PL estimation acc. to EN ISO
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1 PL estimation acc. to EN ISO Example calculation for an application MAC Safety / Armin Wenigenrath, January 2007
2 Select the suitable standard for your application Reminder: The standards and the technologies Technology implementing the safety EN ISO related control function(s) A Non electrical, e.g. hydraulics X B Electromechanical, e.g. relays, Restricted to designated architectures (see Note ) and or non complex electronics up to PL=e C Complex electronics, e.g. programmable Restricted to designated architectures (see Note ) and up to PL=d D A combined with B Restricted to designated architectures (see Note ) and up to PL=e E C combined with B Restricted to designated architectures (see Note ) and up to PL=d F C combined with A, or X see Note 2 C combined with A and B "X" indicates that this item is dealt with by this standard. EN IEC 6206 Not covered All architectures and up to SIL 3 All architectures and up to SIL 3 X see Note 3 All architectures and up to SIL 3 X see Note 3 NOTE Designated architectures are defined in Annex B of EN ISO to give a simplified approach for quantification of performance level. NOTE 2 For complex electronics: Use of designated architectures according to EN ISO up to PL=d or any architecture according to EN IEC NOTE 3 For non-electrical technology use parts according to EN ISO as subsystems. Table MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 2
3 The 6 Steps to Safety with EN ISO STEP : Risk Assessment and basic structure of Safety-Related Parts of a Control System (SRP/CS) implementing a Safety Function STEP 2: Determine the required Performance Level PL r for the safety function. STEP 3: Identify the combination of safety-related parts which carry out the safety function. STEP 4: Evaluate the Performance Level PL for the all safety-related parts. STEP 5: Verify that the PL of the SRP/CS for the safety function is greater or equal to the PL r. STEP 6: Validate that all requirements are met. MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 3
4 STEP: Risk Assessment and basic structure of the safety chain We will take as example the Safety Function which will disconnect a motor when the Safety Guard is open. From the Risk Assessment (see Annex ) we got the safety requirements for this structure. It needs to achieve the PL e in order to provide the necessary risk reduction (see Annex 2). The diagram shows the combination of safety-related parts of control systems processing a typical safety function: SRP/CS PL r = e Initiation event i ab SRP/CS a SRP/CS b SRP/CS c i bc Machine actuator e.g. Motor brakes INPUT LOGIC OUTPUT A Safety Function may be implemented by one ore more Safety-Related Parts of a Control System (SRP/CS) and several safety functions may share one ore more SRP/CS, e.g.: Input (SRP/CS a ) Logic / processing (SRP/CS b ) Output / power control elements (SRP/CS c ) Interconnecting means (i ab, i bc ) MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 4
5 STEP 2: Determine the required Performance Level In this example the Safety Function is the disconnection of a motor when the safety guard is open. Without the guard the possible harm is to loose an arm: Required Performance Level (PLr) P F P2 S Starting point for the evaluation of P the contribution to the risk reduction F2 of a safety function P2 P F P2 S2 P F2 P2 S = Severity of injury S = Slight (normally reversible injury) S2 = Serious (normally irreversible) injury including death a b c d e Low contribution to risk reduction High contribution to risk reduction F = Frequency and/or exposure time to the hazard F = Seldom to less often and/or the exposure time is short F2 = Frequent to continuous and/or the exposure time is long P = Possibility of avoiding the hazard or limiting the harm P = Possible under specific conditions P2 = Scarcely possible With the answers for S2, F2 and P2 the graph leads to a required performance level of PL r = e. MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 5
6 STEP 3: Identify the safety-related parts All parts which carry out to the safety function must be identified; in our example we use a redundant structure with 2 inputs, 2 logic channels and 2 outputs switching the power. Each block in the diagram represents one hardware device implementing the safety function: I L O I2 L2 O2 INPUT Interlocking Switch SW Interlocking Switch 2 SW2 LOGIC Safety Module XPS OUTPUT Contactor CON Contactor 2 CON2 SRP/CS a SRP/CS b SRP/CS c In this example the two channels provide redundancy, the Safety Module provides the logic solving and diagnostics for both channels; both channels of the SRP/CS are equal. MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 6
7 STEP 4: Evaluate the Performance Level PL For each selected SRP/CS and/or for the combination of SRP/CS that performs the safety function the estimation of PL shall be done. The PL of the SRP/CS shall be determined by the estimation of the following parameters: (see Annex 2): The CATEGORY (structure) (see Clause 6 of EN ISO 3849-) The d for the single components (see Annex C, D of EN ISO 3849-) The DC (see Annex E of EN ISO 3849-) The CCF (see score table in Annex F of EN ISO 3849-) (If the PLs of all SRP/CS in the combination are known you can estimate the overall PL according to Annex 4.) MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 7
8 STEP 4: Evaluate the Performance Level PL 4. Category, d, DC and CCF From the safety related block diagram we know the category 4 structure, the channels and the safety-related parts in each channel: SW CON XPS SW2 CON2 From the catalogue of the supplier we get the values of d or B 0 for the selected devices: Example SRP/CS B 0 (operations) d (years) DC Interlocking Switches SW, SW % Safety Module XPS (here XPSAK) 72,2 99% Contactors CON, CON % Table 2a The DC values we take from the Table E. in Annex E of EN ISO The measures against CCF must be checked using the Table F. in Annex F of EN ISO The score for the example achieves 80 points which is OK. MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 8
9 STEP 4: Evaluate the Performance Level PL 4.2 The d of single components With the formulae from Annex 4 we calculate the d for the interlocking switches and the contactors. The operation of the example machine is notified with the following data: the mean time between two cycles is 90s, the machine is used on 220 days per year, and 8 hours per day so that n op = operations per year. (see Annex 4) d = B 0d / (0, n op ), with B 0d = 2 B 0 Example SRP/CS B 0 (operations) d (years) DC Interlocking Switches SW, SW % Safety Module XPS (XPSAK) 72,2 99% Contactors CON, CON % Table 2b The d values in blue are depending on the number of annual operations in the application; that s why the supplier can only provide the B 0 or B 0d values for the life time. MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 9
10 STEP 4: Evaluate the Performance Level PL 4.3 The d of each channel With the formula for the parts count method we calculate the d for the channels: d = ~ N i= di SW d = 2840y SW2 d = 2840y XPS d =72,2y CON d = 284y CON2 d = 284y Channel Channel 2 dc = dc2 = dsw,2 + dxps + dcon,2 dc,2 = 2840 years + 72,2 years years = 56,4 years The d for each channel in the example is 56,4 years, which is high according to Table in Annex 2. MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 0
11 STEP 4: Evaluate the Performance Level PL 4.4 The average DC (DC avg ) The diagnostic coverage is defined as the ratio between the detected dangerous failure rate and the failure rate of the total dangerous failures. According to this definition an average diagnostic coverage DC avg is estimated with the following formula: DC avg = DC d d DC2 + + d2 d2 DCN dn dn For our example we get: 0,99 0,99 0, ,2 284 DC avg = = 99% ,2 284 SW d = 2840y DC = 99% SW2 d = 2840y DC=99% DC=99% CON d = 284y DC = 99% CON2 d = 284y DC=99% The DC avg in the example is 99%, which is high according to Table 2 in Annex 2. XPS d =72,2y Channel Channel 2 MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN
12 STEP 5: Verify the achieved PL We put the data for the example SRP/CS with d = high, DC avg = 99% and category 4 in the graph below in order to find the achieved performance level for our safety function: a Performance Level b c d 2 Safety Integrity Level e 3 Cat. B DC avg = none Cat. DC avg = none Cat. 2 DC avg = low Cat. 2 DC avg = medium Cat. 3 DC avg = low Cat. 3 DC avg = medium Cat. 4 DC avg = high d of each channel = low d of each channel = medium d of each channel = high The graph shows that the achieved PL = e. MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 2
13 STEP 6: Validation The design of the SRP/CS shall be validated. The validation shall demonstrate that the combination of SRP/CSs providing each safety function meet all the relevant requirements of the EN ISO The details of validation can be found in EN ISO MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 3
14 Annex : Risk Graph The EN ISO refers to the ISO 42 (EN 050) regarding the Risk Assessment. The safety requirements for a control system contributing to the reduction of risk can be determined with the risk graph from the Annex A of EN ISO 3849-: Required Performance Level (PLr) P F P2 S Starting point for the evaluation of P he contribution to the risk reduction F2 of a safety function P2 P F P2 S2 P F2 P2 S = Severity of injury S = Slight (normally reversible injury) S2 = Serious (normally irreversible) injury including death F = Frequency and/or exposure time to the hazard F = Seldom to less often and/or the exposure time is short F2 = Frequent to continuous and/or the exposure time is long P =Possibility of avoiding the hazard or limiting the harm P = Possible under specific conditions P2 = Scarcely possible a b c d e Low contribution to risk reduction High contribution to risk reduction MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 4
15 Annex 2: Category, structure and behavior Category B When a fault occurs it can lead to the loss of the safety function i m i m Input Logic Output Category Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 When a fault occurs it can lead to the loss of the safety function, but the d of each channel in category is higher than in category B. Consequently the loss of the safety function is less likely. Category 2 system behavior allows that: the occurrence of a fault it can lead to the loss of the safety function between the checks; the loss of the safety function is detected by the check. SRP/CS to category 3 shall be designed so that a single fault in any of these safety-related parts does not lead to the loss of the safety function. Whenever reasonably possible the single fault shall be detected at or before the next demand upon the safety function. SRP/CS to category 4 shall be designed so that a single fault in any of these safety-related parts does not lead to the loss of the safety function, and the single fault is detected at or before the next demand upon the safety functions, e.g. immediately, at switch on, at end of a machine operation cycle. If this detection is not possible an accumulation of undetected faults shall not lead to the loss of the safety function. i m Input Logic Output i m i m i m Input Logic Output i Test m Test equipment output m i m Input Logic i m Output cross monitoring m i m Input 2 Logic 2 i m Output 2 m i m Input Logic i m Output cross monitoring m i m Input 2 Logic 2 i m Output 2 MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 5
16 Annex 2: Mean Time to dangerous Failure ( d ) The value of d of each channel is given in three levels and shall be taken into account for each channel (e.g. single channel, each channel of a redundant system) individually. Denotation of mean time to dangerous failure low medium high Range of d 3 years d < 0 years 0 years d < 30 years 30 years d < 00 years Table For the estimation of d of a component the hierarchical procedure to find data shall be:. use manufactures data; 2. use methods of Annexes C and D of EN ISO 3849-; 3. choose 0 years. MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 6
17 Annex 2: Diagnostic Coverage (DC) The value of the diagnostic coverage (DC) is given in four levels: Denotation of diagnostic coverage Table 2 Range of DC none DC < 60% low 60% DC < 90% medium 90% DC < 99% high 99% DC For the estimation of DC in most cases, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or similar methods can be used. Examples of DC for functions and modules can be found in Annexes E of EN ISO MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 7
18 Annex 2: Common Cause Failure (CCF) The common cause failures (CCF) should also be taken into account (see Annex F of EN ISO 3849-). In Category B and the common cause failures (CCF) are not relevant. Examples of measures against CCF: separation diversity prevention of contamination and electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 8
19 Annex 3: d calculation for components from the B 0 For the electromechanical, mechanical, pneumatic or hydraulic devices normally the supplier should provide the d or the B 0d values (mean number of cycles until ten percent of the components fail dangerously). Where this data is not available the calculation of the d from the B 0 may be necessary: If the dangerous fraction of B 0 is not given 50% of B 0 may be used, so B 0d = 2 B 0 is recommended. With B 0d and the mean number of annual operations (n op ) the d for components can be calculated as: d = B 0d / (0, n op ). n op can be calculated as: n op = (d op h op 3600s/h) / t cycle, where d op = mean operation days per year, h op = mean operation per hours per day, t cycle = mean time between the beginning of two successive cycles MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 9
20 Annex 4: The overall PL for a combination of SRP/CS If the PLs of each SRP/CS in a combination is known, the new complex calculation of the overall performance level achieved can be avoided. For a serial alignment of SR/CS the following estimations are presented: Example: SRP/CS PL = d SRP/CS 2 PL 2 = e SRP/CS 3 PL 3 = d. Identify the lowest PL, this PL low PL low =d 2. Identify the number N low N of SRP/CS with PL low N low =2 3. Look-up PL in the following table: PL = d PL low N low PL a > 3 No, not allowed 3 a b > 2 a 2 b c > 2 b 2 c d > 3 c 3 d e > 3 d 3 e MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 20
21 Glossary Safety-Related Parts of Control Systems (SRP/CS) A part of a control system that responds to input signals and generates safety-related output signals. Category The classification of safety-related parts of a control, respective their resistance against faults and their behaviour in the fault condition, which is achieved by the structural arrangement of the parts, fault detection and/or by their reliability. Performance Level (PL) The ability of safety-related parts to perform a safety function under foreseeable conditions (which should be taken into account) to fulfil the expected risk reduction. The performance level is indicated in five possible discrete levels from a to e according to Table. Safety Integrity Level (SIL) One of three possible discrete levels for specifying the safety integrity requirements to be allocated to the safety-related electrical control system (SRECS), where the SIL 3 has the highest level of safety integrity for machinery and SIL the lowest. Mean Time To dangerous Failure ( d ) Expectation of the mean time to dangerous failure. Diagnostic Coverage (DC) The DC is a measure for the effectivity of diagnostics, may be determined as the ratio between the rate of the detected dangerous failures (λ DD ) and the rate of total dangerous failures (λ D ): DC = Σλ DD / Σλ Dtotal Common Cause Failure (CCF) The CCF-factor b is a measure for a failure, which is the result of one or more events causing coincident failure of two or more separate channels in a multiple channel (redundant architecture) subsystem, leading to failure of a safety function. MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 2
22 Glossary Risk Combination of the probability of the occurrence of a harm and severity of that harm. Risk assessment Overall process comprising of risk analysis and risk evaluation. Risk analysis Combination of the specification of the limits of the machine, hazard identification and risk estimation. Risk evaluation Judgment, on the basis of risk analysis, of whether risk reduction objectives have been achieved. Low Complexity Component component in which failure modes are well-defined, and the behavior under fault conditions can be completely defined Complex Component component in which failure modes are not well-defined, or the behavior under fault conditions cannot be completely defined MAC A.Wenigenrath JAN EN 22
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