URBAN LAND INSTITUTE

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1 URBAN LAND INSTITUTE 2012 ULI FALL MEETING (Denver, 18 October 2012) The Global Economic Outlook Dark clouds on the horizon Andrea Boltho Magdalen College University of Oxford Oxford Economics and REAG

2 CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON Rising food and oil prices? Unpredictable A Chinese hard landing? Rather unlikely A US fiscal policy disaster? Improbable A Euro breakdown? Unfortunately possible

3 STOCK MARKETS (1 June 2007 = 100) 100 S&P FTSE EuroStoxx Nikkei

4 COMMODITY PRICES (January 2006 = 100; in dollars) Food commds. 200 Oil

5 60 CHINA'S PMI INDICES (3 months moving averages) GOVERNMENT DEBT/GDP RATIOS Official 100 United States Eurozone Private (HSBC) China

6 105 CHINA - HOUSE PRICES* (2010 = 100) * In real terms.

7 110 CONSUMER CONFIDENCE (3 months moving averages) PMI INDICES (3 months moving averages) United States 90 Eurozone (r.h.scale) Eurozone United States (l.h.sc.)

8 US AND EUROZONE HOUSEHOLD DEBT/GDP RATIOS 150 US AND EUROZONE CORPORATE* DEBT/GDP RATIOS 100 United States Eurozone Eurozone United States * Non-financial corporations.

9 GROWTH IN LENDING TO THE BUSINESS SECTOR (per cent changes; 3 mnths. mov.avrgs.) 20 United States Eurozone

10 US - HOUSE PRICES* (2000 = 100) EUROZONE - HOUSE PRICES* (1980 = 100) trend line (1.5% p.a.) * trend line (0.35% p.a.) *BIS ( ); OFHEO ( ); Schiller-Case ( ). In real terms. * Jan.-July *In real terms. * 1st half *

11 EUROPE - A NEW RECESSION? 4 (GDP; per cent changes; 3 qtrs. mv. avrgs.) United States 2 0 Eurozone Source: Oxford Economics.

12 RECESSION AND RECOVERY 107 (GDP; levels; 2007 Q1 = 100) Sweden Germany 102 USA Euro Zone U.K. Japan 97 Italy

13 THE EUROZONE'S PROBLEMS The immediate problem is one of deficits and debt in a number of Southern countries. These are seen as excessive by financial markets The medium-run problem is one of insufficient competitiveness in a number of, again, Southern countries And there could be an even longer-run problem that has to do with different and diverging governance standards between Northern and Southern Europe

14 GOVERNMENT DEBT/GDP RATIOS GOVERNMENT DEBT/GDP RATIOS 180 Greece Italy Netherlands Belgium 100 Ireland 80 Austria 80 Portugal 60 Germany 60 Spain 40 Finland

15 HOW TO DEAL WITH EXCESSIVE DEFICITS AND DEBT? The easiest way to eliminate both is to have growth and inflation. Unfortunately, neither are forthcoming The standard answer is, therefore, to enforce austerity: cut public expenditure and raise taxation The problem with this medicine is that it depresses economic activity: as a ratio to GDP deficits and debt either do not decline or they may even increase

16 REDUCTIONS IN PUBLIC DEBT (in percentage points of GDP) USA ( ) UK ( ) Total reduction due to: Fiscal policy Growth Inflation Source: W.Buiter.

17 4 GREEK AND EUROZONE GDP GROWTH (per cent changes; 3 years mov. avrgs.) Greece GREECE'S PUBLIC DEFICIT AND DEBT (in per cent of GDP) Debt (r.h.sc.) Eurozone 10 5 Includes significant "hair cut"* in Deficit (l.h.sc.)

18 WHAT ELSE CAN GREECE DO? Leaving the euro seems, by now, to be a distinct possibility The hope would be to replicate Argentina's experience... but Argentina's conditions at the time were very different from Greece's conditions today - hence huge risks In either case, if Greece leaves there is a high danger of contagion

19 GREECE AND ARGENTINA (GDP; levels; 2011 Q1 or 2000 Q1 = 100) 110 Argentina ( ) * Greece in EMU ( ) * Argentina's devaluation: January 2002.

20 CAN THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK PREVENT CONTAGION? Yes in theory, since the ECB can print money and buy public sector debt (it has unlimited firing power) The recently announced OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions) programme goes in this direction But many in Germany (and elsewhere) are opposed to this. Why? Two major reasons: i) Fear of future inflation ii) Fear of future indiscipline and profligacy in the weaker countries

21 ITALY AND SPAIN - BOND YIELD DIFFERENTIALS* : Draghi's "Whatever it takes" 6 Spain- Germ : OMT Announcem. 5 Italy- Germ. 4 3 June July August September Oct. * Difference between yields on 10 year Spanish or Italian Euro bonds and equivalent German 10 year Eurobonds.

22 2,600 U.S. - MONETARY BASE AND INFLATION Monetary base ($ bill.) 6 5 2,300 2,000 Inflation (% ch.; r.h.sc.) 4 3 1, , , August 2008: 843 bn August 2012: 2,653 bn

23 WHAT HAPPENS IF CONTAGION SPREADS? Severe consequences in the short-run (and not just in the Eurozone) One possible scenario would be for Southern Europe to return to separate currencies, while Northern Europe retains the Euro Introducing new currencies is difficult. Banks and financial markets may have to be closed; deposits might have to be frozen; capital control would seem inevitable; currencies would swing wildly (with the Northern Euro rising sharply); contracts would have to be renegotiated, etc., etc. The economic costs of this could be huge and the turmoil could well last for at least two-three years

24 EMU BREAKDOWN (GDP; per cent changes; 3 qtrs. mv. avrgs.) 4 Central scenario United States 2 Euro zone EMU breakdown

25 US - MAJOR EXPORT MARKETS 2011 $ bn. in % of total World Canada Mexico Euro Z. 197* 13.3 China Japan * Or 1.5 per cent of US GDP.

26 GROWTH OF EARNINGS (1999 Q.1 = 100) Spain PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH (GDP per employee; 1999 Q.1 = 100) Germany 140 Italy 110 France France Italy Spain Germany

27 TOTAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES (1999 Q.1 = 100) Italy Spain 115 France Germany Source: IMF. United States

28 EUROZONE CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES (in per cent of GDP) 6 "North"* "South"** * Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland. ** Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal.

29 WHO WILL FINANCE ALL THESE DEFICITS? Any deficit must be financed In existing monetary unions the deficits of uncompetitive areas either do not persist, because wages decline (e.g. in the US) or, if they persist, they are financed by the country's richer regions (e.g. in Italy, or in Spain, or in Belgium, etc.). No such mechanism exists in the Eurozone and public opinion in the richer countries is hardly likely to favour one! In its absence, either the "weak" regions/ countries improve their competitiveness, or they are condemned to low growth/ high unemployment

30 30 EMU - NORTH-SOUTH CONVERGENCE ESTIMATES OF SIZE OF SHADOW ECONOMY (in per cent of GDP) USA EZ Nth.EZ Sth. Source: F.Schneider.

31 30 EMU - NORTH-SOUTH CONVERGENCE ESTIMATES OF SIZE OF SHADOW ECONOMY (in per cent of GDP) USA EZ Nth.EZ Sth. Source: F.Schneider. USA EZ Nth.EZ Sth.

32 6 EMU - NORTH-SOUTH CONVERGENCE PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION USA EZ Nth. EZ Sth. USA EZ Nth. EZ Sth. Source: Transparency International.

33 GOVERNANCE STANDARDS PRESENCE OF THE RULE OF LAW (deviations from international average) USA EZ Nth.EZ Sth. USA EZ Nth.EZ Sth. Source: World Bank.