ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND EPR AT DUKOVANY NPP

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND EPR AT DUKOVANY NPP"

Transcription

1 ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND EPR AT DUKOVANY NPP September 2017 Vienna IAEA Miroslav Trnka

2 OVERVIEW General EOPs and SAMGs (changes) DAM (FLEX) EDMG Equipment (new + ongoing projects) Staff (drills and exercises) 1

3 CZECH REPUBLIC NPP Temelín 2 Units VVER 1000/V320 Unit Unit Installed capacity 2 x 1125 MWe NPP Dukovany 4 Units VVER 440/V213 Unit Unit Unit Unit Installed capacity 4 x 500 MWe 2

4 HISTORY OF EOPs AND SAMGs 1993 begin development of EOPs, Westinghouse philosophy 1999 implementation of EOPs 2001 begin development of SAMGs 2003 implementation of SAMGs 2010 upgrade SAMGs shutdown mode and Spend Fuel Pool 2013 begin development of DAM Program (FLEX) 2015 begin development of EDMG upgrade of SAMGs 3

5 MAIN CHANGES IN PROCEDURES EOPs Blackout procedure the first version of procedure was for several hours blackout, now is at least for three days. New SAMG guideline Blackout and loss DC power Changed structure of SAMG by PWROG philosophy DAM procedures (incorporate to others procedures, especially Blackout procedures) EDMG procedure Technical specification for mobile equipment and for SA equipment 4

6 DAM PROCEDURES Short, single-instructions on the use of mobile and portable devices to fulfill some functions, sometimes in several variations. Usage in SAMGs, EOPs (blackout), SD EOPs, EDMG Issue from This is necessary to drill shift and fire brigade Examples: Feeding SGs by mobile pump Makeup RCS using pump powered by mobile DG Loss of vital instrumentation or control power SFP makeup Isolation of Hydroaccumulators 5

7 EXTENSIVE DAMAGE MITIGATION GUIDELINE (EDMG) The Guideline provides: Initial actions and alternative methods of plant operation and communication ERO activation Initial damage assessment and muster of available resources Initial immediate operational response actions Reactor trip verification Core cooling restoration Local immediate actions: Security threats Medical services Fire fighting Radiological monitoring 6

8 EXTENSIVE DAMAGE MITIGATION GUIDELINE - EDMG ENTRY CONDITIONS EDMG is entered if command and control capability is disabled: From Shift supervisor Intervention Procedure -OR - Whenever ANY of the following conditions is satisfied: Control of plant equipment cannot be established from MCR or ECR Use of EOPs is not feasible 7

9 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FOR MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND FOR SA EQUIPMENT Who care about devices and where devices is placed Who control availability and how often Testing How long is possible to be inoperable Corrective action 8

10 KEY PARAMETERS MEASUREMENT Portable I&C Devices SAMG entry parameters Measurement from transmitter or on line to Control Room Measurement in voltage or current transform to real value of parameter Not measured in breach of the sensor or routes between sensor and transmitter 9

11 TECHNICAL CHANGES - READY In Vessel Retention Hydrogen Recombiners PAR SBO DGs, 2 per two twin units, 3 MW Mobil DGs, 4 per for units, 300 kw Ultimate FWPump - third one Possibility to depressurise SGs to low (zero) pressure, modificatinn of SGSV 10

12 MAIN TECHNICAL CHANGES - ONGOING Independent line to depressurization of RCS Add to atmosphere to containment during big subpressure from air trap, support hydrogen recombiners Long term heat sink system Hydrogen concentration measurement independent of oxygen concentration New sources of boron water and independent pump, high pressure and low pressure The Third independent system for Spent Fuel cooling 11

13 DRILLS Recognition of the site Feeding SGs by fire brigade pump Feeding reactor, SFP by the fire brigade pump Alternative supply of selected pumps via mobile DGs Alternative supply emergency switchyard 0,4 kv via mobile DGs Diesel refueling for long-term operation DG 12

14 13 IN VESSEL RETENTION

15 ALTERNATIVE FEEDING OF RCS Injection after loss of cooling into RPV, SFP or spray system using Fire brigade pump Valves and quick operated valves is possible to open/close by portable devices New procedure for using these devices Injection using T-joints is necessary to cut piping (RCS) Injection using flange dismantling, without cutting (SFP, spray systém) Objímka 14

16 15 T-JOINT

17 16 PLACE TO CUTTING

18 17 FLANGE

19 18 PLACE FOR FLANGE AIR PIPING

20 19 USAGE OF FLANGE

21 20 PORTABLE DRIVER

22 21 CONTROL QOV BY PORTABLE DRIVER- CONNECTION

23 MOBIL DG kw (+ 4 cable cars) Supply one division of battery section (valves, I&C measurement, PAMS) + one pump directly about 70 kw 22

24 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Car for emergency staff Independent Connection by Pager or mobile phone Satelite phone Field phones Cameras 23

25 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Hose truck with pump 6 m 3 / minute for long distance transport of water up to 2.6 km - 1 pc Another pump 6 m 3 / min at a trailer for water- supply 1 piece 24

26 DAM FEEDING OF SG (AND SFP) Fire brigade mobile pump 7 pc (2 pumps portable) 25

27 26 FIRE BRIGADE TRUCKS 3

28 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Fuel tank truck - Volume (15 m m 3 ) Refiling to SBO diesel Refiling to small power generators 27

29 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Backhoe loader TEREX release routes - removing snow, debris and other obstacles Tipper truck with a hydraulic arm and a snow blade for releasing routes - removing snow, debris and other obstacles 28

30 TRUCK WITH LIFT Lift until to 44 meters Two person TV camera Remote control 29

31 RESOURCES AND EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE Enhacement of resources and equipment for emergency Response 30

32 RESOURCES AND EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE Providing of alternative means of abnormal occurrence management during loss of primary control centers Diverse Emergency Control Centre (off site Emergency planning zone) Mobile Emergency Control Centre (container workplace) 31

33 END Do not forget that prevention is more important than repression Question? 32

Integrated Coping Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events

Integrated Coping Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events IAEA IEM on SAM in the Light of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, 17-20 March 2014, Vienna, Austria Integrated Coping Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events Jaewhan Kim and Kwang-Il Ahn KAERI Contents

More information

Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMG)

Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMG) Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMG) Roy Harter RLH Global Services Regional Workshop on Sharing Best Practices in Development and Implementation of Severe Accident Management Guidelines October

More information

IEM on Severe Accident Management in the light of the accident at the Fukushima Daïchi NPP

IEM on Severe Accident Management in the light of the accident at the Fukushima Daïchi NPP IEM on Severe Accident Management in the light of the accident at the Fukushima Daïchi NPP Progress, challenges and perspectives in the field of design features, as regards SAMG IAEA, March 2014 Introduction

More information

Human Reliability Analysis of Ultimate Response Guideline in a Compound Disaster. Hyatt Regency Tokyo, Japan April 16, 2013

Human Reliability Analysis of Ultimate Response Guideline in a Compound Disaster. Hyatt Regency Tokyo, Japan April 16, 2013 PSAM 203 Topical Conference in Tokyo OS-VIII : Human Factors and (#08) Human Reliability Analysis of Ultimate Response Guideline in a Compound Disaster Kang-Hung Liu, Sheue-Ling Hwang, Tsu-Mu Kao and Hui-Wen

More information

Severe Accident Management Programmes for Nuclear Power Plants

Severe Accident Management Programmes for Nuclear Power Plants DS 483: Mode 2 27 March 2017 IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS for protecting people and the environment STEP 11: Approval by the relevant review Committees Reviewed in NSOC (Asfaw) Severe Accident Management Programmes

More information

Safety and efficiency go hand in hand at MVM Paks NPP

Safety and efficiency go hand in hand at MVM Paks NPP International Forum Atomexpo 2018 Safety and efficiency go hand in hand at MVM Paks NPP József Elter MVM Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd. Hungary Start up Four of the VVER-440/V213 unit Power units up-rate

More information

TEPCO s Safety Assurance Philosophy on Nuclear Power Generation Plants

TEPCO s Safety Assurance Philosophy on Nuclear Power Generation Plants TEPCO s Safety Assurance Philosophy on Nuclear Power Generation Plants January 25, 2013 Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. This English translation has been prepared with the intention of creating an accurate

More information

Considerations for the Practical Application of the Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Design

Considerations for the Practical Application of the Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Design Considerations for the Practical Application of the Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Design Joint ICTP-IAEA Essential Knowledge Workshop on Deterministic Safety Analysis and Engineering Aspects

More information

Ing. JOZEF BALÁŽ Ph.D. and Ing MILAN CVAN CSc

Ing. JOZEF BALÁŽ Ph.D. and Ing MILAN CVAN CSc PROPOSAL, DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND SAFETY DEMONSTRATION OF SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT MEASURES AT VVER440 IN SLOVAKIA Ing. Jozef Baláž, Ph.D. VUJE a.s. Trnava, Slovakia Email: Jozef.Balaz@vuje.sk Ing.

More information

ASVAD THE SIMPLE ANSWER TO A SERIOUS PROBLEM. Automatic Safety Valve for Accumulator Depressurization. (p.p.)

ASVAD THE SIMPLE ANSWER TO A SERIOUS PROBLEM. Automatic Safety Valve for Accumulator Depressurization. (p.p.) ASVAD Automatic Safety Valve for Accumulator Depressurization (p.p.) THE SIMPLE ANSWER TO A SERIOUS PROBLEM International Experts Meeting on Strengthening Research and Development Effectiveness in the

More information

FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY CHAPTER F: CONTAINMENT AND SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS 7. CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (EVU [CHRS])

FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY CHAPTER F: CONTAINMENT AND SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS 7. CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (EVU [CHRS]) PAGE : 1 / 16 7. CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (EVU [CHRS]) 7.0. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 7.0.1. Safety functions The main functions of the EVU system [CHRS] are to limit the pressure inside the containment

More information

EXPERIMENTAL SUPPORT OF THE BLEED AND FEED ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT MEASURES FOR VVER-440/213 TYPE REACTORS

EXPERIMENTAL SUPPORT OF THE BLEED AND FEED ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT MEASURES FOR VVER-440/213 TYPE REACTORS International Conference Nuclear Energy for New Europe 22 Kranjska Gora, Slovenia, September 9-12, 22 www.drustvo-js.si/gora22 EXPERIMENTAL SUPPORT OF THE BLEED AND FEED ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT MEASURES FOR

More information

The Nitrogen Threat. The simple answer to a serious problem. 1. Why nitrogen is a risky threat to our reactors? 2. Current strategies to deal with it.

The Nitrogen Threat. The simple answer to a serious problem. 1. Why nitrogen is a risky threat to our reactors? 2. Current strategies to deal with it. International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety: Safety Demonstration of Advanced Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants. The simple answer to a serious problem Vienna. 6 9 June 2017

More information

IAEA Training in Level 2 PSA MODULE 8: Coupling Source Terms to Probabilistic Event Analysis (CET end-state binning)

IAEA Training in Level 2 PSA MODULE 8: Coupling Source Terms to Probabilistic Event Analysis (CET end-state binning) IAEA Training in Level 2 PSA MODULE 8: Coupling Source Terms to Probabilistic Event Analysis (CET end-state binning) The Problem A probabilistic treatment of severe accident progression leads to numerous

More information

Dynamic Context Quantification for Design Basis Accidents List Extension and Timely Severe Accident Management

Dynamic Context Quantification for Design Basis Accidents List Extension and Timely Severe Accident Management Dynamic Context Quantification for Design Basis Accidents List Extension and Timely Severe Accident Management Emil Kostov a,b and Gueorgui Petkov a a Technical University, Sofia, Bulgaria b WorleyParsons,

More information

Level 2 PSA for the VVER 440/213 Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant

Level 2 PSA for the VVER 440/213 Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Nuclear Research Research Institute Řež plc Institute Řež plc Level 2 PSA for the VVER 440/213 Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant Jiří Dienstbier, Stanislav Husťák OECD International Workshop on Level-2

More information

A comparative study of FLEX strategies to cope with Extended Station Blackout (SBO)

A comparative study of FLEX strategies to cope with Extended Station Blackout (SBO) A comparative study of FLEX strategies to cope with Extended Station Blackout (SBO) Presented by M. G Shahinoor Islam Master s Student of KINGS October 26 th 2017 KNS Meeting FLEX Objectives 2 page of

More information

V.H. Sanchez Espinoza and I. Gómez-García-Toraño

V.H. Sanchez Espinoza and I. Gómez-García-Toraño V.H. Sanchez Espinoza and I. Gómez-García-Toraño ANALYSIS OF PWR SEVERE ACCIDENT SEQUENCES INCLUDING MITIGATIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT OR DELAY THE FAILURE OF SAFETY BARRIERS WITH THE SEVERE ACCIDENT CODE

More information

Recent Research on Hazards PSA

Recent Research on Hazards PSA Recent Research on Hazards PSA Marina Röwekamp, Hartmut Holtschmidt, Michael Türschmann Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) ggmbh IEM8 - International Experts Meeting on Strengthening

More information

A c o n c e p t u a l c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d y o f F L E X s t r a t e g i e s t o c o p e w i t h e x t e n d e d S B O.

A c o n c e p t u a l c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d y o f F L E X s t r a t e g i e s t o c o p e w i t h e x t e n d e d S B O. A c o n c e p t u a l c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d y o f F L E X s t r a t e g i e s t o c o p e w i t h e x t e n d e d S B O Hak Kyu Lim KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School (KINGS) Probabilistic

More information

Lockout/Tagout Training Overview. Safety Fest 2013

Lockout/Tagout Training Overview. Safety Fest 2013 Lockout/Tagout Training Overview Safety Fest 2013 Purpose of Lockout/Tagout The standard covers the servicing and maintenance of machine and equipment in which the unexpected energization or start up of

More information

Nuclear safety Lecture 4. The accident of the TMI-2 (1979)

Nuclear safety Lecture 4. The accident of the TMI-2 (1979) Nuclear safety Lecture 4. The accident of the TMI-2 (1979) Ildikó Boros BME NTI 27 February 2017 The China Syndrome Opening: 16 March 1979 Story: the operator of the Ventana NPP tries to hide the safety

More information

Loss of Normal Feedwater Analysis by RELAP5/MOD3.3 in Support to Human Reliability Analysis

Loss of Normal Feedwater Analysis by RELAP5/MOD3.3 in Support to Human Reliability Analysis Loss of Normal Feedwater Analysis by RELAP5/MOD3.3 in Support to Human Reliability Analysis ABSTRACT Andrej Prošek, Borut Mavko Jožef Stefan Institute Jamova cesta 39, SI-1 Ljubljana, Slovenia Andrej.Prosek@ijs.si,

More information

Ranking of safety issues for

Ranking of safety issues for IAEA-TECDOC-640 Ranking of safety issues for WWER-440 model RANKING OF SAFETY ISSUES FOR WWER-440 MODEL PLEASE BE AWARE THAT ALL OF THE MISSING PAGES IN THIS DOCUMENT WERE ORIGINALLY BLANK RANKING OF SAFETY

More information

THE NITROGEN INJECTION THREAT IN PWR REACTORS

THE NITROGEN INJECTION THREAT IN PWR REACTORS THE NITROGEN INJECTION THREAT IN PWR REACTORS Weakness of current strategies & ASVAD, the new passive solution. Arnaldo Laborda Rami ASVAD INTL. SL (SPAIN) Tarragona (SPAIN) Email: alaborda@asvad-nuclear.com

More information

FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY CHAPTER I: AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2. VOLUME AND CHEMICAL CONTROL (RCV [CVCS])

FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY CHAPTER I: AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2. VOLUME AND CHEMICAL CONTROL (RCV [CVCS]) PAGE : 1 / 16 2. VOLUME AND CHEMICAL CONTROL (RCV [CVCS]) 2.0. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 2.0.1. Safety functions 2.0.1.1. Control of reactivity In normal operation, the RCV [CVCS] regulates and adjusts (jointly

More information

-. 30ýv. Entergy ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT I IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SUBMITTAL. 05/01101 Supplement Volume 2 of 2. (Sections 3.7 and 3.

-. 30ýv. Entergy ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT I IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SUBMITTAL. 05/01101 Supplement Volume 2 of 2. (Sections 3.7 and 3. ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT I IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SUBMITTAL -. 30ýv May 1, 2001 05/01101 Supplement Volume 2 of 2 (Sections 3.7 and 3.8) Entergy MSSVs 3.7.1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Main Steam

More information

AP1000 European 19. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Design Control Document

AP1000 European 19. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Design Control Document APPENDIX 19E SHUTDOWN EVALUATION 19E.1 Introduction Westinghouse has considered shutdown operations in the design of the A1000 nuclear power plant. The AP1000 defense-in-depth design philosophy to provide

More information

Classical Event Tree Analysis and Dynamic Event Tree Analysis for High Pressure Core Melt Accidents in a German PWR

Classical Event Tree Analysis and Dynamic Event Tree Analysis for High Pressure Core Melt Accidents in a German PWR OECD International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management Koeln, Germany, March 29-31, 2004 Classical Event Tree Analysis and Dynamic Event Tree Analysis for High Pressure Core Melt Accidents

More information

HTR Systems and Components

HTR Systems and Components IAEA Course on HTR Technology Beijing, 22-26.October 2012 HTR Systems and Components Dr. Gerd Brinkmann Dieter Vanvor AREVA NP GMBH Henry-Dunant-Strasse 50 91058 Erlangen phone +49 9131 900 96840/95821

More information

Nuclear Safety Regulation: Before and after Fukushima*

Nuclear Safety Regulation: Before and after Fukushima* Nuclear Safety Regulation: Before and after Fukushima* Shridhar Chande, India International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Sustaining Improvements Globally, Vienna 11-15 April 2016

More information

FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY CHAPTER P: REFERENCE OPERATING CONDITION STUDIES (PCC)

FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY CHAPTER P: REFERENCE OPERATING CONDITION STUDIES (PCC) PAGE : 1 / 11 1. PASSIVE SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS The aim of the accident analysis in Chapter P is to demonstrate that the safety objectives have been fully achieved, despite the most adverse single failure.

More information

Accident Management Strategies for Mark I and Mark III BWRs

Accident Management Strategies for Mark I and Mark III BWRs Accident Management Strategies for Mark I and Mark III BWRs E. L. Fuller Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission IAEA Workshop Vienna, Austria July 17-21, 2017

More information

Custom-Engineered Solutions for the Nuclear Power Industry from SOR

Custom-Engineered Solutions for the Nuclear Power Industry from SOR Custom-Engineered Solutions for the Nuclear Power Industry from SOR As the world s aging nuclear power plants continue to be challenged with maintenance and Instrumentation Solutions for the Nuclear Power

More information

2. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE ACTIONS AND NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

2. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE ACTIONS AND NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES 2. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE ACTIONS AND NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES This section of the GOSRP provides the general procedures to be followed at the time of an incident. The section is distinctively marked by a RED

More information

DISTRIBUTION LIST. Preliminary Safety Report Chapter 19 Internal Hazards UK HPR1000 GDA. GNS Executive. GNS all staff. GNS and BRB all staff CGN EDF

DISTRIBUTION LIST. Preliminary Safety Report Chapter 19 Internal Hazards UK HPR1000 GDA. GNS Executive. GNS all staff. GNS and BRB all staff CGN EDF Rev: 000 Page: 2 / 20 DISTRIBUTION LIST Recipients GNS Executive GNS all staff Cross Box GNS and BRB all staff CGN EDF Regulators Public Rev: 000 Page: 3 / 20 SENSITIVE INFORMATION RECORD Section Number

More information

Profile LFR-43 HELENA ITALY. Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development, C.R. ENEA Brasimone, Italy

Profile LFR-43 HELENA ITALY. Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development, C.R. ENEA Brasimone, Italy Profile LFR-43 HELENA ITALY GENERAL INFORMATION NAME OF THE FACILITY ACRONYM COOLANT(S) OF THE FACILITY LOCATION (address): OPERATOR CONTACT PERSON (name, address, institute, function, telephone, email):

More information

SAFETY APPROACHES. The practical elimination approach of accident situations for water-cooled nuclear power reactors

SAFETY APPROACHES. The practical elimination approach of accident situations for water-cooled nuclear power reactors SAFETY APPROACHES The practical elimination approach of accident situations for water-cooled nuclear power reactors 2017 SUMMARY The implementation of the defence in depth principle and current regulations

More information

Requirements for Reduced Supervision of Power Plants, Thermal Liquid Heating Systems, and Heating Plants

Requirements for Reduced Supervision of Power Plants, Thermal Liquid Heating Systems, and Heating Plants the pressure equipment safety authority Requirements for Reduced Supervision of Power Plants, Thermal Liquid Heating Systems, and Heating Plants AB-528 Edition 2, Revision 1 Issued 2016-09-12 Table of

More information

Instrumentation systems of BWR

Instrumentation systems of BWR Instrumentation systems of BWR 1 Reactor core and pressure vessel of BWR Fuel rod Fuel assembly Reactor vessel :15~22cm thickness of steel, height of 21m, diameter of 7m Steam dryer Pressure vessel Main

More information

NUBIKI Nuclear Safety Research Institute, Budapest, Hungary

NUBIKI Nuclear Safety Research Institute, Budapest, Hungary System Reliability Analysis and Probabilistic Safety Assessment to Support the Design of a New Containment Cooling System for Severe Accident Management at NPP Paks Tamas Siklossy* a, Attila Bareith a,

More information

RISKAUDIT GRS - IRSN Safety assessment of the BELENE NPP

RISKAUDIT GRS - IRSN Safety assessment of the BELENE NPP RISKAUDIT GRS - IRSN Safety assessment of the BELENE NPP Bulatom Conference 2010 Bulgarian Nuclear Energy National, Regional and World Energy Safety 9th -11th June 2010, Riviera complex, Varna Système

More information

FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY CHAPTER I: AUXILIARY SYSTEMS. A high-capacity EBA system [CSVS] [main purge]

FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY CHAPTER I: AUXILIARY SYSTEMS. A high-capacity EBA system [CSVS] [main purge] PAGE : 1 / 9 5. CONTAINMENT PURGE (EBA [CSVS]) The Reactor Building purge system comprises the following: A high-capacity EBA system [CSVS] [main purge] A low-capacity EBA system [CSVS] [mini-purge] 5.1.

More information

Record of Assessment OFFICER IN CHARGE OF AN ENGINEERING WATCH

Record of Assessment OFFICER IN CHARGE OF AN ENGINEERING WATCH Record of Assessment for OFFICER IN CHARGE OF AN ENGINEERING WATCH Candidate s Name Candidate s Signature Candidate s Mariner Reference NOTE TO QUALIFIED ASSESSOR(S): In performing your function as a Qualified,

More information

SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS: SDS1 AND SDS2

SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS: SDS1 AND SDS2 Chapter 12 SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS: SDS1 AND SDS2 12.1 INTRODUCTION Up to this point we have looked with great details at the reactor regulating system. In order to better understand the overall design of a CANDU

More information

DISTRIBUTION LIST. Preliminary Safety Report Chapter 7 Safety Systems UK HPR1000 GDA. GNS Executive. GNS all staff. GNS and BRB all staff CGN EDF

DISTRIBUTION LIST. Preliminary Safety Report Chapter 7 Safety Systems UK HPR1000 GDA. GNS Executive. GNS all staff. GNS and BRB all staff CGN EDF Rev: 000 Page: 2 / 82 DISTRIBUTION LIST Recipients GNS Executive GNS all staff Cross Box GNS and BRB all staff CGN EDF Regulators Public Rev: 000 Page: 3 / 82 SENSITIVE INFORMATION RECORD Section Number

More information

CONTENTS OF THE PCSR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION

CONTENTS OF THE PCSR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION PAGE : 1 / 8 CONTENTS OF THE PCSR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION SUB-CHAPTER 1.1 INTRODUCTION SUB-CHAPTER 1.2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIT SUB-CHAPTER 1.3 COMPARISON WITH REACTORS

More information

IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS for protecting people and the environment

IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS for protecting people and the environment Date: 2016-08-31 IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS for protecting people and the environment STATUS: STEP 8a For Submission to Member States DESIGN OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

More information

QuickHeat TM Packaged Heat Exchanger Solutions

QuickHeat TM Packaged Heat Exchanger Solutions 4831999/1 IM-P483-03 CH Issue 1 QuickHeat TM Packaged Heat Exchanger Solutions Installation and Maintenance Instructions 1. Safety information 2. General product information 3. Installation 4. Commissioning

More information

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT OF COLD CHANNEL PIPELINE RUPTURE SIZE FOR WWER 440/270 REACTOR

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT OF COLD CHANNEL PIPELINE RUPTURE SIZE FOR WWER 440/270 REACTOR PROCEEDINGS OF THE YEREVAN STATE UNIVERSITY Physical and Mathematical Sciences 216, 2, p. 57 62 P h y s i c s SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT OF COLD CHANNEL PIPELINE RUPTURE SIZE FOR WWER 44/27

More information

Verification and validation of computer codes Exercise

Verification and validation of computer codes Exercise IAEA Safety Assessment Education and Training (SAET) Programme Joint ICTP- IAEA Essential Knowledge Workshop on Deterministic Safety Assessment and Engineering Aspects Important to Safety Verification

More information

CENTRAL ZONE OPERATIONS MANUAL

CENTRAL ZONE OPERATIONS MANUAL Number: Title: Page 1 of 6 PURPOSE The purpose of this policy is to establish the minimum standards and requirements needed for Central Zone Fire Departments to comply with all applicable regulations including

More information

Safety Essentials. Mandatory rules for our high risk activities

Safety Essentials. Mandatory rules for our high risk activities Mandatory rules for our high risk activities Remember... Only undertake activities for which you are trained, competent and authorised to do Before you start a job take a step back, think about all the

More information

Safety Analysis: Event Classification

Safety Analysis: Event Classification IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Safety Analysis: Event Classification Lecturer Lesson IV 1_2 Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City, Country XX - XX Month,

More information

Power Supply Facilities Failure (Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A), etc.) March 22, 2013 Tokyo Electric Power Company

Power Supply Facilities Failure (Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A), etc.) March 22, 2013 Tokyo Electric Power Company < Reference > Power Supply Facilities Failure (Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A), etc.) March 22, 2013 Tokyo Electric Power Company Occurrence of Events in a Chronological Order At around 6:57 PM on March 18,

More information

White Paper. Electrical control valve actuators on oil and gas production separators

White Paper. Electrical control valve actuators on oil and gas production separators White Paper Electrical control valve actuators on oil and gas production separators Electrical control valve actuators on oil and gas production separators White Paper 18 th August 2014 Electrical control

More information

DESIGN OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

DESIGN OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SAFETY STANDARDS SERIES No. NS-G-1.10 DESIGN OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SAFETY GUIDE DS 482 2016-04-20 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA, C-41 (May 13)

More information

Control of Hazardous Energy Program (LOTO)

Control of Hazardous Energy Program (LOTO) 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this program is to establish minimum safety requirements for the lockout and tagout of hazardous energy sources and the verification of energy isolation through the use of isolating

More information

SAFETY DIRECTIVE 2.0 DEPARTMENTS AFFECTED. This Administrative Directive shall apply to all Town of Marana departments and employees.

SAFETY DIRECTIVE 2.0 DEPARTMENTS AFFECTED. This Administrative Directive shall apply to all Town of Marana departments and employees. SAFETY DIRECTIVE Title: Control of Hazardous Energy Lock-out/Tag-out/Try-out Issuing Department: Town Manager s Safety Office Effective Date: July 1, 2014 Approved: Gilbert Davidson, Town Manager Type

More information

23.1 Functions, Basic Configuration, and Interfaces

23.1 Functions, Basic Configuration, and Interfaces 23 (6.6.D) SF 6 and Other Special Gases 23.1 Functions, Basic Configuration, and Interfaces 23.1.1 Functions The primary function performed by the SF 6 and other special gases system is to provide SF 6

More information

IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS for protecting people and the environment

IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS for protecting people and the environment IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS for protecting people and the environment DESIGN OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS DRAFT SAFETY GUIDE DS 482 STATUS: STEP 11 Submission to Review

More information

C5: Control Emergencies and Critical Situations

C5: Control Emergencies and Critical Situations C5: Control Emergencies and Critical Situations This unit is about controlling emergencies and critical situations. C5.1 Maintain a State of Readiness C5.2 Control Critical Situations C5.3 Coordinate the

More information

Energy Control. Suite 2A, 55 Frid Street Hamilton, ON L8P 4M3 office: cell:

Energy Control. Suite 2A, 55 Frid Street Hamilton, ON L8P 4M3 office: cell: Energy Control Suite 2A, 55 Frid Street Hamilton, ON L8P 4M3 office: 905.577.0303 cell: 905.977.0210 consultant@staffaid.ca www.staffaid.com Safety, Energy Control, Power Lockout & Function Test Procedures

More information

Record of Assessment OFFICER IN CHARGE OF AN ENGINEERING WATCH

Record of Assessment OFFICER IN CHARGE OF AN ENGINEERING WATCH Record of Assessment for OFFICER IN CHARGE OF AN ENGINEERING WATCH Candidate s Name Candidate s Signature NOTE TO QUALIFIED ASSESSOR(S): In performing your function as a Qualified, you may use your initials

More information

Lockout Tagout Program

Lockout Tagout Program Lockout Tagout Program 1.0 INTRODUCTION Public Safety Department Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) Division Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) #18 Purpose To ensure that machinery or equipment is

More information

ANNEX AMENDMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR FIRE SAFETY SYSTEMS (FSS CODE) CHAPTER 15 INERT GAS SYSTEMS

ANNEX AMENDMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR FIRE SAFETY SYSTEMS (FSS CODE) CHAPTER 15 INERT GAS SYSTEMS Annex 3, page 2 ANNEX AMENDMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR FIRE SAFETY SYSTEMS (FSS CODE) CHAPTER 15 INERT GAS SYSTEMS The text of existing chapter 15 is replaced by the following: "1 Application This

More information

DETAILS OF THE ACCIDENT PROGRESSION IN 1F1

DETAILS OF THE ACCIDENT PROGRESSION IN 1F1 DETAILS OF THE ACCIDENT PROGRESSION IN 1F1 EMUG 2019 BRAUN, Matthias Switzerland, 3 rd -5 th April 2019 Not part of the BSAF OECD Benchmark Project Relying exclusively on publically available input data

More information

ACCURATE PRESSURE MEASUREMENT FOR STEAM TURBINE PERFORMANCE TESTING

ACCURATE PRESSURE MEASUREMENT FOR STEAM TURBINE PERFORMANCE TESTING ACCURATE PRESSURE MEASUREMENT FOR STEAM TURBINE PERFORMANCE TESTING Blair Chalpin Charles A. Matthews Mechanical Design Engineer Product Support Manager Scanivalve Corp Scanivalve Corp Liberty Lake, WA

More information

Introduction to Emergency Response & Contingency Planning

Introduction to Emergency Response & Contingency Planning & Contingency Planning Rationale Why is it important for you to learn this material? Designed for those who may witness a release, this is an introductory course designed to help ensure those who are likely

More information

Pressure Reducing & Desuperheating (PRDS) Station Pressure Reducing (PRS) Station Desuperheating (DSH) Station. Ver. 1.1 (2016)

Pressure Reducing & Desuperheating (PRDS) Station Pressure Reducing (PRS) Station Desuperheating (DSH) Station. Ver. 1.1 (2016) Pressure Reducing & Desuperheating (PRDS) Station Pressure Reducing (PRS) Station Desuperheating (DSH) Station Ver. 1.1 (2016) Pressure Reducing & Desuperheating (PRDS) Station Modular Ready-to-Fit Conditioning

More information

How to reinforce the defence-indepth in NPP by taking into account natural hazards?

How to reinforce the defence-indepth in NPP by taking into account natural hazards? How to reinforce the defence-indepth in NPP by taking into account natural hazards? Caroline LAVARENNE Karine HERVIOU Patricia DUPUY Céline PICOT IAEA 21-24 October 2013, Vienna Introduction The DiD has

More information

ACCESS TO CONFINED SPACES

ACCESS TO CONFINED SPACES INSTRUCTION 1(10) ACCESS TO CONFINED SPACES Table of contents: 1 PURPOSE 2 DEFINITIONS 3 RESPONSIBILITY 4 DESCRIPTION 4.1 Standby person 4.2 Blinds 4.3 Approval of blind and blanks list 4.4 Installing/removing

More information

Proposed Abstract for the 2011 Texas A&M Instrumentation Symposium for the Process Industries

Proposed Abstract for the 2011 Texas A&M Instrumentation Symposium for the Process Industries Proposed Abstract for the 2011 Texas A&M Instrumentation Symposium for the Process Industries Focus Area: Automation HMI Title: Author: Shared Field Instruments in SIS: Incidents Caused by Poor Design

More information

LOCKOUT/TAGOUT PROGRAM

LOCKOUT/TAGOUT PROGRAM LOCKOUT/TAGOUT PROGRAM HOW CLIMATE ENGINEERS INC. COMPLIES WITH THELO/TO STANDARD It is the intent of Climate Engineers Inc. to comply with OSHA s Control of Hazardous Energy Standard (1910.147). The following

More information

The Relationship Between Automation Complexity and Operator Error

The Relationship Between Automation Complexity and Operator Error The Relationship Between Automation Complexity and Operator Error presented by Russell Ogle, Ph.D., P.E., CSP rogle@exponent.com (630) 274-3215 Chemical Plant Control Control physical and chemical processes

More information

USER MANUAL OPERATION AND THE USE OF A CAR WITH. Diego G3 / NEVO SEQUENTIAL GAS INJECTION SYSTEM

USER MANUAL OPERATION AND THE USE OF A CAR WITH. Diego G3 / NEVO SEQUENTIAL GAS INJECTION SYSTEM USER MANUAL OPERATION AND THE USE OF A CAR WITH Diego G3 / NEVO SEQUENTIAL GAS INJECTION SYSTEM Page 2 / 8 Table of csontents 1. STARTING THE ENGINE... 3 2. CONTROL PANEL... 3 2.1 Indication of the current

More information

CONFINED SPACE AWARENESS

CONFINED SPACE AWARENESS Document Number: HSE09-001 June 1, 2013 AWARENESS Author: A Holland MAPP Construction - Corporate 344 Third Street Baton Rouge, LA 70801 (225) 757-0111 MAPP Construction - Houston 1511 Katy Freeway, Suite

More information

TIGHTNESS. Glass sealing Thanks to our glass-sealing technology, ODU products can meet the most demanding tightness requirements.

TIGHTNESS. Glass sealing Thanks to our glass-sealing technology, ODU products can meet the most demanding tightness requirements. TIGHTNESS Glass sealing Thanks to our glass-sealing technology, ODU products can meet the most demanding tightness requirements. ODU has the necessary expertise for developing and manufacturing connectors

More information

OPERATING PROCEDURES

OPERATING PROCEDURES OPERATING PROCEDURES 1.0 Purpose This element identifies Petsec s Operating Procedures for its Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS) Program; it applies to all Petsec operations. Petsec is

More information

DESIGN OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

DESIGN OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SAFETY STANDARDS SERIES No. NS-G-1.10 DESIGN OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SAFETY GUIDE DS 482 2016-04-20 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA, C-41 (May 13)

More information

Spiratec ST14, ST16 and ST17 Sensor Chambers and sensors

Spiratec ST14, ST16 and ST17 Sensor Chambers and sensors 0862050/1 IM-P086-18 MI Issue 1 Spiratec ST14, ST16 and ST17 Sensor Chambers and sensors Installation and Maintenance Instructions 1. Safety Information 2. General product information 3. Installation 4.

More information

Safety Classification of Structures, Systems and Components in Nuclear Power Plants

Safety Classification of Structures, Systems and Components in Nuclear Power Plants DS367 Draft 5.1 IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS for protecting people and the environment Date: 04/11/2008 Status: for Member States comments Reviewed in NS-SSCS Please submit your comments by 20 March 2009 Safety

More information

Steam Turbine Performance Measurement. Pressure Measurement

Steam Turbine Performance Measurement. Pressure Measurement Steam Turbine Performance Measurement Pressure Measurement General Description Pressure losses can be determined by measuring pressures at various stages of the steam turbine cycle operating under load

More information

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL CHILLED WATER DEPARTMENT ENERGY CONTROL PROCEDURE The purpose of this document is to establish minimum requirements for the manual isolation and securing

More information

Description. Chassis. Cabinet. Long chassis - Type: Dimensions (mm): 2700 x 1200 x 1678

Description. Chassis. Cabinet. Long chassis - Type: Dimensions (mm): 2700 x 1200 x 1678 1 ITV bench is equipped with a INJETVISION vision system whose purpose is to observe and study the jets from high pressure diesel injector in inert atmosphere (nitrogen or CO2) up to 50 bar (± 0.5 bar).

More information

UKEPR Issue 04

UKEPR Issue 04 Title: PCSR Sub-chapter 6.8 Main steam relief train system - VDA [MSRT] Total number of pages: 16 Page No.: I / III Chapter Pilot: M. LACHAISE Name/Initials Date 25-06-2012 Approved for EDF by: A. PETIT

More information

PUBLIC COMPANY ORLEN LIETUVA OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROCEDURE BDS-12 USE OF PORTABLE GAS ANALYZERS I. GENERAL

PUBLIC COMPANY ORLEN LIETUVA OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROCEDURE BDS-12 USE OF PORTABLE GAS ANALYZERS I. GENERAL PUBLIC COMPANY ORLEN LIETUVA APPROVED BY Deputy Director of Quality, Labor Safety and Environmental Control Director 30 November 2017 Order No TV1(1.2-1)-457 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROCEDURE BDS-12

More information

Event tree analysis. Prof. Enrico Zio. Politecnico di Milano Dipartimento di Energia. Prof. Enrico Zio

Event tree analysis. Prof. Enrico Zio. Politecnico di Milano Dipartimento di Energia. Prof. Enrico Zio Event tree analysis Politecnico di Milano Dipartimento di Energia Techniques for Risk Analysis Hazard identification: FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) & HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability study) Accident

More information

Lockout / Tagout Safety Program

Lockout / Tagout Safety Program Lockout / Tagout Safety Program Prepared by: The Ohio State University Environmental Health and Safety Occupational Safety & Industrial Hygiene 1314 Kinnear Road Columbus, OH 43212-1168 614-292-1284 Phone

More information

Enhancing NPP Safety through an Effective Dependability Management

Enhancing NPP Safety through an Effective Dependability Management Prepared and presented by Gheorghe VIERU, PhD Senior Scientific Nuclear Security Research Worker AREN/c.o. Institute for Nuclear Research Pitesti, ROMANIA Safety: Defence in Depth, October 2013 1 OUTLINES

More information

Fire in an isomerisation unit and domino effects on a benzene saturation unit, in a refinery December, 2002 Rome Italy

Fire in an isomerisation unit and domino effects on a benzene saturation unit, in a refinery December, 2002 Rome Italy French ministry of the Environment - DPPR / SEI / BARPI Registered Installations Inspectorate N ARIA 26983 Fire in an isomerisation unit and domino effects on a benzene saturation unit, in a refinery December,

More information

Review and Assessment of Engineering Factors

Review and Assessment of Engineering Factors Review and Assessment of Engineering Factors 2013 Learning Objectives After going through this presentation the participants are expected to be familiar with: Engineering factors as follows; Defense in

More information

Gas Network Craftsperson

Gas Network Craftsperson Gas Network Craftsperson Unit EIAU06 Maintaining Instrumentation and Control Equipment Circuits This assessment specification has been developed as part of the network maintenance craftsperson standard

More information

Sample Written Program for The Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout)

Sample Written Program for The Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout) USAG Bavaria Safety Office Sample Written Program for The Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout) Nov 2016 1910.147 The Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout) The following lockout/tagout program

More information

Kodiak Electric Renewable Energy Implementation. Colin Young System Engineer 4/26/2016

Kodiak Electric Renewable Energy Implementation. Colin Young System Engineer 4/26/2016 Kodiak Electric Renewable Energy Implementation Colin Young System Engineer 4/26/216 Kodiak Electric Territory 216 Grid Kodiak Board Members Create a Vision in 25 Endeavor to produce 95% of energy sales

More information

In addition to this SOP, the policies and procedures of each operating company will be strictly observed by Rockwater personnel.

In addition to this SOP, the policies and procedures of each operating company will be strictly observed by Rockwater personnel. SOP FB-08 (Revised MAR 2014) STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES-FLOWBACK Hydrogen Sulfide Operations Section 1.0 Introduction and Background Rockwater Energy Solutions, Inc. (and all its affiliated and subsidiary

More information

Reduce Turnaround Duration by Eliminating H 2 S from Flare Gas Utilizing VaporLock Scrubber Technology

Reduce Turnaround Duration by Eliminating H 2 S from Flare Gas Utilizing VaporLock Scrubber Technology Reduce Turnaround Duration by Eliminating H 2 S from Flare Gas Utilizing VaporLock Scrubber Technology Jim Woodard Vice President of Sales Bryant Woods Lead Project Engineer 4/3/18 Page 1 Objectives Impact

More information

Ammonia Purge Near Miss. Jason Clarke, Gulf Power Co.

Ammonia Purge Near Miss. Jason Clarke, Gulf Power Co. Ammonia Purge Near Miss Jason Clarke, Gulf Power Co. Four generating units 2-82 MW 1-320 MW 1-500 MW Plant Crist Overview All four units run through a common scrubber The two large units utilize SCR technology

More information

SINGLE VALVE WITH LOW-FLOW BYPASS

SINGLE VALVE WITH LOW-FLOW BYPASS CONTROL VALVES Pressure Reducing Valve Sizing Guide Sizing pilot operated reducing valves is not a complicated process. It starts with determining requirements and following these guidelines in valve size

More information

TW Temperature Control Valve

TW Temperature Control Valve 0470050/6 IM-P047-04 CH Issue 6 TW Temperature Control Valve Installation and Maintenance Instructions 1. Safety information 2. General product information 3. Installation 4. Maintenance 5. Spare parts

More information