Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis
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1 Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis Project: Variable area flow meter RAMC Customer: Rota Yokogawa GmbH & Co. KG Wehr Germany Contract No.: Rota Yokogawa 05/04-20 Report No.: Rota Yokogawa 05/04-20 R001 Version V1, Revision R1.0, November 2005 Stephan Aschenbrenner The document was prepared using best effort. The authors make no warranty of any kind and shall not be liable in any event for incidental or consequential damages in connection with the application of the document. All rights on the format of this technical report reserved.
2 Management summary This report summarizes the results of the hardware assessment carried out on the variable area flow meter RAMC. Table 1 gives an overview of the considered versions of the variable area flow meter RAMC. The hardware assessment consists of a Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostics Analysis (FMEDA). A FMEDA is one of the steps taken to achieve functional safety assessment of a device per IEC From the FMEDA, failure rates are determined and consequently the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) is calculated for the device. For full assessment purposes all requirements of IEC must be considered. Table 1: Version overview Version Description [V1] RAMC with inductive limit switches [V2] RAMC with ma output; software version F2.30 (without HART) and F3.00 (HART) For safety applications only the above described outputs were considered. All other possible output variants or electronics are not covered by this report. The local indicator is not part of the considered safety function. The failure rates used in this analysis are the basic failure rates from the Siemens standard SN Rota Yokogawa and exida together did a quantitative analysis of the mechanical parts of the variable area flow meter RAMC to calculate the mechanical failure rates using different failure rate databases ([N5], [N6], [N7] and exida s experienced-based data compilation) for the different mechanical components (see [R1] and [R2]). The results of the quantitative analysis are included in the calculations described in section 5.1 and 5.2. According to table 2 of IEC the average PFD for systems operating in low demand mode has to be 10-2 to < 10-1 for SIL 1 safety functions and 10-3 to < 10-2 for SIL 2 safety functions. However, as the modules under consideration are only one part of an entire safety function they should not claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. they should be better than or equal to 3,50E-02 for SIL 1 or 3,50E-03 for SIL 2 respectively. The variable area flow meter RAMC with inductive limit switches is considered to be a Type A 1 component with a hardware fault tolerance of 0 ([V1]). For Type A components the SFF has to be 60% to < 90% according to table 2 of IEC for SIL 2 (sub-) systems with a hardware fault tolerance of 0. The variable area flow meter RAMC with ma output is considered to be a Type B 2 component with a hardware fault tolerance of 0 ([V2]). Type B components with a SFF of 60% to < 90% must have a hardware fault tolerance of 1 according to table 3 of IEC for SIL 2 (sub-) systems. The following tables show how the above stated requirements are fulfilled based on the different applications. 1 Type A component: Non-complex component (all failure modes are well defined); for details see of IEC Type B component: Complex component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see of IEC Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 2 of 4
3 Table 2: Summary for RAMC with inductive limit switches Failure rates λ sd λ su 3 λ dd λ du SFF DC S 4 DC D 4 0 FIT 101 FIT 10 FIT 56 FIT 66% 0% 15% Table 3: Summary for RAMC with inductive limit switches PFD AVG values T[Proof] = 1 year T[Proof] = 5 years T[Proof] = 10 years PFD AVG = 2,46E-04 PFD AVG = 1,23E-03 PFD AVG = 2,45E-03 The boxes marked in green ( ) mean that the calculated PFD AVG values are within the allowed range for SIL 2 according to table 2 of IEC and do fulfill the requirement to not claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 3,50E-03. Because the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) is above 60%, also the architectural constraints requirements of table 2 of IEC for Type A subsystems with a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) of 0 are fulfilled. Table 4: Summary for RAMC with ma output Failure rates Failure category Failure rates (in FIT) Fail Dangerous Detected 234 Fail detected (internal diagnostics or indirectly 5 ) 167 Fail low (detected by the logic solver) 13 Fail High (detected by the logic solver) 54 Fail Dangerous Undetected 187 No Effect 59 Annunciation Undetected 1 Not part 84 Table 5: Summary for RAMC with ma output IEC failure rates λ sd λ 3 su λ dd λ du SFF DC 4 S DC 4 D 0 FIT 60 FIT 234 FIT 187 FIT 61% 0% 55% Table 6: Summary for RAMC with ma output PFD AVG values T[Proof] = 1 year T[Proof] = 5 years T[Proof] = 10 years PFD AVG = 8,17E-04 PFD AVG = 4,08E-03 PFD AVG = 8,13E-03 3 Note that the SU category includes failures that do not cause a spurious trip 4 DC means the diagnostic coverage (safe or dangerous). 5 indirectly means that these failure are not necessarily detected by diagnostics but lead to either fail low or fail high failures depending on the device setting and are therefore detectable. Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 3 of 4
4 The boxes marked in green ( ) mean that the calculated PFD AVG values are within the allowed range for SIL 1 according to table 2 of IEC and do fulfill the requirement to not claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 3,50E-02. Because the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) is above 60%, also the architectural constraints requirements of table 3 of IEC for Type B subsystems with a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) of 0 are fulfilled. The failure rates listed above do not include failures resulting from incorrect use of the variable area flow meter RAMC, in particular humidity entering through incompletely closed housings or inadequate cable feeding through the inlets. The listed failure rates are valid for operating stress conditions typical of an industrial field environment similar to IEC class C (sheltered location) with an average temperature over a long period of time of 40ºC. For a higher average temperature of 60 C, the failure rates should be multiplied with an experience based factor of 2,5. A similar multiplier should be used if frequent temperature fluctuation must be assumed. A user of the variable area flow meter RAMC can utilize these failure rates in a probabilistic model of a safety instrumented function (SIF) to determine suitability in part for safety instrumented system (SIS) usage in a particular safety integrity level (SIL). A full table of failure rates is presented in sections 5.1 and 5.2 along with all assumptions. It is important to realize that the no effect failures are included in the safe undetected failure category according to IEC Note that these failures on its own will not affect system reliability or safety, and should not be included in spurious trip calculations. The failure rates are valid for the useful life of the variable area flow meter RAMC, which is estimated to be between 8 to 12 years (see Appendix 2). Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 4 of 4
5 Table of Contents Management summary Purpose and Scope Project management exida.com Roles of the parties involved Standards / Literature used Reference documents Documentation provided by the customer Documentation generated by exida.com Description of the analyzed module Principle of measurement Principle of operation Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis Description of the failure categories Methodology FMEDA, Failure rates FMEDA Failure rates Assumptions Results of the assessment Variable area flow meter RAMC with inductive limit switches Variable area flow meter RAMC with ma output Terms and Definitions Status of the document Liability Releases Release Signatures...21 Appendix 1: Possibilities to reveal dangerous undetected faults during the proof test..22 Appendix 1.1: Possible proof tests to detect dangerous undetected faults...24 Appendix 2: Impact of lifetime of critical components on the failure rate...26 Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 5 of 26
6 1 Purpose and Scope Generally three options exist when doing an assessment of sensors, interfaces and/or final elements. Option 1: Hardware assessment according to IEC Option 1 is a hardware assessment by exida.com according to the relevant functional safety standard(s) like DIN V VDE 0801, IEC or EN The hardware assessment consists of a FMEDA to determine the fault behavior and the failure rates of the device, which are then used to calculate the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) and the average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD AVG ). This option for pre-existing hardware devices shall provide the safety instrumentation engineer with the required failure data as per IEC / IEC and does not include an assessment of the software development process Option 2: Hardware assessment with proven-in-use consideration according to IEC / IEC Option 2 is an assessment by exida.com according to the relevant functional safety standard(s) like DIN V VDE 0801, IEC or EN The hardware assessment consists of a FMEDA to determine the fault behavior and the failure rates of the device, which are then used to calculate the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) and the average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD AVG ). In addition this option consists of an assessment of the proven-in-use documentation of the device and its software including the modification process. This option for pre-existing programmable electronic devices shall provide the safety instrumentation engineer with the required failure data as per IEC / IEC and justify the reduced fault tolerance requirements of IEC for sensors, final elements and other PE field devices. Option 3: Full assessment according to IEC Option 3 is a full assessment by exida.com according to the relevant application standard(s) like IEC or EN 298 and the necessary functional safety standard(s) like DIN V VDE 0801, IEC or EN The full assessment extends option 1 by an assessment of all fault avoidance and fault control measures during hardware and software development. This option is most suitable for newly developed software based field devices and programmable controllers to demonstrate full compliance with IEC to the end-user. This assessment shall be done according to option 1. This document shall describe the results of the hardware assessment carried out on the variable area flow meter RAMC with software version F2.30 (without HART) and F3.00 (HART) for [V2]. It shall be assessed whether the described variable area flow meter RAMC meets the average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD AVG ) requirements and the architectural constraints for SIL 1 / SIL 2 sub-systems according to IEC It does not consider any calculations necessary for proving intrinsic safety. Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 6 of 26
7 2 Project management 2.1 exida.com exida.com is one of the world s leading knowledge companies specializing in automation system safety and availability with over 150 years of cumulative experience in functional safety. Founded by several of the world s top reliability and safety experts from assessment organizations like TUV and manufacturers, exida.com is a partnership with offices around the world. exida.com offers training, coaching, project oriented consulting services, internet based safety engineering tools, detail product assurance and certification analysis and a collection of on-line safety and reliability resources. exida.com maintains a comprehensive failure rate and failure mode database on process equipment. 2.2 Roles of the parties involved Rota Yokogawa GmbH & Co. KG Manufacturer of the considered variable area flow meter RAMC. exida.com Performed the hardware assessment according to option 1 (see section 1). Rota Yokogawa GmbH & Co. KG contracted exida.com in July 2005 with the FMEDA and PFD AVG calculation of the above mentioned device. 2.3 Standards / Literature used The services delivered by exida.com were performed based on the following standards / literature. [N1] IEC :2000 Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems [N2] ISBN: John Wiley & Sons Electronic Components: Selection and Application Guidelines by Victor Meeldijk [N3] FMD-91, RAC 1991 Failure Mode / Mechanism Distributions [N4] FMD-97, RAC 1997 Failure Mode / Mechanism Distributions [N5] NPRD-95, RAC Non-electronic Parts Reliability Data 1995 [N6] SN Failure rates of components [N7] NSWC-98/LE1 Handbook of Reliability Prediction Procedures for Mechanical Equipment Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 7 of 26
8 2.4 Reference documents Documentation provided by the customer [D1] IM 01R01B02_00E_E_ed7_low_res.pdf Instruction manual Model RAMC Short Stroke ROTAMETER IM 01R01B02-00E-E 7 th edition, September 2005 [D2] GS_RAMC_Eng_ed12.pdf General specifications Model RAMC Short Stroke ROTAMETER GS 01R01B02-00E-E 12 th edition, October 2004 [D3] Anzeigeteil RAMC.pdf Diagram RAMC indicator T90 opt.k index d of [D4] Gehäuse WT-MAG.pdf Diagram WT-MAG housing for Typ 90,66, index d of [D5] Messrohr RAMC.pdf Diagram RAMC cone with ASME flanges index a of [D6] _test.004.jpg RAMC housing [D7] Stromlaufplan WT-MAG + HART Platine ST4.pdf Circuit diagram WT-MAG + HART Platine ST /DSN index A of [D8] Stromlaufplan WT-MAG Display (rundes Gehäuse).pdf [D9] Stromlaufplan WT-MAG Kalibrier- EEPROM.pdf [D10] Stromlaufplan WT-MAG mit HART Basisleiterplatte.pdf [D11] FMEDA SWK Blocking detection.xls of [D12] Versuch 352.xls of Documentation generated by exida.com Circuit diagram WT-MAG + DISPLAY (rundes Gehaeuse) /DSN index A of Circuit diagram WT-MAG KALIBRIER-EEPROM /DSN index A of Circuit diagram WT-MAG mit HART BASISLEITERPLATTE /DSN index C1 of Analysis of the diagnostic float blocking detection Practical tests for the diagnostic coverage of the diagnostic float blocking detection [R1] FMEDA V7 mechanical components V1R4 without inductive sensors.xls of [R2] FMEDA V7 mechanical components without FMD V1R4.xls of [R3] FMEDA V7 4-20mA output with mechanic V1R4.xls of Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 8 of 26
9 3 Description of the analyzed module 3.1 Principle of measurement The RAMC is a Variable Area Flow Meter for volume flow and mass flow measurements of gases and liquids. A float, whose movement is for low viscose fluids nearly independent of viscosity is guided concentrically in a specially shaped cone. The position of the float is transferred magnetically to the indicator, which shows the measurement values by a pointer on a scale. The indicator can be equipped with limit switches or an electronic transmitter (see Figure 2). Figure 1: Principle of measurement All units are calibrated with water by the manufacturer. By adjusting the calibration values to the measured substance s state of aggregation (density, viscosity), the flow rate scale for each application and measuring tube can be determined. Figure 2: RAMC unit showing the ma output and the output of the limit switches Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 9 of 26
10 3.2 Principle of operation The position of the float is magnetically transferred to a magnetic follow up system. For [V2] the position angle of this magnetic rocker is detected by magnet sensors. A micro controller determines the angle by means of a combining reference value table in the memory and calculates the flow rate by the angle with calibration and operation parameters of the calibration EEPROM. The flow rate is given as a current ma and in addition indicated on the digital display. The electronic transmitters have been electronically calibrated before shipping and, therefore, are mutually exchangeable. Calibration data of the metering tube as well as customer specific data are entered into a calibration EEPROM, inserted on the board. This calibration EEPROM and the indication scale are assigned to the respective metering tube. The variable area flow meter RAMC when used with inductive limit switches is considered to be a Type A component with a hardware fault tolerance of 0 ([V1]). The variable area flow meter RAMC when used with the ma output is considered to be a Type B component with a hardware fault tolerance of 0 ([V2]). Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 10 of 26
11 4 Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis The Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis was done together with Rota Yokogawa GmbH & Co. KG and is documented in [R1] to [R3]. 4.1 Description of the failure categories In order to judge the failure behavior of the variable area flow meter RAMC, the following definitions for the failure of the product were considered. Fail Safe Failure that causes the module / (sub)system to go to the defined fail-safe state without a demand from the process or has no effect on the safety function. Fail Dangerous Undetected Failure that is dangerous and that is not being diagnosed by internal diagnostics. Fail Dangerous Detected Failure that is dangerous but is detected by internal diagnostics (These failures may be converted to the selected fail-safe state). Annunciation Undetected Failure that does not directly impact safety but does impact the ability to detect a future fault (such as a fault in a diagnostic circuit) and that is not detected by internal diagnostics. For the calculation of the SFF it is treated like a safe undetected failure. Fail No Effect Failure of a component that is part of the safety function but that has no effect on the safety function or deviates the output current by not more than 2% full scale. For the calculation of the SFF it is treated like a safe undetected failure. Not part Failures of a component which is not part of the safety function but part of the circuit diagram and is listed for completeness. When calculating the SFF this failure mode is not taken into account. It is also not part of the total failure rate ma output Fail-Safe State The fail-safe state is defined as the output exceeding the user defined threshold. Fail Dangerous Failure that does not respond to a demand from the process (i.e. being unable to go to the defined fail-safe state) or deviates the output current by more than 2% full scale (+/-0.32mA). Fail High Failure that causes the output signal to go to the maximum output current (> 20,5 ma) Fail Low Failure that causes the output signal to go to the minimum output current (< 3.6 ma) Switch output Fail-Safe State The fail-safe state is defined as the output being de-energized. Fail Dangerous Failure that does not respond to a demand from the process (i.e. being unable to go to the defined fail-safe state). Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 11 of 26
12 The failure categories listed above expand on the categories listed in IEC which are only safe and dangerous, both detected and undetected. The reason for this is that, depending on the application, a fail low or fail high may be detected or undetected depending on the programming of the safety logic solver. Consequently during a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) verification assessment the fail high and fail low categories need to be classified as either detected or undetected. The No Effect and Annunciation Undetected failures are provided for those who wish to do reliability modeling more detailed than required by IEC In IEC the No Effect and Annunciation Undetected failures are defined as safe undetected failures even though they will not cause the safety function to go to a safe state. Therefore they need to be considered in the Safe Failure Fraction calculation. Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 12 of 26
13 4.2 Methodology FMEDA, Failure rates FMEDA A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic way to identify and evaluate the effects of different component failure modes, to determine what could eliminate or reduce the chance of failure, and to document the system in consideration. A FMEDA (Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis) is a FMEA extension. It combines standard FMEA techniques with extension to identify online diagnostics techniques and the failure modes relevant to safety instrumented system design. It is a technique recommended to generate failure rates for each important category (safe detected, safe undetected, dangerous detected, dangerous undetected, fail high, fail low) in the safety models. The format for the FMEDA is an extension of the standard FMEA format from MIL STD 1629A, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Failure rates The failure rate data used by exida.com in this FMEDA are the basic failure rates from the Siemens SN failure rate database. The rates are considered to be appropriate for safety integrity level verification calculations. The rates match operating stress conditions typical of an industrial field environment similar to IEC , class C. It is expected that the actual number of field failures will be less than the number predicted by these failure rates. The user of these numbers is responsible for determining their applicability to any particular environment. Accurate plant specific data may be used for this purpose. If a user has data collected from a good proof test reporting system that indicates higher failure rates, the higher numbers shall be used. Some industrial plant sites have high levels of stress. Under those conditions the failure rate data is adjusted to a higher value to account for the specific conditions of the plant Assumptions The following assumptions have been made during the Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis of the variable area flow meter RAMC. Failure rates are constant, wear out mechanisms are not included. Propagation of failures is not relevant. Failures during parameterization are not considered. Sufficient tests are performed prior to shipment to verify the absence of vendor and/or manufacturing defects that prevent proper operation of specified functionality to product specifications or cause operation different from the design analyzed. The time to restoration after a safe failure is 8 hours. All modules are operated in the low demand mode of operation. External power supply failure rates are not included. The HART protocol is only used for setup, calibration, and diagnostics purposes, not during normal operation. The float blocking indication detection is activated for version [V2]. For version [V1] the output of the inductive limit switches is connected to a fail-safe NAMUR amplifier (e.g. Pepperl+Fuchs KF**-SH-Ex1). Practical fault insertion tests can demonstrate the correctness of the failure effects assumed during the FMEDAs. Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 13 of 26
14 The stress levels are average for an industrial environment and can be compared to the Ground Fixed classification of MIL-HNBK-217F. Alternatively, the assumed environment is similar to: o IEC , Class C (sheltered location) with temperature limits within the manufacturer s rating and an average temperature over a long period of time of 40ºC. Humidity levels are assumed within manufacturer s rating. Only the current output 4..20mA or the limit switch output are used for safety applications. The application program in the safety logic solver is configured to detect under-range and over-range failures and does not automatically trip on these failures; therefore these failures have been classified as dangerous detected failures. Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 14 of 26
15 5 Results of the assessment exida.com did the FMEDAs together with Rota Yokogawa GmbH & Co. KG. For the calculation of the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) the following has to be noted: λ total consists of the sum of all component failure rates. This means: λ total = λ safe + λ dangerous + λ no effect + λ annunciation SFF = 1 λ du / λ total For the FMEDAs failure modes and distributions were used based on information gained from [N3] to [N5]. For the calculation of the PFD AVG the following Markov model for a 1oo1D system was used. As after a complete proof test all states are going back to the OK state no proof test rate is shown in the Markov models but included in the calculation. The proof test time was changed using the Microsoft Excel 2000 based FMEDA tool of exida.com as a simulation tool. The results are documented in the following sections. ok Abbreviations: du The system has failed dangerous undetected dd The system has failed dangerous detected s The system has failed safe λ du λ dd λ s τ Repair λ du λ dd λ s Failure rate of dangerous undetected failures Failure rate of dangerous detected failures Failure rate of safe failures T Test Test time τ Test Test rate (1 / T Test ) du dd τ Test s T Repair Repair time τ Repair Repair rate (1 / T Repair ) Figure 3: Markov model for a 1oo1D structure Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 15 of 26
16 5.1 Variable area flow meter RAMC with inductive limit switches ([V1]) The FMEDA carried out on the variable area flow meter RAMC with inductive limit switches leads under the assumptions described in section and 5 to the following failure rates: λ sd = 0,00E-00 1/h λ su = 4,98E-08 1/h λ dd = 9,70E-09 1/h 6 λ du = 5,61E-08 1/h λ no effect = 5,12E-08 1/h λ total = 1,67E-07 1/h λ not part = 3,36E-08 1/h MTBF = MTTF + MTTR = 1 / (λ total + λ not part ) + 8 h = 569 years Under the assumptions described in section 5 and the definitions given in section 4.1 the following tables show the failure rates according to IEC 61508: λ sd λ su 7 λ dd λ du SFF DC S DC D 0 FIT 101 FIT 10 FIT 56 FIT 66,38% 0% 15% The PFD AVG was calculated for three different proof test times using the Markov model as described in Figure 3. T[Proof] = 1 year T[Proof] = 5 years T[Proof] = 10 years PFD AVG = 2,46E-04 PFD AVG = 1,23E-03 PFD AVG = 2,45E-03 The boxes marked in green ( ) mean that the calculated PFD AVG values are within the allowed range for SIL 2 according to table 2 of IEC and do fulfill the requirement to not claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 3,50E-03. Figure 4 shows the time dependent curve of PFD AVG. 6 These are failures which are detectable by the fail-safe NAMUR amplifier. 7 Note that the SU category includes failures that do not cause a spurious trip Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 16 of 26
17 1oo1D structure Probability 3,00E-03 2,50E-03 2,00E-03 1,50E-03 1,00E-03 5,00E-04 0,00E PFDavg Years Figure 4: PFD AVG (t) Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 17 of 26
18 5.2 Variable area flow meter RAMC with ma output ([V2]) The FMEDA carried out on the variable area flow meter RAMC with ma output leads under the assumptions described in sections and 5 to the following failure rates: λ sd = 0,00E-00 1/h λ su = 0,00E-00 1/h λ dd = 1,67E-07 1/h λ du = 1,87E-07 1/h λ high = 1,30E-08 1/h λ low = 5,43E-08 1/h λ annunciation = 1,20E-09 1/h λ no effect = 5,92E-08 1/h λ total = 4,81E-07 1/h λ not part = 8,43E-08 1/h MTBF = MTTF + MTTR = 1 / (λ total + λ not part ) + 8 h = 202 years These failure rates can be turned over into the following typical failure rates: Failure category Failure rates (in FIT) Fail Dangerous Detected 234 Fail detected (internal diagnostics or indirectly 8 ) 167 Fail High (detected by the logic solver) 13 Fail low (detected by the logic solver) 54 Fail Dangerous Undetected 187 No Effect 59 Annunciation Undetected 1 Not part 84 Under the assumptions described in section and 5 the following tables show the failure rates according to IEC 61508: λ sd λ su 9 λ dd λ du SFF DC S DC D 0 FIT 60 FIT 234 FIT 187 FIT 61,20% 0% 55% 8 indirectly means that these failure are not necessarily detected by diagnostics but lead to either fail low or fail high failures depending on the device setting and are therefore detectable. 9 Note that the SU category includes failures that do not cause a spurious trip Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 18 of 26
19 The PFD AVG was calculated for three different proof test times using the Markov model as described in Figure 3. T[Proof] = 1 year T[Proof] = 5 years T[Proof] = 10 years PFD AVG = 8,17E-04 PFD AVG = 4,08E-03 PFD AVG = 8,13E-03 The boxes marked in green ( ) mean that the calculated PFD AVG values are within the allowed range for SIL 1 according to table 2 of IEC and do fulfill the requirement to not claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 3,50E-02. Figure 5 shows the time dependent curve of PFD AVG. 1oo1D structure Probability 9,00E-03 8,00E-03 7,00E-03 6,00E-03 5,00E-03 4,00E-03 3,00E-03 2,00E-03 1,00E-03 0,00E PFDavg Years Figure 5: PFD AVG (t) Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 19 of 26
20 6 Terms and Definitions DC S Diagnostic Coverage of safe failures (DC S = λ sd / (λ sd + λ su )) DC D Diagnostic Coverage of dangerous failures (DC D = λ dd / (λ dd + λ du )) FIT Failure In Time (1x10-9 failures per hour) FMEDA Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis HART Highway Addressable Remote Transducer HFT Hardware Fault Tolerance Low demand mode Mode, where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safetyrelated system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof test frequency. PFD AVG Average Probability of Failure on Demand SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Integrity Level Type A component Non-complex component (all failure modes are well defined); for details see of IEC Type B component Complex component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see of IEC T[Proof] Proof Test Interval Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 20 of 26
21 7 Status of the document 7.1 Liability exida.com prepares FMEDA reports based on methods advocated in International standards. Failure rates are obtained from a collection of industrial databases. exida.com accepts no liability whatsoever for the use of these numbers or for the correctness of the standards on which the general calculation methods are based. 7.2 Releases Version: V1 Revision: R1.0 Version History: V0, R1.0: Initial version; October 24, 2005 V1, R1.0: Review comments incorporated; October 28, 2005 Authors: Stephan Aschenbrenner Review: V0, R1.0: Ralph Schmidt (Rota Yokogawa); October 25, 2005 Rachel Amkreutz (exida); November 4, 2005 Release status: Released to Rota Yokogawa GmbH & Co. KG 7.3 Release Signatures Dipl.-Ing. (Univ.) Stephan Aschenbrenner, Partner Dipl.-Ing. (Univ.) Rainer Faller, Principal Partner Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 21 of 26
22 Appendix 1: Possibilities to reveal dangerous undetected faults during the proof test According to section f) of IEC proof tests shall be undertaken to reveal dangerous faults which are undetected by diagnostic tests. This means that it is necessary to specify how dangerous undetected faults which have been noted during the FMEDA can be detected during proof testing. Table 7 and Table 8 show an importance analysis of the ten most critical dangerous undetected faults and indicate how these faults can be detected during proof testing. Appendix 1 shall be considered when writing the safety manual as it contains important safety related information. Table 7: Variable area flow meter RAMC with inductive limit switches Component % of total λ du Detection through Bearing ( ) 71,32% Float stop top 17,83% Housing bottom part incl. PG connector 3,21% Mounting screw ( ) 2,41% Retaining ring for indicator housing Mounting screw for inductive sensor 1,60% 1,60% Float 0,89% Housing seal ( ) 0,32% Inductive NAMUR sensors 0,32% Securing ring top 0,17% Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 22 of 26
23 Table 8: Variable area flow meter RAMC with ma output Component % of total λ du Detection through Magneto resistive sensors (R1, R2) 21,43% IC3 7,50% IC2 7,50% IC4 6,96% Mechanical components 6,47% IC5-4 4,29% Q1 3,21% IC6 3,21% IC1 3,21% D11 3,19% Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 23 of 26
24 Appendix 1.1: Possible proof tests to detect dangerous undetected faults Variable area flow meter RAMC with inductive limit switches Proof test 1 consists of the following steps, as described in Table 11. Table 9 Steps for Proof Test 1 Step Action 1 Take appropriate action to avoid a false trip 2 Force the variable area flow meter RAMC to reach a defined MAX threshold value and verify that the inductive limit switch goes into the safe state. 3 Restore the loop to full operation 4 Restore normal operation Proof test 2 consists of the following steps, as described in Table 12. Table 10 Steps for Proof Test 2 Step Action 1 Take appropriate action to avoid a false trip 3 Force the variable area flow meter RAMC to reach a defined MIN threshold value and verify that the inductive limit switch goes into the safe state. 4 Restore the loop to full operation 5 Restore normal operation Both tests together will detect approximately 90% of possible du failures. Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 24 of 26
25 Variable area flow meter RAMC with ma output Proof test 1 consists of the following steps, as described in Table 11. Table 11 Steps for Proof Test 1 Step Action 1 Bypass the safety PLC or take other appropriate action to avoid a false trip 2 Force the variable area flow meter RAMC to go to the high alarm current output and verify that the analog current reaches that value. This tests for compliance voltage problems such as a low loop power supply voltage or increased wiring resistance. This also tests for other possible failures. 3 Force variable area flow meter RAMC to go to the low alarm current output and verify that the analog current reaches that value. This tests for possible quiescent current related failures 4 Restore the loop to full operation 5 Remove the bypass from the safety PLC or otherwise restore normal operation This test will detect approximately 50% of possible du failures in the variable area flow meter RAMC. Proof test 2 consists of the following steps, as described in Table 12. Table 12 Steps for Proof Test 2 Step Action 1 Bypass the safety PLC or take other appropriate action to avoid a false trip 2 Perform Proof Test 1 3 Perform a two-point calibration of the variable area flow meter RAMC 4 Restore the loop to full operation 5 Remove the bypass from the safety PLC or otherwise restore normal operation This test will detect more than 90% of possible du failures in the variable area flow meter RAMC. Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 25 of 26
26 Appendix 2: Impact of lifetime of critical components on the failure rate Although a constant failure rate is assumed by the probabilistic estimation method (see section 4.2.3) this only applies provided that the useful lifetime of components is not exceeded. Beyond their useful lifetime, the result of the probabilistic calculation method is meaningless, as the probability of failure significantly increases with time. The useful lifetime is highly dependent on the component itself and its operating conditions temperature in particular (for example, electrolyte capacitors can be very sensitive). This assumption of a constant failure rate is based on the bathtub curve, which shows the typical behavior for electronic components. Therefore it is obvious that the PFD AVG calculation is only valid for components which have this constant domain and that the validity of the calculation is limited to the useful lifetime of each component. It is assumed that early failures are detected to a huge percentage during the installation period and therefore the assumption of a constant failure rate during the useful lifetime is valid. Table 13 shows which components are contributing to the dangerous undetected failure rate and therefore to the PFD AVG calculation and what their estimated useful lifetime is. Table 13: Useful lifetime of components contributing to λ du Type Name Useful life Mechanical part Appr. 10 years According to section of IEC , a useful lifetime, based on experience, should be assumed. According to section note 3 of IEC experience has shown that the useful lifetime often lies within a range of 8 to 12 years. Stephan Aschenbrenner Page 26 of 26
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