Federal Aviation Administration Safety & Human Factors Analysis of a Wake Vortex Mitigation Display System

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1 Safety & Human Factors Analysis of a Wake Vortex Mitigation Display System Presented to: EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar By: Dino Piccione Date: October 23, 2008

2 Project Objectives Forge a link between Human Factors and Safety activities in FAA system acquisition Test the HESRA tool on a system still in the concept phase Participate in the development of the human error portion of the safety package for SMS Provide a feed-forward to the Human Factors practitioners for detailed system design Use a Human System Integration approach 2

3 The basis for HESRA Human Error and Safety Risk Analysis Proactive human error analysis Based on engineering model (FMEA) Looking at human errors rather than component failures Based on tasks rather than component functions Three scales for each potential error mode Likelihood of occurrence Severity of outcome Likelihood of detection/mitigation* Scales use nominal anchors Goal is to produce ordered list of errors/outcomes *Not part of SMS 3

4 What are the objectives of using HESRA? Provide tools to support the FAA Safety Management System (SMS) Safety Risk Management (SRM) component of SMS Hazard identification Safety risk assessments Hazard tracking and risk mitigation Provide FAA human factors staff with a method that will allow them to evaluate system design and proactively predict elements of design that negatively influence human performance and safety. Allow FAA to field better and safer systems that will enhance ATM safety, and improve the ability of maintainers and service providers to successfully perform the job 4

5 What does HESRA do? Identifies the relative likelihood of particular errors Relies on relative, ordinal scaling Rank orders error modes Identifies critical single component failures Can utilize detection/mitigation Produces a task breakdown as a byproduct 5

6 How does HESRA do it? Starts with procedural and task breakdown Relies on analysts to identify possible error modes For each error mode, analysts assign ratings for Likelihood of occurrence Severity of outcome Likelihood of detection/mitigation Rating scales follow SMS Ratings are multiplied to yield Hazard Index (HI) = Likelihood X Severity Risk Priority Number (RPN) = Likelihood X Severity X Detection can be used to supplement SMS requirements Error modes are sorted by HI, RPN, or both 6

7 HESRA Likelihood Scale Error Likelihood Rating 1(A) 2(B) 3(C) 4(D) 5(E) Category Extremely Likely (Frequent) Likely (Probable) Occasional (Remote) Unlikely (Extremely Remote) Extremely Unlikely (Extremely Improbable) Error Likelihood Rating Definition Likely to occur on the order of once every 3-4 times the task is performed. Likely to occur on a regular basis, on the order of once every 10 times the task is performed. Likely to occur sporadically over the life of the system, on the order of once every 25 times the task is performed. Not likely to occur more than 5-10 times over the life of the system. Not likely to occur more than once or twice during the operational life of the system. 7

8 Severity Rating Scales (FAA SMS Category Names) Severity Rating Category Catastrophic (Catastrophic) Critical (Hazardous) Significant (Major) Marginal (Minor) Severity Definition Serious injury, death, permanent loss of one or more equipment functions Extended loss of function/service Major increase in maintainer or ATC workload Increased safety risk for FAA personnel Loss of positive A/T control Extended reduction of safety margin Serious injury or moderate temporary loss of equipment function Moderate increase in maintainer or ATC workload No safety margin for FAA personnel Potential loss of A/C separation Brief reduction in local safety margin Moderate injury or moderate equipment damage Loss of redundancy for a critical component Slight increase in maintainer or ATC workload Decreased safety margin for FAA personnel Increased risk should additional errors or equipment failures occur Potential increased stress on remaining functional equipment Minor injury or slight equipment damage Work around Loss of redundancy for a non-critical component Increased risk of more serious effects Minimal decrease of safety margin 5 Negligible (No Safety Effect) No injury or equipment damage No significant effect on osafety ofunction/service oschedule 8

9 Detection/Recovery Rating Scales Recovery Rating Category Very Low Low Moderate High Very High Recovery Scale Definition Detection and/or recovery are not likely to occur until the error propagates through the operational system(s) Detection and/or recovery are delayed until the error causes at least some serious effects on the operational system(s) Detection and/or recovery occur after a moderate delay, but in time to prevent all but minor effects on the operational system(s) Immediate or very quick detection. Recovery requires manual intervention, but is likely to be done before the error causes any operational effects. Immediate, automatic detection and/or recovery 9

10 What do we do with the results? Categorize results, e.g., Slight Moderate Severe Extreme Assign actions based on category Determine how hazards can be managed during Acquisition Management System (AMS) process Allocate hazard management to system design, procedures, training, etc. Commit resources where they will do the most good. 10

11 11

12 WTMD Concept of Use HESRA First Pass The WTMD weather algorithm will determine which runways will be wake independent for the next 30 minutes. Send that information to the tower supervisor s display. Exact form of that display has yet to be determined. If the tower supervisor decides to declare one of the eligible runways as a Wind Independent Runway (WIR), the runway is selected and designated as a WIR Procedures (not yet developed) must be invoked Updating the ATIS message to reflect the presence of the WIR(s) Informing the appropriate ATC facilities that one, or more, WIR has been designated Verbally verifying with the local controllers that they know about the WIRs and understand the implications for departure spacing. 12

13 WTMD Concept of Use If a WIR no longer qualifies as wake independent: Visual and audio alert will be sent to the tower supervisor s display Visual indication will appear on the local controllers WTMD displays to alert them to the new non-wir status When the tower supervisor acknowledges the alert, the audio portion will be silenced and all displays will revert to their pre- WIR status. Once WIR status is withdrawn, departure operations for that runway should revert to standard wake separation rules When a previously declared WIR becomes a non-wir, communication needs to occur among the supervisor, local controllers, centers, and pilots. 13

14 Initial Task Categories HESRA Wake Turbulence Start or stop the WTMD system Detect, recognize, select WIR(s) Communicate that WIR(s) are available Clear aircraft for departure with no wake separation Detect, recognize, acknowledge that WIR(s) is(are) NOT available Communicate that WIR(s) NOT available Clear aircraft for departure with wake separation 14

15 Human Error Highlights WTMD provides for suspending and invoking rules Introduces potential for new errors Consequences of errors vary depending on outcome of wake turbulence encounter Identified errors can be mitigated through: Proper human factors in system design Development of procedures Training 15

16 Highlights of Human Errors Aircraft on wrong runway cleared with no wake delay Misinterpretation of display Failure to detect that runway is no longer wind independent Failure to communicate non-wir status Position relief brief Supervisor distraction 16

17 Hazard Index Results Assessment of hazard severity was curtailed due to lack of information Several human error modes could result in a wake turbulence encounter Consequences of an encounter were not available at the time of the analysis Controller and system SMEs used for the analysis had no credible basis for making this judgment At the early stages of system development this may be a frequent analytical problem Results of the analysis are still valuable for hazard management 17

18 Mitigation and Hazard Management Proper design of display system Use of audio and visual display alerts Alerts should orient toward safety not capacity Need redundant displays to allow verification of WIR status by supervisor and local controller Procedures and training to require verification Readback-hearback procedures within tower cab Verification of verbal instructions prior to suspending wake separation rules Integration of WTMD procedures in position relief Monitoring of WTMD to assure procedures match runway status 18

19 Conclusions Proactive analysis of human error is a viable and valuable tool for hazard management Results of the analysis were passed on to the system design and human factors teams Tool still needs refinement and validation Validation trials scheduled Unclear use of Risk Priority Number (RPN) = Likelihood X Severity X Detection How to proceed when severity information is not available? 19

20 Next Steps Validation trials for HESRA Tool refinement to finalize and introduce to SMS toolbox Follow-up to assure mitigation recommendations are incorporated System design Procedure design Training 20

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