Deterrents and Drivers of Poaching on Andros Island, Bahamas Ian Peterson, Andrew Klein, Reid Evans, and Monica Chen. Abstract

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1 Deterrents and Drivers of Poaching on Andros Island, Bahamas Ian Peterson, Andrew Klein, Reid Evans, and Monica Chen Abstract The illegal harvesting of natural resources is a major threat to animals and plants globally. With an ever-increasing human population, natural resources and the ecosystems on which they rely will continue to be overused. Countries around the world have enacted legislation to limit what is extracted from natural systems to make them profitable and sustainable. Public support is crucial for effective law enforcement and understanding the motivations of those who break these laws is essential for developing policies that encourage compliance. Introduction Breaking hunting or fishing regulations in the process of taking wildlife (also known as poaching) can have negative consequences for both wildlife and sportspersons. Poaching can threaten wildlife resources and wildlife related recreation for both consumptive and nonconsumptive wildlife users (Muth 1998, Sethi and Hilborn 2008). These adverse consequences make reducing poaching a priority for both wildlife conservation and law enforcement agencies (Beattie et al. 1977, Kahler and Gore, 2012). Emerging literature on poaching suggests both normative and traditional models explain rule-breaking (Hatcher et al. 2000, Kahler and Gore 2012). Four primary factors influence consumptive wildlife users decisions to comply with hunting and fishing regulations: perceived legitimacy of regulations, sanctions, enforcement and peer pressure. Under normative compliance theory, perceived legitimacy of regulations corresponds to one s level of compliance (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998). Higher trust in regulations and perceived legitimacy have been shown to explain higher voluntary compliance of regulations (Stern 2008). Voluntary compliance or ccompliance motivated by peer pressure ((Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Nielsen

2 2003) is particularly important in contexts where inadequate resources are available for credible law enforcement because sanctions imposed on rule-breakers are not available to deter poaching activities (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998). Despite the various laws that governments around the world have implemented, poaching still poses a problem. Previous studies have found poachers tend to be motivated by commercial gain, household consumption, recreational satisfaction, trophy poaching, thrill killing, protection of self and property, poaching as rebellion, poaching as traditional right or use, disagreement with specific regulations, and gamesmanship. Others are motivated by the ease of poaching due to little to no regulation of the law while others are simply unaware of the law (Muth and Bowe 1998, Senko et al. 2011, Reyes et al. 2009, Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland 1993). Given the variety of motivations and the importance of each motivation for the individual, poaching continues to be a prevalent threat to biodiversity (Bassett 2005). Understanding the drivers and deterrents associated with poaching is perhaps most important in biodiversity hotspots, such as the Bahamas, with exceptional concentrations of endemic species and experiencing exceptional loss of habitat. Hotspots are of particular interest because of their endemic species, species found nowhere else on earth. The Caribbean, the Tropical Andes, Sundaland, Madagascar, and Brazil s Atlantic Forest comprise the top five leading hotspots. These areas contain endemic plants and animals that contribute to at least 2% of the world s total species world-wide. The Caribbean is of particular interest because its small area is home to 1,518 vertebrate species, 779 of which are endemic (Meyers 2000). Despite its ecological importance, the Bahamas is still subject to poaching activities. Poorly enforced natural resource extraction regulationshave contributed to the collapse of locally important resources (JICA and MAG , Catterson et al. 2004; FAO 2009). This study will address the critical need of evaluating potential drivers of poaching in the Carribean Hotspot with a case study focused Andros Island, The Bahamas. Specifically, we will conduct a qualitative study focusing on understanding the interrelated roles of perceived regulation legitimacy, perceptions of enforcement, sources of regulations (e.g., community versus government), knowledge of regulations, and contexts where residents believe it is acceptable to break regulations. We hope to determine how aware the Androsians are about harvesting regulations and what contributes to perceived legitimacy of harvesting regulations.

3 Methods We will interview between 40 and 70 adults who harvest natural resources on Andros using an open-ended interview guide (Appendix A). We will conduct a snowball sample of adult residents in rural communities on North Andros. The facilities manager at the research station where students stay (Ricardo) works with many local people who harvest lobster, conch, and grouper and will provide initial key contacts to students. Students will then ask respondents to recommend additional people to interview until the saturation occurs and the same people are repeatedly recommended. These communities (Red Bays, Stafford Creek, rural areas in between) are heavily dependent on harvesting natural resources for both food and income. Students will use a variant of the following script to recruit participants: We are studying what people know about harvesting regulations on Andros and what might make them work better for local communities and natural resource conservation. Then the student will give the potential participant the information sheet (Appendix B) and ask the potential respondent to participate in the study. All communications will be via word of mouth, either in person or via telephone, and interviews will be conducted in person. The interview will occur at a convenient place chosen by the subject, but researchers will ensure the location is private before conducting the interview. The qualitative open ended interview guide is attached in Appendix A. We will use in person interviews because likely subjects may not be able to communicate effectively in written form (e.g., web surveys). The PIs, TA, and 4 students who conduct the project will store all files on password protected computers. Students will analyze the text data using thematic analysis. The PI and students will synthesize analysis into a final report using qualitative data analysis software (NVIVO, and students will present the final report in an oral presentation. We will collect all data between July 6 th July 19 th. Potential Results Based off the results from previous studies, we expect the low risk of being caught, family needs, and the ease of selling illegally harvested goods on the black market to influence perceptions of regulation legietamcy and when locals believe it is justificed to break regulations (Reyes et al, 2009, Mancini 2011). Figure 1 provides a hypothetical thematic hierarchy that could result from our analysis.

4 Figure 1. Potential relationships associated with informant views on regulation legitimacy and when breaking regulations is justifiable. [This is from another study so you will need to make your own.] Implications of Findings Results from this study can highlight important patterns in how Androsians view the legitimacy of harvest regulations. Armed with an understanding of how social norms, trust in government, fear of sanctions, and reliance on resources for sustenance influence poaching, the Bahamas can design more effective regulations. Our results also highlight key principles for legitimate regulations that other regions facing biodiversity threats and limited law enforcement budgets can use. Perhaps most importantly, our qualitative research design will allow us to answer unanticipated questions about illegal natural resource harvesting (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). Because so little is known about this spoical phenomenon, open ended qualitative research allows us to develop an understanding of the phenomenon in the absence of well formed hypotheses in the subject area.

5 Appendix A: Interview Guide 1. Do you harvest wild foods? (probes: fish, game, plants) a. Why? (probes: survival, money, food, fun, family, culture, tradition) b. How important are these activities to you? (probe: explain how it matters [percent of income or food or length of history) Please list the species you harvest (wildlife, fish, other [e.g., berries, sponges, nuts]) Please list any harvesting rules that you know relate to these species (note these can be from both informal community rules and government rules) Please describe who made the rules (e.g., family, neighbors, governments) How do you feel about these rules? (Legitimate or not, why, etc.) Please describe any contexts where it s okay to break this rule What happens when people break this rule?

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7 Appendix B. Participant information sheet Title of Study: Evaluating perceptions of illegal natural resource harvesting on Andros, Bahamas: A service learning project This form is valid from July 1, 2013 through July 1, 2014 Principal Investigator M. Nils Peterson Associate Professor, NCSU nils_peterson@ncsu.edu Dear Participant: We are asking you to participate in a study about how local people view natural resource harvesting regulations on Andros. This research is part of a service learning project in a Conservation Biology in the Bahamas class at NC State University. In this type of class, the students learn valuable research skills while helping address research needs. This project is important because it will provide information needed to make harvesting regulations that are seen as more socially legitimate. Participation in this study is voluntary and there is no penalty for declining to participate. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time. We are interested in your knowledge about harvesting regulations. The student conducing the interview will not collect or record any personal information about you. After the study is complete, we would be happy to share our findings with you, but we will have no record of your identity, so you will need to ask for the information using the address provided at the beginning of this sheet (nils_peterson@ncsu.edu). If at any point you feel your rights have been violated by this study, please contact the Deb Paxton with the Institutional Review Board at NCSU at , debra_paxton@ncsu.edu.

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