry or cavalry that they tended to have the greatest impact, one way or the other, on the wider battle. They were at their best against enemy cavalry, because they could make horses which were unaccustomed to them unmanageable with fright. This helped to protect the Indian forces at the Hydaspes from Alexander s horsemen, and it was the decisive factor at Ipsus when a screen of hundreds of elephants shuffled along to block every effort by Demetrius victorious cavalry to return to the battlefield and save his father. 77 Even smaller numbers of beasts could be decisive in appropriate circumstances. Pyrrhus twenty elephants finally won the battle at Heraclea by routing the Roman horsemen, and Antiochus I used just sixteen pachyderms to panic the Galatian cavalry and chariots and win his so-called Elephant victory. 78 However, cavalry were not always so intimidated, and they might even be able to assail elephants with missile fire, as at Paraetacene and Zama. 79 Against infantry, the honours were more even. Sometimes, as at the Hydaspes and the Metaurus, the elephants became embroiled in a drawnout infantry slogging match. 80 On other occasions, as at Cynoscephalae and Pydna, the presence of elephants at the spearhead of an infantry attack helped put the enemy infantry quickly to flight (Livy 33.9, 44.41). Exactly how elephants and supporting heavy infantry worked together in combat is something of an enigma. We know from the defeat of Regulus that the elephant line usually remained out in front of the heavy infantry, since Polybius (1.34) says that some Romans were able to fight their way past the beasts and regroup, only to be cut to pieces by the unbroken Punic spearmen. When Antiochus at Magnesia adopted a more integrated deployment 74 Garoufalias (1979) 91 2; Bar-Kochva (1976) Devine (1985a), (1985b). 76 Scullard (1974) Devine (1987); Bar-Kochva (1976) ch Scullard (1974) 103 5, Diod. Sic ; Polyb Arr. Anab ; Polyb

5 battle 421 with elephants in the gaps between brigades of the phalanx, this proved disastrous, as missile fire panicked the beasts, breaking up the infantry formation (App. Syr ). However, it is hard to see how a separate forward line, even of dozens of elephants, could physically defeat upwards of 10,000 enemy heavy infantry. Perhaps part of the explanation is that the vanquished tended to over-emphasize the role of the elephants, since it provided a better excuse for their defeat than more mundane factors such as Pyrrhus generalship or Xanthippus 8:1 cavalry superiority. In fact, it was perfectly possible for determined infantry to see off elephants as happened at Gaza and Zama, and to turn them against their own side. 81 The key lay not in exotic counter-measures like the Roman antielephant wagons at Asculum or Perseus anti-elephant corps with spiked shields and helmets (though burning pigs did allegedly discomfit the pachyderms of Antigonus Gonatas). 82 It was more a matter of avoiding the charges of the beasts (as with the lanes left between the maniples at Zama) and using light infantry to deluge them with missiles and to attack them from the flanks (Polyb ). Even cheers and trumpet calls might be effective against ill-trained pachyderms, and sometimes (as at Gabiene and Beneventum) it only took the death or wounding of one elephant to panic the rest. 83 Thereafter, the same trade-off arose as with scythed chariots the closer that supporting troops were deployed, the more vulnerable they themselves were to the beasts getting out of hand. The self-destruct system of mallet and spike employed by Hasdrubal at the Metaurus (if the mahouts remained alive to implement it) does not seem to have been in general use, and elephants often caused as much harm to their own side as they did to the enemy. 84 Despite all the lurid tales of the physical damage done by exotic weapons, their primary impact seems to have been psychological. There were usually too few of them to cause widespread direct devastation, and the sources lay great stress on the terrifying sights, sounds and smells which they created. (Perseus even apparently attempted to immunize his horses against these effects by hiding trumpeters inside dummy elephants coated in noxious paste.) 85 Troops themselves were not immune to the terror which these unfamiliar weapons could cause, as at Sentinum, where Livy (10.28) says that the din of the hooves and wheels of the Celtic chariots triggered blind panic among men and horses alike. Unfortunately, not only did this unfamiliarity sooner or later wear off, but the elephants and chariot horses themselves proved just as vulnerable to panic when things went wrong. Hence, it is not surprising that these double-edged devices gradually fell into disuse in favour of more tried and trusted means of securing battlefield success. 81 Diod. Sic ; Polyb Scullard (1974) 107 9, , Diod. Sic ; Dion. Hal Livy Scullard (1974) 184.