Introduction Risk management plan Legislation Responsibility of fire and rescue services Search Hazard - Lack of co-ordinated search plan (generic)

Transcription

1 Introduction... 1 Risk management plan... 3 Legislation... 3 Responsibility of fire and rescue services... 4 Search... 4 Hazard - Lack of co-ordinated search plan (generic)... 7 Control measure - Gather information from the public and liaise with other agencies... 7 Control measure - Request resources for search... 8 Control measure - Request National Resilience resources for Urban Search and Rescue (USAR)... 9 Control measure - Urban search and rescue team arrival at incident Control measure - Urban search and rescue work plan Control measure - Carry out urban search and rescue logistics management Control measure - Have clearly defined area of operations Control measure - Carry out a wide area assessment (ASR level 1) Control measure - Carry out a sector assessment (ASR level 2) Control measure - Ensure search teams have detailed briefing Control measure - Have a communication strategy: Search Control measure - Conduct search using thermal imaging equipment Control measure - Provide adequate lighting Control measure - Identify areas that have been searched Hazard - Lack of co-ordinated search plan (transport) Control measure - Search in hidden voids Control measure - Review passenger/cargo manifests Control measure - Be aware of seating and standing capacities Control measure - Look for occupancy indicators Hazard - Working environment: Terrain Control measure - Safe access and egress: Terrain Control measure - Safe night time operations Hazard - Noise Control measure - Reduce risk from exposure to noise Hazard - Unstable ground Control measure - Employ a safe system of work to recover casualties and rescuers Hazard - Animals Control measure - Understand animal behaviour Control measure - Contain or avoid animals Control measure - Specialist advice: Animals Control measure - Rescue or evacuate animals Control measure - Personal protective equipment (PPE)... 43

2 Extrication of a casualty Hazard - Failure to extricate the casualty without deterioration of their condition Control measure - Situational awareness Control measure - Request resources for extrication Control measure - Stabilise the casualty Control measure - Extricate the casualty Hazard - Electricity: Supply in contact with person, ground or vehicle Control measure - Remain in place: Electricity Control measure - Safe withdrawal from live electricity Extrication - generic Hazard - Medical equipment Control measure - Identify and communicate medical equipment in use Control measure - Isolate and remove medical equipment Control measure - Be oxygen aware Control measure - Establish an equipment, resource or tool area Hazard - Rescue tools Control measure - Use methods of space creation Control measure - Identify the most appropriate rescue tool for the task Control measure - Manage tool operatives and their actions Control measure - Manage the effects of tool use Control measure - Personal protective equipment (PPE): Rescues Extrication from the built or natural environment Hazard - Primary surface extrication of casualties following collapse of a structure Control measure - Highlight avoidance routes Control measure - Incident ground safety management Control measure - Provide adequate lighting Control measure - Conduct search using thermal imaging equipment Control measure - Have a communication strategy Control measure - Request National Resilience resources for Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Control measure - Urban search and rescue team arrival at incident Control measure - Urban search and rescue work plan Control measure - Carry out a rapid search and rescue (ASR level 3) Control measure - Carry out a full search and rescue (ASR level 4) Control measure - Carry out a total coverage search and recovery (ASR level 5) Control measure - Carry out urban search and rescue logistics management Control measure - USAR post incident response Hazard - Manual handling over terrain Control measure - Deploy adequate personnel Control measure - Manage physiological stress Control measure - Use casualty transport equipment Control measure - Use motorised vehicles Hazard - Extrication of casualties from confined spaces Control measure - Isolate machinery, processes and utilities Control measure - Establish appropriate safe systems of work: Confined space

3 Control measure - Incident ground safety management Control measure - Provide adequate lighting Control measure - Establish effective communications: Confined spaces Control measure - Firefighter decontamination Hazard - Restricted or complex layout affecting extrication of casualties Control measure - Deploy appropriate numbers of personnel Control measure - Manage physiological stress Control measure - Use casualty transport equipment Control measure - Identify the most appropriate rescue tool for the task Hazard - Cables Control measure - Situational awareness: Cables Control measure - Isolate utilities Control measure - Remove or secure internal fixings or cables Control measure - Firefighter emergency arrangements: Cables Extrication from any mode of transport Hazard - Unstable vehicle containing casualties Control measure - Make a safe and controlled approach to the incident: Transport Control measure - Manage pressurised air systems Control measure - Stabilise the mode of transport Control measure - Deploy appropriate number of personnel Control measure - Identify and maintain safe access and egress routes Control measure - Incident ground safety management Hazard - Construction materials: Performing rescues Control measure - Identify and communicate vehicle or craft construction materials Control measure - Avoid manipulation or damage to composite materials Control measure - Use tactical advisers and responsible person Control measure - Apply fine water spray or foam Control measure - Know the capabilities and uses of rescue equipment Control measure - Make the correct tool choice for vehicle construction Control measure - Be aware of the respiration of particles and dermal irritation Control measure - Consider the release of energy from structural vehicle components Control measure - Manage heavy vehicle considerations Extrication from air transport Hazard - Military aircraft Control measure - Cordon controls: Military aircraft Control measure - Specialist advice: Military aircraft Control measure - Restrict radio transmissions Control measure - Access the cockpit Control measure - Make ejection seats safe Control measure - Extricate the aircrew Extrication from rail transport Hazard - Delay in accessing driver or passenger compartments Control measure - Use designated doors and windows Control measure - Use tactical advisers and responsible person

4 Extrication from road transport Hazard - Alternative fuelled vehicles (AFV) Control measure - Identify and communicate the vehicle type Control measure - Immobilise vehicle Control measure - Isolate high voltage systems Control measure - Appropriate extrication techniques for alternative fuelled vehicle (AFV) Hazard - Unconventional or specialist road vehicles Control measure - Use tactical advisers and responsible person Control measure - Contain the vehicle or cargo Control measure - Identify and isolate electrical and fuel systems Control measure - Use specialist cutting equipment Hazard - Vehicle supplementary restraint systems (SRS) Control measure - Identify the supplementary restraint systems (SRS) and communicate the information Control measure - Establish an appropriate safe distance for supplementary restraint systems (SRS) Control measure - Isolate the supplementary restraint systems (SRS) Control measure - Prevent manipulation or damage to supplementary restraint systems (SRS) Extrication from machinery, lifts and escalators Hazard - Gaining access to machine rooms and shafts Control measure - Establish a safe working environment Hazard - Noise Control measure - Reduce risk from exposure to noise Hazard - Power systems Control measure - Request specialist advice Control measure - Isolate and lock out power supplies Hazard - Machinery Control measure - Specialist advice: Machinery Control measure - Isolate and lock out power Control measure - Establish appropriate cordon controls Control measure - Prevent uncontrolled movement Control measure - Incident ground safety management Control measure - Personal protective equipment (PPE) Hazard - Hydraulics and lubricants Casualty care Hazard - Failure to assess, identify and treat life-threatening problems of the casualty Control measure - Request resources for casualty care Control measure - Establish casualty care arrangements Control measure - Follow principles of casualty care Control measure - Carry out structured assessment and treatment using Ac B C D E Control measure - Maintain the privacy and dignity of the casualty Hazard - Single casualty in cardiac arrest

5 Control measure - Use effective Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and Automated External Defibrillator (AED) Control measure - Personal protective equipment (PPE) Hazard - Failure to hand over vital casualty information Control measure - Offer a structured handover to an appropriately trained and competent practitioner Hazard - Multiple casualties Control measure - Share situational awareness using M\ETHANE Control measure - Establish a triage sieve (adult and paediatric) Hazard - Bariatric casualty Control measure - Make an early identification of the bariatric casualty Control measure - Use bariatric management equipment Control measure - Request specialist medical support for bariatric casualty Control measure - Consider structural stability Hazard - Thermal or chemical injury Control measure - Provide treatment to burns casualties Hazard - Casualty with crushed body part Control measure - Carry out structured assessment and treatment using Ac B C D E Control measure - Plan for the casualty deteriorating on release Control measure - Protect from hypothermia or hyperthermia Hazard - Impaled casualty Control measure - Stabilise casualty and request medical assistance Bibliography

6 Introduction A 'person at risk' is defined as a person involved in any situation that exposes them to a risk of death, injury or illness. Those falling into this category may include bystanders, casualties and those involved in performing rescues, including fire and rescue service personnel. This extends to those involved in scene preservation and post-incident activities being carried out whilst the fire and rescue service is still at the scene. A person may remain 'at risk' even after being rescued. For example, where somebody has been extricated or has self-extricated from a vehicle following a road traffic collision, but is required to remain at the roadside awaiting an ambulance. A rescue is defined in the Cabinet Office UK Civil Protection Lexicon as the: "Removal, from a place of danger to a place of relative safety, of persons threatened or directly affected by an incident, emergency, or disaster This guidance is for incidents where the fire and rescue service personnel will conduct search and rescue operations. This includes both fire and non-fire incidents. For fire incidents, some elements of this guidance will be supported by the hazards and control measures contained in National Operational Guidance: Fires and firefighting The performing rescues hazards and control measures should be read in conjunction with the 'all incident' and 'context' guidance. In particular, the hazards in the 'Transport' context and the control measures that enable responders to operate safely. National Operational Guidance looks to share good practice; an example of this is the recommendation that search techniques may be enhanced by the use of audio or optical equipment and/or the use of canine resources. The satisfactory identification and management of people at risk requires a combination of incident pre-planning, incident management and incident debrief functions, beginning with a service-wide appreciation of which incidents the organisation can and will respond to. Fire and rescue services should use all available specialist knowledge to assist with rescue of casualties. This knowledge may be available from within the fire and rescue service either locally or regionally, external agencies or the owner/occupier. Fire and rescue services should clarify the range of rescue and other functions they will provide and more importantly, which functions they are not able to deliver. This should inform the organisation's risk management plan. Where activities are identified that require the assistance of another fire and rescue service or agency (blue light, private sector, voluntary, etc.), clear, 1 of 231

7 unambiguous agreements should be drawn up. These too should inform and be reflected in the risk management plan. When drawing up the risk management plan and underpinning agreements, fire and rescue services should consider how information, intelligence and data can and should be shared among and between the command, control and communications elements for planning, co-ordinating, integrating and executing response operations. Agreements should include: The span of activities to be undertaken Clarity of what roles and activities are to be performed and by whom A defined, clear, understood chain of command What resources are required The mechanisms for co-ordination of operations Suitable controls to cover the span of operations and resources deployed How access to the scene of operations (cordoned or not) is to be controlled and by whom Which roles, tasks and activities the fire and rescue service will have fulfilled before departing from the scene including: Rescue of trapped persons Provision of initial medical care to casualties Assistance with casualty handling and body recovery Extinguishing fires Dealing with released chemicals, fuels and contaminants Managing health and safety activity Co-ordination with other agencies Agreements should consider the provisions for co-operation and communication between the responders and agencies involved and/or present. Agreements should identify the measures required to effect formal handover of responsibilities as and where appropriate. Where possible and appropriate, fire and rescue services should seek to gather Site-Specific Risk Information (SSRI) to inform their response arrangements. This information, together with local arrangements, agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) should be tested and reviewed to ensure suitability and accuracy through a programme of exercises and debriefs involving relevant agencies. Operational response should be underpinned by prevention and protection initiatives, delivered in partnership with local communities and a wide range of other relevant partners, locally, regionally and nationally. In some incidents, it is important to determine the point when the fire and rescue service's duty to protect people from harm has been fulfilled. Fire control rooms should ensure they employ robust information gathering wherever possible and pass this information on to mobilising crews. This information gathering process supports the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability 2 of 231

8 Framework. A more accurate picture of the situation can be developed through liaison with other agencies and information gathering from members of the public. This includes information about the number of people involved, their last known position (LKP) or point last seen (PLS). The information gathering process should continue throughout the incident and will inform the nature of operational response. Risk management plan Each fire and rescue authority must develop their strategic direction through their risk management plan. To determine the extent of their firefighting capability, strategic managers will consider their statutory duties and the foreseeable risk within their area. Work to identify risk and prepare operational plans should consider all stakeholders, including local emergency planning groups and the fire and rescue service risk management plan. Legislation Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 (The Scotland Act) Fire and Rescue Services (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 (The NI Order) The Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) (England) Order 2007 Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) (Wales) Order 2007 Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) (Northern Ireland) Order 2011 Civil Contingencies Act 2004 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 (The 2005 Regulation) The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 2005 (The Scotland Regulation) 3 of 231

9 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) (Amendment) Regulations 2012 (The 2012 Regulation) The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework Crime and Disorder Act 1998 Responsibility of fire and rescue services Fire and rescue services are responsible, under legislation and regulations, for developing policies and procedures and to provide information, instruction, training and supervision to their personnel about foreseeable hazards and the control measures used to mitigate the risks arising from those hazards. This guidance sets out to provide fire and rescue services with sufficient knowledge about the potential hazards their personnel could encounter when attending incidents. Fire and rescue service should ensure their policies procedure and training covers all of the hazards and controls contained within this guidance. Search Operating principles There are four phases in every search and rescue scenario. Depending on the incident, they may be present to a greater or lesser degree. They are known by the 'LAST' acronym: Locate Access Stabilise Transport These phases are the basis of a set of principles that may be applied at every incident requiring 4 of 231

10 search and rescue operations. The nature and complexity of the situation should determine the levels of management and control applied to the incident and the scale of the search and rescue operations. Fire and rescue services should be prepared to deal with this type of operation. Guidance for operational planning may be found in Section 7 of the government publication Fire and Rescue Authorities, Health, safety and welfare framework for the operational environment. The overall responsibility for search and rescue operations should rest with the appropriate (lead) agency and their representative. A competent person from the lead agency should be nominated as soon as possible in the operations to co-ordinate resources and activity around the search and rescue principles. The requirement for search and rescue operations will usually fall into one of the following broad categories: Operations in the built environment, such as a fire in a building or a collapsed structure Operations in the natural (open) environment, such as unstable ground or a wide area search on land or water Please note that an incident involving a confined space may occur in either of these categories. Locate 'Locate' represents the search phase. This may be brief, in the case of a clearly identified casualty, or protracted, when the person is reported to be missing. Identify, record and mark the point last seen (PLS) or last known position (LKP), collectively referred to by UK search and rescue organisations and the police as the initial planning point (IPP). Record the casualty details and time at PLS or LKP Assess the situation in terms of significant hazards, operational activity and the required resources. Resources include personnel, personal protective equipment (PPE) and work equipment (including firefighting, rescue and communication equipment). Allocate tasks and brief operational crews on the working environment, hazards, tasks and communication method - enhance the briefing with visual information, such as suitable plans that have been annotated to provide clarification Take into consideration the resources available and, en route, consider what else may be required Establish search management records. Operational crews should landmark any recognisable features to: Provide orientation, and therefore support. for effective briefing of crews Support effective recording of the areas and compartments that have been searched Communicate progress to inform the overall tactical plan If the casualty is not immediately located, a number of search phases may be identified and considered: primary phase, secondary phase, tertiary phase and so on Identify and employ a safe system of work throughout Ensure this information is communicated and included in the overall tactical plan 5 of 231

11 Access Start a dynamic risk assessment (DRA) and communicate the findings when the casualty is located Identify the agency with the appropriate capability to access the casualty Update search management records using progress and activity reports Stabilise 'Stabilise' should involve stabilising both the situation and any casualties Stabilise the situation to reduce the risk to operational crews and prevent further harm to any casualties. Examples may include securing unstable structures or ground, or controlling a fire compartment Stabilise the casualty by physically isolating them from any immediate hazard with the potential to cause harm. Ideally, any hazard should be removed from the vicinity of the casualty. If the hazard cannot be removed the casualty should be moved to a place of (relative) safety Assess and secure the casualty following the <C> Ac B C D E approach Carry out casualty packaging for transport, extrication and rescue using, for example, a vacuum mattress, scoop stretcher or basket stretcher Prepare for transport and rescue Communicate progress to inform the overall tactical plan Transport 'Transport' is the final part of the operation. It should provide the removal of any casualties to a place of relative safety and definitive care. It is important to remember that the casualty should be protected from any harm during this part of the operation Information that may be relevant and important for casualties to be safely and effectively transported should be passed to the responsible agencies. The hand over of accurate standardised information recognised by local medical responders is essential. An example of an acronym to ensure that this is done is ATMIST, details of which can be found in the Casualty care section of this guidance. Information transferred in this format should contribute to successful pre-hospital care. Operational crews, their personal protective equipment (PPE) and other equipment should be removed to a place of safety End of the incident Operational activities should be safely and effectively managed throughout the closing stage of an incident. A debrief should be conducted to identify best practice and lessons learned. Guidance on incident debrief can be found in Section 12 of the government publication Fire and Rescue Authorities, Health, safety and welfare framework for the operational environment. 6 of 231

12 See National Operational Guidance: Operations - Incident closure and handover Hazard Lack of co-ordinated search plan (generic) Hazard Knowledge A search may be required for either a missing person or an absent person. If a co-ordinated search plan is not carried out in a timely and structured way, the casualty may not be located and their condition could potentially deteriorate. The working environment, weather conditions and time of day may affect the search, especially with regard to visibility. This may make it more difficult to carry out an effective search, as people and objects may be difficult to distinguish. Control measure Gather information from the public and liaise with other agencies Initial crews will need to gather information from members of the public and liaise with other agencies in attendance. Ensure all incident commanders are familiar with information sources at search incidents Arrange training and exercising with other agencies 7 of 231

13 Confirm and communicate the involvement, num ber and severity of any casualties (persons or animals) Anticipate casualty condition and potential survivability given the environmental situation Identify number and last known position (LKP) of any occupants in need of rescue or assistance to evacuate Establish the last known position (LKP) or place last seen (PLS) of casualties, including times Establish communications with police search advisors (PolSA) and other responder agencies Develop and communicate a co-ordinated search plan following JESIP principles Identify whether any rescue attempts have been made by onsite rescue teams prior to arrival Question the casualty, other responders and witnesses to understand incident factors and history Control measure Request resources for search Search and rescue incidents may require a multi-agency response and in many cases will require specialist teams. The skills required may need to be sourced from internal resources, other fire and rescue services or external agencies. Fire and rescue services should have an awareness of National Resilience capabilities that should include an understanding of the arrangements contained in the National Co-ordination Advisory Framework (NCAF). They should also ensure that there are appropriate and current procedures to deal with any related requests. Specialist resources to support search may include search dogs, UAVs (Drones) USAR, lighting, police teams, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, cave/mountain/mines rescue and other agencies Have arrangements with other category 1 and 2 responders for mobilisation and cooperation at search incidents Consider appointing a search co-ordinator to ensure all areas have been systematically 8 of 231

14 searched Request adequate resources to enable effective search given the scope and environment of the incident Control measure Request National Resilience resources for Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) The affected fire and rescue service is responsible for ensuring that responders have received appropriate awareness training in relation to the National Coordination Advisory Framework (NCAF), and the means of accessing specialist National Resilience (NR) capabilities, such as urban search and rescue (USAR). This is essential pre-incident knowledge for the affected fire and rescue service, as they are responsible for surveying the scene, assessing the impact of the incident, and requesting appropriate resources. The affected fire and rescue service may need to request NR USAR assistance through National Resilience Fire Control (NRFC), whether they have assets within their own service, or require a greater level of response. Operations to save life, prevent incident escalation or to provide humanitarian aid should not be delayed awaiting the attendance of USAR resources, subject to appropriate risk assessment. All operational personnel should apply USAR awareness training, be aware of the hazards associated with collapsed structures and the limits of initial responder actions, based on the condition of the structure. Initial responders should commence the Six Stages of Rescue as an approach to effective management of the incident until the arrival of USAR resources. Progression through the Six Stages of Rescue takes a considerable time, even at a small, single-dwelling collapse. The tactical plan should take account of this, and the resources required, to achieve a safe and successful conclusion to the incident. 9 of 231

15 The Six Stages of Rescue are: R Reconnaissance and survey E Elimination of utilities P Primary surface search and rescue E Exploration of voids and spaces A Access by selected debris removal T Termination by general debris removal For further information refer to the National Operational Guidance: Performing rescues. It is also important that first responding crews adopt stage 1 structural monitoring, with safety officers watching the structure for movement, and where possible periodically take photographs for comparison to track movement. On arrival, USAR units will deploy specialist monitoring equipment and collate an audit trail of results of the monitoring to give an overview of the structural state of the site. The primary focus for the USAR capability is to be equipped, trained and available to respond to large-scale events such as collapsed structures or major transport incidents. The capability can also be used to support incidents including: High-profile searches for missing persons Responses to extreme medical cases requiring technical extrication Support to other agencies, providing additional expertise and technical capability, such as confined space operations USAR equipment includes: Visual search equipment Audible search equipment Canine search Breaking, breaching and cutting equipment Shoring equipment Lifting and moving equipment Safety equipment Communications equipment Lighting equipment Equipment for confined space operations Safe work at height equipment Medical equipment 10 of 231

16 Requesting National Resilience response It may be beneficial for the affected fire and rescue service to seek guidance from the USAR capability team or a national tactical adviser (TacAd) prior to requesting assistance. Capability advice and national TacAds should be requested via the NRFC. The request to the NRFC will prompt the mobilisation of National Resilience resources from one or more hosting fire and rescue services. The NRFC should provide an estimated time of arrival; this information will assist the incident commander in determining what level of initial operational response is required. If the fire and rescue service incident commander believes the USAR capability is required, they should provide the following information to the NRFC: Incident location Type of incident The approximate number of people involved Scale of the incident Approximate size Footprint Number of floors Construction of the building if involved: Light structure light frame or traditional (un-reinforced) masonry construction Medium structure heavy timber, reinforced masonry, and modular concrete construction Heavy structure reinforced concrete or steel frame construction Initial location for a rendezvous point (RVP), strategic holding area (SHA) or multi-agency strategic holding area (MASHA) refer to for further information Additional information regarding to the incident may be useful for the NRFC and USAR capability team, including: Number of people confirmed trapped or missing Occupancy the number of possible occupants and likely locations Occupancy type children or adults Time of day refers to the time of the event that caused the building to collapse, which is a critical factor when combined with the occupancy number Information from witnesses about known trapped casualties, or last known locations of potential casualties The use of the structure Possible cause, the current state of the structure (total collapse or partial collapse) and potential for further collapse Main hazards and any involvement of damaged utilities What actions have been taken already and the current tactical mode 11 of 231

17 Other agencies present Incident commanders should also consider requesting other specialist resources, including: Hazardous materials adviser or detection, identification and monitoring (DIM) capability to provide support to USAR operations Hazardous Area Response Teams (HART) or the Special Operations Rescue Team (SORT) Structural engineers Utility providers Mine or cave rescue teams These requests are in addition to the need to send the standard informative and assistance messages; M/ETHANE is now the recognised common model for passing incident information Ensure incident commanders have received awareness of the National Coordination Advisory Framework and specialist NR capabilities that can be provided Have systems in place to request USAR advice and resources from the NRF Ensure that personnel understand the use and limitations of USAR resources Ensure that personnel understand the use and limitations of USAR resources Establish the quantity and types of resources being provided and identify suitable locations for them RVP, SHA or MASHA Establish the estimated time of arrival for the NR resources Consider requesting the attendance of other specialist resources 12 of 231

18 Control measure Urban search and rescue team arrival at incident The process for booking-in on arrival at the assigned rendezvous point (RVP), strategic holding area (SHA) or multi-agency strategic holding area (MASHA), will depend on the urban search and rescue (USAR) level of response; this could be a single unit or group response. USAR single unit response The designated unit leader will report to the incident commander and hand over a copy of the USAR 01 Unit Fact Sheet Form, which provides an overview of the USAR modules, personnel deployed and their specialist skills. A second copy of the form should be handed to the USAR tactical adviser (TacAd) or group response co-ordinator. A third copy is retained by the unit. USAR group response USAR units should report to a pre-determined RVP, SHA or MASHA. USAR teams will book in using the standard process with information on personnel, vehicles and modules being captured on the asset management tool (AMT); this may be via the enhanced logistics support (ELS) team if in attendance. USAR 01 Unit Fact Sheet Form, should be handed to the USAR group response coordinator, or USAR co-ordination cell upon arrival at the incident ground. Fire and rescue service briefing When the USAR capability arrives at the incident an initial plan of action (POA) should be provided by the affected fire and rescue service. This should support the carrying out of rapid USAR operations. The following should be included in the initial POA: Details of potential worksites size, nature, scale Numbers of people trapped or missing Allocated escape routes, RVPs or marshalling areas Presence and status of significant hazards, such as utilities Allocated location for USAR vehicles and equipment A fire and rescue service point of contact name and number Details of the incident command organisational structure 13 of 231

19 National Resilience should: Provide USAR guidance material and supporting documentation for completion by specialist responders Specialist responders should: Report to the rendezvous point, strategic holding area or multi-agency strategic holding area and book in Receive the initial plan of action, and agree a USAR Tactical Work Plan with the incident commander prior to deploying Control measure Urban search and rescue work plan The urban search and rescue (USAR) unit leaders or USAR co-ordination cell should develop and implement search and rescue strategies and tactics. These are detailed in a USAR work plan and recorded on USAR 02 Tactical Work Plan Form. The USAR work plan should be discussed and agreed with the incident commander, and be consistent with the overall incident objectives and action plan to ensure: There are suitable arrangements to ensure the safety of all personnel, including the deployment of structural monitoring and its results and nomination of a USAR safety officer. Prioritisation of rapid casualty extrications where possible Effective management and co-ordination of USAR operations Effective and documented dynamic and analytical risk assessment Improved use and co-ordination of USAR resources and specialist personnel 14 of 231

20 Provision of a clear overview for all responding agencies Assistance from other agencies, such as structural engineers, is incorporated into the USAR response The provision of simultaneous 24-hour multiple-site search and rescue operations The USAR work plan is used to identify the operational objectives for a work period, including the number of operational sectors and work sites to which USAR resources will be deployed. USAR operations will be conducted by using the assessment, search and rescue (ASR) levels as a framework, with the addition of specific objectives if required. The USAR unit leader or group response co-ordinator should advise the incident commander when each of the objectives of the plan has been carried out. However, it is likely that ASR levels may run concurrently across multiple sectors, dependent on the size and scale of the incident. National Resilience should: Provide USAR guidance material and supporting documentation for completion by specialist responders Request assistance from other agencies if required, using agreed protocols Provide resources to facilitate simultaneous 24-hour multiple-site search and rescue operations Maintain a register of other agencies that may be able to assist with USAR operations Specialist responders should: Liaise with the incident commander to develop a USAR work plan Advise the incident commander when each of the objectives of the plan has been carried out 15 of 231

21 Control measure Carry out urban search and rescue logistics management USAR initial logistics area Due to the potentially protracted nature of an incident involving urban search and rescue (USAR) operations, large amounts of specialist modules and equipment are required to support activities. To facilitate this, a USAR initial logistics area will need to be established in order to enable the prompt availability of tools, equipment and consumables. The incident commander should be advised of this USAR requirement, along with an estimate of the size of area that will be needed. In the early stages of an incident, the establishment and management of a USAR initial logistics area will be carried out by the first USAR units to arrive at the affected fire and rescue service, through liaison with the incident commander. The USAR initial logistics area consists of a series of demounted USAR modules and air shelters that provide a principal point for the management of equipment being checked into and out of the area. USAR personnel are trained to carry out procedures related to equipment issue, tracking and retrieval, as outlined in USAR SOP Logistics, and two technicians will be appointed as the initial logistics team. This will allow a basic function to be established at local or cross-border incidents. However, for national incidents involving a single or double group response, a USAR Logistics Team from West Sussex Fire and Rescue Service will be deployed to manage and co-ordinate the logistics support framework. USAR logistics team The USAR logistics team are mobilised on request and as part of any USAR group response. They will take responsibility for the overall management and co-ordination of the USAR equipment being deployed to and retrieved from the scene of operations, and are primarily responsible for: Establishing a main logistics area Identifying any missing inventory items on USAR modules as they arrive within the main logistics area Recording information about missing inventory items on the inventory hard copy list Co-ordinating and tracking the movement of specialist tools between worksites (see Control measure Carry out a sector assessment (ASR level 2) for information about worksites) and sectors, using a logging system Ensuring pre-use checks are carried out before equipment is released 16 of 231

22 Monitoring equipment use where the condition of safety-critical parts are repaired or replaced as required Ensuring cleaning and checking equipment for any damage prior to returning to storage on the relevant module Collating information on all items used, damaged, lost or remaining at the scene of the incident, and reporting this to the USAR group response co-ordination cell Liaising with The National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT) operations recovery support cell (ORSC) if established The prime contractor Equipment Maintenance and Repair Centre (EMRC) Mobile maintenance units (MMUs) Liaising with the USAR group response co-ordinator or other agencies to ensure the security of the forward logistics area The USAR logistics team will normally consist of a minimum of two operators per shift. However, this will depend on the geographical spread of the incident and the number of worksites and sectors in use, and may require additional operators. Provide USAR guidance material and supporting documentation for completion by specialist responders Specialist responders should: Establish and manage a USAR main logistics area Control measure Have clearly defined area of operations 17 of 231

23 To carry out a co-ordinated search plan, the best way of defining and subdividing the search area should be considered. Once designated, search teams should confirm this, and provide regular updates to the incident commander. Establish clearly defined parameters of the search area and subdivide into appropriate sizes depending on: Structure Terrain Natural features Type and size of transport involved Available resources If visibility is reduced, or at night, give additional consideration to using safe routes and landmarks. Ensure incident commanders understand the principles of search co-ordination Implement a co-ordinated search plan, define parameters and sub-divide the area where necessary Develop a plan based on Locate, Access, Stabilise, Transport (LAST) principles Control measure Carry out a wide area assessment (ASR level 1) Fire and rescue service initial responders may have carried out initial actions prior to the arrival of urban search and rescue (USAR) teams, for example reconnaissance and survey, elimination of utilities, primary surface search. 18 of 231

24 However, assessment, search and rescue (ASR) level 1 is an initial, rapid preliminary survey carried out by specialist responders of an assigned area for the purpose of: Determining the scope, nature and scale of the incident Identifying the exact location and types of damage Estimating the immediate USAR resource needs Establishing priorities Identifying general hazards Identifying any infrastructure or access issues Identifying potential USAR forward operating locations National Resilience should: Provide USAR guidance material and supporting documentation for completion by specialist responders Specialist responders should: Liaise with the incident commander and initial responders Remain mobile and not engage in rescue operations Report the results as quickly as possible, using a USAR 04 Wide Area Assessment Form Control measure Carry out a sector assessment (ASR level 2) The main purpose of this assessment is to identify specific and viable live rescue sites within an allocated sector of operations. It should be carried out as soon as possible after the wide area assessment (ASR level 1) and when sectors have been established. It needs to be a fast-paced but methodical assessment. 19 of 231

25 Depending on the extent and area of damage, the sector assessment is usually co-ordinated by an urban search and rescue (USAR) search manager. It is assumed that most of the ambulant casualties will have already been removed, therefore rescue operations are not usually carried out during this level. The benefits and limitations of search dogs, technical search equipment and drones should be considered when planning the assessment. Worksites and the worksite ID system Any site where significant USAR operations are likely to take place will be referred to as a worksite. However, if a worksite is identified as a potential live rescue location, it will be allocated a worksite ID. The worksite ID system uses sets of 25 identification cards for each USAR team. Worksite IDs display critical information about the particular worksite which is simple to understand and apply. It allows worksites to be easily recognised and should be applied to collapsed structures where USAR operations are undertaken. The worksite ID system assists in the co-ordination of USAR activity across potentially large sectors or areas of operations. National Resilience should: Provide USAR guidance material and supporting documentation for completion by specialist responders Specialist responders should: Liaise with the incident commander or USAR co-ordination cell Complete a USAR 05 Worksite Triage Form Request additional resources to carry out rescues if casualties are found Consider using search dogs Consider using technical search equipment Consider requesting drones 20 of 231

26 Allocate a worksite ID to appropriate worksites Control measure Ensure search teams have detailed briefing Before briefing personnel, incident commanders should consider all available sources of information. Team briefings should be based on incident needs and a plan should be constructed to achieve them. Continuous evaluation and review throughout the incident will determine whether the current objectives and subsequent plan are appropriate. Crews should be given a brief, including the area to be searched along with information available on casualties, their last known position (LKP) or point last seen (PLS). Ensure that incident commanders are competent in delivering clear and concise briefings to crews Brief search teams on plans, parameters and casualty information, confirming understanding Control measure Have a communication strategy: Search 21 of 231

27 Effective communications should be established with the search co-ordinator and the deployed crews. These are essential for a successful outcome to operations, both within the incident command structure where they are vital to the incident commander in ensuring that the current objectives and subsequent plan are appropriate, but also between safety officers and crews. If distances are adequate, verbal communications may be more appropriate during the dynamic stages of the incident. See National Operational Guidance: Incident command - Have a communication strategy There are no tactical actions associated with this control measure. Control measure Conduct search using thermal imaging equipment Thermal imaging equipment can be used to locate people, especially at night or if visibility is reduced. In these situations, thermal imaging equipment can prove invaluable to search operations. Thermal imaging equipment may include: Thermal imaging cameras Aerial appliances Unmanned aerial vehicles (Drones) Police/Coastguard helicopters Make arrangements for crews to access thermal imaging equipment for use at search incidents in poor visibility 22 of 231

28 Adopt a methodical system when using thermal imaging equipment to search for casualties Consider using a range of thermal imaging resources such as aerial appliances, drones and helicopters Control measure Provide adequate lighting Many searches will need to be undertaken at night or with reduced visibility. Adequate scene lighting should be used to define safe routes, and scene of operations. In some rescue situations generator powered lighting may hamper operations and present additional hazards; battery powered lighting that is silent and does not create toxic fumes should be considered. Consider how appropriate personal or scene lighting should be used Ensure sufficient lighting resources are requested Make sure generators are located at an appropriate distance from the scene of operations. This avoids exhaust fumes entering the void and can also reduce noise pollution Ensure sufficient quantities of fuel for generators are available at the scene to ensure a loss of lighting does not hamper rescue operations See National Operational Guidance: Operations - Manage hazards in the physical environment Provide operational crews with access to a range of lighting equipment suitable for use in rescue operations Request sufficient lighting resources appropriate to the activities and identified risks Consider using battery powered lighting to reduce noise and eliminate fumes 23 of 231

29 Locate generators at an appropriate distance from the scene to reduce risk from exhaust fumes and noise Secure fuel for generators to ensure loss of lighting does not hamper rescue operations Control measure Identify areas that have been searched To prevent duplication of effort and potential delays in covering unsearched areas, there should be effective search co-ordination as the incident progresses. Detailed debriefing of teams on their progress against objectives and the extent of the areas covered should be carried out and the results recorded. Any areas that have not yet been searched should be prioritised and identified to subsequent search teams as part of their brief. Have procedures for co-ordinating the areas to be searched Have procedures for debriefing teams following search and recording of outcomes in a way that can be shared with subsequent search teams Consider appointing a search coordinator to ensure all areas have been systematically searched Consider establishing a search sector to co-ordinate fire survival guidance and prioritise response Hazard Lack of co-ordinated search plan 24 of 231

30 (transport) Hazard Knowledge A search may be required for either a missing person or an absent person. If a co-ordinated search plan is not carried out in a timely and structured way, the casualty may not be located and their condition could potentially deteriorate. On arrival at incidents, the exact location of casualties or numbers involved may not be apparent, even after carrying out a scene assessment including an inner and outer survey (see below). Surveying the scene Once the incident commander has assessed the scene and determined the nature of any hazards present, they can decide to task others to carry out a more intensive survey of the scene. This can be achieved by initiating inner and outer surveys. Performing a scene survey gives a full picture of the incident and can save valuable time by allowing the rescuers to develop an adequate plan of action. Inner survey An inner survey allows closer examination of the vehicles or crafts. One or two rescuers walk adjacent to the vehicles, checking the immediate area for casualties and any hazards. During this assessment a look around and under the vehicles can help identify: That there are no further casualties underneath Any weak areas of the vehicle due to accident damage that will require additional stabilisation The presence of any fuel or oil from the accident The presence of supplementary restraint systems (SRS) Any other situation requiring attention, e.g. the position of catalytic converters Outer survey One or two rescuers walk completely around the vehicle. They look in towards the vehicle or craft and out to the perimeter of the scene, checking for casualties, obstructions, and any potential problems, while remaining a safe distance from the vehicle. All information gathered should be shared with personnel in attendance. Incident commanders should consider any areas of vehicles that may have not been thoroughly checked because they lack obvious signs of any casualties. With larger forms of transport - aircraft and trains that have crashed or derailed, for example - the interior will be unfamiliar. As a result of the damage, disorientation may lead to confusion for the search personnel. 25 of 231

31 For example, the interior of an aircraft may be unfamiliar to fire and rescue service personnel. It is therefore vital to personnel working inside the aircraft that firefighting, search and rescue operations are methodical. In these situations, fire and rescue services should use the knowledge and expertise of the rescue and firefighting service personnel (from an airport) if in attendance. Fire and rescue service personnel should be aware of the benefits of a structured and co-ordinated approach to search operations. Six elements should be considered; they will help in performing a well-controlled rescue from various forms of transport. These elements are: Scene assessment and safety Stabilisation and initial access Glass management Space creation Full access Immobilisation and casualty extrication techniques The involvement of other emergency services, such as specialist USAR teams, or appropriate resources and casualty care should be considered. Control measure Search in hidden voids Before briefing personnel, incident commanders should consider all available sources of information and assess the developing incident. Incident commanders and crews should have an understanding of the layout of various road vehicles, including passenger-carrying vehicles such as cars, minibuses and coaches, commercial light goods vehicles (LGV), trains and aircraft. Incident commanders should give crews specific briefings and ensure crews understand the plan. In structuring search plans, a thorough check of hidden voids should be considered. These include: Under seats Sleeping compartments on coaches, LGV, trains and aircraft Luggage compartments Toilets Cargo or luggage areas 26 of 231

32 Ensure all personnel have an understanding of the construction of vehicle or craft likely to be encountered in a rescue Ensure that a systematic inner and outer survey of search area is carried out Systematically search for casualties including underneath vehicles, in hidden voids and surrounding areas Control measure Review passenger/cargo manifests Where possible, incident commanders should review passenger lists to determine the number of persons involved (though this will not apply to certain types of transport such as local buses with a transient and variable amount of passengers). Incident commanders should also check the lists against the number of casualties located, and those who may have been taken to hospital before fire and rescue service resources arrived. Cargo and load manifests should be checked for any potential hazards to casualties and rescuers. Have support mechanisms to enable incident commanders to obtain information from transport operators 27 of 231

33 Question the driver and passengers to determine the number of persons and type of cargo involved Contact commercial vehicle operators to obtain passenger numbers and cargo information Control measure Be aware of seating and standing capacities Incident commanders should consider confirming the seating and standing capacities of larger forms of transport. This can indicate the potential number of persons involved, though it should be borne in mind that the vehicle may not have been full at the time of departure and may have had several drop off points. Refer to the control measure Review passenger/cargo manifests Searching in larger forms of transport should be done in a methodical manner and in a way that subsequent teams can assist or re-enter and continue with the search. The use of seat counting and simple laminated charts depicting seat layouts can be useful in identifying casualties and as a reference point for subsequent fire and rescue service rescue teams. Ensure all personnel have an understanding of the construction of vehicles and craft likely to be encountered in a rescue Consider counting the seats to identify potential number of casualties Control measure Look for occupancy indicators 28 of 231

34 Casualties may have fallen or been thrown clear due to the impact. The incident commander should consider other visual indicators to identify this possibility, including the presence of: Child seats Disabled badges or ramp access Personal effects Have arrangements for requesting search teams at incidents where casualties may be spread over a wide area. Investigate the scene looking for indicators of occupancy considering seating and standing capacities Hazard Working environment: Terrain Hazard Knowledge In this guidance, the term scene of operations or terrain applies to the conditions underfoot and physical objects, both manmade and natural, that fire and rescue service personnel may have to traverse to the scene of operations. There are generic hazards that may be encountered while gaining access to or operating at incidents such as wildfire; they should form part of the risk assessment process. Personnel need to carry equipment long distances and/or over rough terrain, increasing the likelihood of manual handling injuries, slips, trips and falls and other physical hazards. Some hazards present at the scene of operations may be identifiable on topographical maps, but personnel should be aware that the landscape and hazards may have changed after the maps were made. For example, areas of forest that appear on the map may have been thinned or clear felled, changing the hazards that were present and potentially creating new hazards. 29 of 231

35 The hazards present at the scene of operations can be controlled and mitigated by good indecent ground safety management, identifying safe access, egress and escape routes, and by ensuring personnel operate at a safe distances from hazards. It is also critical that all personnel maintain situational awareness of the fire and their surroundings to identify potential hazards, implement control measures and maintain safety. Terrain Poor conditions underfoot will increase the risk of slips, trips and falls. The terrain may present hazards, either en route to, or at, the scene of operations, including: Tree roots Holes Stump holes Steep gradients Cliffs Quarries Disused mines and shafts Bogs, marshes and fens Irrigation ditches Walls, hedges and fencing Shooting ranges (commercial or military) Hunting areas Reduced visibility and working at night Visibility at the scene of operations may be reduced through smoke, weather conditions or lack of daylight. This may mean that: Personnel are unable to see the fire Personnel are unable to see each other Personnel may become isolated, disorientated or lost Commanders may have difficulty in monitoring the location of all personnel Other hazards at the scene of operations, as outlined in this section, may be concealed from view The current and future levels of visibility at the scene of operations need to be carefully considered in tactical plans for wildfires. Also, the direction and impact of smoke travel should be considered when deploying personnel at the incident, and when identifying any potential impact on members of the public and transport routes. For example, smoke could reduce visibility on public roadways or affect air traffic. Shooting ranges/areas and military training areas Ordnance, ammunition and weapons may be present in shooting ranges/areas and military training areas. Unexploded ordnance and ammunition may also be present at areas previously used for shooting or military training. Extra care should be taken when attending incidents in or near these 30 of 231

36 areas. For wildfire incidents on or near military training areas or shooting areas, fire and rescue services should always liaise closely with the Ministry of Defence, or Ministry of Defence land agents, before deploying personnel.. Pipelines Gas or oil pipelines may be present either above or underground, which may present a hazard. Control measure Safe access and egress: Terrain Before briefing personnel, incident commanders should consider all available sources of information and assess the developing incident. Team briefings should be based on the incident with safe access and egress routes highlighted. This should ensure crews are not exposed to potential risks. Underfoot conditions and prevailing weather conditions should be taken into account, with continuous evaluation and review throughout the incident to determine whether the current incident plan is effective. Access and egress routes from vehicles and craft should be maintained, taking into account that an alternative egress route may need to be established if the mode of transport becomes more unstable or moves. When identifying access, egress and escape routes, all of the hazards at the scene of operations and the current and predicted weather conditions should be considered. These routes should be monitored and reviewed continuously throughout the incident. Team briefings should include information on access, egress and escape routes. Any changes to these routes need to be communicated to all personnel as soon as possible. The ability to read and understand topographical maps is critical in identifying access, egress and escape routes. However, the suitability of routes should also be confirmed through observation or reconnaissance. Provide suitable maps and/or mapping systems to aid navigation across terrain 31 of 231

37 Ensure personnel have an appropriate understanding of topographical maps Ensure personnel have appropriate navigation skills Clearly define access, egress and escape routes to personnel and confirm their understanding Provide team briefings that include information on access, egress and escape routes Communicate any changes to routes to all personnel as soon as possible Establish, identify and communicate safe traffic routes, establish clear zones and equipment points Control measure Safe night time operations There are enhanced hazards associated with personnel operating at night. Reduced visibility at night is also likely to increase the time taken to complete tasks and may reduce the effectiveness of some activities. Any activities and operations completed at night must be fully risk-assessed, and the hazards balanced against the potential effectiveness and benefits. The hours of darkness are generally characterised by cooler temperatures, higher fuel moisture and higher relative humidity levels, all of which can substantially reduce fire intensity, rate of spread and the likelihood of extreme fire behaviour. Operating at night can therefore provide windows of opportunity for suppression. Provide personnel with appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) and equipment for operating at night Provide an effective communications network for operating at night 32 of 231

38 Ensure personnel have appropriate navigation skills for operating at night Review the area during daylight before deploying personnel at night Deploy additional incident ground safety management measures at night to take into account reduced visibility Limiting operations to specific tasks during the hours of darkness Hazard Noise Hazard Knowledge Exposure to excessive noise over a period of time can lead to permanent hearing loss or Tinnitus. Factors that contribute to hearing damage are noise levels and how long people are exposed to the noise, daily or over a number of years. Permanent hearing damage can be caused immediately by sudden, extremely loud, explosive noises, e.g. from guns or cartridge-operated machines. In this guidance, the term noise incorporates any form of sound in an environment that is due to industrial processes, machinery, transport or alarms and that can affect the ability to communicate effectively or to hear audible warning devices. Fire and rescue service personnel may need to work at industrial sites where there are on-site alarms and warning systems. This may present a hazard if alarms have been activated. The alarms may be associated with a single building, may operate site-wide or even be installed to provide a warning to those outside the site s boundary. Alarms or audible warning devices may interfere with: Communications The impact on emergency evacuation instructions Response to the actuation of an automatic distress signal unit (ADSU) The ability to hear distress calls from casualties In defining this hazard and associated control measures, it is assumed that the appropriate resources (personnel and equipment) are available, and that personnel have the training required to appreciate the potential impact of noise on communication between the incident commander and crews, crews directly and may prevent rescuers from hearing a casualty. 33 of 231

39 See: The Control of Noise at Work Regulations 2005 Control measure Reduce risk from exposure to noise Fire and rescue services must assess the risk and identify measures to eliminate or reduce the consequences of exposure to noise. Pre-planning should identify known sources of noise and identify control measures that reduce risk. Incident commanders in dynamic environments should identify safe systems of work which may include eliminating the noise by switching off equipment, increasing the distance of the people at risk from the source or wearing hearing protection. Fire and rescue services must: Assess and identify measures to eliminate or reduce risk from exposure to noise in the workplace Provide suitable hearing protection for operational staff Record information about noise hazards in the Site-Specific Risk Information (SSRI) Eliminate noise hazards by switching off the source of the noise Reduce exposure by rotating crews and increasing the distance from the hazard Wear hearing protection as identified in service risk assessment, procedures and training Consider alternatives to audible evacuation signals where they may be ineffective due to background noise 34 of 231

40 Hazard Unstable ground Hazard Knowledge In this guidance, sudden collapse or the failure of unstable ground can be attributed to adverse weather conditions or naturally occurring erosion that has undermined the integrity of the ground, so that it can fail without warning. The presence of unstable ground after a partial building collapse should also be considered. Through knowledge pooling between various agencies and information sharing in local emergency planning groups; fire and rescue service personnel should be aware of specific areas within service boundaries where there is a risk of failure from unstable ground. Involving specialist fire and rescue teams (such as USAR and line rescue) and other emergency services or appropriate resources should be considered. See National Operational Guidance: Operations - Bodies of water and unstable ground Control measure Employ a safe system of work to recover casualties and rescuers Incident commanders should consider implementing a safe system of work which is capable of recovering casualties and their rescuers. A recoverable system using line equipment is an example, but may not be appropriate in all circumstances. Ensure that crews understand the importance of having tag line and recovery systems in place when deploying crews around areas of existing and potential ground collapse 35 of 231

41 Ensure personnel working around unstable ground are secured using work restraint or fall arrest systems Establish tag line and recovery systems for crews deployed around unstable ground Hazard Animals Hazard Knowledge Encountering animals or insects may result in personnel from the fire and rescue service, other emergency services and agencies being unable to deliver operational plans effectively; any resultant delay may cause the incident to deteriorate. Fire service engagement with animals at incidents may include: Trapped animals requiring release or evacuation from an area Animals contained in buildings threatened by fire Loose and stray animals, including animals emerging from concealed areas and fleeing across paths, roads or waterways For the purposes of this guidance, the term animals refers to: Wild animals Domesticated animals Livestock Reptiles Arachnids Insects Members of the public endangering themselves in an attempt to rescue an animal and how they behave if they see an animal in distress should be considered when evaluating tactical plans. Domesticated and non-domesticated animals or insects could be encountered in any environment while conducting fire service operations. Animals may be encountered at any incident but are especially likely at: Farms Veterinary facilities 36 of 231

42 Boarding kennels and catteries Equine facilities see supplementary information Zoos, aquariums and wildlife parks see supplementary information Circuses Laboratories Abattoirs This hazard could also apply to semi-captive animals, such as bees that are kept in hives. The possible consequences to responders from contact with animals include: Crush injuries Puncture wounds Abrasions, cuts and bruising Bites and stings Infection and disease In a laboratory environment, the infections and diseases may not be restricted to those normally carried by animals. Personnel should be aware that dogs, including guard dogs, whether trained or untrained, may act unpredictably, especially if frightened by fire or of the large number of people and vehicles arriving at the site. Incident commanders should consider defensive tactics until any dogs are removed or contained. Flood survivors may have pets and animals that need to be dealt with during the follow-on rescue effort. The RSPCA has a flood rescue capability and will be able to provide advice and assistance when dealing with animals. Large numbers of dead animals may become a public health hazard if not properly managed. Control measure Understand animal behaviour When approaching animals, or working where animals are present, personnel need to understand animal instinct and behaviour. When feeling threatened and fearful, animals resort to natural instinct and have defence mechanisms that may cause unwanted or unpredictable behaviour, such as panic and flight or aggression. 37 of 231

43 The reaction of an animal to a perceived threat will differ, depending on: The species of animal The nature of the entrapment or perceived threat Levels of stimulation Operational activity Environmental conditions Failure to understand and anticipate the behaviour of animals may pose a risk to life, an immediate threat to safety and have a negative impact on implementing the tactical plan. It may also restrict or block access, egress and escape routes for personnel and vehicles. The behaviour of frightened, trapped or stressed animals may be unpredictable, especially if they are protecting their territory or young. Animals can be affected by the sound or sight of the incident including flashing lights on appliances and the sounding of audible warning devices; these may cause animals to panic or stampede. Some livestock are inquisitive and may move towards the scene of activity, however, any sudden movement or noise could start a stampede. Ensure that information about animals, where held in a permanent location, is included in Site-Specific Risk Information (SSRI) Consider providing personnel with access to specialist information on animals Ensure personnel have a basic level of awareness of animal behaviour Consider providing personnel with the means of controlling animals and insects where their presence may hamper rescue operations Ensure that personnel are aware of mechanisms for animal containment (e.g. corralling, herding etc.) Consider the impact of operational activity and equipment noise on animal behaviour 38 of 231

44 Turn off lights, beacons and audible warning devices where possible, to prevent agitating animals Monitor and assess onsite activity involving animals that could impact fire and rescue service personnel Control measure Contain or avoid animals Consider isolating the animals or insects, where appropriate, to prevent exposure or injury to fire and rescue service personnel, other agencies and the casualty. Fire and rescue personnel should always try to avoid any animals that may be present at a wildfire incident. If they cannot be avoided, animals should ideally be kept under control and/or separated from operational responders and members of the public. Personnel should be aware that loose animals, particularly in smoke, may present an immediate and unforeseen hazard. If it is necessary to enter an area where animals are kept, take advice from on-site staff and close gates, cages or pens where possible. Assistance may be provided by: Animal owners or handlers Animal welfare charities Veterinary surgeons and nurses Farmworkers Zookeepers These specialists may be able to give advice on animal behaviour, handle the animals correctly or sedate them if required. As a precaution, it may be necessary to seek the assistance of the police, especially if they are required to deal with an animal that escapes. 39 of 231

45 Identify and communicate the presence of animals and any associated risk to responders and the public Contain animals or isolate crews using existing or improvised barriers Consider alternative routes if access or egress is obstructed by the presence of animals or insects Ensure personnel do not touch or handle animals unless unavoidable Consider contingency arrangements if personnel may become isolated in areas where animals present a risk Control measure Specialist advice: Animals Assistance from owners or keepers should be sought if appropriate, or consider other agencies such as animal welfare charities. In particular, consider issues arising from the presence of animals or insects such as the risk of infection or disease and their implications on casualty care. Consider requesting advice and support from animal specialists including: Animal owners Land owners Farmers 40 of 231

46 Land managers Responsible persons Animal rescue/behaviour specialists Fire and rescue service animal rescue specialists Veterinary practices Animal welfare charities Defra Local authority animal health inspectors Where the facilities contain dangerous animals, fire and rescue personnel should liaise with on-site staff to determine locations with potential hazards and to identify safe access and egress routes. Fire and rescue service personnel should be accompanied by on-site staff and there should not be any unsupervised working. Animals should be secured so that they cannot come into contact with fire and rescue service personnel. Fire and rescue service personnel should remain vigilant, especially regarding the security arrangements in animal facilities, to prevent them from being accidentally locked in cages or other areas. For further information refer to Hazard: Security features. On-site CCTV can be used to support monitoring the animal facility, and assessing any activity that could impact on fire and rescue service personnel. The responsible person may be able to provide information about antidotes, antivenom or specialist treatment, in case this is required. See also National Operational Guidance: Operations Manage risk from biological hazards Make arrangements for mutual aid for animal rescue or evacuation Consider pre-planning with land owners, land managers and other animal owners to consider how they would deal with their animals in a wildfire situation Liaise with animal charity and other animal associations in conjunction with the statutory resilience forum to develop tactical plans and contingencies 41 of 231

47 Identify and liaise with the owner or person responsible for any animals involved Identify resources that may be available to contain or corral animals if needed Request support with managing animals from owners, keepers, police, vets or welfare organisations Control measure Rescue or evacuate animals The preferred option for fire and rescue services is to avoid or isolate animals during incidents. However, there will be incidents when the fire and rescue service has to consider helping to rescue or evacuate animals involved. Techniques employed when evacuating animals from a place of danger to a place of safety may take many forms and be entirely dependent on the nature of the danger, the species involved and the number of animals. Specialist advice should be sought from animal rescue or behaviour specialists, either within the fire and rescue service or from other organisations. The primary consideration needs to be the safety of the public and of personnel on the incident ground. When engaging other organisations and animal owners with rescuing or evacuating animals, it is essential to remember that the behavioural characteristics of animals are likely to be very different from those exhibited in non-emergency situations. This means that all personnel in the vicinity of the animals need to be clearly briefed and closely supervised. Effective communication and liaison between the fire and rescue service and animal owners or responsible persons is important for ensuring that any incident involving animals is dealt with safely and effectively. Small animals can usually be dealt with by using animal cages and responders should consider having a supply of them. Dogs may require muzzling before being transported and large animals may require specialist equipment to move them. 42 of 231

48 Establish joint working arrangements with animal facilities in their area Provide familiarisation information for fire and rescue service personnel Brief personnel on the animal-related hazards or animal evacuation techniques Evacuate animals along appropriate routes to holding areas away from the incident Control measure Personal protective equipment (PPE) Personal protective equipment (PPE) is equipment that will protect the user against health or safety risks. It can include items such as helmets, gloves, eye protection, high-visibility clothing and safety footwear. Equipment such as Chemical Protective Suits (CPC), Respiratory Protective Equipment (RPE) and safety harnesses are considered PPE and are covered in more detail elsewhere in guidance. PPE should be regarded as a last resort where risks to health and safety cannot be adequately controlled in other ways. Service risk assessments should define the specific PPE required for an activity to avoid unsuitable selection. If more than one item of PPE is to be worn, they must be compatible with each other and adequately control the risks when used together. PPE must be maintained in good working order and properly stored when not in use. Employees must make proper use of PPE in accordance with training received and report any loss, damage, destruction or fault. During protracted incidents and when making up equipment personnel may be inclined to relax PPE; incident commanders should be vigilant and base any decision to downgrade the need for PPE on an assessment of residual risk. 43 of 231

49 When PPE has become dirty, contaminated or damaged it may not perform to the standard required by the appropriate specification. PPE should only be worn if it has been subject to appropriate cleaning or decontamination and testing processes. See: Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992 For further information on respiratory protective equipment see, National Operational Guidance: Operations - Respiratory Protective Equipment Fire and rescue services must: Provide employees with suitable personal protective equipment that fits the wearer correctly and adequately controls identified risks Ensure that personal protective equipment and respiratory protective equipment worn simultaneously is compatible and does not negatively impact other safety measures Provide appropriate accommodation for personal protective equipment when not in use Specify the level of PPE for hazards identified through risk assessment and communicate to personnel Have suitable arrangements for the cleaning and maintenance of PPE in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions Ensure that there are suitable arrangements to support the replenishment of PPE Ensure that all personnel wear the level of PPE identified by service risk assessments, procedures and training Ensure the appropriate PPE is maintained throughout the incident based on an assessment of risk Check the condition and serviceability of PPE when assessing operational readiness for 44 of 231

50 redeployment Recognise the potential contamination of equipment and PPE and follow service procedures Extrication of a casualty Casualties may need to be extricated from many environments. Further information will be provided in the 'Context' guidance including: Road transport systems (including Highways Agency managed motorways) Underground rail transport systems Overground rail transport systems, including overhead line equipment (OLE) Air transport systems Maritime environments and waterways (including docks and boatyards) Underground structures (including tunnels and mines) (not yet published) Areas with restricted access or egress (not yet published) Confined spaces (not yet published) In this guidance, the term 'mode of transport' refers to any form of transport such as aircraft, rail vehicles, road vehicles, vessel or craft and will be referred to as 'vehicle or craft'. For further information, see National Operational Guidance: Water rescue and flooding. Each form of transport has its own set of hazards, relating to the materials used in construction, its contents and so on. Information on these hazards can be found in the relevant sections of this guidance. Extrication of casualties may result in exposure to various hazards, many of which may be encountered at any incident. The control measures to address these more generic hazards will be found in the Operations guidance including: Manual handling Slips, trips and falls (on the same level) Falls from working at height Trauma/psychological stress Body fluids from casualties Physiological stress from work Mechanical hazards Environmental hazards Animal hazards 45 of 231

51 Extrication of casualties will take place within the inner cordon of the incident. The Incident Command guidance provides information about establishing cordons. A casualty can suffer further injury, illness or death from the incident if they do not receive prompt medical aid. By adopting a systematic approach to casualty care, any life-threatening conditions can be rapidly identified and managed. Hazard Failure to extricate the casualty without deterioration of their condition Hazard Knowledge The primary focus should be on the extrication of the casualty. The impact of any secondary hazards that exist because of the location of the casualty should also be managed. Control measure Situational awareness Situational awareness is a person's perception and understanding of the situation they face. It includes their anticipation of what the situation may become, including the impact of their actions. For an incident commander, it is their perspective of the scene of operations. A commander's situational awareness of an incident is made up of many sources of information that are interpreted into a coherent picture in a way that makes sense to them. The incident commander's situational awareness forms a basis for: Assessing risk and making decisions Identifying and prioritising objectives Developing an incident plan Anticipating how an incident will develop 46 of 231

52 Predicting the consequences of actions Insufficient situational awareness may lead to incident commanders potentially overlooking information when they make decisions. It is important to consider the relationship between the information that was reasonably available and how the working conditions at an incident may affect their ability to process information. Post-incident evaluations of operational decisions should take this relationship into account. The three stages of situational awareness are: Information gathering Understanding information Anticipation Information gathering Incident commanders will gather information from a variety of sources to gain accurate situational awareness. Fire and rescue services should ensure that incident commanders have access to all the available and necessary information, such as risk information, to assist this process. Sources to inform situational awareness may include: Fire control: Information gathered from callers and other systems Local knowledge: Communication with crews including previous incident history Site-Specific Risk Information (SSRI): Where available this should be accessed, the accuracy of information confirmed and used to inform decision making Weather conditions: Influence on incident development and safety of crews Time of day: Effect on persons and environment Scene survey: Reconnaissance of the scene to gain information using sight, sound, smell and touch Communication: With the responsible person, other responders and witnesses to gain an understanding of the history of the incident development including numbers and locations of persons missing or unaccounted for On-site information: Building, emergency or evacuation via mobile data terminals Understanding information After a commander gathers information, they will process it and extract the meaning. As a result, they will form an understanding of the incident. Experience, context and assumptions can supplement or distort the incident commander's interpretation of the scene. Anticipation Fire and rescue services should ensure that incident commanders use their understanding of the situation to anticipate what is likely to happen next; for example, how the situation might develop and the consequences of their actions. This means it is vital that their interpretation reflects the actual situation, which will allow the incident commander to effectively plan their operational activities. 47 of 231

53 Effective situational awareness Effective situational awareness ensures that the interpretation reflects the actual situation. This is critical for making appropriate decisions and predicting the likely effects of activities. The following may assist effective situational awareness: Clear briefing Minimising distractions during critical tasks Appropriate spans of control Regular review Self-awareness of stress and fatigue Factors that affect situational awareness Fire and rescue services should ensure incident commanders are aware of the factors that can affect situational awareness. Incident commanders should understand how to put in place the means to monitor the operational environment to detect changes and maintain an accurate understanding of the situation. For example, by using an appropriate command structure and communication network, together with operational assurance/active monitoring arrangements. Forming an accurate understanding of the situation is risk-critical. Incident commanders should be aware of the factors likely to affect their situational awareness. New information about risks may come to light as crews work on their tasks. As the incident commander may not be aware of this information, they rely on each person to complete their own risk assessment. New information may affect the incident plan and the safety of people operating in that area, so it is important that personnel are aware of their responsibilities for identifying hazards and assessing risks to influence their actions. Relevant information should also be relayed to the incident commander as appropriate. Fire and rescue services must: Provide effective training and development programmes to ensure incident commanders are able to develop and practice the skill of situational awareness. Assessment processes and exercises should assess the effectiveness of an individual's ability to gain situational awareness and provide constructive feedback to allow learning. Ensure incident commanders are aware of the factors that can affect situational awareness Ensure that incident commanders are trained to use their understanding of the situation to anticipate what is likely to happen next (for example, how the situation might develop and the consequences of their actions) 48 of 231

54 All personnel should: Ensure that all relevant incident information is relayed to the incident commander Gather information from available sources to gain accurate situational awareness and understanding Ensure that a full scene survey is carried out at the earliest opportunity to gain sensory perception of the current situation and hazards present Consider requesting a drone to assist with informing accurate situational awareness Question the responsible person, other responders and witnesses to understand incident factors and history Anticipate the likely development of the incident and evaluate the potential consequences of a range of actions Maintain situational awareness and identify changes during the incident through active monitoring and regular briefings Control measure Request resources for extrication Some rescue situations may require resources in terms of personnel and equipment that are beyond the capability of the initial response. Incident commanders should make an assessment of their available capabilities against the likely development of the incident and request sufficient resources to enable a timely extrication of casualties. Such resources may include heavy duty or specialist cutting equipment and heavy recovery vehicles. 49 of 231

55 Have arrangements to enable the request of specialist rescue equipment that may be required at incidents Request adequate resources to enable effective search and timely extrication of casualties Request attendance of heavy or specialist rescue equipment (consider other agencies and USAR) Consider requesting additional resources or specialist teams to assist with the transportation of casualties Consider requesting specialist resources to transport people and equipment to the scene Control measure Stabilise the casualty The principles of casualty care listed below apply to all casualties, including trapped and nontrapped casualties: Protect the casualty from the hazards associated with the event Minimise on-scene time Extricate the casualty in the quickest way possible, considering their injuries and the overall threat to their life 50 of 231

56 Provide training to crews on casualty stabilisation and scene safety Stabilise life threatening injuries or conditions and maintain casualty care throughout incident Stabilise casualties until resources or specialist teams are available to assist with extrication Control measure Extricate the casualty A number of control measures may need to be implemented depending on the location of the casualty, their condition and the equipment and resources available and used. Secondary hazards identified in making the inner cordon safer may previously have been managed, but may need to be considered further where interaction is required to carry out extrication of the casualty as a result of moving, manipulating, cutting or working in closer vicinity of the secondary hazard and so on. It is also likely that secondary hazards not previously identified will become apparent during an extrication. Refer to the control measures in the following sections of this guidance: Extrication - Generic - Equipment used by other agencies Extrication - Generic - Tools Provide personnel with training in a range of extrication techniques based on local risk 51 of 231

57 Develop and communicate immediate release, emergency and full extrication plans Carry out any rescues or lifesaving actions Implement a co-ordination process for fire survival guidance being given by fire control Deploy personnel with suitable equipment to rescue casualties based on information and risk Consider extrication methods which do not require the use of tools or equipment Consider benefits to casualty of immediate extrication or medical attention in-situ Extricate the casualty considering their injuries and overall threat to life Hazard Electricity: Supply in contact with person, ground or vehicle Hazard Knowledge Electricity supply in contact with ground When high-voltage equipment is in contact with the ground (or an uninsulated object is touching the ground), there is a risk of the ground itself becoming live and transferring the voltage to anybody present within a few metres. This can happen whether the ground is wet or dry. The highest voltage is on the ground closest to the point of contact. It gradually reduces, in concentric rings, the further you are from the point of contact. This hazard is also known as potential gradient or voltage gradient. When walking towards or away from the point of contact, each foot can have a difference in electrical potential, resulting in one foot touching one voltage while the other is touching another voltage. The two voltages will try to equalise by flowing up one leg, through the body and down the other leg. This will be indicated by a tingling sensation. If the ground has become live a similar situation can occur when standing with a charged hose. The 52 of 231

58 voltage differential will be between where you are standing and where the hose is in contact with the ground. The Energy Networks Association has produced Safety Information for the Fire Service. This contains information on emergency situations involving electricity, along with important contact numbers for electricity companies. Electricity supply in contact with vehicle There may be occasions when high-voltage equipment is in contact with a vehicle but not with the ground. The vehicle tyres may insulate the electricity from the ground. Any personal contact with the vehicle and ground at the same time will offer the electricity a path to the ground and may result in electrocution. The Energy Networks Association has produced Safety Information for the Fire Service. This contains information on emergency situations involving electricity, along with important contact numbers for electricity companies. Control measure Remain in place: Electricity If somebody is in a vehicle that has become affected by high-voltage equipment and there is a risk of the vehicle becoming live, they should be instructed to remain in the vehicle, if safe for them to do so, until the power supply has been isolated. Until the supply to the electrical installation can be isolated by the distribution network operator (DNO) or competent person, responding emergency personnel should keep a safe distance from the vehicle. Establish arrangements with local distribution network operators (DNOs) and maintain up-todate emergency contact details in their fire control rooms 53 of 231

59 Instruct person at risk of electrocution to remain in place if it is safe for them to do so Control measure Safe withdrawal from live electricity If it is necessary to rescue a casualty who is within 5m of a high-voltage conductor, the following steps should be followed: Request permission from the designated competent person to perform the rescue of a casualty, providing information such as: Condition of casualty Distance and position of the casualty in relation to the conductor Whether the casualty is at, above or below ground level Weather conditions Transmission tower markings and signs Record permission when received Carry out a risk assessment Proceed with caution However, if it can be determined that a casualty is in direct contact with a low-voltage conductor: Carry out a risk assessment Pull the casualty clear using electrical gloves or other dry insulating material An exclusion zone of at least 5m should be implemented. To minimise the effects of the equalisation of voltages when leaving the exclusion zone, one of the following methods should be used: Shuffle, keeping both feet close together, maintaining contact with the ground at all times Hop, making sure that both feet hit the ground at the same time Make leaping strides, so that one foot is off the ground at all times In extreme circumstances, for example, if the vehicle is on fire, it may not be safe for people to remain in the vehicle. If this is the case, they will need to leave the affected vehicle in a safe 54 of 231

60 manner. An exclusion zone of at least 5m should be implemented. To minimise the effects of the equalisation of voltages when leaving the exclusion zone, one of the following methods should be used: Shuffle, keeping both feet close together, maintaining contact with the ground at all times Hop, making sure that both feet hit the ground at the same time Make leaping strides, so that one foot is off the ground at all times If the person is unable to self-extricate, refer to Extrication from vehicle. Provide information, instruction and training to all personnel on safe procedures for the rescue of persons at risk from electrocution Instruct people to leave the exclusion zone using an appropriate method Consider advising persons at risk from electrocution to jump clear of source of live electricity, breaking all contact with it Consider using insulating materials for the persons to step onto as they move away from source of live electricity Stay 1 metre from live parts of the system when performing a rescue of person in contact with live electricity Extrication - generic 55 of 231

61 Hazard Medical equipment Hazard Knowledge In this document, the term 'equipment used by other agencies' refers primarily to equipment used by the ambulance service. This will include 'sharps' such as syringes and scalpels, and also drugs and oxygen. Further information can be found in the Casualty care section. The hazards posed by the equipment used by other agencies include: Puncture wounds Cross-contamination Cuts Lacerations Explosion It is reasonable to assume that the ambulance service will take responsibility for its own equipment. However, it is also reasonable to assume that when medical interventions on a casualty are taking place inside a vehicle, some equipment may be scattered. Other agencies do not always practise the discipline of creating an ordered equipment or tool point and this can create issues for maintaining a safe working environment. It is important to realise that different agencies at the same incident have different ways of working, and may have different priorities to fire and rescue service personnel. This may also include their approach to appropriate levels of personal protective equipment (PPE). Co-operation and communication are important to resolve the incident. Regardless of the agency, or number of agencies, they should be focused on the casualty, making the incident safe and using a casualty centred rescue approach. Control measure Identify and communicate medical equipment in use Identifying the medical processes in place is the first step to controlling the hazard. Letting crews 56 of 231

62 know if needles are in use has a self-explanatory effect. The importance of communicating with other agencies cannot be understated. Ensure that personnel have an understanding of the equipment likely to be encountered and the associated risks when working on multi-agency rescue operations Liaise with other agencies to identify and understand their activities and equipment Control measure Isolate and remove medical equipment Medical personnel normally carry sharps cases. In their absence, signposting, removing or covering up sharps in such a way that they do not become a hidden hazard should be considered. Consider that the casualty could be carrying personal medical equipment required to manage their health condition. Medical alert tags, bracelets or cards may provide an indication of this. Be alert to the potential presence of non-prescription sharps. For further information, see National Operational Guidance: Operations - Manage risk from biological hazards Ensure that personnel are aware of the risks posed by contaminants such as body fluids and routes of entry 57 of 231

63 Identify and isolate personal medical equipment that presents a risk to responders Avoid handling sharps if possible and take precautions when it is necessary to handle sharps Control measure Be oxygen aware Remember that medical oxygen should not be contaminated with grease or oil; there is an associated hazard of ignition between a fuel and an oxidiser. Refer to the HazMat guidance for further information. The use of oxygen at an incident scene will pose additional hazards because oxygen supports combustion, making non-combustible items likely to become more flammable. If the oxygen cylinder is damaged in any way during an extrication, and this results in a larger uncontrolled leak, it should be identified and managed immediately. Further information can be found in the Casualty care section. Ensure that all personnel are aware of the risk presented by working with medical oxygen Identify and communicate the presence of any oxygen equipment to emergency responders Wear medical gloves when handling oxygen equipment and ensure isolation from oil and grease Consider the risk from oxygen enrichment when using tools, equipment or defibrillators Control measure Establish an equipment, resource 58 of 231

64 or tool area Fire and rescue service equipment or tool points, and good housekeeping in the immediate vicinity of the incident, help create a safer working environment for all personnel. Consider establishing a personnel marshalling point - a location for unused personnel from all agencies to congregate away from the immediate scene of operations. For example, a screwdriver dropped on the floor in the extrication path of a casualty being removed from a vehicle by emergency responders may seem innocuous. But if an emergency responder slips on the screwdriver and loses their balance while managing the casualty's head and neck, the outcome could be significant. Have procedures for safe management of the incident ground including equipment, personnel and debris Consider establishing an equipment, tool, debris or personnel areas Encourage the use of fire service equipment or tool area by ambulance personnel and other agencies Hazard Rescue tools Hazard Knowledge In this guidance, the term 'tools' relates to different types of specialist rescue equipment such as: Cutters Rams 59 of 231

65 Spreaders Combination tools Reciprocating saws Angle grinders Disc cutters Chisels This list is not exhaustive and encompasses tools powered by manual, battery, pneumatic and hydraulic systems. The hazards posed by tools may occur as a result of a malfunction, misuse or in normal use by the operator. These may include: Noise Muscular skeletal injuries Projectiles Impact injuries Crush injuries Amputations Sparks High pressure liquids/hydraulic injections Irrespirable exhaust gases Dust / toxic particles Corrosives Toxic materials Irritants Flammable substances For further information, see National Operational Guidance: Operations - Physical hazards and National Operational Guidance: Operations - Chemical hazards It is reasonable to assume that all fire and rescue service equipment will be well-maintained and tested, and only used by trained operators. However, it is also reasonable to assume that a combination of advances in materials, ageing equipment and human error can all contribute towards safety events, which encourages further control measures. Refer to the Extrication sections relating to vehicle construction for further information about composite materials, metals and other materials. Although equipment is manufactured with safety features to prevent and protect against misuse or malfunctions, operators should still be aware of the varied materials being tackled and the energies involved, whether stored inside the structure or as part of the operation of the tool; high-pressure liquids and hydraulic injections for example. 60 of 231

66 Control measure Use methods of space creation Personnel should employ a hierarchical approach to creating space, using the easiest and/or quickest methods as a priority such as creating space through the adjustment of internal features like seats, steering controls and removal of any luggage. Using larger tools such as hydraulic rescue equipment may not be the most appropriate solution. Opportunities may exist to use spanners, torque wrenches and smaller tools that may support simultaneous activity better. Alternative extrication paths for the casualty should be identified to ensure they can be safely removed, whilst considering their injuries and the overall threat to their life. The use of tools to create or maintain space should not impede the plan of action and extrication route. Tackling high strength components used in construction may introduce high energy dispersal throughout the item. Formulating a space creation plan to suit the needs of the rescuers and casualties should be considered, which involves tackling components that can be displaced and/or removed using low energy strategies. Refer to the Extrication sections for new or heavy vehicle construction. Other agencies may need to attend the incident, such as medics, environment agencies, vehicle recovery companies, Highways Agency, police collision investigation team, and so on. They may need access to the incident to perform their respective roles. Where a vehicle or craft has come in to contact with street lighting, agencies such as electricity providers may need to be contacted to isolate the power. If a tree is resting on a vehicle, specialist resources may need to be contacted to aid with the extrication. Ensure that personnel have a good understanding of space creation techniques in a range of rescue environments 61 of 231

67 Identify and request assistance from other agencies where specialist response is required Brief agencies working in the inner cordon on hazards and control measures Implement appropriate space creation techniques in line with the casualty extrication plan Consider prioritising rescuer access and egress when developing the space creation plan Consider internal contents and furniture when developing the space creation plan Be aware that the size, shape and integrity of the structure may change during space creation Consider the integrity of the surrounding structures and environment before, during and after space creation Control measure Identify the most appropriate rescue tool for the task Once the need for a tool is identified, it is important for the operator to select the most appropriate tool for the task. Most manufacturers offer an extensive range of tools, from small tools designed for use in confined compartments to heavy duty tools designed for use on Large Goods Vehicles (LGV). Selecting the smallest tool appropriate for the task can help to avoid manual handling injury to the operator and reduce the need to rotate crews, speeding up the extrication while avoiding unnecessary imposition on the casualty. See National Operational Guidance: Operations. Manufacturers offer guidance on best practice in using their tools, which is cascaded to crews during regular training. This guidance should normally include connecting the equipment, use, possible techniques, advantages, limitations and ongoing maintenance requirements to ensure that the tools are operationally ready. Ensure personnel have access to a range of rescue tools suitable for the environments likely to be encountered by rescuers Ensure that all operators are aware of the limitations and manufacturer's guidance on the use of rescue tools Have a schedule of inspection and maintenance for rescue tools 62 of 231

68 Select the appropriate rescue tool considering the condition of the casualty, extrication plan and materials Monitor rescue tool performance for indicators of unidentified materials Control measure Manage tool operatives and their actions Effective management of tool operatives and maintaining crew discipline within the inner cordon will improve the effectiveness of simultaneous activity. Incident commanders should consider establishing a marshalling point for personnel to report to following completion of their task. A safe working area should be established immediately around the tool operation wherever possible. Only essential personnel should be in the area (approx. 2 to 5 metres from the tool). Other responders and casualties should be warned immediately before the operation of tools by the use of terms such as 'cutting', 'spreading' or 'impact' to alert them to the potential for noise and movement caused by the tool's action. At extrications a safety officer's role will involve overseeing the actions of emergency responders using tools and ensuring their safety. This wider view allows improved awareness of the impact of the tool operations, the item being operated on and those directly surrounding it. See National Operational Guidance: Incident Command - Establish appropriate cordon controls and National Operational Guidance: Incident Command - Incident ground safety management Provide information and training to operational personnel on the safe operation of rescue tools in a range of extrication situations 63 of 231

69 Consider positioning a safety officer to monitor rescue tool operation Co-ordinate the simultaneous activities of extrication teams and tool operators Restrict entry to the passenger cell until hazards have been assessed and controlled All personnel should: Establish a safe area around the tool operation wherever possible Use action words to warn others when operating rescue tools Manage hydraulic hoses carefully within limitations and avoiding kinking Reveal hidden areas to aid identification of components that could damage tools or cause uncontrolled release Control measure Manage the effects of tool use As mentioned in the hazard knowledge, the hazards posed by using tools can be extensive. The impact or likelihood of hazards resulting in harm are directly related to the type, location of use and the operator's capabilities. It is important to remember that many of the tools used in extrications will be extremely powerful and can easily lead to uncontrolled movements when not managed correctly and in an appropriate manner. Continuous familiarisation with the tools intended for use is recommended, including a check before use. This should be done outside a risk area or inner cordon, to re-familiarise operators with the equipment and check that the tool is working correctly before entering a work position. For example, reciprocating saws create a lot of vibration and noise, which may be transferred on to, or distress the casualty. This may vary with the tool design, the item or material being cut and the operator. A simple test cut, where available and possible, on similar items or materials but without the inherent hazards, will result in improved tool use. Operators should consider the following elements when using tools: Look for hidden hazards before you operate. Make sure the operator knows what is being cut, moved and so on Think about what the tool will do. How will it react, what direction it will move, etc.? Think about what the item or material you are manipulating will do. Will it affect any other 64 of 231

70 item, will it release explosively, and will it cause fragments or dust to be liberated? Compensate and manage the inevitable hazard of fragments of certain items or materials that are cut, squeezed, manipulated and so on as part of an extrication being liberated, despite the best efforts of tool operators. A combination of hard and soft protection should be placed between the tool and the casualty as a minimum, depending on the actions being undertaken and the item or material being affected. Ensure tool operators consider using further protection when required during cutting operations, such as a water spray on laminated glass Ensure all personnel are trained and maintain competence in the safe and effective use of all rescue tools Monitor the use of rescue tools to ensure capabilities are not exceeded Consider rotating crews involved in the use of rescue tools to reduce fatigue, exposure to noise and vibration Provide hard and soft protection between the tool and the casualties, operators and other responders Minimise the production of airborne particulates during extrication and provide respiratory protection Control measure Personal protective equipment (PPE): Rescues All fire and rescue service personnel working in the inner cordon should wear full protective clothing, which includes: Full firefighting gear, suitable overalls or similar Medical gloves Additional debris gloves or heavy duty gloves if handling cables etc. Eye protection at all times Helmet visors to be worn whilst actually cutting, spreading etc. 65 of 231

71 Hi-visibility jackets or markings Ensure that suitable personal protective equipment is provided to personnel who may be involved in search, rescue and treatment of casualties Ensure all personnel wear PPE according to service risk assessment and procedures for rescue incidents Extrication from the built or natural environment Hazard Primary surface extrication of casualties following collapse of a structure Hazard Knowledge Following the partial or full collapse of a structure, initial attending fire and rescue service personnel may have to extricate casualties located on the surface of the debris pile or those entrapped because of fallen masonry and metalwork, before specialist resources such as Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) or canine search teams arrive. The following details the framework for the CFOA National Resilience Six Stages of Rescue. Although initial attending fire and rescue service personnel should be aware of this information, 66 of 231

72 their participation in this type of incident may need to be restricted to non-specialist activities. To assist in the creation of an operational plan, Six Stages of Rescue provides a framework for the organisation of any collapsed structure incident. Whilst it is likely that there will not be a clear delineation between each stage, and there will be times when stages overlap, the incident command structure must ensure that each stage is undertaken and completed. This logical and progressive approach will mean that rescue personnel will maximise effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of an incident. In simple terms, any operations conducted in a sector will have a defined search phase followed by a defined rescue phase, although these two phases may run concurrently across multiple sectors dependent on the size and scale of the incident. Progression through the Six Stages of Rescue takes a considerable time even at a small, singledwelling collapse. The tactical plan should take account of this and the resources required to achieve a safe and successful conclusion to the incident. Rescue operations are conducted under the following six stages: R Reconnaissance and survey E Elimination of utilities P Primary surface search and rescue E Exploration of voids and spaces A Access by selected debris removal T Termination by general debris removal Stage 1: Reconnaissance and survey The area is searched for possible casualties (surface and/or buried), and the evaluation of the structure's stability and potential danger to rescue personnel is performed. Immediately after a collapse, the debris of the building is very unstable and prone to additional movement. Rescuers must assess the nature of the scene and the pattern of the collapse before entering onto a pile of rubble to ensure their own safety and that of those potentially buried in it. Thermal imaging cameras may assist in this task. Before attempting rescues, shoring may be necessary to prevent movement. Gather as much information as possible at the onset of the incident. Intelligence regarding the last known locations and activities of those believed to be in the structure will greatly assist in developing a plan for recovery efforts. Preliminary efforts should be concentrated on areas where people were last seen or known to be. It is suggested that a search co-ordinator be designated to interview those who may have escaped the collapse, were eyewitnesses, or were in the building and rescued early in the effort. A list of the 67 of 231

73 people normally in the building should be obtained if one is available. Stage 2: Elimination of utilities During this stage of the incident, all utilities must be evaluated and controlled for safety. If necessary, utility services should be isolated before any rescue work proceeds, and if this is not possible, the condition of the utilities present in the structure should be continually monitored. Dynamic risk assessments and subsequent analytical risk assessments based on the information received from the monitoring process can dictate additional control measures, and will provide personnel with information as to the working environment. Personnel should be aware that some supplies may not have been located and made safe and, therefore, should not cut the following: Water pipes: flooding, or a sudden ingress of water, has been known to drown rescuers and casualties in flooded basements. The sound of flowing water can also interfere with the use of acoustic search equipment Gas pipes: gases leaking into a collapsed building can pool at lower levels such as basements, depending on the density of the gas Electrical cables or wires: experience has shown that other wiring (e.g. telephone cables) can become live after coming into contact with mains wiring Stage 3: Primary surface search and rescue At this point in the incident, it may be appropriate for the incident commander to withdraw all personnel and to assess progress made up to that point. It may also be appropriate for the incident commander to review the suitability of the ICS structure in place at that time. Consideration should be given to designating one or more specific search sectors dependent on the size of the incident, each of which should be nominated its own site identification number. After ensuring rescuer safety and minimal movement of the debris, small organised teams should be deployed to search each sector systematically in specific grids. Canine search teams can be particularly effective in undertaking this task. An agreed marking scheme should be used to demonstrate visually the areas that have been searched, any areas of canine interest, and those areas that could potentially contain casualties. Care should be taken when using some methods of marking (e.g. spray paints) as these may interfere with ongoing canine search operations when indoors. The chosen method of marking should also consider the need for discretion where casualty locations are to be noted. As many as half of all building collapse survivors have historically been rescued near the surface of the debris and early on in the operation. The initial search should be concentrated on those areas that are believed to be the last known locations of people when the collapse occurred. All surface casualties should be removed as quickly and safely as possible. Extreme care should be taken during this phase to ensure that rescuers do not become casualties. Personnel should not be misled by the outward appearance of a structure; what appears to be a settled pile of debris could, in reality, be lacking any genuine support, and a secondary collapse 68 of 231

74 could occur without warning. Stage 4: Exploration of voids and spaces All voids and accessible spaces created as a result of the collapse must be searched and explored for live casualties. An audible call-out system can be used during this phase. Only trained canine or rescue personnel should be used to search voids and accessible spaces. Voids should be explored visually, by canines and with technical search equipment. Good practice dictates that at approximately every hour on the hour all work on the site be shut down for a few minutes to listen for calls for help. During that period sound detection devices can be used to listen for movement or sounds deep within the debris. Stage 5: Access by selected debris removal Selected debris removal using special tools and techniques may be necessary after locating a casualty. It may be necessary to remove only certain obstructions that are blocking access to the casualty. Information concerning a casualty's location prior to the collapse can be helpful during the selected debris removal phase. Information gathering on other possible casualty locations can greatly enhance the operation. Stage 6: Terminate by general debris removal General debris removal is usually conducted after all known casualties have been removed. Exceptions would be: When information is obtained that indicates the possibility of other casualties not originally accounted for When large amounts of debris are impairing or obstructing operations. The decision to use heavy equipment during this phase must be given serious consideration, especially when the possibility exists that there are still live casulaties in the debris Involving other emergency services or appropriate resources and casualty care should be considered. Refer to the Casualty care section. The incident commander, while developing their tactical plans, should take the following hazards that may be present following a structural collapse into account, and carry out a Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) that considers them: Incoming and/or damaged utilities. See National Operational Guidance: Utilities and fuel Sub-surface voids Underfoot conditions, including the unstable nature of surface (rubble). See National Operational Guidance: Operations Manual handling. See National Operational Guidance: Operations Secondary collapse Uncontrolled rescue attempts Secondary or further collapse as a result of wind, rain, vibration, etc. Intimidation or violence from casualties, etc. 69 of 231

75 Noise levels. See National Operational Guidance: Operations Dust (airborne, static or caustic). See National Operational Guidance: Hazardous materials Damage to mass storage vessels Asbestos. See National Operational Guidance: Hazardous materials Obstructed, hidden or flooded voids Glass Glass dust. Refer to the Extrication - Generic - Tools section Falling objects including glass Temperature-induced illness. See National Operational Guidance: Operations Arduous working conditions and physiological stress Hazardous materials (HazMat); irrespirable/hazardous atmospheres, explosives, flammable, toxic or biological materials/substances etc. See National Operational Guidance: Hazardous materials Environmental conditions such as darkness Fire, heat and smoke. See National Operational Guidance: Fires and firefighting Snagging, e.g. sharp edges from damaged building components, for example reinforcement bars Falls from height. See National Operational Guidance: Operations Control measure Highlight avoidance routes Before briefing personnel, incident commanders should consider all available sources of information. Team briefings should be based on incident needs and a plan should be constructed to achieve them. Continuous evaluation and review throughout the incident will determine whether the current objectives and subsequent plan are appropriate. Consider the following sources of information throughout the incident: Building and site plans Premises information boxes (PIB) Responsible Person (or appointed competent person) Observation External scene surveys of the building and area Reconnaissance of the location reported to be involved Information from personnel operating in the building and/or risk area Witnesses Occupiers 70 of 231

76 Other agencies Ensure that all personnel are aware of the risk and correct procedures for avoidance routes Identify sub-surface voids and highlight avoidance routes at building collapse incidents Establish clear routes to the scene of operations and confirm them to all personnel Identify any utilities not isolated and communicate to all personnel Identify and communicate routes avoiding unsuitable and hazardous areas Identify clear avoidance routes to the scene of operations and confirm them to all personnel Control measure Incident ground safety management The incident command system is an all-hazards approach that provides the incident commander with a structure they can adapt to every incident. The system helps to achieve a safe and efficient way of organising people and equipment. The incident commander at the scene is the nominated competent person. They can delegate some responsibilities to others; however, they remain responsible for health and safety at an incident. Providing risk-critical information at an incident is an essential part of the planning process. It has a direct impact on safety. A lack of risk information, or failure to pass it on, can have a critical impact on decisions made by an incident commander. See National Operational Guidance: Operations Information gathering. Safety briefings It will be necessary to organise safety briefings. As the incident develops or where the risk of injury increases those briefings should be more comprehensive. See Communication. 71 of 231

77 Safety officer The incident commander or sector commander may appoint a safety officer at any time. This person should have suitable competencies for the role. A safety officer at larger incidents may be designated as the safety sector commander from that time they will co-ordinate the role of other safety officers. Safety within sectors Sector commanders are responsible for the health and safety of people in their sector. Due to the demands at an incident the sector commander might nominate a safety officer to assist them. Although each safety officer should report to a sector commander, organisation of the safety officer(s) will be managed by the safety sector commander. Emergency evacuation and tactical withdrawal The incident command system provides two formal means of withdrawing personnel from the scene of operations: Emergency evacuation Tactical withdrawal At every incident, the incident commander will apply a command structure. They must establish a safe system of work. This should include a plan for emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal. The fire and rescue service retains responsibility for the health, safety and welfare of its personnel working in the risk area. It also has a duty to consider the effects of its actions on the safety of other people, including when undertaking emergency evacuation or a tactical withdrawal. The plans they make should enable emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal which: Evacuates people at highest risk while protecting escape routes Removes people from areas where the risk has become too high Emergency evacuation is the term used to describe the urgent and immediate withdrawal of crews from a risk area. The incident commander should inform everyone at an incident of the location of the muster point. At a prolonged incident the location of the muster point may change. They should ensure that everyone at an incident knows about this change. See The Foundation for Incident Command. The evacuation should include a roll call at a suitable location. Additionally, the incident commander should make sure there has been a roll call of non-fire service personnel at the scene. Following an evacuation or an evacuation signal being given, no one should re-enter the hazard area without the permission of, or explicit instruction from the incident commander. Where personnel remain unaccounted for after an evacuation, the incident commander will need to assess the risks and commence appropriate search and rescue procedures. 72 of 231

78 Tactical withdrawal is the term used to describe the systematic or staged withdrawal of crews from the risk area. The incident commander may need to redeploy resources or move people from danger. This is a tactical withdrawal. They may also need to withdraw all or part of a sector. When a tactical withdrawal is taking place, an evacuation signal or full incident roll call may not be required. See The Foundation for Incident Command. Provision of information Provision of relevant information is essential to ensure safe operations. Command decision-making can be significantly affected if there is a lack of risk information or where information has not been passed on. Fire control room operators will often be required to receive and communicate risk-critical information. Where risk-critical information is included on the initial turnout details, it should be easy to identify. Where specific risk information is available, incident commanders should ensure this is disseminated to all appropriate personnel on the incident ground. This may include provision of information between agencies or organisations. Ensure they take into account the need to meet health and safety legislation and regulations when developing their policies and procedures on structuring the incident ground. Have procedures for the withdrawal of personnel from the hazard area. These procedures should describe: When each withdrawal type is appropriate The method of implementing the withdrawal The method of carrying out a roll call The communications necessary when withdrawal has been instigated Additionally, they should include the actions to be taken when personnel are unaccounted for after the withdrawal, and the procedure for recommencing activity. Fire control operators should: Ensure that risk critical information is communicated to the incident commander in a timely manner 73 of 231

79 Ensure that everyone on the incident ground is fully briefed on the current hazards, specific risks and control measures including other agencies and organisations Appoint suitably competent safety officers to observe specific hazards and/or activities or monitor risks to personnel at the incident Instigate a safety sector at large or complex incidents under the control of a safety sector commander Establish and communicate the emergency evacuation and tactical withdrawal plan to everyone on the incident ground Communicate emergency evacuation signal and muster point arrangements to all personnel Communicate the tactical withdrawal and emergency evacuation arrangements to all personnel Inform everyone at an incident of the location of the muster point Carry out a roll call of fire service and all other personnel at the scene following an emergency evacuation Review situational awareness following an emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal Commit only minimum number of essential personnel to hazard area Ensure that effective supervision of operational activity is maintained until the conclusion of the incident Control measure Provide adequate lighting 74 of 231

80 Many searches will need to be undertaken at night or with reduced visibility. Adequate scene lighting should be used to define safe routes, and scene of operations. In some rescue situations generator powered lighting may hamper operations and present additional hazards; battery powered lighting that is silent and does not create toxic fumes should be considered. Consider how appropriate personal or scene lighting should be used Ensure sufficient lighting resources are requested Make sure generators are located at an appropriate distance from the scene of operations. This avoids exhaust fumes entering the void and can also reduce noise pollution Ensure sufficient quantities of fuel for generators are available at the scene to ensure a loss of lighting does not hamper rescue operations See National Operational Guidance: Operations - Manage hazards in the physical environment Provide operational crews with access to a range of lighting equipment suitable for use in rescue operations Request sufficient lighting resources appropriate to the activities and identified risks Consider using battery powered lighting to reduce noise and eliminate fumes Locate generators at an appropriate distance from the scene to reduce risk from exhaust fumes and noise Secure fuel for generators to ensure loss of lighting does not hamper rescue operations Control measure Conduct search using thermal imaging equipment Thermal imaging equipment can be used to locate people, especially at night or if visibility is reduced. In these situations, thermal imaging equipment can prove invaluable to search 75 of 231

81 operations. Thermal imaging equipment may include: Thermal imaging cameras Aerial appliances Unmanned aerial vehicles (Drones) Police/Coastguard helicopters Make arrangements for crews to access thermal imaging equipment for use at search incidents in poor visibility Adopt a methodical system when using thermal imaging equipment to search for casualties Consider using a range of thermal imaging resources such as aerial appliances, drones and helicopters Control measure Have a communication strategy The aim at every incident is to integrate communications and decision making between the incident commander and operational personnel. The purpose of communication is to provide another person with information. This typically involves three factors: The meaning of the message from the sender The actual message passed The meaning of the message as understood by the recipient. An incident commander should be aware that messages are not always understood in the way they are intended. Problems with messages arise because the sender often assumes the person receiving their communication has the same understanding. Sometimes this is not the case 76 of 231

82 because the person receiving the message extracts meaning in a way that makes sense to them. Incident commanders should check the other person's understanding of important messages. The incident commander should be aware of both their own assumptions and those of the person with whom they are communicating. They should test assumptions and make information clear. They should make sure the other person has accurately understood the message. Communication at an incident may be: One-way communication: there are times when direct one-way communication may be appropriate. The sender will deliver a message with no opportunity for feedback. This form of communication is rapid and puts the sender in control of the message. But the lack of feedback from the recipient means that they cannot confirm their understanding Two-way communication: this offers the receiver the opportunity to feedback to the sender. Information flows between them. Whilst this often takes longer than one-way communication it can be more accurate because it provides an opportunity to confirm the intended meaning Communication at incidents can occur in different forms: verbal, non-verbal (mobile data terminals, internet, for example) and written (e.g. SSRI, tactical fire plans, standard operating procedures). The incident commander should consider how people will perceive non-verbal communication. Non-verbal communication is important when briefing crews or liaising with other agencies. They should consider it carefully when they interact with members of the public in an emergency situation as these people may be highly sensitive to the emotional states of others. The incident commander's non-verbal behaviour should match their message. It is important to maintain open and effective communications. There may be many lines of communication and they are a major aid to control. Examples include direct or indirect reports from individuals, crews or sectors. Other parties will also be communicating: Emergency services, assisting agencies and fire control rooms. When assessing the span of control, they should consider how to manage communications, taking into account the pressure this may put on an incident commander. It is critical to share communications in a way that will support a common picture of the incident. The commander should be able to cope with the flow of information. It is important to limit both direct communication and information flows to manageable levels. Failure to keep communication manageable can have a negative effect at an incident. It could result in poor communication of riskcritical information or overlooking it. It is best to keep the span of control for tactical roles as narrow as possible. They should not give individuals so many aspects that they cannot give them enough attention. Effective communication Some qualities of effective communication include: Information is received and confirmed as being from a reliable and credible source before 77 of 231

83 being acted on Information is clear, avoiding ambiguity by using commonly understood terms. This is especially important when working with other agencies. For other agencies some terms might have different meanings Information is relevant, appropriate and concise. Incorrect information can overload the receiver and the meaning can be lost Information exchange is timely. To avoid distractions from critical tasks, commanders should consider how urgent the information is and the reader's current tasks Understanding is confirmed, preventing misunderstanding and differences in shared situation awareness Assumptions are questioned. Senders and receivers of information may have assumptions about the information. Incident commanders should question and clear up assumptions. This will help to make sure what they say is what the other person hears and understands There is a clear benefit to being assertive to clarify meaning and test assumptions. Both confidence and status can affect the ability to be assertive under pressure The environment at an incident can make it harder to communicate. Noise, adverse weather conditions and heightened levels of activity can be distracting and make listening difficult. Pre-conceptions about the status of the person who is communicating may also affect listening Words and behaviours are matched. People are constantly communicating, even when not using words. When verbal and non-verbal messages match, it helps people to make sense of the message. For example, a calm approach reinforces a reassuring message When establishing an effective communication strategy incident commanders should consider key principles. Because of differing sizes, types and locations of incidents, the format of a communication structure and strategy will undoubtedly differ, but key questions should be considered: Is the communication structure and strategy to be applied, appropriate for the incident, effective and resilient? Is the information received in support of the incident accurate, appropriate and timely? Is the information from a reliable credible source? Is there a security requirement of the information received and what is the appropriate method for the communication and maintenance of this? Who needs to be informed of the information, and how? What is the relevance of the information? Establish effective arrangements for communication. A good flow of information is one of the most important assets on the incident ground. An incident commander should make sure that they can: Gather information Issue orders to personnel Receive situation reports from all areas, including sector commanders Assess and provide for the needs of other agencies Carry out a risk assessment and add this to the briefing on arrival. Crews will be briefed about the tasks they need to perform and the hazards and risks they face. Briefing crews thoroughly 78 of 231

84 is essential to share any safety critical information. Incident commanders may also hold briefings on the way to an incident. The extent of the briefing will depend on an incident's type and scale. For example, the pre-briefing for small fires may be straightforward. Where crews have little experience or there is high risk then a comprehensive brief may be needed. Debrief crews that have withdrawn from a working area during an incident - debriefs are a good source of safety information and this should not be overlooked. Incident commanders should also: Gather information, issue orders and receive situation reports Assess the needs of other agencies and plan to meet them Establish suitable arrangements for communications (usually the role of command support, under guidance of the incident commander): Establish communication links with fire and rescue service control Ensure they correctly assign radio channels and call signs Establish communications with other agencies Establish communications with sector commanders and other command support functions to receive regular situation reports Ensure sector commanders can communicate between themselves Use local systems; some new and complex buildings and structures, including those extending underground, have communication systems installed for use by emergency services Failure of communication Communication can fail when information is not shared at the right time or is not understood by the receiver. This can lead to: Incorrect or inappropriate information being used to assess a situation, resulting in poor individual situational awareness. This can lead to inconsistent shared situational awareness Incorrect or inappropriate information leading to a faulty perception of events unfolding. This may result in the wrong decisions being taken for the actual situation Failure to co-ordinate team activities, causing task conflicts between fire and rescue service teams or with other agencies 'Freelancing' because of a breakdown in leadership and followership Increased risk of accidents because risk-critical information is not shared or understood Throughout all aspects of communication, fire and rescue services and their employees need to be aware of the potential for misuse of information and mindful of the legal requirements placed on them in by the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Freedom of Information Act See: JESIP joint doctrine 79 of 231

85 Ensure there is resilience in all their communication strategies and aligned equipment used on the incident ground Test the compatibility of communications equipment, systems and processes with neighbouring fire and rescue services and other agencies Ensure appropriate control measures are in place to support reinstating operational communication across all aspects of operational incident command in the event of equipment and strategy failure Establish and maintain an incident ground communication plan considering other agencies and remote resources Pass information to fire control rooms in a timely way Provide regular situation updates to all responders Establish incident ground communications considering working environment and infrastructure Establish resilient telecommunications with other responding agencies and consider talk groups Control measure Request National Resilience resources for Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) The affected fire and rescue service is responsible for ensuring that responders have received 80 of 231

86 appropriate awareness training in relation to the National Coordination Advisory Framework (NCAF), and the means of accessing specialist National Resilience (NR) capabilities, such as urban search and rescue (USAR). This is essential pre-incident knowledge for the affected fire and rescue service, as they are responsible for surveying the scene, assessing the impact of the incident, and requesting appropriate resources. The affected fire and rescue service may need to request NR USAR assistance through National Resilience Fire Control (NRFC), whether they have assets within their own service, or require a greater level of response. Operations to save life, prevent incident escalation or to provide humanitarian aid should not be delayed awaiting the attendance of USAR resources, subject to appropriate risk assessment. All operational personnel should apply USAR awareness training, be aware of the hazards associated with collapsed structures and the limits of initial responder actions, based on the condition of the structure. Initial responders should commence the Six Stages of Rescue as an approach to effective management of the incident until the arrival of USAR resources. Progression through the Six Stages of Rescue takes a considerable time, even at a small, single-dwelling collapse. The tactical plan should take account of this, and the resources required, to achieve a safe and successful conclusion to the incident. The Six Stages of Rescue are: R Reconnaissance and survey E Elimination of utilities P Primary surface search and rescue E Exploration of voids and spaces A Access by selected debris removal T Termination by general debris removal For further information refer to the National Operational Guidance: Performing rescues. It is also important that first responding crews adopt stage 1 structural monitoring, with safety officers watching the structure for movement, and where possible periodically take photographs for comparison to track movement. On arrival, USAR units will deploy specialist monitoring equipment and collate an audit trail of results of the monitoring to give an overview of the structural state of the site. The primary focus for the USAR capability is to be equipped, trained and available to respond to large-scale events such as collapsed structures or major transport incidents. 81 of 231

87 The capability can also be used to support incidents including: High-profile searches for missing persons Responses to extreme medical cases requiring technical extrication Support to other agencies, providing additional expertise and technical capability, such as confined space operations USAR equipment includes: Visual search equipment Audible search equipment Canine search Breaking, breaching and cutting equipment Shoring equipment Lifting and moving equipment Safety equipment Communications equipment Lighting equipment Equipment for confined space operations Safe work at height equipment Medical equipment Requesting National Resilience response It may be beneficial for the affected fire and rescue service to seek guidance from the USAR capability team or a national tactical adviser (TacAd) prior to requesting assistance. Capability advice and national TacAds should be requested via the NRFC. The request to the NRFC will prompt the mobilisation of National Resilience resources from one or more hosting fire and rescue services. The NRFC should provide an estimated time of arrival; this information will assist the incident commander in determining what level of initial operational response is required. If the fire and rescue service incident commander believes the USAR capability is required, they should provide the following information to the NRFC: Incident location Type of incident The approximate number of people involved Scale of the incident Approximate size Footprint Number of floors Construction of the building if involved: Light structure light frame or traditional (un-reinforced) masonry construction Medium structure heavy timber, reinforced masonry, and modular concrete construction 82 of 231

88 Heavy structure reinforced concrete or steel frame construction Initial location for a rendezvous point (RVP), strategic holding area (SHA) or multi-agency strategic holding area (MASHA) refer to for further information Additional information regarding to the incident may be useful for the NRFC and USAR capability team, including: Number of people confirmed trapped or missing Occupancy the number of possible occupants and likely locations Occupancy type children or adults Time of day refers to the time of the event that caused the building to collapse, which is a critical factor when combined with the occupancy number Information from witnesses about known trapped casualties, or last known locations of potential casualties The use of the structure Possible cause, the current state of the structure (total collapse or partial collapse) and potential for further collapse Main hazards and any involvement of damaged utilities What actions have been taken already and the current tactical mode Other agencies present Incident commanders should also consider requesting other specialist resources, including: Hazardous materials adviser or detection, identification and monitoring (DIM) capability to provide support to USAR operations Hazardous Area Response Teams (HART) or the Special Operations Rescue Team (SORT) Structural engineers Utility providers Mine or cave rescue teams These requests are in addition to the need to send the standard informative and assistance messages; M/ETHANE is now the recognised common model for passing incident information Ensure incident commanders have received awareness of the National Coordination Advisory Framework and specialist NR capabilities that can be provided Have systems in place to request USAR advice and resources from the NRF Ensure that personnel understand the use and limitations of USAR resources 83 of 231

89 Ensure that personnel understand the use and limitations of USAR resources Establish the quantity and types of resources being provided and identify suitable locations for them RVP, SHA or MASHA Establish the estimated time of arrival for the NR resources Consider requesting the attendance of other specialist resources Control measure Urban search and rescue team arrival at incident The process for booking-in on arrival at the assigned rendezvous point (RVP), strategic holding area (SHA) or multi-agency strategic holding area (MASHA), will depend on the urban search and rescue (USAR) level of response; this could be a single unit or group response. USAR single unit response The designated unit leader will report to the incident commander and hand over a copy of the USAR 01 Unit Fact Sheet Form, which provides an overview of the USAR modules, personnel deployed and their specialist skills. A second copy of the form should be handed to the USAR tactical adviser (TacAd) or group response co-ordinator. A third copy is retained by the unit. USAR group response USAR units should report to a pre-determined RVP, SHA or MASHA. USAR teams will book in using the standard process with information on personnel, vehicles and modules being captured on the asset management tool (AMT); this may be via the enhanced logistics support (ELS) team if in attendance. USAR 01 Unit Fact Sheet Form, should be handed to the USAR group response coordinator, or USAR co-ordination cell upon arrival at the incident ground. Fire and rescue service briefing 84 of 231

90 When the USAR capability arrives at the incident an initial plan of action (POA) should be provided by the affected fire and rescue service. This should support the carrying out of rapid USAR operations. The following should be included in the initial POA: Details of potential worksites size, nature, scale Numbers of people trapped or missing Allocated escape routes, RVPs or marshalling areas Presence and status of significant hazards, such as utilities Allocated location for USAR vehicles and equipment A fire and rescue service point of contact name and number Details of the incident command organisational structure National Resilience should: Provide USAR guidance material and supporting documentation for completion by specialist responders Specialist responders should: Report to the rendezvous point, strategic holding area or multi-agency strategic holding area and book in Receive the initial plan of action, and agree a USAR Tactical Work Plan with the incident commander prior to deploying Control measure Urban search and rescue work plan 85 of 231

91 The urban search and rescue (USAR) unit leaders or USAR co-ordination cell should develop and implement search and rescue strategies and tactics. These are detailed in a USAR work plan and recorded on USAR 02 Tactical Work Plan Form. The USAR work plan should be discussed and agreed with the incident commander, and be consistent with the overall incident objectives and action plan to ensure: There are suitable arrangements to ensure the safety of all personnel, including the deployment of structural monitoring and its results and nomination of a USAR safety officer. Prioritisation of rapid casualty extrications where possible Effective management and co-ordination of USAR operations Effective and documented dynamic and analytical risk assessment Improved use and co-ordination of USAR resources and specialist personnel Provision of a clear overview for all responding agencies Assistance from other agencies, such as structural engineers, is incorporated into the USAR response The provision of simultaneous 24-hour multiple-site search and rescue operations The USAR work plan is used to identify the operational objectives for a work period, including the number of operational sectors and work sites to which USAR resources will be deployed. USAR operations will be conducted by using the assessment, search and rescue (ASR) levels as a framework, with the addition of specific objectives if required. The USAR unit leader or group response co-ordinator should advise the incident commander when each of the objectives of the plan has been carried out. However, it is likely that ASR levels may run concurrently across multiple sectors, dependent on the size and scale of the incident. National Resilience should: Provide USAR guidance material and supporting documentation for completion by specialist responders Request assistance from other agencies if required, using agreed protocols Provide resources to facilitate simultaneous 24-hour multiple-site search and rescue operations 86 of 231

92 Maintain a register of other agencies that may be able to assist with USAR operations Specialist responders should: Liaise with the incident commander to develop a USAR work plan Advise the incident commander when each of the objectives of the plan has been carried out Control measure Carry out a rapid search and rescue (ASR level 3) This is usually carried out in the early stages of a large-scale event, when a relatively small number of urban search and rescue (USAR) teams are in attendance. USAR units are assigned to one or more worksites as rapid progress is required to ensure the allocated areas are searched quickly to maximise any life-saving opportunities. Rescue operations will usually consist of structural monitoring, debris removal, mechanical shoring, and limited breaking and breaching. There is limited deep penetration into the structure and the search or rescue operations at this level are normally possible to complete within a few hours. Assessment personnel should identify those structures or worksites where a full search and rescue (ASR level 4) is required. If trapped casualties are located and require extrication, the assessment team should move into assessment, search and rescue (ASR) level 4 operations. This would require liaison with the incident commander or USAR group response co-ordinator. Any unsearched worksites assigned to that assessment team should be reassigned to a new ASR level 3 team. A range of USAR forms are available and should be completed as appropriate to support information management, these may include: Assignment Briefing 87 of 231

93 Structural Monitoring Analytical Risk Assessment Casualty Extrication Worksite Report Marking systems Marking systems are used in USAR operations to display and share key information between USAR teams and other agencies. They are also used to strengthen co-ordination at sites with multiple scenes of operations and large numbers of casualties involved, and to minimise duplication of effort. The USAR capability has adopted an abbreviated version of the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) marking system as it is an internationally recognised system. USAR operations use two of the principal marking elements; rapid clearance marking system and the victim marking system. National Resilience should: Provide USAR guidance material and supporting documentation for completion by specialist responders Specialist responders should: Liaise with the incident commander Complete appropriate USAR documentation Use worksite marking: Rapid clearance marking system Victim marking system Be prepared to carry out assessment, search and rescue (ASR) level 4 activities if authorised 88 of 231

94 Control measure Carry out a full search and rescue (ASR level 4) This level involves search and rescue work that should identify, locate and rescue any casualties who are severely trapped, for example by debris or in voids that the assessment, search and rescue (ASR) Level 3 operations were unable to achieve. If the incident commander has already identified specific sites, the ASR level 4 operations may commence as soon as the urban search and rescue (USAR) unit or group arrives at the scene of the incident. ASR 4 operations will usually be at a single worksite and involve penetration into most, or all of the structure. They are likely to be longer-term operations requiring a wide range of USAR skills and liaison with other agencies. Activities may include: Using search techniques and equipment; this is repeated as access is achieved Extensive shoring to make the structure or access and egress routes safe Heavy and repeated breaking and breaching of the full range of structural elements Lifting or moving of large structural elements, including some delayering if access is needed to reach a casualty Working in enclosed or confined spaces, sometimes deep inside structures National Resilience should: Maintain a register, and build relationships with other agencies that may be able to assist with USAR operations Request assistance from other agencies if required, using agreed protocols Specialist responders should: Liaise with the incident commander or USAR co-ordination cell 89 of 231

95 Manage equipment use and availability, to ensure that equipment no longer required at a worksite is made available for use elsewhere Liaise with other agencies Use all available techniques and equipment to carry out search and rescue activities Monitor structural stability during activity. By this stage structural specialists may have been deployed to assist in structural monitoring (level 3 structural monitoring) Control measure Carry out a total coverage search and recovery (ASR level 5) The decision to transition to assessment, search and rescue (ASR) level 5 should be given serious consideration, especially if there remains any possibility that casualties may have survived in the structure. During the rescue phase of a major structural collapse incident, the fire and rescue service will be responsible for rescue operations within the inner cordon. However, the incident will reach a point in time when the probability of further rescues becomes remote; the focus of the strategic coordination group (SCG) and the tactical co-ordination group (TCG) will move towards recovery operations. At this stage a decision may be taken to transfer responsibility for the inner cordon to the police. ASR level 5 is usually carried out after all known casualties have been removed, with operations entering the recovery phase. However, there may be a need for ASR level 5 activities to be used during the rescue phase. Urban Search and rescue (USAR) teams may be required to assist with further search and potential delamination of the building to either confirm that there are no more casualties, or to assist with body recovery. General debris removal usually requires the use of heavy machinery, such as cranes and demolition equipment. This can be used to lift or move large elements of the debris pile. This activity may 90 of 231

96 involve working with contractors to achieve access to expose voids and remove debris away from the site. Many agencies may be involved with the recovery phase of an incident. If required to maintain a presence at scene, minimum numbers of rescue personnel should deployed while heavy machinery removes debris. If USAR personnel need to be committed onto the debris pile to perform specific actions, the use of heavy machinery should cease while these operations are being completed. ASR level 5 activities may include: Searching or making access into every possible survivable void using all available search techniques and equipment; this is often repeated as access is achieved Assisting the police in Disaster Victim Identifications (DVI) including physical recovery of bodies and body parts, in accordance with the DVI protocols. Assisting the police to recover personal and high-value items Carrying out heavy and repeated breaking and breaching of structural elements Lifting or moving large elements of the debris pile and working with heavy machinery The need to work in enclosed or confined spaces, sometimes deep inside structures Delayering large elements of the debris pile, to allow access to all parts of the collapsed structure Working closely with structural engineers and demolition contractors to develop detailed recovery strategies and plans National Resilience should: Maintain a register of other agencies that may be able to assist with USAR operations Request assistance from other agencies if required, using agreed protocols Specialist responders should: Liaise with the incident commander or USAR co-ordination cell Liaise with the police Use all available techniques and equipment to carry out search and rescue activities 91 of 231

97 Review structural stability during activity Liaise with other agencies Liaise with Hazardous Area Response Teams (HART) or the Special Operations Rescue Team (SORT) Control measure Carry out urban search and rescue logistics management USAR initial logistics area Due to the potentially protracted nature of an incident involving urban search and rescue (USAR) operations, large amounts of specialist modules and equipment are required to support activities. To facilitate this, a USAR initial logistics area will need to be established in order to enable the prompt availability of tools, equipment and consumables. The incident commander should be advised of this USAR requirement, along with an estimate of the size of area that will be needed. In the early stages of an incident, the establishment and management of a USAR initial logistics area will be carried out by the first USAR units to arrive at the affected fire and rescue service, through liaison with the incident commander. The USAR initial logistics area consists of a series of demounted USAR modules and air shelters that provide a principal point for the management of equipment being checked into and out of the area. USAR personnel are trained to carry out procedures related to equipment issue, tracking and retrieval, as outlined in USAR SOP Logistics, and two technicians will be appointed as the initial logistics team. This will allow a basic function to be established at local or cross-border incidents. However, for national incidents involving a single or double group response, a USAR Logistics Team from West Sussex Fire and Rescue Service will be deployed to manage and co-ordinate the logistics support framework. USAR logistics team The USAR logistics team are mobilised on request and as part of any USAR group response. They will take responsibility for the overall management and co-ordination of the USAR equipment being 92 of 231

98 deployed to and retrieved from the scene of operations, and are primarily responsible for: Establishing a main logistics area Identifying any missing inventory items on USAR modules as they arrive within the main logistics area Recording information about missing inventory items on the inventory hard copy list Co-ordinating and tracking the movement of specialist tools between worksites (see Control measure Carry out a sector assessment (ASR level 2) for information about worksites) and sectors, using a logging system Ensuring pre-use checks are carried out before equipment is released Monitoring equipment use where the condition of safety-critical parts are repaired or replaced as required Ensuring cleaning and checking equipment for any damage prior to returning to storage on the relevant module Collating information on all items used, damaged, lost or remaining at the scene of the incident, and reporting this to the USAR group response co-ordination cell Liaising with The National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT) operations recovery support cell (ORSC) if established The prime contractor Equipment Maintenance and Repair Centre (EMRC) Mobile maintenance units (MMUs) Liaising with the USAR group response co-ordinator or other agencies to ensure the security of the forward logistics area The USAR logistics team will normally consist of a minimum of two operators per shift. However, this will depend on the geographical spread of the incident and the number of worksites and sectors in use, and may require additional operators. Provide USAR guidance material and supporting documentation for completion by specialist responders Specialist responders should: Establish and manage a USAR main logistics area 93 of 231

99 Control measure USAR post incident response Equipment At large-scale urban search and rescue (USAR) incidents, equipment will be managed by the USAR logistics management team. However, prior to demobilisation, specialist responders should ensure that all USAR equipment is checked and re-stowed onto the appropriate modules. Items used, lost or damaged should be identified and reported. The prime contractor may be sited at the incident or the repatriation site to replenish, repair or replace equipment as part of the long-term maintenance contract. If equipment needs to remain at the scene of the incident, for example due to continuing operations, contamination or ongoing investigative work, USAR units may need to return to their own fire and rescue service without it. In this situation the fire and rescue service may require the assistance of the NRAT operations recovery support cell (ORSC). The ORSC, in consultation with the NRAT, USAR-hosting fire and rescue service and, if necessary, the USAR capability lead, will agree any necessary temporary inventory changes caused by equipment being left at the incident. Any resultant reduction in the ability to respond to further incidents should be communicated to the NRFC. Equipment recovery Equipment and modules that have been left at an incident must be returned to the USAR-hosting fire and rescue service in a clean and serviceable condition, accompanied by a certificate of cleanliness and a completed inventory check sheet noting any discrepancies. Criminal investigations The police service may: Impound fire and rescue service assets as part of their incident investigation Gather material evidence from fire and rescue service personnel Take statements from fire and rescue service personnel Post-incident activity Other issues that should be considered post-incident include: 94 of 231

100 Record keeping and document management Critical incident stress management (defusing) of crews in line with individual fire and rescue service welfare procedures Debriefing, subject to police guidance Other issues may be addressed by a recovery working group if established for the incident. Keep a record of any USAR resources that are affected by equipment shortages, where it may impact on the ability for them to respond to further incidents Specialist responders should: Carry out a full inventory check of all USAR units Restock USAR units for redeployment Release National Resilience (NR) equipment to the police for investigation purposes if required Provide evidence and statements to the police if required Hazard Manual handling over terrain Hazard Knowledge When extricating casualties from the natural environment in rural and urban settings, fire and rescue service personnel may have to use additional equipment and techniques. This may be due to terrain and potential travel distances, or to alleviate any manual handling issues that may arise in transporting equipment to and from the scene of operations, and/or for extricating casualties to a place of relative safety following initial clinical assessment. For further information, refer to the 95 of 231

101 Casualty Care section. Teams should have received appropriate manual handling training and should receive briefs on the hazards and risks, both known and perceived, that can be encountered when extricating casualties from the rural natural environment, specifically in relation to manual handling issues due to the terrain and/or travel distances. Through a joint agency approach and initial information gathering, fire and rescue services, will establish a multi-agency response to ensure appropriate resources are mobilised. Refer to the Intraoperability and interoperability section for further information. Consider involving specialist fire and rescue service USAR teams, other emergency services or appropriate resources and casualty care. Control measure Deploy adequate personnel Team size should be appropriate to the task and the team equipped with the necessary resources to undertake specific briefing, subject to fire and rescue service level of training. The incident commander should review all sources of information to ensure timely request for appropriate and additional resources. Subject to the demands of the developing incident, this may include requesting other agency resources. Provide information, instruction and training in the hazards, risks and control measures associated with the physical movement of casualties over challenging terrain or long distances Deploy an appropriately sized team to ensure the safe transportation of casualties Consider requesting additional resources or specialist teams to assist with the transportation of casualties 96 of 231

102 Control measure Manage physiological stress Fatigue is a subjective feeling of tiredness which has a gradual onset; it can have physical or mental causes and may significantly affect a person's ability to perform tasks. Dehydration occurs when the body loses more fluid than it takes in; minerals in the body get out of balance which affects the way that it functions. Physiological stress is the body's response to a stressor such as an environmental condition or a stimulus. Depending on the stressful event, the body's way to respond to stress is by sympathetic nervous system activation which results in the fight-or-flight response. Examples of physiological stress are hypothermia and heat stress: Hypothermia happens when a person's body temperature drops below 35 C (normal body temperature is C). Hypothermia can quickly become life threatening and should be treated as a medical emergency. It's usually caused by being in a cold environment and can be triggered by a combination of things such as being outdoors in cold conditions for a long time or falling into cold water. Heat stress occurs when the body's means of controlling its internal temperature starts to fail; as well as air temperature, factors such as work rate, humidity and clothing worn while working may lead to heat stress. Heat stress can give rise to the medical conditions heat exhaustion and, more seriously, heat stroke. For further information, see: Consider Welfare Carry out strategic risk assessments to identify foreseeable hazards within their area and identify control measures that eliminate or reduce risk Make arrangements to provide engineering controls where identified by risk assessment Develop service policy and procedures for the acquisition, application and maintenance of operational competency Provide information to assist emergency responders in identifying signs and symptoms of fatigue, dehydration, heat stress and hypothermia 97 of 231

103 Monitor personnel exposed to extremes of temperature for signs and symptoms of heat stress or hypothermia Control measure Use casualty transport equipment Subject to their own fire and rescue service provisions, the incident commander should consider the use of suitable spinal stabilisation equipment such as basket stretchers, scoop stretchers or equivalent, to assist crews in extricating casualties, and to reduce any manual handling issues for fire and rescue service personnel, while also reducing possible further deterioration of the casualty condition. Requests for suitable resources or equipment from other agencies should be also considered; refer to the Intraoperability and Interoperability section. Refer to the Casualty care section for further information Ensure that crews are aware of, and how to request, a range of casualty transport equipment such as stretchers or equivalent Stabilise casualties until resources or specialist teams are available to assist with extrication of the casualty Transport casualty using appropriate stretchers or equivalent means 98 of 231

104 Control measure Use motorised vehicles Subject to their own fire and rescue service provisions, the incident commander should consider the use of suitable motorised vehicles to assist crews in the extrication and transportation of casualties. Consideration should also be given to utilising other agencies or emergency services resources. The benefits of using motorised vehicles to assist in the transportation of casualties include: Access and egress to scene of operations Impact on the ongoing operations of other fire and rescue services or other agencies Condition of the casualty Welfare of crews due to manual handling issues Refer to the Intraoperability and interoperability section. Ensure that incident commanders are aware of motorised patient transport that may be available on request if required at an incident Consider requesting motorised vehicles for patient transport over long distances Hazard Extrication of casualties from confined spaces 99 of 231

105 Hazard Knowledge The hazards in a confined space arise through a combination of the confined nature of the workplace and the possible presence of substances or conditions that could increase the risk to the health and safety of personnel. Fire and rescue services should consider the possibility that a hazard could be introduced to a confined space during an incident, for example, water. Definitions The Confined Space Regulations 1997 define a confined space as: "any place, including any chamber, tank, vat, silo, pit, trench, pipe, sewer, flue, well or other similar space in which, by virtue of its enclosed nature, there arises a reasonably foreseeable specified risk. A 'specified risk' is further defined as a risk of the: Serious injury to any person at work arising from a fire or explosion Loss of consciousness of any person at work arising from an increase in body temperature Loss of consciousness or asphyxiation of any person at work, arising from gas, fume, vapour or lack of oxygen Drowning of any person at work arising from an increase in the level of liquid Asphyxiation of any person at work arising from a free flowing solid, or the inability to reach a respirable environment due to the entrapment by a free flowing solid Under the regulations, a confined space has two defining features: It is a space which is substantially (but not always entirely) enclosed There is a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious injury to personnel from hazardous substances or conditions in the space Incidents that fire and rescue services may attend, which can be defined as confined spaces, may include: Rescues from sewers Rescues from silos Rescues from trenches and pits Before committing personnel into any hazard area, incident commanders should take account of the actual information about the incident that is available, to make operational decisions in what are recognised as sometimes dangerous, fast-moving and emotionally charged environments. A thorough safety brief should be carried out before personnel are deployed in the hazard zone. Areas that the incident commander will have to consider include: Working at height Falling equipment Internal conditions 100 of 231

106 Oxygen deficient or flammable atmosphere. See National Operational Guidance: Hazardous materials Excessive noise Restricted access/egress Stability and condition of the soil in and around trenches and pits Reduced visibility Heavy and/or moving machinery Electricity supply Nature of stored material Voids, bridging Biohazards Consideration should be given to the involvement of other emergency services such as USAR teams, rope rescue teams or appropriate resources and casualty care. Refer to the Casualty care section for more information. Control measure Isolate machinery, processes and utilities All machinery, processes and utilities should be isolated and controlled for safety. If full isolation is required in the hazard area, isolating all utility services should be considered before any rescue work proceeds. DRAs based on the information received from the monitoring process can dictate additional control measures and will provide personnel with information on the working environment. For further information, refer to the Extrication section for machinery. Ensure that all personnel have an understanding of isolation and lock out procedures to enable safe operation around machinery 101 of 231

107 Identify the presence of live utilities and isolation points Request the attendance of utility providers to isolate incoming supplies if local isolation is not possible Control measure Establish appropriate safe systems of work: Confined space Because of the potential need for rapid evacuation from the confined space, good access and egress should be established as soon as practicable and maintained throughout. Access and egress should be monitored for signs of collapse, water ingress and so on which may affect the safety of personnel within the silo, trench or pit. See National Operational Guidance: Sub-surface, height, structures and confined spaces Ensure that crews are aware of the hazards associated with confined space working Commit personnel who have the required competency to operate in confined spaces Implement appropriate breathing apparatus procedures based on risk assessment Implement appropriate tag line and recovery systems for teams working within confined spaces Deploy an appropriate team size into confined or restricted areas for search and rescue task Control measure Incident ground safety 102 of 231

108 management The incident command system is an all-hazards approach that provides the incident commander with a structure they can adapt to every incident. The system helps to achieve a safe and efficient way of organising people and equipment. The incident commander at the scene is the nominated competent person. They can delegate some responsibilities to others; however, they remain responsible for health and safety at an incident. Providing risk-critical information at an incident is an essential part of the planning process. It has a direct impact on safety. A lack of risk information, or failure to pass it on, can have a critical impact on decisions made by an incident commander. See National Operational Guidance: Operations Information gathering. Safety briefings It will be necessary to organise safety briefings. As the incident develops or where the risk of injury increases those briefings should be more comprehensive. See Communication. Safety officer The incident commander or sector commander may appoint a safety officer at any time. This person should have suitable competencies for the role. A safety officer at larger incidents may be designated as the safety sector commander from that time they will co-ordinate the role of other safety officers. Safety within sectors Sector commanders are responsible for the health and safety of people in their sector. Due to the demands at an incident the sector commander might nominate a safety officer to assist them. Although each safety officer should report to a sector commander, organisation of the safety officer(s) will be managed by the safety sector commander. Emergency evacuation and tactical withdrawal The incident command system provides two formal means of withdrawing personnel from the scene of operations: Emergency evacuation Tactical withdrawal At every incident, the incident commander will apply a command structure. They must establish a safe system of work. This should include a plan for emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal. 103 of 231

109 The fire and rescue service retains responsibility for the health, safety and welfare of its personnel working in the risk area. It also has a duty to consider the effects of its actions on the safety of other people, including when undertaking emergency evacuation or a tactical withdrawal. The plans they make should enable emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal which: Evacuates people at highest risk while protecting escape routes Removes people from areas where the risk has become too high Emergency evacuation is the term used to describe the urgent and immediate withdrawal of crews from a risk area. The incident commander should inform everyone at an incident of the location of the muster point. At a prolonged incident the location of the muster point may change. They should ensure that everyone at an incident knows about this change. See The Foundation for Incident Command. The evacuation should include a roll call at a suitable location. Additionally, the incident commander should make sure there has been a roll call of non-fire service personnel at the scene. Following an evacuation or an evacuation signal being given, no one should re-enter the hazard area without the permission of, or explicit instruction from the incident commander. Where personnel remain unaccounted for after an evacuation, the incident commander will need to assess the risks and commence appropriate search and rescue procedures. Tactical withdrawal is the term used to describe the systematic or staged withdrawal of crews from the risk area. The incident commander may need to redeploy resources or move people from danger. This is a tactical withdrawal. They may also need to withdraw all or part of a sector. When a tactical withdrawal is taking place, an evacuation signal or full incident roll call may not be required. See The Foundation for Incident Command. Provision of information Provision of relevant information is essential to ensure safe operations. Command decision-making can be significantly affected if there is a lack of risk information or where information has not been passed on. Fire control room operators will often be required to receive and communicate risk-critical information. Where risk-critical information is included on the initial turnout details, it should be easy to identify. Where specific risk information is available, incident commanders should ensure this is disseminated to all appropriate personnel on the incident ground. This may include provision of information between agencies or organisations. 104 of 231

110 Ensure they take into account the need to meet health and safety legislation and regulations when developing their policies and procedures on structuring the incident ground. Have procedures for the withdrawal of personnel from the hazard area. These procedures should describe: When each withdrawal type is appropriate The method of implementing the withdrawal The method of carrying out a roll call The communications necessary when withdrawal has been instigated Additionally, they should include the actions to be taken when personnel are unaccounted for after the withdrawal, and the procedure for recommencing activity. Fire control operators should: Ensure that risk critical information is communicated to the incident commander in a timely manner Ensure that everyone on the incident ground is fully briefed on the current hazards, specific risks and control measures including other agencies and organisations Appoint suitably competent safety officers to observe specific hazards and/or activities or monitor risks to personnel at the incident Instigate a safety sector at large or complex incidents under the control of a safety sector commander Establish and communicate the emergency evacuation and tactical withdrawal plan to everyone on the incident ground Communicate emergency evacuation signal and muster point arrangements to all personnel Communicate the tactical withdrawal and emergency evacuation arrangements to all personnel Inform everyone at an incident of the location of the muster point 105 of 231

111 Carry out a roll call of fire service and all other personnel at the scene following an emergency evacuation Review situational awareness following an emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal Commit only minimum number of essential personnel to hazard area Ensure that effective supervision of operational activity is maintained until the conclusion of the incident Control measure Provide adequate lighting Many searches will need to be undertaken at night or with reduced visibility. Adequate scene lighting should be used to define safe routes, and scene of operations. In some rescue situations generator powered lighting may hamper operations and present additional hazards; battery powered lighting that is silent and does not create toxic fumes should be considered. Consider how appropriate personal or scene lighting should be used Ensure sufficient lighting resources are requested Make sure generators are located at an appropriate distance from the scene of operations. This avoids exhaust fumes entering the void and can also reduce noise pollution Ensure sufficient quantities of fuel for generators are available at the scene to ensure a loss of lighting does not hamper rescue operations See National Operational Guidance: Operations - Manage hazards in the physical environment Provide operational crews with access to a range of lighting equipment suitable for use in rescue operations 106 of 231

112 Request sufficient lighting resources appropriate to the activities and identified risks Consider using battery powered lighting to reduce noise and eliminate fumes Locate generators at an appropriate distance from the scene to reduce risk from exhaust fumes and noise Secure fuel for generators to ensure loss of lighting does not hamper rescue operations Control measure Establish effective communications: Confined spaces Appropriate communications are essential for a successful outcome to operations; both within the incident command structure, where they are vital to the incident commander in ensuring that the current objectives and subsequent plan are appropriate, but also between safety officers and crews. If distances are adequate, verbal communications may be more appropriate during the dynamic stages of the incident. Refer to the Operations guidance for further information. Ensure crews have access to intrinsically safe radio equipment for use in flammable or explosive atmospheres Use intrinsically safe radio equipment in atmospheres where there is a risk of fire or explosion Allocate radio channels to incident ground functions and communicate radio procedures to all personnel 107 of 231

113 Control measure Firefighter decontamination The type of decontamination will be based on several factors: The level and type of personal protective equipment (PPE) (structural firefighting PPE, liquidtight or gas-tight chemical protective clothing or reusable or disposable protection) The type and quantity of contaminant The type and availability of decontamination additives The ability to monitor and detect contamination The availability of drainage and containment options The conditions of the weather (rain and wind) The topography of the area The availability of equipment to conduct the decontamination The location of the decontamination area should consider the following: The topography of the ground it should be a flat area or sloped away from unprotected personnel in the cold zone Wind direction should be blowing away from unprotected personnel Any drainage in the area should be identified as either surface, foul or combined drainage and then blocked using a suitable drain blocker or mat It should be set up in the cold zone until ready to receive contaminated members of personnel, at which point it will become the warm zone It should be appropriately marked to prevent unprotected people from entering the decontamination zone Operational circumstances and the risk assessment The level and method of decontamination The weather conditions Location of breathing apparatus entry control Location of a pumping appliance if wet decontamination is being provided Disrobe assistants The process of undressing contaminated personnel presents a high risk of contamination passing from the PPE to the operative and responder. The application of a strict and well-rehearsed undressing procedure is important in preventing this. It is important for personnel involved in this process to fully understand their role and the procedures to be adopted. 108 of 231

114 Every attempt should be made to contain run-off from the decontamination process until expert advice is received regarding appropriate disposal. See also Disposal of contaminated water (October 2012) Have systems to assess contamination of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other equipment Provide suitable equipment to conduct a decontamination process, or range of decontamination processes, based on the types of contamination likely or possible to be encountered during operational incidents in their area Ensure personnel that respond to HazMat incidents are provided with the necessary knowledge, skills and understanding to operate decontamination effectively Provide hazardous materials advisers (HMA) to determine appropriate decontamination including the use of any additive to assist in removing the contaminant Make arrangements for dealing with contaminated equipment, including equipment used inside the hot zone and the decontamination equipment used for the decontamination process Develop a decontamination method that allows for a dry/safe undress of contaminated personal protective equipment (PPE) Develop a range of emergency decontamination methods where speed is required when there has been a failure of air supply or personal protective equipment (PPE) or when contamination has occurred when only structural firefighting PPE is being worn Consider a methodology for dealing with personal protective clothing (PPE) when decontamination has failed to clean away the contaminant Consider a process for disposing of items that are deemed disposable Provide arrangements for decontaminating or disposing of contaminated equipment that has been used inside the hot zone; this will require advice from specialist advisers 109 of 231

115 Provide arrangements for dealing with the decontamination equipment once the process has been completed Have arrangements for testing reusable chemical protective clothing (CPC) which will confirm that CPC can be safely returned to service after decontamination, if appropriate. This includes accepting the risk around re-using CPC Have procedures for decontamination zone management which should be readily available to incident commanders and officers with specific responsibility for decontamination on the fire ground Consider firefighter decontamination arrangements prior to committing personnel to the hot zone Attempt to contain all run-off from the decontamination process until disposal arrangements are agreed Provide disrobe assistants in suitable personal protective equipment (PPE) to assist contaminated personnel Hazard Restricted or complex layout affecting extrication of casualties Hazard Knowledge This hazard relates to the impact of an internal layout of premises or complex access or egress routes on extrication activities. This may be due to the effects on a building from fire, partial collapse or complex layouts such as sewers, trenches and silos. Fire and rescue service personnel may have to use additional equipment and techniques to extricate casualties. Teams should have a good understanding of the hazards they may encounter when extricating casualties from premises with complex layouts or restricted access/egress routes. They may be required to extricate casualties before fire and rescue service USAR teams or other agencies arrive. 110 of 231

116 Consideration should be given to involving specialist fire and rescue service USAR teams, other emergency services or appropriate resources and casualty care. Control measure Deploy appropriate numbers of personnel Team size should be appropriate to the task and the team equipped with the necessary resources to undertake specific briefing, subject to fire and rescue service level of training. The incident commander should review all sources of information to ensure timely request for appropriate and additional resources. Subject to the demands of the developing incident, this may include requesting other agency resources. Develop rescue procedures that consider team size Deploy an appropriately sized team into confined or restricted areas for search and rescue tasks Consider requesting specialist resources for rescue operations involving restricted or complex layouts Control measure Manage physiological stress 111 of 231

117 Fatigue is a subjective feeling of tiredness which has a gradual onset; it can have physical or mental causes and may significantly affect a person's ability to perform tasks. Dehydration occurs when the body loses more fluid than it takes in; minerals in the body get out of balance which affects the way that it functions. Physiological stress is the body's response to a stressor such as an environmental condition or a stimulus. Depending on the stressful event, the body's way to respond to stress is by sympathetic nervous system activation which results in the fight-or-flight response. Examples of physiological stress are hypothermia and heat stress: Hypothermia happens when a person's body temperature drops below 35 C (normal body temperature is C). Hypothermia can quickly become life threatening and should be treated as a medical emergency. It's usually caused by being in a cold environment and can be triggered by a combination of things such as being outdoors in cold conditions for a long time or falling into cold water. Heat stress occurs when the body's means of controlling its internal temperature starts to fail; as well as air temperature, factors such as work rate, humidity and clothing worn while working may lead to heat stress. Heat stress can give rise to the medical conditions heat exhaustion and, more seriously, heat stroke. For further information, see: Consider Welfare Carry out strategic risk assessments to identify foreseeable hazards within their area and identify control measures that eliminate or reduce risk Make arrangements to provide engineering controls where identified by risk assessment Develop service policy and procedures for the acquisition, application and maintenance of operational competency Provide information to assist emergency responders in identifying signs and symptoms of fatigue, dehydration, heat stress and hypothermia Monitor personnel exposed to extremes of temperature for signs and symptoms of heat stress or hypothermia Control measure Use casualty transport equipment 112 of 231

118 Subject to their own fire and rescue service provisions, the incident commander should consider the use of suitable spinal stabilisation equipment such as basket stretchers, scoop stretchers or equivalent, to assist crews in extricating casualties, and to reduce any manual handling issues for fire and rescue service personnel, while also reducing possible further deterioration of the casualty condition. Requests for suitable resources or equipment from other agencies should be also considered; refer to the Intraoperability and Interoperability section. Refer to the Casualty care section for further information Ensure that crews are aware of, and how to request, a range of casualty transport equipment such as stretchers or equivalent Stabilise casualties until resources or specialist teams are available to assist with extrication of the casualty Transport casualty using appropriate stretchers or equivalent means Control measure Identify the most appropriate rescue tool for the task Once the need for a tool is identified, it is important for the operator to select the most appropriate tool for the task. Most manufacturers offer an extensive range of tools, from small tools designed for use in confined compartments to heavy duty tools designed for use on Large Goods Vehicles (LGV). Selecting the smallest tool appropriate for the task can help to avoid manual handling injury to the operator and reduce the need to rotate crews, speeding up the extrication while avoiding 113 of 231

119 unnecessary imposition on the casualty. See National Operational Guidance: Operations. Manufacturers offer guidance on best practice in using their tools, which is cascaded to crews during regular training. This guidance should normally include connecting the equipment, use, possible techniques, advantages, limitations and ongoing maintenance requirements to ensure that the tools are operationally ready. Ensure personnel have access to a range of rescue tools suitable for the environments likely to be encountered by rescuers Ensure that all operators are aware of the limitations and manufacturer's guidance on the use of rescue tools Have a schedule of inspection and maintenance for rescue tools Select the appropriate rescue tool considering the condition of the casualty, extrication plan and materials Monitor rescue tool performance for indicators of unidentified materials Hazard Cables Hazard Knowledge Cabling, including mechanical, electrical and data cables, is used extensively in buildings, with an increased reliance on surface-mounted conduit and trunking during installation. Electrical upgrades and retrofitting additional electrical sockets, light fittings, security/fire alarms and data cables may mean that lightweight cable fixings are more common in older buildings. Cabling may also be concealed above suspended ceilings, with little or no fixing. Suspended ceilings may also become distorted or fail at relatively low temperatures. Plastic conduit or trunking that is surface-mounted on ceilings and walls will fail at relatively low temperatures (more than 100 C). Thin section aluminium trunking may also fail. Cabling and cable installation in buildings present hazards including: 114 of 231

120 Electrocution Entanglement Breaching of fire compartmentation Hazardous products of combustion When the conduit or trunking fails, cables may be released. Because they can fail at relatively low temperatures, cables may drop some distance from the seat of fire and may hang down, presenting a risk of entanglement or electrocution. Hanging cables pose a significant hazard for firefighters and have contributed to firefighter deaths in the past. This hazard must be considered in any building with an electrical supply. Most cables are sheathed or protected with polyvinyl chloride (PVC), polyethylene (PE) or thermoplastic polyurethane (TPU). In a fire, these plastics release dioxins, hydrogen cyanide and hydrogen chloride. See National Operational Guidance: Fires and firefighting Smoke and fire gases. From 1 January 2016, regulations require that all new wiring systems use metal, rather than plastic, to support cables in escape routes, to prevent their premature collapse in a fire. Electrical installations fitted before changes to the regulations, or that do not conform to the regulations, may still present a hazard. Further reading Harrow Court (Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service) Shirley Towers (Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service) Fire and Rescue Service Immediate Bulletin 4/2011 Control measure Situational awareness: Cables Where areas involving lightweight conduit, trunking and cable fixings are identified, effective control measures should be implemented to limit the hazards to emergency service personnel and occupants. Presence of these fixings may be identified by inspecting other compartments in the building, or similar nearby properties. Thermal imaging equipment may assist in identifying internal fixings that have been subjected to 115 of 231

121 heat, either from processes within the premises or after being exposed to fire, as they may not be readily identifiable by the naked eye. Consider providing specialist equipment, such as anti-entanglement covers/straps and cable cutters to minimise the risk of entanglement and optimise the likelihood of successful selfrelease Have arrangements for thermal imaging equipment to be made available at incidents Identify and communicate the presence of lightweight conduit, trunking and cable fixings Assess the likelihood that cables and fixings will fail increasing the risk of entanglement Consider the use of thermal imaging cameras to identify hazards and locate casualties Identify loose cables and consider using alternative access and egress routes or defensive tactics Control measure Isolate utilities It may be necessary to isolate utilities for the safety of occupiers and emergency service personnel. Refer to the National Operational Guidance: Utilities and fuel, hazard of Dealing with utility or fuel supplies at an incident. 116 of 231

122 If there evidence or suspicion of illegal activity involving electricity refer to National Operational Guidance: Utilities and fuel, hazard for Electricity. Liaise with local utility supply companies and maintain up-to-date emergency contact details in their fire control rooms Ensure that Site-Specific Risk Information (SSRI) contains details of utility shut-off facilities in commercial premises Isolate any utilities that may affect the incident or crew safety, and secure against reconnection Consider the impact of isolating electricity to the business continuity of premises Consider isolation of electricity supply to mitigate the risk of electrocution Control measure Remove or secure internal fixings or cables To maintain access and egress from the scene of operations, crews should remove or secure internal fixings or cables where possible, subject to confirmation by a competent person that services have been isolated. 117 of 231

123 Secure loose cables or consider removing them if the electrical supply has been isolated Consider a controlled release of cables from trunking prior to committing crews Control measure Firefighter emergency arrangements: Cables Entrapment of crews in cables may occur due to unseen fire spread or unidentified cables becoming affected by fire. Procedures for extrication should be in place prior to committing crews to an environment where cables may be present. Movement by entrapped personnel may become difficult; where possible the person should remain still and be cut free from cable entrapment. Live cables may damage cutting equipment, consider isolating electrical supplies. If this is not possible, personnel should consider attempting self-release techniques such as finding an area close to a wall, where cables are still attached, and moving slowly whilst attempting to release cables. Consider providing rated insulated cutters for cutting electrical cables Provide information and instruction to crews on the risk of cable entanglement and release techniques 118 of 231

124 Brief personnel on any identified risk from the presence of cables prior to entering risk area Ensure that cable cutting equipment is available at incidents involving the risk of entanglement ARCHIVED Establish emergency arrangements appropriate to the size and complexity of the incident Establish appropriate emergency arrangements for the release of personnel from an entrapment situation Extrication from any mode of transport The content of this section is relevant to the activity of searching for and extricating casualties from incidents involving modes of transport and transport networks. It should not be read in isolation as many of the hazards associated with working in these environments are in the context guidance. See National Operational Guidance: Transport Hazard Unstable vehicle containing casualties Hazard Knowledge In this guidance, the term 'mode of transport' refers to any form of transport such as aircraft, rail vehicles, road vehicles, vessel or craft that has become unstable due to the incident. The instability may be as a result of damage caused to the vehicle during the incident, as a result of its location or resting position, or a combination of these factors. At the scene of a vehicle rescue incident, the geographic layout may be less than obvious. An obvious hill or slope may be a reminder to secure the vehicle, but an insignificant gradient may go unnoticed. 119 of 231

125 The vehicle may well be secured by collision damage but it should be remembered that ramming, cutting away or pulling during operations could release the vehicle, allowing it to become a 'runaway'. The risk associated with incorrect stabilisation application or poorly managed and maintained stabilisation increases dramatically the larger or heavier the unstable vehicle. Where the casualty is injured, especially seriously or in a critical, deteriorating condition, the vehicle should be secured and stabilised. This will yield several benefits, some of which may not be obvious to the attending fire and rescue service personnel. Proper stabilisation will prevent the floor pan flexing and the vehicle moving or rocking, particularly when personnel climb into or onto the vehicle. It is important to note that if a firefighter climbs in to or on to a collision-damaged vehicle before suitable stabilisation, they may be subjecting the casualty to further crushing. The body weight of personnel in the vehicle may be directly supported by the casualty's trapped legs, particularly where a vehicle component has given way under impact or is cut during the rescue. Securing the vehicle in a realistic manner will help to avoid rocking when carrying out certain techniques and will suppress jarring when operating equipment, especially where a part may be released under load, such as a forced door removal. It will also ensure that medical attendants have a sound base for their pre-hospital care. There is seldom any feedback about the person who was trapped, but it is known that post-collision trauma is potentially lethal. Being released from a correctly secured vehicle should be considered less traumatic. Before beginning any work on the vehicle, it should be completely stabilised to prevent further injury to the casualty and to protect the rescuers. The properties of a good stabilisation method are: It should secure the vehicle safely It should completely immobilise the vehicle, preventing it from moving at all and reducing the casualty's chance of further injury It should be simple, being able to stabilise a vehicle in the position it was found on arrival of the rescue crew, and not hinder the appropriate extrication of the casualty The method should not take a long time to set up It should allow for easy checking on a regular basis to ensure the vehicle remains stable Fire and rescue service personnel should practise and train as a crew to effectively stabilise different vehicles in a variety of locations, such as soft ground or in ditches. Fire and rescue service personnel should also be familiar with differing construction techniques, including the materials used, to ensure that stabilisation techniques make best use of the load bearing parts of a vehicle's structure to support the vehicle, rather than sheet metal, fascia sections etc. Refer to the Extrication section for new or heavy vehicle construction. 120 of 231

126 Everyone should know the speed required to stabilise, be aware of the importance of doing so, and be aware of the ways the objective can be reached. The vehicle may continue to move or collapse because of instability, resulting in injury to members of the public, fire and rescue service personnel, other agencies and so on. It could cause damage to the environment, other vehicles or surroundings. Control measure Make a safe and controlled approach to the incident: Transport See National Operational Guidance: Operations - Time of alert to time of attendance. By its very nature, an incident affecting the transport network will present challenges to responding emergency services. Some incident types will enable a degree of pre-planning for the location of access and rendezvous points (RVPs) but more remote incidents may present significant difficulties. When considering the safest and most effective access to an incident the following should be considered: Location: May be given by grid reference, last known location or by a member of the public Terrain: Consideration should be given to the type of terrain the appliance is driven over. In some cases the shortest distance may not always be the quickest. Wreckage: Must be avoided, as it could be covering casualties, could cause damage to vehicles and will form part of subsequent investigations Casualties: May self-evacuate and travel considerable distances from the incident. Drivers must be aware that these people may be injured, disorientated or confused. Others may have collapsed and could be difficult to see, especially in adverse weather conditions. Fuel spillages: Fuel spillages may be difficult to detect, especially if the incident occurred at night, during inclement weather or away from areas of hard standing Animals: Disruption to the transport network could result in unconfined animals being encountered on roadways or by crews travelling on foot Larger, more complex incidents may involve multiple resources from many responding agencies. Rendezvous points (RVPs) or strategic holding areas should be identified and communicated, if not pre-planned. Where the evacuation of casualties is likely to be involved, or they require conveyance by the ambulance service, a clear route to and from the incident will be required. 121 of 231

127 On attendance at incidents, drivers must display appropriate warning beacons in accordance with the Road Vehicles Lighting Regulations 1989 and be aware of the legal requirements of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations & 105 in addition to other relevant legislation. Air Designated rendezvous points (RVPs) for responding emergency services attending the aerodrome will be located around the aerodrome and included in the aerodrome emergency plan. These areas will be designated for emergency services only and should be kept clear at all times. Depending on the size of the aerodrome the facilities will vary, but may include: Immediate access to airside areas via an access gate or equivalent Designated parking areas for all emergency services Shelter or control room facilities Radio communications with the aerodrome fire service and/or air traffic control Telephones Detailed aerodrome crash maps and additional critical information Aircraft hazard sheets and seating configuration for the aircraft that regularly use the aerodrome Tabards and associated incident command facilities See specific control measures relating to military aircraft and helicopters in this guidance. Rail Railway incidents are often linear by nature, with limited access points. This can have a significant effect on the provision of equipment and personnel to the scene of operations. Whatever the source of information about an incident, the relevant fire authority mobilising control centre should establish contact with the appropriate railway traffic control. A considerable problem may be identifying the location of an incident. Members of the public supplying information are likely to be very imprecise, particularly in areas unfamiliar to them or in areas of open countryside where no specific landmark is available. Assistance in specifying the location of an incident comes from the individual numbers marked on bridges and tunnels, on most signal gantries, and on all overhead line equipment supports. There are also mile-marker posts alongside all lines, and there may also be quarter-mile posts. Network Rail also makes common use of National Grid references to identify locations, and firefighters are recommended to do the same where possible. Adjacent roads, buildings, main rail junctions, level crossings and tunnels will also give a good idea of the whereabouts of an incident. Access points or emergency response locations are areas that can be used as a means of access for an emergency response. They will also provide integrated facilities for fire and rescue service actions and managed evacuation by the relevant infrastructure manager (incorporating train design, cross passages and rail-managed evacuation trains) and may also incorporate evacuation 122 of 231

128 facilities for members of the public. They can vary greatly from basic access stairs to complex, purpose-built structures. Emergency responders should be aware of the following features: Rendezvous points (RVPs) Access arrangements Plans Water supplies Communication facilities The urgency of the situation should be assessed when determining the most appropriate method of accessing the infrastructure. Some fire and rescue services have obtained specialist vehicles for use at rail incidents to reduce access issues to specific infrastructure. It is always preferable for fire and rescue service crews to gain access to the infrastructure by means designed for public or fire and rescue service access purposes. This principally involves stations, emergency response locations or access points, and purpose-built walkways. Fire and rescue service personnel must not move from an area intended for normal public use (e.g. station platforms or the public highway) to an area on or near the railway where there is a hazard from rail vehicles or the infrastructure, without first implementing appropriate control measures. Any signage provided should be considered as part of the risk assessment process. Roadways Build-up of traffic caused by drivers being unable to leave the area can present significant difficulties for responding emergency vehicles and fire and rescue services should consider dual approach procedures for incidents involving the road infrastructure. When approaching any incidents where animals are located on or near to carriageways, or are believed to be involved in the incident (directly or by virtue of being cargo), the warning devices on all emergency responder vehicles will only add to the animals' distress and potentially increase the unpredictability of their actions. Consideration should be given to turning off all flashing lights and preventing the use of audible warning devices as soon as is practicable. Approach to these incidents should be slow, without any undue noise or visual stimuli. Approaching or passing any vehicles carrying animals should also be carried out with caution to avoid unduly distressing them. Waterways The dockside is a high hazard environment and multiple risks are evident; vehicle and plant movements, high tensile mooring lines, falls into water, maintaining safety cordons and controlling the numbers of personnel at the scene. 123 of 231

129 Identify pre-determined access and rendezvous points (RVPs) in Site-Specific Risk Information and incident plans Identify areas that are unsuitable for vehicular access in Site-Specific Risk Information and incident plans Include access and rendezvous points (RVPs) on identified sites in training and multi-agency exercises Consider having dual approach procedures for incidents involving severe disruption to transport networks Access and consider Site-Specific Risk Information and incident plans when considering the most appropriate routes, access and rendezvous points Make a safe approach at an appropriate speed and consider wreckage, casualties, fuel spills, animals etc. Consider the effects of geography on equipment logistics, casualties and crew welfare Consider a range of alternative means of access such as using specialist vehicles or cutting through fences Consider appointing a marshalling officer to manage the logistics of emergency response vehicles at the scene or RVP Observe variable message signs and other road signage to identify traffic delays Establish the type of road and the status of the affected carriageway (live or closed) Consider time of day and effect on transport systems and working environment Control measure Manage pressurised air systems Pneumatic systems that may impact on stability can be broken down into two primary systems: Pneumatic suspension units found mainly in large goods vehicles (LGVs), rail stock and some aircraft Pneumatic braking systems found on rail, some aircraft and road vehicles 124 of 231

130 The hazard posed by the pneumatic suspension unit may be as a result of normal wear and tear in use, or from damage sustained in a collision, fire or similar potentially catastrophic event. While personnel are working around them, operating these units may cause potential failure unless properly assessed and controlled. The hazards posed by pneumatic suspension units include: Projectile Impact Noise Entrapment due to chassis or axle dropping (a lift axle) Braking systems on rail vehicles use compressed air as the force to push blocks on to wheels or pads on to discs. The compressed air is transmitted along the train through a brake pipe. Changing the level of air pressure in the pipe causes a change in the state of the brake on each vehicle. It can apply the brake, release it, or hold it 'on' after a partial application. Pneumatic systems found on aircraft are sometimes used for: Brakes Opening and closing doors Driving hydraulic pumps, alternators, starters, water injection pumps, etc. Operating emergency devices Suspension systems Identify any mechanical interlocks or built-in safety systems that can assist fire and rescue service personnel working in the vicinity of these systems. Any loss of integrity in the unit will result in the vehicle chassis or axle lowering and a potential blast hazard from the suddenly released compressed air. The hazards posed by an air braking system include: Unexpected movement of the vehicle or craft Stored energy release (especially from spring brake chamber or parking brake) Entrapment due to uncontrolled movement Provide tactical guidance and support arrangements to ensure personnel are aware of the hazards and procedures associated with pressurised air systems Have arrangements for using specialist equipment and/or other agencies to assist with managing pressurised air systems 125 of 231

131 Carry out reconnaissance of the incident at the earliest opportunity, to identify and assess the presence and integrity of pressurised air systems Liaise with the driver, operator or responsible person to gain further information regarding the operation and isolation of pressurised air systems Identify and communicate hazards relating to pressurised systems to all responders Establish appropriate cordon control arrangements to restrict access to areas where there are risks relating to pressurised air systems Control measure Stabilise the mode of transport Stabilising the vehicle or craft seeks to ensure that the risk to any casualties and emergency responders associated with uncontrolled movement of the vehicle or craft is minimised. Any stabilisation measures should take into account the expected level of operational intervention by emergency responders. During the stabilisation phase of the incident, appropriate resources should be allocated to address issues relating to the vehicle or craft and its load or cargo. Requesting assistance including specialist resources from other services, partner agencies or external contractors should be considered in the early stages due to the potential response times. Urban search and rescue (USAR) teams may provide considerable expert knowledge and resources relating to stability at transport incidents. The incident commander must make an assessment on the benefit versus the risks regarding the prioritisation of stability over other fire and rescue service priorities at the scene. The properties of a good stabilisation method are: It should secure the vehicle or craft safely It should completely immobilise the vehicle or craft It should be simple, able to stabilise a mode of transport in the position it was found on arrival of the rescue crew, and not hinder any subsequent actions The method should not take a long time to set up It should allow for easy checking on a regular basis to ensure the vehicle or craft remains stable 126 of 231

132 Fire and rescue service personnel should practise and train as a crew to effectively stabilise a variety of vehicles or craft in a range of locations based on the risks in that service area. Fire and rescue service personnel should also be familiar with differing construction techniques, including the materials used, so that stabilisation techniques make best use of the load bearing parts of the structure to support the vehicle or craft. Primary, secondary and tertiary stabilisation methods should be employed and regularly checked throughout the course of the incident. Large and heavy objects may assist with vehicle or craft stability and these should be considered as part of the plan; it may be appropriate to carry out a controlled movement of the object such as removing it from the inner cordon. UKRO provides further information on stabilising large goods vehicles (LGVs) and public service vehicles (PSVs). Provide crews with information, instruction and training in safe and effective stabilisation of a range of vehicles and craft Make arrangements for the provision of specialist equipment to assist in transport related incidents associated with risks identified in their areas Consider the stabilisation of unsecured vehicles as part of the incident plan Identify and request the resources required to implement the identified stabilisation plan, having consideration for response times (including USAR teams) Prioritise the use of approved stabilisation techniques and equipment over improvised methods that may be required in some situations Regularly assess the effectiveness of the stabilisation techniques employed Appoint a safety officer to monitor the effect of operations on the stability of vehicle Maintain rescuer egress route in case the vehicle becomes unstable or moves Consider securing an unstable vehicle to a suitable anchor point Stabilise the vehicle and create initial access to casualties 127 of 231

133 Stabilise the vehicle to protect against uncontrolled movement and regularly check effectiveness Control measure Deploy appropriate number of personnel To ensure that personnel inside the vehicle and their movement do not make any instability worse, the numbers of emergency responders should be controlled, taking fire and rescue service and other emergency service personnel into account, along with any casualties. Develop rescue procedures considering the deployment of minimum numbers of personnel required to avoid affecting stability Minimise the number of personnel operating in the vehicle or craft to minimise effect on stability Control measure Identify and maintain safe access and egress routes Before briefing personnel, incident commanders should consider all available sources of information and assess the developing incident. Team briefings should be based on the incident with safe access and egress routes highlighted. This should ensure crews are not exposed to 128 of 231

134 potential risks. Underfoot conditions and prevailing weather conditions should be taken into account, with continuous evaluation and review throughout the incident to determine whether the current incident plan is effective. Access and egress routes from vehicles and craft should be maintained, taking into account that an alternative egress route may need to be established if the mode of transport becomes more unstable or moves. Ensure responding personnel understand the requirement to maintain safe access and egress routes Identify and communicate access and egress routes to crews considering the incident plan and environment Define routes using physical barriers and clearly illuminate where there is reduced visibility Monitor access and egress routes as the incident progresses and review the incident plan if necessary Control measure Incident ground safety management The incident command system is an all-hazards approach that provides the incident commander with a structure they can adapt to every incident. The system helps to achieve a safe and efficient way of organising people and equipment. The incident commander at the scene is the nominated competent person. They can delegate some responsibilities to others; however, they remain responsible for health and safety at an incident. Providing risk-critical information at an incident is an essential part of the planning process. It has a direct impact on safety. A lack of risk information, or failure to pass it on, can have a critical impact on decisions made by an incident commander. See National Operational Guidance: Operations Information gathering. Safety briefings 129 of 231

135 It will be necessary to organise safety briefings. As the incident develops or where the risk of injury increases those briefings should be more comprehensive. See Communication. Safety officer The incident commander or sector commander may appoint a safety officer at any time. This person should have suitable competencies for the role. A safety officer at larger incidents may be designated as the safety sector commander from that time they will co-ordinate the role of other safety officers. Safety within sectors Sector commanders are responsible for the health and safety of people in their sector. Due to the demands at an incident the sector commander might nominate a safety officer to assist them. Although each safety officer should report to a sector commander, organisation of the safety officer(s) will be managed by the safety sector commander. Emergency evacuation and tactical withdrawal The incident command system provides two formal means of withdrawing personnel from the scene of operations: Emergency evacuation Tactical withdrawal At every incident, the incident commander will apply a command structure. They must establish a safe system of work. This should include a plan for emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal. The fire and rescue service retains responsibility for the health, safety and welfare of its personnel working in the risk area. It also has a duty to consider the effects of its actions on the safety of other people, including when undertaking emergency evacuation or a tactical withdrawal. The plans they make should enable emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal which: Evacuates people at highest risk while protecting escape routes Removes people from areas where the risk has become too high Emergency evacuation is the term used to describe the urgent and immediate withdrawal of crews from a risk area. The incident commander should inform everyone at an incident of the location of the muster point. At a prolonged incident the location of the muster point may change. They should ensure that everyone at an incident knows about this change. See The Foundation for Incident Command. The evacuation should include a roll call at a suitable location. Additionally, the incident commander should make sure there has been a roll call of non-fire service personnel at the scene. Following an evacuation or an evacuation signal being given, no one should re-enter the hazard area without the permission of, or explicit instruction from the incident commander. 130 of 231

136 Where personnel remain unaccounted for after an evacuation, the incident commander will need to assess the risks and commence appropriate search and rescue procedures. Tactical withdrawal is the term used to describe the systematic or staged withdrawal of crews from the risk area. The incident commander may need to redeploy resources or move people from danger. This is a tactical withdrawal. They may also need to withdraw all or part of a sector. When a tactical withdrawal is taking place, an evacuation signal or full incident roll call may not be required. See The Foundation for Incident Command. Provision of information Provision of relevant information is essential to ensure safe operations. Command decision-making can be significantly affected if there is a lack of risk information or where information has not been passed on. Fire control room operators will often be required to receive and communicate risk-critical information. Where risk-critical information is included on the initial turnout details, it should be easy to identify. Where specific risk information is available, incident commanders should ensure this is disseminated to all appropriate personnel on the incident ground. This may include provision of information between agencies or organisations. Ensure they take into account the need to meet health and safety legislation and regulations when developing their policies and procedures on structuring the incident ground. Have procedures for the withdrawal of personnel from the hazard area. These procedures should describe: When each withdrawal type is appropriate The method of implementing the withdrawal The method of carrying out a roll call The communications necessary when withdrawal has been instigated Additionally, they should include the actions to be taken when personnel are unaccounted for after the withdrawal, and the procedure for recommencing activity. Fire control operators should: Ensure that risk critical information is communicated to the incident commander in a timely manner 131 of 231

137 Ensure that everyone on the incident ground is fully briefed on the current hazards, specific risks and control measures including other agencies and organisations Appoint suitably competent safety officers to observe specific hazards and/or activities or monitor risks to personnel at the incident Instigate a safety sector at large or complex incidents under the control of a safety sector commander Establish and communicate the emergency evacuation and tactical withdrawal plan to everyone on the incident ground Communicate emergency evacuation signal and muster point arrangements to all personnel Communicate the tactical withdrawal and emergency evacuation arrangements to all personnel Inform everyone at an incident of the location of the muster point Carry out a roll call of fire service and all other personnel at the scene following an emergency evacuation Review situational awareness following an emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal Commit only minimum number of essential personnel to hazard area Ensure that effective supervision of operational activity is maintained until the conclusion of the incident Hazard Construction materials: Performing rescues 132 of 231

138 Hazard Knowledge See National Operational Guidance: Transport - Construction materials Control measure Identify and communicate vehicle or craft construction materials Identifying the materials used in the vehicle or craft construction provides key information to emergency responders when they are making a scene safe and forming their extrication strategies. Glass in vehicles or craft is marked to indicate glass type, but currently no standards exist for marking up other materials; alternative data sources should be referenced and operational experiences drawn on to understand the materials being tackled. Carry out a risk assessment of the materials identified in vehicle or craft construction and identify appropriate control measures including appropriate respiratory protective equipment (RPE) Provide responding personnel with access to up-to-date information regarding vehicle or craft design and construction Identify materials and systems used within a vehicle and communicate to all emergency responders Use a range of information sources to identify materials used within a vehicle or craft and communicate to all emergency responders Identify vehicle construction materials, pressurised air systems, hydraulics and refrigerants Identify safe cutting zones from fuselage marking and gain access to any persons requiring rescue 133 of 231

139 Identify and communicate the involvement of super-single HGV tyres Identify the status of ventilation systems, pressurised escape areas and intervention/access shafts Provide sharps protection to responders and casualties around deformed metal and broken glass Consider the management of any glass that might affect rescue operations Control measure Avoid manipulation or damage to composite materials Because composite materials may be hidden and are difficult to identify, personnel could inadvertently cause damage to materials containing composite materials. Develop operational tactics that minimise the risk of damage to composite materials Provide operational crews with information, instruction and training in operational tactics developed to minimise risk of unnecessary damage and manipulation to composite materials Consider a tactical plan that minimises risk to casualties, fire crews and other agencies from vehicle or craft construction materials Provide comprehensive safety briefing to crews operating in areas where there is a risk of inhalation, ingestion or injection from composite materials Avoid manipulation and damage of composite materials, use spray to reduce airborne particles 134 of 231

140 Minimise the production of airborne particulates during extrication and provide respiratory protection Control measure Use tactical advisers and responsible person See National Operational Guidance: Incident Command - Situational awareness A responsible person may be nominated by the relevant agency and should have the required competence and knowledge of the transport infrastructure hazards and risks to provide timely and accurate information. The responsible person or agency for an incident in the transport environment will vary depending on the type and context of the incident. Identifying a responsible person or agency may give the incident commander access to a range of information sources and expertise that will support in developing a safe and effective tactical plan. Air The agencies that should be considered for liaison include: The aerodrome fire service Aerodrome mangers Airlines Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) Military agencies Rail Network Rail will not always appoint a railway incident officer (RIO) to incidents affecting the railway. This will depend on the nature of the incident and if in doubt incident commanders should request their assistance. It is the role of the RIO to liaise with and advise the incident commander on safety issues relating to staff working on or adjacent to the permanent way. For further information on the permanent way see Hazard - Complexity of the rail infrastructure. The railway incident officer (RIO) will assist with the identification of rail specific hazards and may provide options for removing or reducing hazards. Different rail infrastructures have assigned the responsible person with different titles, such as train operating liaison officer (TOLO) and station incident officer (SIO). An attending Network Rail mobile operations manager (MOM) may be in attendance and assigned the role of a RIO if required. 135 of 231

141 Rail incident officer (RIO) Network Rail The railway incident officer (RIO) is the nominated and certified individual responsible for on-site command and control of all rail-related operations. Not normally on-site before the arrival of the fire and rescue services, they will be nominated to attend incidents that are likely to have a serious impact on the rail network. The railway incident officer will be able to: Provide information to the incident commander on rail safety matters Arrange for specialist rail workers, engineers, contractors and equipment to be moved to the scene Obtain specialist information on the infrastructure Arrange for the delivery of extra equipment such as rail trolleys, generators, cranes and welfare facilities Liaise with the incident commander to provide options for partial or complete restoration of services Assess the suitability of control measures implemented Co-ordinate the phased reopening of rail lines Road Depending on the type of roadway involved, the responsibility could lie with the local authority, the appropriate highways agency or another body. Where the severity of the incident places a restriction on the normal operation of the roadway or there is damage to the infrastructure, the incident commander should ensure that contact is made with the relevant authority. Waterways The responsible person should have intimate and comprehensive knowledge of the vessel and the hazards within the waterways environment. They may also have access to other tactical advisers able to provide additional information that may be useful to the incident commander, such as information on stability, cargo and hazardous materials. There will be a need to liaise with the port/harbour master if available, as well as the owner or captain of the vessel. Appropriate communications will need to be set up and they should consider vessel size, location and interaction between all attending agencies and port authorities. Many different types of organisation can operate within port boundaries, including cargo terminal operators, passenger terminal operators, leisure marinas, boat builders and commercial fishing. Under UK legislation, the waterways of many ports are the responsibility of the local port authority, which is managed by a harbour master. There may be memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between the fire and rescue service and the port authority to ensure the correct information has been collated at the earliest opportunity to improve the service response. The incident commander should liaise with the port controller, harbour master or ship's master at 136 of 231

142 the earliest opportunity to understand the emergency within the waterways environment. This would include gathering information on the number of passengers and crew involved, the size, type and construction of the vessel and passing this information to fire and rescue service control using the following format: Type e.g. ferry, tanker or cargo Name Tonnage Location (quay or berth number) Cargo Location and extent of any fire hazard Summary of resources (what's in use) Develop arrangements and protocols to identify responsible persons, relevant agencies and/or specialists within the transport environment that can respond and assist at incidents Maintain the details of any tactical adviser (Tac Ad) or subject matter expert (SME) relevant to the risk and area and know how to request their attendance Ensure early liaison with the responsible person is carried out to gather appropriate information to inform a safe and effective operational response plan ARCHIVED Request the timely attendance of a tactical adviser (Tac Ad) or subject matter expert (SME) with relevant competence Establish and maintain contact with the rail infrastructure controller or Rail Incident Officer (RIO) Establish communications with the Aerodrome RFFS, CAA, AAIB or other relevant agencies Control measure Apply fine water spray or foam 137 of 231

143 Applying fine sprays or firefighting foam will reduce the risk of airborne pollution by composite materials and the general disturbance of the material in and around the wreckage. An alternative measure, where composite materials are badly fire damaged, is to apply a fine water spray to prevent particulates from becoming airborne. By reducing airborne composite material particles, the hazards associated with exposure to the material or substance (by inhalation, ingestion or injection) can be reduced significantly. When using firefighting foam or water, environmental protection should also be considered. See National Operational Guidance: Environmental protection. Ensure all personnel are aware of appropriate safe systems of work and personal protective equipment (PPE) relevant to the risk associated with vehicle or craft construction materials Provide responding appliances or make arrangements to have available appropriate water spray and foam equipment required to implement identified safe systems of work Consider using fine sprays or foam blankets to minimise airborne particulates Ensure the continued integrity of an evenly distributed foam blanket throughout the incident and manage hazards obscured by the foam blanket Carry out appropriate post-incident decontamination following exposure to vehicle or craft construction materials Control measure Know the capabilities and uses of rescue equipment Transport incidents are usually complex and a wide range of materials will have been involved in 138 of 231

144 construction. Working at transport incidents will often involve the use of specialist equipment. The type of equipment and the hazards involved will vary but typically may include: Potential injury from failure of equipment causing collapse or sudden movement of loads under pressure Cuts, nip, trap or entanglement hazards from the moving parts of equipment Excessive noise and/or vibration. Damage to high-pressure hydraulic or pneumatic systems involved with cutting or spreading tools can cause soft tissue injuries Burns from hot and/or cold components Accidental ignition of fuels Refer to the Extrication - Generic - Tools section, for details of the control measures that apply when considering the capabilities and use of rescue equipment. There are no tactical actions associated with this control measure. Control measure Make the correct tool choice for vehicle construction Due to the wide range of materials used by manufacturers in the construction of vehicles, the choice of tool has become increasingly important. The fundamental goal for using tooling is to achieve the required task while minimising the hazards associated with tackling the vehicle materials. To achieve this, the tool operator should identify the material being tackled as far as possible. The tool operator should have a thorough knowledge of the tools and their configurations. This is important to ensure that vehicle materials are tackled with awareness of the dust and fibres that may be created, in addition to the energies that can be introduced to the vehicle structure, and potentially to any casualties. 139 of 231

145 Where the tools required to achieve objectives are likely to introduce additional energy, alternative tools should be considered. Where this is not appropriate, the vehicle should be further stabilised and detailed communications made. Identify vehicle materials before cutting/repositioning, to aid appropriate tool choice. Closely monitor the tool when vehicle materials cannot initially be identified Reconsider the choice of rescue tools and operational methodologies, if the rescue tools in use do not perform as expected; unknown materials may be present Consider alternative rescue tools or introducing additional control measures, like water mist to minimise airborne dust particles, where the activity is producing additional material hazards Consider identifying operational plans that involve lower risk materials Provide information and training to crews on the identification of vehicle construction and techniques for performing rescues Provide suitable tools and procedures to enable personnel to work safely, effectively and efficiently Select rescue tools and techniques based on the materials and vehicle construction identified Control measure Be aware of the respiration of particles and dermal irritation Material deformation due to collision and the cutting of vehicle materials to remove structural elements produces a range of material particulate sizes. Inhaling these particles to the upper and lower respiratory tract poses a significant risk to emergency responders and casualties, both during the extrication phase and during the recovery phase of an incident where clearing up may be undertaken. Airborne continuous filament particles and their associated health hazards depend on respirability; the potential to enter the lower regions of the lung, where lung disease can be caused. 140 of 231

146 Where dust or fibres are produced during collision or through the extrication process, itching can also occur when there is direct contact with soft tissues such as the skin and eyes. Such irritation is more prevalent when soft tissue is exposed to resin coated fibrous material, especially GFRP and CFRP Dust can be found on equipment or PPE and can also be transferred to other personnel and their equipment. Consider damping down any dust on scene or any dust created during the cutting process Consider introducing barrier membranes like plastic covers between casualties and any materials being cut Consider alternative extrication strategies to reduce the requirement to cut Consider alternative tool strategies to reduce any dust produced Provide respiratory protective equipment (RPE) to rescuers and casualties when dust is likely, and ensure RPE is disposed of correctly after use Consider washing equipment and PPE and ensure that affected PPE is replaced or cleaned Ensure that crews are supplied with PPE and RPE that protect against the dermal irritation and respiration of particulates likely to be encountered in rescue operations Ensure PPE and RPE is compatible with simultaneously worn protection for other incident types Minimise the risk to crews from dust and particles released during rescue operations Ensure that PPE and RPE is worn in accordance with service risk assessment at rescue incidents Control measure Consider the release of energy from structural vehicle components 141 of 231

147 The characteristics of some new vehicle materials such as dual phase and boronated steels mean that where an impact occurs they are less likely to deform. Where deformation occurs, it indicates that high energies have existed. Where deformed components need to be repositioned consideration should be given to the sudden release of energy. Materials such as glass and polycarbonates may fracture when large energy forces are applied. Surface tension across the material can lead to sections being released uncontrollably as projectiles. Use alternative extrication routes to avoid cutting deformed high strength materials Consider tool choice to reduce energy input to materials that can fracture Ensure stabilisation is effective before releasing high energies from vehicle components Provide information and training to crews on the identification of vehicle construction Consider the potential release of stored energy as part of the extrication plan Control measure Manage heavy vehicle considerations In this control measure, the term 'heavy vehicle' primarily relates to LGVs and PSVs, but will incorporate elements relating to incidents involving any rail stock or large aircraft i.e. working at height. For further information, refer to the Extrication sections relating to vehicle construction, including composite materials and metals. The enhanced issues presented when carrying out an extrication from a heavy vehicle include: 142 of 231

148 Weight and construction of vehicle components with the potential to cause injuries due to manual handling issues Sectional thickness or cross-sectional area Construction materials Reinforcement Access Tool or equipment damage Working at height Vehicle systems (including 24 volt systems) Sleeper compartment locations and other voids The size requirements of heavy vehicles, and the significant weight associated with the loads they carry, contribute to the use of high strength, low alloy (HSLA) steels and heavy gauge materials in their construction. If vehicle structural components need to be displaced or removed there will be significant weight associated with them. This should be managed appropriately. For example, the weight associated with removing LGV components such as doors may be further affected by the height of the components from ground level. Operating above ground level with rescue equipment introduces a number of significant working difficulties such as: Gaining access and egress Manual handling of the casualty Manual handling of any tools A clear working area should be established around the vehicle to allow the use of mobile platforms from which crews can work. Such platforms allow same level working between the crews and the casualty location without having to encroach on the minimal space available within a compartment. Where platforms are used, personnel should be managed to ensure that the limited space is used effectively. Crews should be kept to the minimum required for the extrication. Where vehicle components are removed or displaced considered the effect on vehicle stability strategies in use. Recheck stability when structural components are to be removed from heavy vehicles Use lowering mechanisms for items of significant weight: 'Try before you Pry' Ensure a safe area of work exists below any vehicle components being removed Minimise the size of the component being removed from the vehicle to reduce weight and manual handling issues where appropriate Use safe working platforms and ensure a clear working area exists around the platform Ensure fall arrest equipment is used where required 143 of 231

149 Provide information and training to crews on the risk presented by heavy vehicles at rescue operations Consider the size and weight of the vehicle as part of the extrication plan Consider requesting specialist rescue resources to assist with extrications involving large and heavy vehicles Extrication from air transport For more information, see National Operational Guidance: Transport - Air Hazard Military aircraft Hazard Knowledge Fire and rescue services may come into contact with military aircraft of varying types and roles, from a number of different nations. These aircraft operate from military aerodromes around the country, or overseas and in transit through UK air space, but may also operate from civil aerodromes for a variety of reasons. Military organisations operate many types of aircraft that can vary enormously, from small two-seat trainers, attack helicopters, unmanned aircraft and combat fast jets through to large passenger or cargo aircraft. Large transport aircraft may be similar in appearance to civil airliners, but have unconventional interior configurations. Unmanned aerial vehicles are aircraft that do not carry a human pilot. Instead they are flown remotely by an operator, and can carry a lethal payload. 144 of 231

150 Most military aircraft are capable of carrying weapon systems and advanced trainers and/or fast jets may be fitted with differing aircraft assisted escape systems (AAES). Apart from the additional hazards associated with explosive stores, weapon and escape systems, the profile of the aircraft types have synergies with civil aircraft. Due to the hazardous nature of specialist military aircraft, actions should be restricted to life-saving operations. Where it is confirmed by official sources that the aircrew have already ejected, the aircraft should be cordoned off and left undisturbed. An area around the aircraft with a radius of 400m should be evacuated for any incident involving military aircraft and, if the aircraft is armed, this distance should be increased to between 400m and 800m after seeking advice from the responsible military authority. Efforts should be redirected to locating the aircrew and, if requested by the military, the remains of the ejection seats. Aircraft assisted escape systems Aircraft assisted escape systems (AAES) means collectively: the ejection seat, the equipment fitted to the ejection seat including emergency escape parachutes, and personal survival packs with systems for clearing the ejection path from the aircraft, including associated mechanisms operated by explosives. An ejection seat is a system fitted to most military advanced trainer and fast jet aircraft (and can also be found in private ex-military aircraft). It is designed to rescue the pilot or crew from an aircraft in an emergency. In most designs, the seat is propelled from the aircraft by an explosive charge or rocket motor, carrying the occupant with it. Once clear of the aircraft, the system will automatically deploy a parachute. The cockpit canopy will also be jettisoned or fragmented by explosive charges, to provide a clear route for the ejection seat. At aircraft accidents, canopies can be externally jettisoned or fragmented by fire and rescue service personnel separately, to provide emergency access to the cockpit. The operation of ejection seats will normally be controlled by the pilot or crew. The seat can be operated when the aircraft is in flight or on the ground. If it is suspected that the aircrew are intending to operate aircraft assisted escape systems (AAES), rescue crews should not approach the aircraft and should remain at least 15 metres away from the cockpit until the procedure has been completed, or the aircrew indicates that it is safe to approach. During immediate operations, fire and rescue service personnel will take whatever precautions are necessary to rescue crew or other personnel. Thereafter, ejection seats and components, survival equipment and flying clothing are to be left undisturbed until the arrival of the aircraft assisted escape systems (AAES) investigation team, who will be responsible for taking all other aircraft assisted escape systems (AAES) safety precautions under the guidance of the Defence Accident Investigation Branch (DAIB). 145 of 231

151 Aircraft assisted escape systems (AAES) present a significant hazard to fire and rescue service personnel attending a military aircraft incident. If the incident is not on an aerodrome, there is a high likelihood that fire and rescue service personnel will be first on the scene. It is possible to make ejection seats safe, however this must be carried out under the guidance of the responsible person as (MOD specialist AAES engineers), due to the extensive range of seat configurations, general training and familiarisation will be difficult. For information the Miniature Detonation Cord (MDC) is marked black & yellow. Explosive armament stores All missiles, rockets and bombs found on military aircraft will contain varying amounts and types of highly explosive material. Any explosive armament that is in danger of becoming heated by fires should be cooled with water sprays if safe to do so, but on no account should any attempt be made to move or interfere with any potentially explosive devices. Explosive armament does not normally explode on impact of a crashed aircraft, but its condition must be considered as unpredictable, so specialist explosive ordnance disposal advice should be sought. If explosive armament stores, including gun ammunition, have become detached from the aircraft, they should be not disturbed. Their location should be marked, cordoned off and specialist assistance sought for their disposal. Electro-explosive devices may be accidentally initiated by radio or radar frequency electro-magnetic radiation. If an aircraft accident involves nuclear weapons or materials, the Defence Accident Response Organisation will assume command of the accident. Defensive systems Chaff is used to defend aircraft against hostile missile attack. It consists of a large quantity of reflective material, discharged from the aircraft to confuse the guidance systems of the missile. Chaff is deployed from the aircraft with explosive force, and then distributed through the air by a small explosive device. Defensive flares are designed to confuse heat-seeking missile systems and will ignite and burn brightly on release. Defensive flares can provide an ignition source, burn at a very high temperature and may produce a light bright enough to cause significant eye damage. These systems are very sensitive and can activate unexpectedly. Small arms and gun ammunition 146 of 231

152 Several different types of small arms and gun weapon systems may be found fitted to military aircraft, depending on the aircraft s specification and role. Most of the gun ammunition carried on the aircraft is usually, but not always, stored in safe containers or tanks, but some aircraft fly with a live or dummy round loaded in to the weapon. Apart from live ammunition, these weapon systems may also discharge pyrotechnics or blank rounds. Gun ammunition may burst unexpectedly if exposed to fire or impact, and weapons may become detached from the aircraft during accidents. The area directly in front of any weapon systems must be avoided, and if possible, the location of any stored ammunition should be recognised and avoided. Pyrotechnics Various pyrotechnic devices can be found on military aircraft including: signal cartridges, distress flares and smoke markers. They will commonly incorporate a metal tube containing explosive material that is crimped at one end. When ignited it will emit flame and sparks at the open end. Pyrotechnic devices can be used to ignite rocket motors, to deploy under-wing weapons, or to jettison external fuel tanks; they may also be located in fire suppression systems around the aircraft. Marine flares and smoke markers may be ejected from the aircraft with some force, manually or automatically, following a crash or on contact with water. Personal flares may be found within the aircrew survival kit which can be an additional hazard when performing rescues or where bodies have to be recovered. Liquid oxygen As military aircraft may sometimes have to operate at high altitudes, a breathable oxygen supply is provided for the pilot and crew to survive. Oxygen will often be stored under pressure in cylinders or automatically generated on demand. If aircraft are involved in fire, the risk of explosion and the effect that the oxygen may have on the fire should be considered. For more information refer to National Operational Guidance: Hazardous materials Aviation fuel and specialist fuels Military aircraft generally use the same types of aviation fuels that commercial aircraft use, but with some additional additives. Some aircraft can be fitted with auxiliary external fuel tanks, which can be jettisoned in an emergency 147 of 231

153 Mono fuels are special fuels that can support combustion without an external air supply, as the chemical make-up of the substance contains its own oxygen. They are usually found in small quantities on aircraft and are used to power emergency power units, or as propellants for missiles. Infra-red and laser systems Modern weapons systems used on military aircraft are increasingly fitted with infra-red guidance systems for weapons targeting. The devices are often positioned behind a glass vision panel and are commonly forwards or sideways looking. Military laser guidance systems, unlike medical lasers, operate at a much higher intensity for targeting purposes, and have the potential to cause harm; particularly to the eyes and delicate tissues. The likelihood of infra-red and laser guidance systems operating post-crash is minimal due to aircraft safety systems, which automatically isolate weapon firing and release circuits in emergency situations. Fire and rescue service personnel should, however, stay clear of the area in front of these devices and avoid looking into any vision panels. These systems are a non-ionising form of radiation however, most military aircraft will be carrying some form of ionising radiation on board. Specialist advice should be sought to identify this. Aircraft arresting systems Two systems may be installed at military aerodromes. These systems are designed to arrest aircraft landing on short runways, temporary runways or in an emergency. They use a cable spanning the runway or a net positioned at the overrun of the runway. The cable system (generally defined as arrestor gear) consists of a single cable engaged by a hook fitted to many tactical military aircraft. During normal arrestment, the tail hook engages the wire and the aircraft's kinetic energy is transferred to damping systems. Arresting barrier nets stop an aircraft by absorbing its forward momentum. These nets are raised remotely by air traffic control in an emergency. Both systems involve steel cables, which may be under stress during an aircraft arrest. Fire and rescue service personnel should stay clear of these systems until military advisers have made the area of operations safe. Control measure Cordon controls: Military aircraft 148 of 231

154 Specific cordon distances for military aircraft are imposed by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for aircraft post-crash management (APCM) and are recommended for fire and rescue service initial response: All military aircraft: 400m Military aircraft with ordnance: 800m These initial cordons can be reduced in liaison with Ministry of Defence aircraft post crash management incident officer (APCMIO), or equivalent specialist military adviser. Refer to Control measure Liaise with specialist military advisers. For further information refer to Manual of Aircraft Post Crash Management: For more generic advice on approaching an incident and cordons, refer to Hazard Transport incidents Make a safe and controlled approach to the incident. Ensure all personnel are aware of and understand cordon distances for military aircraft incidents Consider risk from on board ordnance, munitions, ejector seat and canopy detonators etc. Implement cordons of 400m for military aircraft or 800m for military aircraft with ordnance Control measure Specialist advice: Military aircraft 149 of 231

155 The role of the Royal Air Force regional liaison officer (RAFRLO) is to liaise with the civilian emergency services and local authorities, providing a conduit between the military, civilian agencies and other government departments as required. There are nine RAFRLOs in the UK. If an incident involves military aircraft, the Ministry of Defence will activate an Aircraft Post Crash Management (APCM) plan which includes a local, trained Aircraft Post Crash Management Incident Officer (APCMIO). They have capability to deploy on-call hazardous materials and aircraft recovery teams. APCMIO will work closely with local responders on the ground to gain safe access to the incident site and carry out the air accident investigation. They will also deal with the clearance and restoration of the crash site. The Royal Navy Institute of Naval Medicine duty hazmat and environmental protection officer and RAF Centre of Aviation Medicine duty environmental health officer can provide advice and on-scene support on hazardous materials, occupational and environmental health, and environmental protection. They can be reached 24/7 via Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Duty Officer (DCDSDO) in Whitehall or the Defence Fire Risk Management Organisation (DFRMO) duty officer. They may also be able to provide advice for incidents involving foreign planes. An explosive ordnance disposal team will respond to an aircraft crash, providing specialist safety advice and the capability to locate and identify all items of explosive ordnance, and render them safe. Liaison should be made with the Ministry of Defence aircraft post crash management incident officer (APCMIO), if in attendance. Develop tactical guidance on the services the military can provide at incidents involving military aircraft in consultation with the Royal Air Force regional liaison officer (RAFRLO) Liaise with Ministry of Defence aircraft post-crash management incident officer (APCMIO) Consider requesting assistance from military agencies 150 of 231

156 Control measure Restrict radio transmissions With the increase in the use of electronic communication devices throughout all sections of the community, there is a potential hazard when these items are used in close proximity to an electro explosive device (EED). To a large extent, the sensitivity of electro explosive devices to extraneous radio frequency fields can be minimised by screening, intrinsic design characteristics and specialised packaging. However, there are a number of circumstances, notably when electro explosive devices are unpackaged, when they are particularly vulnerable to inadvertent initiation by radio frequency. This effect is known as RADHAZ, and must be considered at all times when using management radios, mobile phones and so on in the vicinity of electro explosive devices or stores containing electro explosive devices. Develop tactical guidance on the use of electronic communication devices at incidents involving military aircraft Manage or restrict the use of electronic communication devices until military advisers arrive. Control measure Access the cockpit 151 of 231

157 A military aircraft cockpit is covered/protected by a canopy; a canopy is usually constructed from a transparent material and is extremely strong and heavy (canopies can weigh in the region of 100kg). Once a canopy is open it will need to be secured in place to prevent it from slamming shut, which could render serious injury to emergency service personnel and/or aircrew. Methods of rescuing aircrew from the cockpit will result in one of three entries: Normal entry Emergency entry Forced entry Note - This emergency entry only applies to aircraft fitted with a miniature detonating cord/linear cutting cord and requires a cordon at least three metres forward of the cockpit area when activating it. Forced entry to the canopy is highly dangerous and is not recommended. It would be extremely difficult to assess the state of any damage to the aircraft canopy on a crash damaged aircraft, which could ultimately activate and 'fire off' if the canopy frame is interfered with Ensure personnel are aware of the cockpit canopy types likely to be encountered and the location of their release mechanisms Take instruction from aircrew on safe access and release from the cockpit Open the canopy by releasing the mechanism on the outside of the aircraft, following written instructions Control measure Make ejection seats safe 152 of 231

158 In normal conditions, only trained and competent technicians from the relevant military services should attempt to make an ejection seat safe. However, emergency service personnel may be faced with undertaking the task in exceptional circumstances, where the risk associated with attempting to work around the hazard affects the ability to save life. When an aircraft is parked on the ground safety devices, in the form of distinctive safety pins, are fitted to prevent the accidental actuation of the ejection seat. Modern ejection seats have changed considerably from their earlier equivalents. In most cases, they can be made safe for rescue using just one or two sear pins or by the operation of the seat safe lever. The seats vary in aircraft, but they all work in a similar manner. Once initiated, the ejection sequence is fully automatic and cannot be stopped. All UK aircraft carry a set of sear pins in the cockpit for making the seat safe for rescue. However, some non-uk aircraft no longer carry sear pins and rely solely on the seat safe lever. These actions should be carried out in an emergency situation only (exceptional circumstance) Look for the seat guide rails projecting out of the canopy area on arrival at the aircraft. If they are visible, it can indicate that the seats have fired from the cockpit and the aircrew may be some distance from the airframe. Never assume the seats have gone; a two-seat aircraft may have had only one occupant or a seat may have failed to operate. Making an ejection seat safe requires controlling the firing sequence by pinning the ejection handles or the safe seat lever. Ejection seats can be made safe at varying levels, usually described as: Safe for rescue: seat firing sequence is inoperable but the seat systems are still active and elements such as the drogue gun can still be fired Safe for servicing: seat totally disabled for maintenance purposes by a competent technician To operate the seat safe lever, reach into the cockpit and rotate the lever in an anti-clockwise direction, to turn from armed to safe egress. Ensure that responding personnel have an awareness of ejection seat mechanisms and associated safety precautions Seek specialist advice before making any attempt to make safe any ejection seat 153 of 231

159 Seek specialist advice to identify securing pins etc. Control measure Extricate the aircrew This activity will involve operating in a very confined space. Great care should be taken not to accidentally operate any switches or equipment. Electrical systems are identified by labelled switches marked with black and yellow hatching. Military aircraft are increasingly fitted with infra-red guidance systems for weapons targeting. These may be both Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) and Sideways Looking Infra-Red (SLIR). These emissions can be damaging to delicate eye tissues and all emergency service personnel should be aware of the dangers of looking directly into glass panels located on the aircraft nose or elsewhere on the aircraft, until it can be confirmed that all systems have been isolated. Military laser guidance systems, unlike medical lasers, operate at a much higher intensity for targeting purposes and have the potential to cause harm, particularly to the eyes and delicate tissues. The likelihood of infra-red and laser guidance systems operating post-crash is minimal, due to the aircraft safety system; crash switches, weight on wheels switch, isolating systems and so on. The infra-red guidance systems have to be manually selected by the pilot and therefore it is unlikely these will be activated at a crash site. Any radar on civilian aircraft is normally restricted to weather indication and is relatively small in size and power output. Radar on military aircraft is primarily for detection and surveillance. These radar units operate on differing wavelengths and at much greater power output when switched on. The EC3 Sentry AWACS uses an externally mounted dish scanner for airborne early warning and control with a range of over several hundred miles. In normal operating mode, the dish rotates and has a large white strip across its surface; however, it should not be assumed that it is switched off if the dish is not rotating. The Nimrod uses fully enclosed nose cone search water radar, of extremely high power, and there is no external indication of its operational status. 154 of 231

160 Provide all personnel with information and training on the safe extrication of pilots from military aircraft Release aircrew harness starting at the head, work downwards releasing main harness last Consider that aircrew may be suffering from possible spinal injury; seek medical assistance if time allows Ensure all cables and connectors are released before attempting to extricate pilot from cockpit Document any movement of aircraft controls at the earliest opportunity for investigation purposes Identify the presence of infra-red and laser systems; do not look directly at the source Extrication from rail transport See also National Operational Guidance: Transport - Rail Introduction Many types of rail vehicles are used to provide services for passengers and freight. This guidance is not intended to cover any of these types in detail but to highlight the reasonably foreseeable hazards and to detail options for control measures when performing rescues specifically from railway rolling stock. This guidance does not cover the hazard of diesel fuel, as this is classified as a hazardous material. Extrication and evacuation of casualties from rail vehicles can be resource intensive, requiring specialist local and potentially national resources. Hazard Delay in accessing driver or passenger compartments 155 of 231

161 Hazard Knowledge If there is a delay in gaining access to driver or passenger compartments, either through damage caused or the resting position of the carriage, the condition of casualties could deteriorate. The design strategy for most modern rail vehicles is for the structure to resist the effects of impact or derailment and to provide adequate protection for passengers, whilst keeping them contained within the vehicle. Control measure Use designated doors and windows The preferred route to gain access to train carriages during emergencies should be through the carriage doors. Most modern rolling stock is fitted with door release mechanisms, which will be labelled and operable from the outside. Where access via doors in not available, there are three other options: Windows: designated emergency windows will be marked inside and out, and will break more easily to provide access. Whilst windows may be used initially to gain access to casualties, they would not normally provide a long term solution for access and egress due to size constraints and the difficulty manoeuvring stretcher bound casualties Corridor connector: provides a weatherproof connection between two carriages. Create openings in vehicle body Request early identification and use of designated access points. Alternatively: Corridor connector: Depending on design, it may be feasible to vertically cut through this to access vehicle end doors. Warning: some vehicles may contain cables in this area (refer to Context -Electricity guidance) Windows: glazing systems in modern rail stock are designed to survive severe collision impacts. Whilst the outer element can be managed using existing road vehicle techniques, the plastic membrane of the inner laminated element is significantly tougher and will require significant effort to penetrate Create openings in vehicle body 156 of 231

162 Ensure emergency responders have an awareness of gaining access to railway carriages and rolling stock Gain access to railway carriages and rolling stock via doors, corridor connectors, and windows, or create an opening Obtain specialist advice and assistance from rail network operators regarding the most appropriate access Control measure Use tactical advisers and responsible person See National Operational Guidance: Incident Command - Situational awareness A responsible person may be nominated by the relevant agency and should have the required competence and knowledge of the transport infrastructure hazards and risks to provide timely and accurate information. The responsible person or agency for an incident in the transport environment will vary depending on the type and context of the incident. Identifying a responsible person or agency may give the incident commander access to a range of information sources and expertise that will support in developing a safe and effective tactical plan. Air The agencies that should be considered for liaison include: The aerodrome fire service Aerodrome mangers Airlines Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) Military agencies Rail 157 of 231

163 Network Rail will not always appoint a railway incident officer (RIO) to incidents affecting the railway. This will depend on the nature of the incident and if in doubt incident commanders should request their assistance. It is the role of the RIO to liaise with and advise the incident commander on safety issues relating to staff working on or adjacent to the permanent way. For further information on the permanent way see Hazard - Complexity of the rail infrastructure. The railway incident officer (RIO) will assist with the identification of rail specific hazards and may provide options for removing or reducing hazards. Different rail infrastructures have assigned the responsible person with different titles, such as train operating liaison officer (TOLO) and station incident officer (SIO). An attending Network Rail mobile operations manager (MOM) may be in attendance and assigned the role of a RIO if required. Rail incident officer (RIO) Network Rail The railway incident officer (RIO) is the nominated and certified individual responsible for on-site command and control of all rail-related operations. Not normally on-site before the arrival of the fire and rescue services, they will be nominated to attend incidents that are likely to have a serious impact on the rail network. The railway incident officer will be able to: Provide information to the incident commander on rail safety matters Arrange for specialist rail workers, engineers, contractors and equipment to be moved to the scene Obtain specialist information on the infrastructure Arrange for the delivery of extra equipment such as rail trolleys, generators, cranes and welfare facilities Liaise with the incident commander to provide options for partial or complete restoration of services Assess the suitability of control measures implemented Co-ordinate the phased reopening of rail lines Road Depending on the type of roadway involved, the responsibility could lie with the local authority, the appropriate highways agency or another body. Where the severity of the incident places a restriction on the normal operation of the roadway or there is damage to the infrastructure, the incident commander should ensure that contact is made with the relevant authority. Waterways The responsible person should have intimate and comprehensive knowledge of the vessel and the hazards within the waterways environment. They may also have access to other tactical advisers able to provide additional information that may be useful to the incident commander, such as information on stability, cargo and hazardous materials. There will be a need to liaise with the port/harbour master if available, as well as the owner or 158 of 231

164 captain of the vessel. Appropriate communications will need to be set up and they should consider vessel size, location and interaction between all attending agencies and port authorities. Many different types of organisation can operate within port boundaries, including cargo terminal operators, passenger terminal operators, leisure marinas, boat builders and commercial fishing. Under UK legislation, the waterways of many ports are the responsibility of the local port authority, which is managed by a harbour master. There may be memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between the fire and rescue service and the port authority to ensure the correct information has been collated at the earliest opportunity to improve the service response. The incident commander should liaise with the port controller, harbour master or ship's master at the earliest opportunity to understand the emergency within the waterways environment. This would include gathering information on the number of passengers and crew involved, the size, type and construction of the vessel and passing this information to fire and rescue service control using the following format: Type e.g. ferry, tanker or cargo Name Tonnage Location (quay or berth number) Cargo Location and extent of any fire hazard Summary of resources (what's in use) Develop arrangements and protocols to identify responsible persons, relevant agencies and/or specialists within the transport environment that can respond and assist at incidents Maintain the details of any tactical adviser (Tac Ad) or subject matter expert (SME) relevant to the risk and area and know how to request their attendance Ensure early liaison with the responsible person is carried out to gather appropriate information to inform a safe and effective operational response plan ARCHIVED Request the timely attendance of a tactical adviser (Tac Ad) or subject matter expert (SME) with relevant competence Establish and maintain contact with the rail infrastructure controller or Rail Incident Officer 159 of 231

165 (RIO) Establish communications with the Aerodrome RFFS, CAA, AAIB or other relevant agencies Extrication from road transport For more information, see National Operational Guidance: Transport - Road Hazard Alternative fuelled vehicles (AFV) Hazard Knowledge For the purpose of this guidance, the term 'alternative fuelled vehicles' (AFV) relates to those vehicles powered by fuels other than the conventional petrol or diesel, either exclusively or in combination. Alternative fuelled vehicles (AFV) styles and types are: Cars Vans Off-road vehicles Large goods vehicles (LGVs) Public service vehicles (PSVs) The fuels used in AFVs include: High voltage battery fuel cells in hybrid and electric vehicles Compressed natural gas (CNG) Liquid natural gas (LNG) Bio-fuels Hydrogen fuel cells Where a vehicle uses two or more distinct power sources to move the vehicle, the vehicle is termed a hybrid. The term most commonly refers to hybrid electric vehicles, which combine an internal combustion engine and one or more electric motors. However, this term includes other 160 of 231

166 mechanisms to capture and use energy. Except for the control measures described in this document, hybrid vehicles may be approached using standard vehicle extrication principles and techniques. The hazard posed by the vehicle fuels may be as a result of a collision, fire or submersion, or may be due to the actions of emergency responders during operations. The hazards posed by alternative fuelled vehicles (AFVs) include: The type of vehicle not being identified Uncontrolled vehicle movement Inhalation of gases Death from electrocution Fuel cell explosion during over-pressurisation and/or fires Residual risks to other agencies post-incident The majority of vehicles on the roads in the UK use conventional fuels (petrol and diesel) to propel them, but the use of alternative fuelled vehicles (AFVs) is on the rise. The potential for incidents involving these vehicles will increase with time. The use of compressed natural gas (CNG) in European alternative fuelled vehicles (AFVs) is widespread in mainstream manufacturers, and their presence in the UK will increase. Where alternative fuels have been compromised and/or released, involving other emergency services and agencies, the impact on the casualties involved and the environmental impact should be considered. See National Operational Guidance: Environmental protection, specifically for hazards, control measures and actions. Alternative fuelled vehicles involved in collisions If an AFV has been involved in a collision that has led to components such as battery units becoming detached, it is important for the scene assessment to consider the presence of: High voltage electricity/systems Hazardous Materials; due to the leaking of electrolytes from batteries Pressurised systems The location of the incident and level of damage experienced by the AFV will dictate the initial actions of emergency responders. All AFVs present their own hazards, and combinations of hazards, which will require different actions according to the incident, many involving Hazardous Materials related considerations and procedures. For further information, see National Operational Guidance: Hazardous materials. 161 of 231

167 Control measure Identify and communicate the vehicle type The potential for a road traffic collision with an alternative fuelled vehicle (AFV) will become increasingly likely as they become more popular, so emergency responders should be aware of the need to identify these vehicles. This identification should form part of the initial information gathering, from the time of call and during initial attendance. With the increased availability and use of alternative fuelled vehicles (AFVs) and their associated technology, it is safe to assume that all vehicles are alternatively fuelled, until otherwise confirmed. Information sources that may prove useful in identifying the vehicle type could include: Questioning the driver and/or occupants Where possible, fire control room operators questioning the caller of the incident to identify fuel supply if the person is responsible for the vehicle Considering the aerodynamic design or recognising the model Looking for vehicle markings, such as the use of the term 'hybrid' Looking for their bright orange cabling if the vehicle has overturned or is on its side Using systems such as mobile data terminals (MDT), where available, to assist with identification At complex incidents consideration should be given to placing additional markings on the alternative fuelled vehicle (AFV) to identify its type for oncoming personnel and other agencies, making them aware of the hazards posed by such a vehicle. Equip personnel and provide access to up-to-date information on vehicle design and use Make information available to operational responders at incidents regarding the types of alternative fuelled vehicles and methods of safe isolation Consider requesting specialist advice from vehicle manufacturers regarding credible scenarios and methods of managing the various situations in advance of emergency incidents, given the relatively new nature of the AFV technology 162 of 231

168 Identify fuel type (hyd rocarbon, LPG, electric, hybrid, hydrogen), fuel spillages and potential ignition sources Communicate fuel type and status to all emergency responders Identify the location of any high voltage wiring and presence of battery packs/fuel cells/lpg in the vehicle Identify type of vehicle, contents, passenger, cargo and hazardous materials information Control measure Immobilise vehicle Where vehicles employ electric motors as part of their propulsion, such motors remain energised when powered but provide no audible indicators. Some alternative fuelled vehicles, in particular electric vehicles, will also have different characteristics of drive status when stationary. Where the vehicle s propulsion has not been identified and the vehicle is engaged in drive, an electric vehicle may remain stationary until the accelerator is depressed or the brake released. Simply pressing the accelerator when the alternative fuelled vehicle is in either in Drive or Ready mode may cause the engine to start up. Only power down the alternative fuelled vehicle (AFV) using recognised procedures as per manufacturer s guidance, placing the vehicle into Park mode and removing the key to disable the high voltage system 163 of 231

169 Consider immobilising propulsion system using ignition, power down, gears or chocking Control measure Isolate high voltage systems Electric vehicles and hybrid vehicles typically include high voltage batteries. The presence of high voltage components creates a possible electrocution hazard (voltage levels range from 36v up to 600v). See National Operational Guidance: Operations, - Electricity. High voltage wiring in electric vehicles uses bright orange cabling as an industry standard, so that they are easily recognised by emergency responders and repair technicians. Battery packs are protected to ensure they are safe during use, and firefighters should identify the locations of both battery packs and any associated high voltage cabling when undertaking their operational plan (they are generally routed centrally, outside and underneath the vehicle). Some hybrid vehicles have sensors in the engine compartment that will automatically isolate the high voltage supply from the rear battery compartment to the front electric motors in a medium or severe frontal collision, using similar criteria to that of airbag safety feature/system deployment. This high voltage link will also shut down if there is any interruption to the power supply, for example severing the high voltage cable, water submersion or any damage to the vehicle causing a 'short circuit' within any of the high voltage components. In a severe collision there is a potential risk from high voltage systems due to damage. These systems generally operate between Volts. All of the positive and negative supplies on the hybrid electrical system are isolated from the vehicle chassis. The high voltage battery packs are often located either behind or under the second row of seats. High voltage system, if possible, by removing the proximity key from the scene of operations (more than 5m from the alternative fuelled vehicle (AFV)); however, this can lead to dead-locking doors. Consider the electrical system unsafe for a full ten minutes after ignition shut down; however, this should not delay rescue operations 164 of 231

170 Identify isolation points for alternative fuelled vehicles (AFV) Isolate fuel or power source by removing keys or operate emergency shut-offs when safe to do so Avoid any contact with live electrical power systems or wear appropriate PPE (e.g. electrical gloves) Control measure Appropriate extrication techniques for alternative fuelled vehicle (AFV) Using conventional extrication techniques, in particular hydraulic rams, may cause damage to AFV battery fuel cells. Refer to the Extrication section on Tools. The routing of fuel pipes and high voltage cabling in AFVs must be considered by manufacturers, and as such they are sited in protected areas under the vehicle or within the vehicle panels. Where a vehicle has been involved in an impact and needs to be stabilised, consider the potential detachment of cables/fuel lines. Refer to the Extrication section on unstable vehicle containing casualties. The resting position of an AFV involved in a RTC may be unconventional, given the location of its internal combustion engine and high voltage systems. This should be considered when attempting to stabilise the AFV to carry out a rescue. Identify the area that will be used in the stabilisation plan and ensure that any stabilisation does not compromise fuel lines or high voltage cables; adopt alternative methods for extrication if the fuel cells could be compromised. 165 of 231

171 Provide emergency responders with information and training on alternative extrication techniques suitable for alternative fuelled vehicles Consider vehicle fuel lines and high voltage cables when planning stabilisation and extrication Hazard Unconventional or specialist road vehicles Hazard Knowledge Fire and rescue services may encounter unconventional or specialist vehicles that present different hazards to those of common vehicles. Unconventional, including emergency service response vehicles which may contain: Biohazards Compressed gas cylinders Firearms Prisoners or detainees Agricultural vehicles, which may contain large quantities of pesticides or chemicals; these vehicles may be transported by farm machinery on roads and remote farmland. There may be instances where it is difficult to identify substances because they are premixed or loaded from containers for spreading. Some agricultural vehicles use radioactive monitoring or measuring equipment known as 'yield meters', which may present a hazard if the stainless steel casing has been melted in a fire. Reinforced security or armoured vehicles carrying prisoners or detainees, high value contents or items of an explosive or radioactive nature; these vehicles may have enhanced security features and/or be constructed using strengthened materials, adding to the complexities of managing such a vehicle. 166 of 231

172 Livestock transport vehicles, where the release of animals could affect the scene of operations and present further hazards to other road users, members of the public and emergency response personnel. Military vehicles, which may contain munitions and firearms. Control measure Use tactical advisers and responsible person See National Operational Guidance: Incident Command - Situational awareness A responsible person may be nominated by the relevant agency and should have the required competence and knowledge of the transport infrastructure hazards and risks to provide timely and accurate information. The responsible person or agency for an incident in the transport environment will vary depending on the type and context of the incident. Identifying a responsible person or agency may give the incident commander access to a range of information sources and expertise that will support in developing a safe and effective tactical plan. Air The agencies that should be considered for liaison include: The aerodrome fire service Aerodrome mangers Airlines Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) Military agencies Rail Network Rail will not always appoint a railway incident officer (RIO) to incidents affecting the railway. This will depend on the nature of the incident and if in doubt incident commanders should request their assistance. It is the role of the RIO to liaise with and advise the incident commander on safety issues relating to staff working on or adjacent to the permanent way. For further information on the permanent way see Hazard - Complexity of the rail infrastructure. The railway incident officer (RIO) will assist with the identification of rail specific hazards and may provide options for removing or reducing hazards. Different rail infrastructures have assigned the responsible person with different titles, such as train operating liaison officer (TOLO) and station 167 of 231

173 incident officer (SIO). An attending Network Rail mobile operations manager (MOM) may be in attendance and assigned the role of a RIO if required. Rail incident officer (RIO) Network Rail The railway incident officer (RIO) is the nominated and certified individual responsible for on-site command and control of all rail-related operations. Not normally on-site before the arrival of the fire and rescue services, they will be nominated to attend incidents that are likely to have a serious impact on the rail network. The railway incident officer will be able to: Provide information to the incident commander on rail safety matters Arrange for specialist rail workers, engineers, contractors and equipment to be moved to the scene Obtain specialist information on the infrastructure Arrange for the delivery of extra equipment such as rail trolleys, generators, cranes and welfare facilities Liaise with the incident commander to provide options for partial or complete restoration of services Assess the suitability of control measures implemented Co-ordinate the phased reopening of rail lines Road Depending on the type of roadway involved, the responsibility could lie with the local authority, the appropriate highways agency or another body. Where the severity of the incident places a restriction on the normal operation of the roadway or there is damage to the infrastructure, the incident commander should ensure that contact is made with the relevant authority. Waterways The responsible person should have intimate and comprehensive knowledge of the vessel and the hazards within the waterways environment. They may also have access to other tactical advisers able to provide additional information that may be useful to the incident commander, such as information on stability, cargo and hazardous materials. There will be a need to liaise with the port/harbour master if available, as well as the owner or captain of the vessel. Appropriate communications will need to be set up and they should consider vessel size, location and interaction between all attending agencies and port authorities. Many different types of organisation can operate within port boundaries, including cargo terminal operators, passenger terminal operators, leisure marinas, boat builders and commercial fishing. Under UK legislation, the waterways of many ports are the responsibility of the local port authority, which is managed by a harbour master. There may be memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between the fire and rescue service and the port authority to ensure the correct information has been collated at the earliest opportunity to 168 of 231

174 improve the service response. The incident commander should liaise with the port controller, harbour master or ship's master at the earliest opportunity to understand the emergency within the waterways environment. This would include gathering information on the number of passengers and crew involved, the size, type and construction of the vessel and passing this information to fire and rescue service control using the following format: Type e.g. ferry, tanker or cargo Name Tonnage Location (quay or berth number) Cargo Location and extent of any fire hazard Summary of resources (what's in use) Develop arrangements and protocols to identify responsible persons, relevant agencies and/or specialists within the transport environment that can respond and assist at incidents Maintain the details of any tactical adviser (Tac Ad) or subject matter expert (SME) relevant to the risk and area and know how to request their attendance Ensure early liaison with the responsible person is carried out to gather appropriate information to inform a safe and effective operational response plan ARCHIVED Request the timely attendance of a tactical adviser (Tac Ad) or subject matter expert (SME) with relevant competence Establish and maintain contact with the rail infrastructure controller or Rail Incident Officer (RIO) Establish communications with the Aerodrome RFFS, CAA, AAIB or other relevant agencies 169 of 231

175 Control measure Contain the vehicle or cargo The need to contain specialist vehicle contents or installations will be determined by the cargos being managed, the priorities of any casualties and the availability of any required specialist agencies. Where containment cannot be maintained within the vehicle, alternative locations should be identified by the incident commander until such time as support is received from other agencies or responders. Refer to Hazard - Affected vehicle contents. Contain vehicle contents, where they are not at risk, within the original vehicle until replacement vehicles arrive to continue their transport Estalish a secure area to allow for triage where vehicle contents require attention Control measure Identify and isolate electrical and fuel systems Due to the unique and sometimes bespoke nature of specialist vehicle design, it may prove difficult to locate and gain access to mechanisms that can isolate a vehicle's driven and consumer power 170 of 231

176 sources. Some vehicles may have specialist electrical installations to power devices in the vehicle, and so may have a number of power supply options such as battery or backup generators. See National Operational Guidance: Transport - Fuel and electrical systems There are no tactical actions associated with this control measure. Control measure Use specialist cutting equipment Specialist vehicles may be constructed with additional layers of high strength material. When component relocation is necessary or access to the vehicle is required, specialist equipment may be needed. Consider alternative access and extrication routes that can be made using standard pumping appliance equipment, such as security vehicle escape hatches Identify the location of any required specialist equipment and consider mobilisation timings to scene Seek advice on the equipment required for the vehicle being tackled Make arrangement for emergency responders to access specialist cutting equipment suitable for incidents involving rescue from unconventional or specialist vehicles Make arrangements to provide emergency responders with instruction, information and training where the use of unconventional or specialist vehicles is known to take place 171 of 231

177 Consider requesting specialist cutting equipment at incidents involving unconventional or specialist vehicles Consider requesting additional resources where unconventional or specialist vehicles are involved Hazard Vehicle supplementary restraint systems (SRS) Hazard Knowledge In this guidance, the term 'supplementary restraint systems' (SRS) relates to passive safety features and systems, designed to alleviate the consequences of an accident. It incorporates all relevant forms of road transport such as cars and large goods vehicles (LGVs). Passive safety features/systems may include: Airbags/side impact protection system (SIPS) Front and rear crumple zones Side impact bars Pop-up roll over protection systems (ROPS) Seatbelt pre-tensioners/g-force limiters Collapsible steering columns Laminated glass Steering wheel and fascia padding Anti-whiplash seats/active headrests The hazards posed by the vehicle supplementary restraint system (SRS) concern the potential of actual uncontrolled deployment during emergency service operations, and include: Heat Impact Noise Skin irritation Projectile risk Given the extensive use of vehicle airbags and seatbelt pre-tensioners as a passive safety 172 of 231

178 feature/system, it is reasonable to assume such supplementary restraint systems (SRS) will be present in the majority of relevant forms of transport. All SRS safety features/systems are not alike, but they do contain similar components. Gas restraint bags or airbags are safety devices that have saved many lives and prevented serious injury to the driver or front seat passenger of a vehicle involved in a full frontal, or near frontal, collision. Some simple airbag systems, such as the older Volvo supplementary restraint system (SRS), use a mechanical or pyrotechnic impact sensor. In a side collision, a pressure plate pushes a firing pin and releases the ignition charge. SRS fall into two groups: Door mounted sensor, firing tube and airbag Sill mounted sensor and firing system with a firing tube that leads up to the seat-mounted airbag Pyrotechnic sensor systems usually have some sort of disarming interlock. For further information on pyrotechnics see National Operational Guidance: Hazardous materials Such systems are treated in a similar way to mechanically-sensed frontal airbags and seatbelt pretensioners. It is also important to be familiar with the new (post-2003) generation of supplementary restraint systems (SRS), which have features that may impact on operational response: All the latest generation airbag systems are interlinked with the vehicle electronic control unit (ECU); some are inflated by a stored pressure gas cartridge that may be further energised by using reacting gases, such as hydrogen and oxygen Front seat sensors determine whether the passenger seat is occupied and may also provide information about the driver and passenger weight and proximity to the airbag Multi-stage airbags may deploy as appropriate for the severity of the crash, the weight of the occupants and their proximity to the airbag. If the crash is severe and the occupant heavy, the system will deploy in its most powerful manner. If the crash is minor, it is possible that just the pre-tension seat belts will deploy. The system may respond to these variables in a range of alternative ways. Most vehicles use the electronic control unit (ECU) to trigger the fuel cut off, and a small number also trigger a battery disconnect Some vehicles are fitted with dual action frontal airbags. For low speed crashes, only the first detonator is necessary to cushion the impact, for higher speed impacts a second detonator pumps more air into the airbag to withstand the higher impact force. Due to this dual action these airbags may have the capacity for a secondary actuation. Fire and rescue services must be aware of this, and treat all deployed frontal airbags as if deployment can occur again until proven otherwise. An additional safety concern for emergency personnel that arises when an airbag has activated is direct skin contact with the deflated airbag itself. A chalky white powder will be found on the outside of the bag. This powder is slightly alkaline and, although considered non-toxic, may cause 173 of 231

179 minor irritation to skin, nose and eyes. Manufacturers claim that the inflation chemical (Sodium Azide) will not be present once the bag is deployed. Active roll over protection systems (ROPS) are found in some convertible vehicles. They can operate with explosive force away from the bodywork of the vehicle. These devices, when undeployed, present a serious risk of injury to emergency service personnel who are in close proximity on activation. The dangers posed to rescuers cannot be overemphasised. ROPS deploy at very high speeds and with very high forces that can cause serious injury. The direction of deployment is not always apparent from outside the vehicle. Control measure Identify the supplementary restraint systems (SRS) and communicate the information The first priority is to recognise that a vehicle is equipped with supplementary restraint systems (SRS). If the vehicle is fitted with an airbag, it is usually marked on the windscreen and/or the airbag container itself. It may be marked 'supplementary restraint system', 'SRS' or: Airbag Inflatable tubular system Side impact protection system (SIPS) Head protection system Inflatable curtain Not all systems will be readily identifiable. A typical airbag restraint system, designed to deploy in a frontal impact, is located on the driver's side in the steering wheel hub, or sometimes on the passenger side underneath a plastic bolster on the dashboard. However, they can also be found in the following locations: Side of seat (thorax/side impact airbag) Roof lining (curtain side impact airbag) Lower dashboard (knee airbags) Back of front seat (rear passenger airbag) Front and rear seat trim (side impact airbag) As technology will continue to develop, the above list is not exhaustive. 174 of 231

180 Due to the fact that airbags operate separately, after a collision there may be an inactivated front or side bag in the vehicle. Seat belt pre-tensioners normally deploy in tandem with airbags. They reduce the slack in the seat belt by up to six inches (15cm). These devices, when undeployed, present a finger/hand trap hazard for emergency responders and could potentially cause further injury to casualties. Two main types of roll over protection systems (ROPS) are in production: Rotating bar - these devices protect all the occupants and are generally stored behind and around the rear of the seats. The bar may be mistaken for part of the 'soft top' mechanism. Pop-up roll hoops - these devices are mounted behind each seat and protect the head of each occupant. They all normally deploy at the same time. Some devices are electric, some spring loaded and some are pyrotechnic. Sometimes the devices are visible as head restraint loops, sometimes not. Equip personnel with, and provide access to, up-to-date information regarding vehicle design and identification of any supplementary restraint systems (SRS) Survey the vehicle internally and externally for signs of un-deployed supplementary restraint system (SRS) Not enter the passenger cell until the hazards have been assessed (however, do not delay medical attention unnecessarily) Remember that however medical attention is administered, emergency responders should remain outside the deployment range of any undeployed airbags Identify seatbelt pre-tensioner systems and other supplementary restraint systems (SRS), including the location of their active charges, via a 'peel and reveal' of the vehicle panel fascia Communicate the appropriate hazards identified and the control measures planned or implemented, when handing the incident over to the responsible person Control measure Establish an appropriate safe 175 of 231

181 distance for supplementary restraint systems (SRS) Airbags and other supplementary restraint systems (SRS) deploy at very high speeds and with very high forces that can cause serious injury. They can also become very hot, reaching temperatures of up to 300 C. The safest way to manage the risk from an airbag and other supplementary restraint systems (SRS), when required to work around such devices, is to avoid them. Enforce the safety distance rules relating to airbag deployment range and the distance to remain clear: 5 inches [15cm] clear of side (lumbar) airbags 10 inches [25cm] clear of driver airbags 15 inches [40cm] clear of curtain airbags 20 inches [50cm] clear of passenger airbags Refer to Hazard - Unstable mode of transport. Equip personnel with, and provide access to, up-to-date information regarding vehicle design and use Avoid placing solid objects near to undeployed airbags, within their deployment range Enforce the safety distance rules relating to airbag deployment range and the distance to remain clear Avoid placing objects between un-deployed SRS and casualties or responders Control use of radio equipment in the area where un-deployed SRS has been identified 176 of 231

182 Control measure Isolate the supplementary restraint systems (SRS) Once an airbag has been identified, the airbag should be disarmed. The undeployed supplementary restraint system (SRS) should be made safe if there is to be any cutting or metal displacement and a rescue is to be undertaken. The airbag is disarmed by disconnecting the negative side of the battery. The airbag will not be immediately disarmed; a capacitor, used to deploy the airbag in case of an electrical failure, can still fire the system. However, this loses its charge in about two minutes on most vehicles. The method of disarming electronically sensed side airbags of all types is the same as for disarming the frontal airbag system, with the same cautionary points regarding capacitor back-up power. A side impact protection system (SIPS) airbag has no integral standby power unit, unlike the steering wheel and passenger airbag, so battery disconnection will eliminate any accidental activation of the airbags. However, due care should still be shown especially if cutting into the upholstery of the front seats. Incident commanders should not delay rescue efforts unnecessarily to wait for the decay of a capacitor's charge once a supplementary restraint system (SRS) has been disarmed, but rescuers should remain clear of the immediate area. The chances of inadvertently triggering an airbag operation are not great, but rescuers should never place themselves within the deployment range, nor place any object near the airbag that could become a projectile, until the system is disarmed (Note: earthing both battery terminals may discharge the capacitor immediately but should only be undertaken following liaison with the specific vehicle/supplementary restraint system (SRS) manufacturers). See National Operational Guidance: Performing rescues. Equip personnel with the latest information regarding vehicle design and associated tool use, through structured training Ensure a variety of tools and equipment is made available to fire and rescue service responders to deal with the reasonably foreseeable situations, hazards and implementation of control measures, such as airbag restraint system(s) 177 of 231

183 Use approved and specifically designed equipment to mechanically reduce a vehicle airbag's deployment range Make use of available over-ride switches in the vehicle and disconnect batteries Control measure Prevent manipulation or damage to supplementary restraint systems (SRS) Because supplementary restraint systems (SRS) may be hidden and are difficult to identify, personnel could inadvertently use equipment that can manipulate or damage the features or systems, causing uncontrolled deployment. Newer vehicles have much thicker posts and pillars, often with strengthened steel inserts and supplementary restraint system (SRS) components hidden inside. The bag should be handled with appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), be placed in a plastic bag and disposed of properly. There may be traces of sodium azide or potassium nitrate present, particularly inside the bag. Both are highly flammable and poisonous. If the side impact protection system (SIPS) bag has been activated, then there is no problem dealing with the hazard, except to cut away the exposed bag if it becomes cumbersome. Equip personnel with the latest information regarding vehicle design and associated tool use, through structured training Ensure a variety of tools and equipment is made available to fire and rescue service responders to deal with the reasonably foreseeable situations, hazards and implementation of control measures, such as airbag restraint system(s) 178 of 231

184 Always remove or displace internal trim ('peel and reveal') to ascertain the location of such components, before attempting to cut pillars Consider cutting away a deployed airbag Extrication from machinery, lifts and escalators If a person is trapped in machinery, the initial focus and actions should be to ensure the safety of fire and rescue service personnel by safely accessing and stabilising the scene and the casualty, to ensure that rescue operations are not compromised. This guidance will be valid for rescues from all types of machinery, including lifts and escalators. It is important to remember that when assessing the risks associated with lifts and escalators, temporary lifts such as those on construction sites, whilst used for transporting people and equipment may not meet the same standards as permanent lifts. Hazard Gaining access to machine rooms and shafts Hazard Knowledge Machine rooms may be situated in remote parts of the premises and under normal circumstances should be locked and secured. These areas may have restricted access or space, which will need to be considered when performing a rescue. Crews should anticipate that unsecure lift rooms in publically accessible buildings may contain drug paraphernalia, human and animal excrement. For lifts, these rooms can be either at the top or bottom of the building depending on the type of lift machinery. In the case of escalators, machine rooms will normally be at the top of the escalator either under a floor trap (for small escalators, such as those in shops) or, in larger premises (such as those used in transport systems) a separate room will be used. On railway premises such as London 179 of 231

185 Underground, access is usually available at both the top and the bottom of the escalator. Personnel requiring access to machine rooms will generally have to either ascend or descend stairs. They may also have to climb unprotected vertical ladders and pass through access panels. There is a risk of collision with fixed objects when moving around machine rooms. Machine rooms may have trapdoors and hatches, be on different levels, and will often have displaced lubricants on the floor. This may require implementing additional measures to maintain safe access and egress. There is a risk of falling from height when ascending or descending unprotected vertical ladders or when working near or inside an open lift shaft. Some machine rooms may require personnel to cross roofs without edge protection, thereby increasing the likelihood of falls from height. The risks associated with gaining access to a machine room may be increased by the conditions inside; noise, heat and lack of lighting. Machinery incidents may involve or create working environments where there is minimal headroom and space to manoeuvre. Any available space may be further restricted by the use of fire service equipment or items of machinery that have been left on the floor during maintenance operations. Control measure Establish a safe working environment Before entering a machine room, personnel should recognise and fully assess the risks and hazards associated, as the risk can range from minor cuts and abrasions to being trapped or fatally injured by moving machinery or falling down a lift shaft. Personnel should be aware of the proximity of other moving parts of the equipment. It is important that the correct equipment is identified so that the corresponding machinery and power systems can be isolated. Provide emergency responders with information and training on the safe management of incidents involving lifts and other machinery 180 of 231

186 Ensure that inner and outer cordons are established, identified and communicated Establish safe access and egress routes to machine rooms and shafts Consider the need for fall arrest or work positioning equipment when working near shafts Hazard Noise Hazard Knowledge Exposure to excessive noise over a period of time can lead to permanent hearing loss or Tinnitus. Factors that contribute to hearing damage are noise levels and how long people are exposed to the noise, daily or over a number of years. Permanent hearing damage can be caused immediately by sudden, extremely loud, explosive noises, e.g. from guns or cartridge-operated machines. In this guidance, the term noise incorporates any form of sound in an environment that is due to industrial processes, machinery, transport or alarms and that can affect the ability to communicate effectively or to hear audible warning devices. Fire and rescue service personnel may need to work at industrial sites where there are on-site alarms and warning systems. This may present a hazard if alarms have been activated. The alarms may be associated with a single building, may operate site-wide or even be installed to provide a warning to those outside the site s boundary. Alarms or audible warning devices may interfere with: Communications The impact on emergency evacuation instructions Response to the actuation of an automatic distress signal unit (ADSU) The ability to hear distress calls from casualties In defining this hazard and associated control measures, it is assumed that the appropriate resources (personnel and equipment) are available, and that personnel have the training required to appreciate the potential impact of noise on communication between the incident commander and crews, crews directly and may prevent rescuers from hearing a casualty. See: The Control of Noise at Work Regulations of 231

187 Control measure Reduce risk from exposure to noise Fire and rescue services must assess the risk and identify measures to eliminate or reduce the consequences of exposure to noise. Pre-planning should identify known sources of noise and identify control measures that reduce risk. Incident commanders in dynamic environments should identify safe systems of work which may include eliminating the noise by switching off equipment, increasing the distance of the people at risk from the source or wearing hearing protection. Fire and rescue services must: Assess and identify measures to eliminate or reduce risk from exposure to noise in the workplace Provide suitable hearing protection for operational staff Record information about noise hazards in the Site-Specific Risk Information (SSRI) Eliminate noise hazards by switching off the source of the noise Reduce exposure by rotating crews and increasing the distance from the hazard Wear hearing protection as identified in service risk assessment, procedures and training Consider alternatives to audible evacuation signals where they may be ineffective due to background noise 182 of 231

188 Hazard Power systems Hazard Knowledge Personnel should be aware that the risk from electrocution or electric shock will be present until all electrical power supplies have been isolated. It should be remembered that there may be more than one power source. These may include battery powered standby or emergency generators that activate automatically when the power supply is interrupted. It should be remembered that safety systems may have been circumvented. It is common for there to be two separate electrical sources in a machine room: 230-volt electrical supply for the lighting and any power sockets fitted 415-volt electrical supply for the machinery that drives the lift, escalator or machinery Control measure Request specialist advice The owner or occupier, on-site engineers or maintenance engineers should be able to provide specialist knowledge. Have arrangements to enable responding crews to contact specialist advisors when extricating crews from complex machinery 183 of 231

189 Liaise with the owner or occupier, on-site engineers or maintenance engineers regarding power systems Control measure Isolate and lock out power supplies The owner or occupier, on-site engineers or maintenance engineers should be able to provide specialist knowledge. Where specialist knowledge is not available, crews may be able to identify instructions either on or near the machinery or locate emergency stop buttons to isolate the machinery. Provide emergency responders with information and instruction on the importance of safe and effective isolation of power supplies to plant and machinery at rescue operations Request advice from responsible person or engineer regarding isolation and lock out of power supplies Ensure machinery and processes are isolated and locked out before starting rescue operations Hazard Machinery Hazard Knowledge Some industries use the word 'plant' to indicate specialist equipment, machinery or industrial premises. For the purposes of this guidance, the word 'plant' has purposely been avoided and is 184 of 231

190 referred to as 'on-site machinery', 'on-site vehicles', 'sites' or 'facilities'. Types of on-site machinery include: Generic Automated equipment Robotics - refer to supplementary information Lifts Hoists - refer to supplementary information Cranes - refer to supplementary information Conveyor belt systems - refer to supplementary information Electric motors Mixing machinery Drilling machinery Welding equipment Commercial and business Escalators and moving walkways - refer to supplementary information Places of assembly and entertainment Theme park and fairground rides - refer to supplementary information Moving platforms and stages Retractable roofs Medical facilities Motorised wheelchairs Motorised trolleys Static or movable medical equipment Beds that use electric motors to manoeuvre patients Agriculture Machinery for feeding livestock Automated (robotic) milking systems Waste sites Compactors Shredders Incinerators Construction sites Small equipment, such as handheld tools up to large-scale machinery 185 of 231

191 Machinery can present many types of hazards including: Drawing in Entanglement Friction and abrasion Cutting or shearing Stabbing or puncturing Impact or crush injuries Hazardous substances and emissions Noise and vibration Pressure or vacuum Extreme temperatures Electrocution Damage to eyes by intense ultraviolet light from welding equipment Epidermal injection (hydraulic fluid) Some machinery is highly automated and may be operated by remote control systems. Machinery may be time controlled and could start up automatically. Similarly, the robotic system may be in an inert phase, but reactivate on a timed or activity-triggered basis. Machinery may be old or poorly maintained, resulting in the absence of safety equipment; this may increase the risk of entrapment or injury. Machinery may present hazards if not correctly secured, controlled, earthed or isolated. Machinery may contain moving parts, such as exposed shafts or fan bearings. Certain types of machinery may be fitted with machine guards to offer some protection from moving parts. Safety devices may have been removed or compromised prior to the arrival of fire and rescue service personnel. Machine guards should not be removed until power to the machine has been isolated and confirmed. Where safety devices, such as brakes and interlocks have activated, they should not be overridden before the effect of doing so has been carefully considered. Releasing such devices could result in the uncontrolled movement of machinery. If a machine is stopped suddenly, particularly by a blockage, there may be residual stored energy within the system. When the blockage is removed, the energy released can cause the machinery to move. On-site machinery may be located in confined or restricted areas, making access and egress difficult and potentially arduous. In some environments, moving vehicles, plant or machinery could strike rescuers. Responding vehicles could also disturb the area around the scene of operations through vibration or additional weight. It is essential that the movement of vehicles, plant and machinery around rescue operations is strictly controlled. 186 of 231

192 Some non-building and temporary structures will contain moving parts, for example, wind turbines, while some structures are actually designed to move, for example, tower cranes and roller coaster rides. As well as the issue of power supplies or potential contaminants, any unexpected or uncontrolled movement could put fire service personnel at risk of entrapment. All personnel working near working machinery should be aware and briefed on the potential risk associated with moving parts of machinery such as: Gears Chain wheels Drive shafts/rams Sliding doors Slack cables Moving treads/handrail Parts of machinery that open and close or between lift car and shaft wall. This is particularly relevant if the machinery has been exposed by removal of safety guards Stored energy The release of stored energy may result in the unexpected movement of machinery. Machinery may move slowly downwards after personnel have isolated the power supply. It should also be remembered that fluid in the hydraulic systems may leak; this has the same effect on machinery movement. In both cases, it creates a risk of a crush injury. The braking system should be disengaged to enable manual hand winding of the machinery. Once it has been disengaged, the stored energy within the system is released, creating the potential for rapid uncontrolled movement of the machinery. Once the power to a lift or escalator has been isolated and the braking system is active, the stored energy will be controlled. Waste sites Waste sites often use plant, machinery and vehicles to move or process products. This can be portable machinery such as grabs, bulldozers and forklift trucks. It can also be fixed machinery such as compactors, shredders and conveyor belts. These may present hazards, either through a collision with fire and rescue service vehicles or through fire and rescue service personnel, or others, being struck by moving vehicles or plant. Machinery may present hazards if not correctly secured or powered down. However, the plant and vehicles can often be useful during firefighting operations, to move, disturb and separate waste materials. 187 of 231

193 Control measure Specialist advice: Machinery On-site machinery may prove useful during an incident to move or separate materials, such as waste or items of stock; however, this should be done under the supervision of the fire and rescue service. The on-site machinery would need to be identified and only competent people should operate it. This activity could create additional hazards, as other people may not be used to working with fire and rescue service personnel. Therefore, detailed briefings should take place and any actions should be closely monitored. If a competent person is working within the inner cordon, communication methods, including evacuation signals, should be implemented before commencing operations. The owner or occupier, on-site engineers or maintenance engineers should be able to provide specialist knowledge. Where specialist knowledge is not available, crews may be able to identify instructions either on or near the machinery or locate emergency stop buttons to isolate the machinery. Where the movement of machinery cannot be completely ruled out and crews cannot be completely isolated from moving parts, suitable control should be adopted such as a safe system of work, adequate supervision and appropriate PPE based on dynamic risk assessment. Sites may have a variety of mobile or static machinery that could prove beneficial in firefighting operations. This equipment would need to be identified and competent people would need to operate it. This can create additional hazards, as other people may not be used to working with fire and rescue service personnel. Therefore close monitoring of their performance, and detailed briefing, will be required from the sector commanders and incident commander. Ensure that all fire and rescue service personnel are aware that on-site machinery should only be operated by competent people Consider identifying suitable on-site machinery in pre-planning and site inspection visits Consider establishing contingency arrangements about additional or specialist machinery with the site owner; this may need to be hired in the event of an incident 188 of 231

194 Ensure that all fire and rescue service personnel are aware that site equipment should be operated by competent person only Liaise with the responsible person or process expert to obtain specialist advice on machinery involved Ensure only competent persons use or operate site machinery Control measure Isolate and lock out power Plant and machinery may still be operating after the fire and rescue service arrives. Fire and rescue service personnel should liaise with site staff to identify where and how to isolate the plant or machinery, and to consider the implications of isolating the equipment. Keeping processes operational may support firefighting operations if this can move or separate unburnt waste. Fires can occur in machinery and plant, such as waste compactors. Power should normally be isolated before firefighting begins. Refer to Hazard Electricity. On-site machinery may still be operating when the fire and rescue service arrives. Fire and rescue service personnel should liaise with site staff to identify where and how to isolate the on-site machinery, and to consider the implications of isolating power supplies to it. Keeping processes going may support fire and rescue service operations, for example, by reducing the volume of material that could be affected by the incident. Power supplies to on-site machinery may include: Electricity Gas Pneumatics Hydraulics Kinetic, for example, windmills and watermills 189 of 231

195 Some types of machinery may take a considerable time to isolate and in some circumstances it may not be possible to prevent reactivation. Isolating power supplies to machinery may have an impact on the business some on-site machinery may be damaged by emergency isolation. The power supply for the machinery may be remote from the equipment. Instructions may be displayed for isolating the power supply or using manual controls. Isolating power supplies may involve using: A tag out system - where a warning tag is attached to the power controls once in a safe position (off or closed), but reactivation may be possible A lock out system - where a padlock or bolt is used to prevent reactivation Where possible, fire and rescue personnel attending incidents should seek to isolate any source of power or propulsion. There may also be cases that a mechanical brake is included on certain moving parts to eliminate the risk of entrapment, In many cases, information available on how best to make safe the installation will be available. Where this is not available, service personnel may find it necessary to withdraw and seek other assistance, for example, from the operating company. It should also be recognised that, in some cases, the actual movement of the structure may be a built-in safety design feature. For example, in the case of tower cranes, the rotation of the horizontal jib when not in use is generally set in free slew, allowing it to move with the changing wind direction; this reduces the windage stress on the structure. Consider identifying and recording information about power supplies on-site, including whether they are high or low voltage, during pre-planning and site inspection visits Ensure contact details for the responsible person are included in Site-Specific Risk Information (SSRI) Ensure details about power supplies are included in Site-Specific Risk Information (SSRI) Ensure that information about emergency isolation of on-site machinery is included in SiteSpecific Risk Information (SSRI) Isolate and lock out machinery considering the impact on business continuity 190 of 231

196 Control measure Establish appropriate cordon controls Incident commanders must consider the safety of firefighters, members of other agencies and the public. They have a duty, so far as reasonably practicable in the context of operational requirements, to ensure that people are not put at risk by fire and rescue service activities and that anybody exposed to serious and imminent danger is informed of the hazards and the control measures necessary to protect them. The fire service has the power to restrict the access of persons to premises or a place in an emergency and establishing cordons is an effective way of maintaining safety and controlling resources. Where practical, the police will establish and maintain cordons at appropriate distances to allow the emergency services and other responding agencies to save life, protect the public and property, and care for survivors. In some areas the police will have agreements enabling the fire and rescue services to manage gateways into the inner cordon, establish who should be granted access and keep a record of people entering and exiting. Cordons can be divided into distinct areas: Outer cordon An outer cordon may be established around the vicinity of the incident to control access to a wide area. This will allow the emergency services and other agencies to work unhindered and in privacy. Access through the outer cordon for essential non-emergency service personnel should be by way of an access control point. The police will usually control outer cordons, and may also establish traffic cordons to prevent unauthorised vehicular access. The police will identify safe routes in and out of the cordon for emergency vehicles and other agencies. Rendezvous points and marshalling areas will usually be located within the outer cordon. 191 of 231

197 Figure 4: Where practical the outer cordon should be identified by using blue and white barrier tape. Inner cordon The inner cordon controls access to the immediate scene of operations and provides an increased measure of protection for personnel working in that area. Incident commanders should restrict access to the lowest numbers needed for safe and effective operational activity. At small incidents this could be an existing physical barrier or a safety officer briefed to restrict access. At incidents where a higher degree of control is required, those entering the inner cordon should report to a designated scene access control point and register their arrival. This ensures that they can be safely accounted for should there be any escalation of the incident, and affords an opportunity for briefing about the hazards, control measures, emergency arrangements and other issues. Nobody should be permitted to enter the inner cordon without an appropriate level of personal protective equipment (PPE). It is necessary to ensure that those leaving the inner cordon register their departure. The fire and rescue service will be responsible for safety management within the inner cordon until responsibility for the scene is transferred to another body. Overall responsibility for the health and safety of personnel working within the inner cordon remains with individual agencies. Such agencies should ensure that personnel arrive at the scene with appropriate PPE and are adequately trained and briefed for the work they are to undertake within the cordon. At certain incident types, for example hazardous materials, working near water and Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack (MTFA), there may be a need to divide cordons into hot, warm and cold zones. This will depend on the level of risk faced by emergency service responders and the range of corresponding control measures identified and implemented. Figure 5: Where practical the inner cordon should be identified with the use of red and white barrier tape Exclusion zone Some hazards may present such a significant danger to the safety to firefighters, other agencies and the public that no control measures will adequately reduce the risk. Incident commanders should consider establishing an exclusion zone within the inner cordon to which access is denied to 192 of 231

198 all personnel, including emergency services. Figure 6: Where practical exclusion zones should be identified with the use of black and yellow barrier tape Further information on cordons can be found in the Cabinet Office document Emergency Response and Recovery. Have a policy for limiting access of personnel to the highest risk areas of an incident ground and for briefing and identification of those involved. This policy should include any procedural guidance and such equipment/resources necessary to implement it safely Agree roles and responsibilities for establishing and controlling access to cordons with partner agencies Agree with partner organisations appropriate procedures for briefing other agencies working within inner cordons under the safety management of the fire service Ensure that appropriate inner and outer cordons are established, identified and communicated following an assessment of risk to crews, other agencies and the public Control access to the inner cordon using methods proportionate to the size and complexity of the incident Establish a scene access control point to log all persons operating within the inner cordon when appropriate Implement exclusion zones where intolerable risks to safety are identified Request the police to establish a traffic cordon where necessary 193 of 231

199 Request an air exclusion zone through the appropriate authority if required Control measure Prevent uncontrolled movement The owner or occupier, on-site engineers or maintenance engineers should be able to provide specialist knowledge in the operation of the machinery. Where specialist knowledge is not available, crews may be able to identify instructions either on or near the machinery or locate emergency stop buttons to isolate the machinery. Isolating and locking out the power supply will not guarantee uncontrolled movement of machinery where there is stored energy. The energy stored in the machinery could be released at any time in a gradual or sudden movement placing casualties and rescuers at risk of serious injury or death. Wherever possible machinery should be physically prevented from moving using shoring, chocking or similar methods. Provide access to equipment suitable for preventing the uncontrolled movement of machinery Prevent the uncontrolled movement of machinery through shoring, chocking or similar means Control measure Incident ground safety management 194 of 231

200 The incident command system is an all-hazards approach that provides the incident commander with a structure they can adapt to every incident. The system helps to achieve a safe and efficient way of organising people and equipment. The incident commander at the scene is the nominated competent person. They can delegate some responsibilities to others; however, they remain responsible for health and safety at an incident. Providing risk-critical information at an incident is an essential part of the planning process. It has a direct impact on safety. A lack of risk information, or failure to pass it on, can have a critical impact on decisions made by an incident commander. See National Operational Guidance: Operations Information gathering. Safety briefings It will be necessary to organise safety briefings. As the incident develops or where the risk of injury increases those briefings should be more comprehensive. See Communication. Safety officer The incident commander or sector commander may appoint a safety officer at any time. This person should have suitable competencies for the role. A safety officer at larger incidents may be designated as the safety sector commander from that time they will co-ordinate the role of other safety officers. Safety within sectors Sector commanders are responsible for the health and safety of people in their sector. Due to the demands at an incident the sector commander might nominate a safety officer to assist them. Although each safety officer should report to a sector commander, organisation of the safety officer(s) will be managed by the safety sector commander. Emergency evacuation and tactical withdrawal The incident command system provides two formal means of withdrawing personnel from the scene of operations: Emergency evacuation Tactical withdrawal At every incident, the incident commander will apply a command structure. They must establish a safe system of work. This should include a plan for emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal. The fire and rescue service retains responsibility for the health, safety and welfare of its personnel working in the risk area. It also has a duty to consider the effects of its actions on the safety of other people, including when undertaking emergency evacuation or a tactical withdrawal. 195 of 231

201 The plans they make should enable emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal which: Evacuates people at highest risk while protecting escape routes Removes people from areas where the risk has become too high Emergency evacuation is the term used to describe the urgent and immediate withdrawal of crews from a risk area. The incident commander should inform everyone at an incident of the location of the muster point. At a prolonged incident the location of the muster point may change. They should ensure that everyone at an incident knows about this change. See The Foundation for Incident Command. The evacuation should include a roll call at a suitable location. Additionally, the incident commander should make sure there has been a roll call of non-fire service personnel at the scene. Following an evacuation or an evacuation signal being given, no one should re-enter the hazard area without the permission of, or explicit instruction from the incident commander. Where personnel remain unaccounted for after an evacuation, the incident commander will need to assess the risks and commence appropriate search and rescue procedures. Tactical withdrawal is the term used to describe the systematic or staged withdrawal of crews from the risk area. The incident commander may need to redeploy resources or move people from danger. This is a tactical withdrawal. They may also need to withdraw all or part of a sector. When a tactical withdrawal is taking place, an evacuation signal or full incident roll call may not be required. See The Foundation for Incident Command. Provision of information Provision of relevant information is essential to ensure safe operations. Command decision-making can be significantly affected if there is a lack of risk information or where information has not been passed on. Fire control room operators will often be required to receive and communicate risk-critical information. Where risk-critical information is included on the initial turnout details, it should be easy to identify. Where specific risk information is available, incident commanders should ensure this is disseminated to all appropriate personnel on the incident ground. This may include provision of information between agencies or organisations. Ensure they take into account the need to meet health and safety legislation and regulations when developing their policies and procedures on structuring the incident ground. 196 of 231

202 Have procedures for the withdrawal of personnel from the hazard area. These procedures should describe: When each withdrawal type is appropriate The method of implementing the withdrawal The method of carrying out a roll call The communications necessary when withdrawal has been instigated Additionally, they should include the actions to be taken when personnel are unaccounted for after the withdrawal, and the procedure for recommencing activity. Fire control operators should: Ensure that risk critical information is communicated to the incident commander in a timely manner Ensure that everyone on the incident ground is fully briefed on the current hazards, specific risks and control measures including other agencies and organisations Appoint suitably competent safety officers to observe specific hazards and/or activities or monitor risks to personnel at the incident Instigate a safety sector at large or complex incidents under the control of a safety sector commander Establish and communicate the emergency evacuation and tactical withdrawal plan to everyone on the incident ground Communicate emergency evacuation signal and muster point arrangements to all personnel Communicate the tactical withdrawal and emergency evacuation arrangements to all personnel Inform everyone at an incident of the location of the muster point Carry out a roll call of fire service and all other personnel at the scene following an emergency evacuation Review situational awareness following an emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal 197 of 231

203 Commit only minimum number of essential personnel to hazard area Ensure that effective supervision of operational activity is maintained until the conclusion of the incident Control measure Personal protective equipment (PPE) Personal protective equipment (PPE) is equipment that will protect the user against health or safety risks. It can include items such as helmets, gloves, eye protection, high-visibility clothing and safety footwear. Equipment such as Chemical Protective Suits (CPC), Respiratory Protective Equipment (RPE) and safety harnesses are considered PPE and are covered in more detail elsewhere in guidance. PPE should be regarded as a last resort where risks to health and safety cannot be adequately controlled in other ways. Service risk assessments should define the specific PPE required for an activity to avoid unsuitable selection. If more than one item of PPE is to be worn, they must be compatible with each other and adequately control the risks when used together. PPE must be maintained in good working order and properly stored when not in use. Employees must make proper use of PPE in accordance with training received and report any loss, damage, destruction or fault. During protracted incidents and when making up equipment personnel may be inclined to relax PPE; incident commanders should be vigilant and base any decision to downgrade the need for PPE on an assessment of residual risk. When PPE has become dirty, contaminated or damaged it may not perform to the standard required by the appropriate specification. PPE should only be worn if it has been subject to appropriate cleaning or decontamination and testing processes. See: Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992 For further information on respiratory protective equipment see, National Operational Guidance: Operations - Respiratory Protective Equipment Fire and rescue services must: 198 of 231

204 Provide employees with suitable personal protective equipment that fits the wearer correctly and adequately controls identified risks Ensure that personal protective equipment and respiratory protective equipment worn simultaneously is compatible and does not negatively impact other safety measures Provide appropriate accommodation for personal protective equipment when not in use Specify the level of PPE for hazards identified through risk assessment and communicate to personnel Have suitable arrangements for the cleaning and maintenance of PPE in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions Ensure that there are suitable arrangements to support the replenishment of PPE Ensure that all personnel wear the level of PPE identified by service risk assessments, procedures and training Ensure the appropriate PPE is maintained throughout the incident based on an assessment of risk Check the condition and serviceability of PPE when assessing operational readiness for redeployment Recognise the potential contamination of equipment and PPE and follow service procedures Hazard Hydraulics and lubricants 199 of 231

205 Hazard Knowledge Leaking hydraulic fluid can cause slippery surfaces, leading to slips, trips and falls. Contact with this fluid can also lead to skin irritation and skin disorders. Some fluids may be carcinogenic. Where hydraulic systems are under pressure there is a risk of hydraulic injection; refer to the Extrication - Generic - Tools section. There is a high likelihood that supplies of lubricants (which can be oil or grease) will be found in machinery rooms. Lubricant containers may create trip hazards and, if spilled, lubricant will create hazardous surfaces in and around machinery. Lubricants can also have properties that can have detrimental short and long-term health effects. Some lubricants are carcinogenic and others cause an allergic reaction if they come into contact with skin. See National Operational Guidance: Hazardous materials. Casualty care The guidance in this section has been written with the support of the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care of the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh. Pre-hospital care is a well-established branch of medicine in the United Kingdom, practised mainly by the ambulance service. As the face of pre-hospital emergency medicine changes, the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care aims to set and maintain clinical standards for all practitioners of the evolving specialty. The principles of casualty care are to: Keep the casualty safe Identify and control catastrophic external compressible bleeding Recognise and assess, manage and/or support airway compromise Control the potential or actual injured spine Recognise and assess, manage and/or support breathing and ventilatory compromise while treating life threatening chest problems Recognise and assess, manage and/or support circulatory compromise and stop and/or identify bleeding Assess and manage the patient with reduced level of consciousness Expose and assess the casualty and evacuate to definitive care. This should be achieved whilst minimising exposure of the casualty to the cold environment (hypothermia) and putting strategies in place to reduce hypothermia (active rewarming with heaters or blankets) 200 of 231

206 Adopting a systematic approach to casualty care assessment, for example <C> Ac B C D E, allows life-threatening conditions to be rapidly identified and managed. Problems identified in this assessment should be dealt with as they are found. Following the intervention, the casualty is then reassessed. The principle of constantly reassessing of the casualty should be promoted. The fire and rescue service may be presented with a single casualty or multiple casualties. Both situations will be dealt with in this guidance. If a casualty is non-responsive, medical alert tags, bracelets or cards may provide information about pre-existing medical conditions. Hazard Failure to assess, identify and treat life-threatening problems of the casualty Hazard Knowledge A casualty can suffer further injury, illness or death from the incident if they do not receive prompt medical aid. By adopting a systematic approach to casualty care, for example <C> Ac B C D E, any life-threatening conditions can be rapidly identified and managed. Identify the need for specialist medical advice or care, according to local protocols. Control measure Request resources for casualty care It may take time to mobilise advanced medical support. Requesting the attendance of such resources at an early stage will benefit the casualty as it may reduce delay in treatment and promote recovery. 201 of 231

207 Hold contact details for specialist medical responders to enable a timely response to incidents Request medical support at rescue incidents as soon as a need is identified Consider medical support requirements for remote locations including skills and equipment Request medical support for any casualties and safety of incident responders if required Control measure Establish casualty care arrangements See National Operational Guidance: Performing rescues The primary providers of casualty care at operational incidents are likely be the ambulance service, paramedics, doctors, Hazardous Area Response Teams (HART) or other medical organisations. Fire and rescue services may provide trauma care trained personnel at incidents. Depending on the numbers of people involved it may be necessary to instigate appropriate arrangements, equipment and facilities to effectively manage casualties. See National Operational Guidance: Performing rescues - Multiple casualties Develop guidance and support arrangements for fire and rescue service personnel to provide casualty care at operational incidents Develop appropriate procedures with partner agencies to effectively manage casualties 202 of 231

208 Confirm and communicate the number, type and severity of casualties at the earliest opportunity Assess and triage the condition of casualties Establish and resource a casualty care point Control measure Follow principles of casualty care The principles of casualty care, listed below, apply to all casualties, including trapped and nontrapped casualties: Protect the casualty from the hazards associated with the event Minimise on-scene time Extrication of the casualty should be carried out in the quickest way possible, considering their injuries and the overall threat to their life, to: Allow 360-degree access to the casualty for assessment, treatment and packaging Minimise transit time to definitive care (for example a major or specialist trauma centre) Reduce the casualty's exposure to the elements Reduce pain Reduce the psychological impact of the event Ensure that responders have access to appropriate pre-packed medical equipment for treating casualties 203 of 231

209 Make a safe approach to the casualty and maintain a safe environment for all involved Identify the casualty's level of consciousness and offer reassurance where possible Make a timely request for appropriate medical response from the fire control room or 999/112 Establish and maintain contact with the casualty Protect casualties by physically isolating them from immediate harm where possible Question the casualty, other responders and witnesses to understand incident factors and history Address life threatening injuries or conditions in line with service training Provide medical care and release trapped casualties Control measure Carry out structured assessment and treatment using Ac B C D E Structured assessment and treatment using <C> Ac B C D E aims to prioritise the needs of the casualty and focus activity towards those injuries or conditions that may do more harm to the casualty, or may cause death. A structured assessment of the casualty may involve: <C> Control of catastrophic external compressible bleeding The use of tourniquets, by trained personnel, forms part of the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care (FPHC) consensus statement. If there is a concern that a major bleed may occur on the casualty's release, tourniquet(s) may be applied loose, prior to extrication. These can then be quickly tightened if required - this action should only be undertaken by trained personnel. Airway A simple 'airway ladder' approach to airway care should be promoted Assessment and monitoring of the airway should be continuous Suction should be available to clear the airway c-spine If possible, self-extrication of the casualty is encouraged, following the guidelines promoted in the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care (FPHC) spinal consensus statement Manual in-line stabilisation is an acceptable method of stabilising the c-spine A long board is used for extrication only and the casualty is placed onto a spinal 204 of 231

210 stabilising device. Ideally a vacuum mattress or split device (for example a scoop stretcher) should be used to transport the casualty to definitive care If extrication cannot be effected quickly, a request for advanced medical support to deliver advanced medical care (doctor or immediate care practitioner) should be considered at the earliest opportunity Breathing Assessment of breathing / ventilation and the chest should be structured Suggest RV-FLAPS WET: Rate and Volume of breathing Feel the chest Look at the chest Armpits clear of injury Press the chest wall Search the back and side/shoulders Wounds on the neck Emphysema felt in the neck Trachea central in the sternal notch Assessment and monitoring of breathing should be continuous Minimum (rate and volume) The means to support a casualty who has stopped breathing should be available pocket mask and/or bag valve mask (BVM) Self-ventilating patients will receive high-flow oxygen via a non-rebreathe mask Sucking chest wounds should be covered with either a gloved hand or appropriate chest seal dressing with one-way air release valve Circulation All bleeding should be stopped or controlled Stopping bleeding is a priority and should be achieved using the 'bleeding ladder' approach: Pelvic injuries should be treated as per Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care (FPHC) consensus statement Shock is a life-threatening condition that occurs when the body is not getting enough flow of blood - if there is no evidence of external blood loss, there is likely to be internal bleeding Disability The casualty's level of consciousness is measured using AVPU: Alert Voice Pain Unresponsive AVPU assessment should be recorded every 3 to 5 minutes Casualties should have a pain score recorded The irritable or uncooperative casualty will require early specialist medical assessment and treatment If the casualty is presenting with a psychiatric illness or personality disorder the police 205 of 231

211 should be involved early Exposure, Extrication and Evacuation Casualties should be protected from the elements Active rewarming is encouraged Casualties may require stripping to skin to enable assessment The dignity of the casualty should be maintained If trapped, extrication should be, where possible, swift but controlled Casualty handling principles should be adopted as per Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care (FPHC) consensus statement Ensure that responders are trained to carry out a structured assessment and provide medical treatment to casualties Assign suitably trained responders to carry out casualty assessment and provide treatment Check casualty for presence of medical ID, jewellery and other indicators of pre-existing conditions Control measure Maintain the privacy and dignity of the casualty There are situations that result in the exposure of a casualty to members of the public or the media; as a result, the casualty's privacy can be breached. It is an important principle for all emergency services to maintain and protect the privacy and dignity of the casualty. The benefits for protecting the scene from members of the public, or the media are: Prevention of the casualty's identity being compromised, possibly to their relatives or friends, via the media (including television and social media) Protection of the dignity of the casualty, especially if their clothing has to be removed for 206 of 231

212 them to receive medical treatment Avoiding unnecessary distress of other emergency responders, other casualties and uninvolved members of the public, particularly over a large scene Protecting the scene affords a degree of privacy for the medical teams and allows them to work efficiently and without distraction Some improvised methods of erecting screens could include: Positioning vehicles to provide a visual barrier Attaching equipment to street furniture or vehicles Deploying personnel to hold sheets, tarpaulins or screens Providing overhead protection to restrict aerial views. Figure 1: Scene screened off to preserve dignity of casualties - photograph courtesy of Rodney Vitalis 207 of 231

213 Train their personnel on the important principle of maintaining the privacy and dignity of casualties and assign someone with responsibility to ensure this happens on scene Consider providing fire and rescue service vehicles with the equipment that could be used to provide adequate screening at an incident involving a casualty, for example: Salvage sheets Tarpaulins Canvas screens Consider screening casualties from the view of the public, media or other casualties Use available equipment to provide a screened-off area for the casualty and medical teams Consider the use of portable shelters to provide screening to casualties Consider extending cordons to a sufficient distance to prevent photography or filming of the casualty Hazard Single casualty in cardiac arrest Hazard Knowledge When initial fire and rescue service responding personnel have a single 'dead' casualty to deal with, it may be considered appropriate to act by carrying out the following control measure. For the casualty in cardiorespiratory arrest a systematic approach to care should be adopted, using Safety ABC. Good effective chest compressions and early defibrillation are key. Control measure Use effective Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and 208 of 231

214 Automated External Defibrillator (AED) For adult basic life support and automated external defibrillation see -defibrillation/ For paediatric basic life support see Consider making automated external defibrillators (AED) available to responding crews Train crews to provide prompt resuscitation treatment to casualties in cardiac arrest following the latest Resuscitation Council guidelines Assess casualty and where cardiac arrest is suspected use an AED or commence CPR as soon as practicable Extricate a casualty who is trapped and in cardiac arrest by the quickest means possible Control measure Personal protective equipment (PPE) Personal protective equipment (PPE) is equipment that will protect the user against health or safety risks. It can include items such as helmets, gloves, eye protection, high-visibility clothing and safety footwear. Equipment such as Chemical Protective Suits (CPC), Respiratory Protective Equipment (RPE) and safety harnesses are considered PPE and are covered in more detail elsewhere in 209 of 231

215 guidance. PPE should be regarded as a last resort where risks to health and safety cannot be adequately controlled in other ways. Service risk assessments should define the specific PPE required for an activity to avoid unsuitable selection. If more than one item of PPE is to be worn, they must be compatible with each other and adequately control the risks when used together. PPE must be maintained in good working order and properly stored when not in use. Employees must make proper use of PPE in accordance with training received and report any loss, damage, destruction or fault. During protracted incidents and when making up equipment personnel may be inclined to relax PPE; incident commanders should be vigilant and base any decision to downgrade the need for PPE on an assessment of residual risk. When PPE has become dirty, contaminated or damaged it may not perform to the standard required by the appropriate specification. PPE should only be worn if it has been subject to appropriate cleaning or decontamination and testing processes. See: Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992 For further information on respiratory protective equipment see, National Operational Guidance: Operations - Respiratory Protective Equipment Fire and rescue services must: Provide employees with suitable personal protective equipment that fits the wearer correctly and adequately controls identified risks Ensure that personal protective equipment and respiratory protective equipment worn simultaneously is compatible and does not negatively impact other safety measures Provide appropriate accommodation for personal protective equipment when not in use Specify the level of PPE for hazards identified through risk assessment and communicate to personnel Have suitable arrangements for the cleaning and maintenance of PPE in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions Ensure that there are suitable arrangements to support the replenishment of PPE 210 of 231

216 Ensure that all personnel wear the level of PPE identified by service risk assessments, procedures and training Ensure the appropriate PPE is maintained throughout the incident based on an assessment of risk Check the condition and serviceability of PPE when assessing operational readiness for redeployment Recognise the potential contamination of equipment and PPE and follow service procedures Hazard Failure to hand over vital casualty information Hazard Knowledge Failure to hand over information relating to the casualty's injuries (or condition) may result in further harm or death and compromises accepted standards in record keeping. Control measure Offer a structured handover to an appropriately trained and competent practitioner Handover of accurate standardised information, that is recognised by local medical responders, is essential. An example of an acronym to ensure that this is done is ATMIST: 211 of 231

217 Adult or child Time that the incident happened and what time the casualty is expected to arrive in the Emergency Department (ED) Mechanism: how the incident occurred and mechanism of injury Injuries: what injuries have been found - follow a <C> Ac B C D E format Signs and symptoms: what signs the casualty is showing (respiratory rate, pulse rate, pallor) and what symptoms the casualty is telling you about (pain, feeling sick, cannot feel their legs) Treatment: what treatment have you given (again follow an <C> Ac B C D E format). 212 of 231

218 Figure 2: Example of an ATMIST handover 213 of 231

219 When handing over information to medical responders, consider the following: Keep the handover brief; aim for 30 seconds to get the information across Do not rush the handover Use written notes for reference Identify the team leader (or the next link in the chain of care) and introduce yourself Let the team know if the casualty is awake or not Tell them the name of the casualty Present accurate and standardised information Ask for any questions or points of clarification before handing over the casualty Align service casualty handover protocols with that of local medical emergency response Ensure that responders are aware of casualty handover protocols Provide a structured handover when transferring casualty to medical responders Hazard Multiple casualties Hazard Knowledge During a multiple casualty situation, it is important to notify control of the event in a structured manner. Adults and children may need to be triaged. Where a number of patients are involved in an incident and not enough personnel are available to treat them, it is important that a system of triage is used before any casualty care is undertaken. Control measure Share situational awareness using 214 of 231

220 M\ETHANE On arrival at the scene, the fire and rescue service will be required to update fire and rescue service control using a M\ETHANE structure. METHANE Major incident declared Exact location Type of incident Hazards Access and egress Number and severity of casualties, number of dead Emergency services present and required See National Operational Guidance: Incident command - Have a communication strategy There are no tactical actions associated with this control measure. Control measure Establish a triage sieve (adult and paediatric) The core principle of triage is to do the most for the most. The initial triage method in a multiple casualty situation is the triage sieve. The triage sieve will identify immediately life-threatening problems based on the C < A B C > system and correctly prioritise the patients for treatment. Not doing this will potentially risk lives. 215 of 231

221 All fire and rescue services should be aware of this system and be prepared to employ it in a multiple casualty situation or at a major incident. As a principle, in a poorly resourced scene, minimal casualty care is carried out in a multiple casualty situation. The following list provides guidance on what could be achieved without breaching the core principle of triage: Quickly turn a patient to protect an airway Encourage self help Encourage a bystander to apply direct pressure With the publication of the 2013 Ambulance Clinical Practice Guidelines (JRCALC) it was acknowledged that now ambulance services are all practising C < A B C > in their initial patient assessment, the standard triage sieve needed to be updated to take account of the importance of initial assessment and treatment of catastrophic haemorrhage. The diagram below is the new National Ambulance Service Medical Directors Group (NASMeD) Triage Sieve, which was published in 2013 for use by all ambulance staff at a major incident (NARU, 2013). The priorities are described as: P1 or red tags (immediate) are used to label those who cannot survive without immediate treatment but who have a chance of survival P2 or yellow tags (observation) are for those who require observation (and possible later retriage). Their condition is stable for the moment and they are not in immediate danger of death. These casualties will still need hospital care and would be treated immediately under normal circumstances. P3 or green tags (wait) are reserved for the 'walking wounded' who will need medical care at some point, after more critical injuries have been treated. The JESIP casualty triage has an additional priority: P4 or P1E (expectant) is used for those whose injuries are so extensive that they will not be able to survive given the care/resource that is available. This is only to be used under authorisation of the Medical Incident Officer. They alone have the responsibility to match these patients' injuries with the number and type of the other casualties and the remaining resources available to the hospitals of 231

222 Figure 3: Triage Sieve Source: National Ambulance Service Medical Directors Group (NASMeD) The same triage principles apply to children. Paediatric triage tape is available, which groups children by length, weight and age and provides normal physiological values for respiratory rate and pulse in each of the groups to carry out the triage process. Having labelled the casualty with their priority, casualties are handed over to an appropriately trained and competent practitioner. A record or log of the numbers of each priority should be kept. 217 of 231

223 When referring to casualties and the above categories at the scene of an incident, everyone should be sensitive to those who may be nearby, which could include relatives and other members of the public. Ensure that responders understand the principle of casualty triage at incidents involving more than one casualty Identify the number of casualties requiring medical attention and instigate a triage process Record the outcome of triage and communicate to medical responders Hazard Bariatric casualty Hazard Knowledge A bariatric casualty presents a range of amplified hazards for fire and rescue service personnel, and for the casualty (HSE, 2007): Manual handling Difficult access, weight, size, shape or mobility of casualty Slips and trips Cluttered environment, loose carpeting, uneven floor surfaces etc. Crushing Hands or limbs pinned between person and hard surface Fatigue Lifting aids unavailable, limited space, distance carried Biohazards Blood or other bodily fluids. Refer to the Operations guidance Altered physiological states Difficult to maintain an airway Respiratory reserve is small Cardiac function is compromised The casualty often has multiple medical conditions associated with obesity 218 of 231

224 Control measure Make an early identification of the bariatric casualty Making an early identification of a bariatric casualty allows for an appropriate response by the fire and rescue service, initiating a response for advanced medical support and appropriate bariatric management equipment. Make an early identification of the bariatric casualty Make an early TILE risk assessment: Task Individual capability Load Environment Use the principles of safer moving and handling: Avoid Assess Reduce Consider access and egress considerations or complications in getting to and from the casualty Enter into arrangements with local care providers and other agencies to establish protocols for response to bariatric rescue Provide information, instruction and training to crews on the factors relating to the rescue of bariatric casualties Consider manual handling when planning to extricate or transport bariatric casualties Adopt service protocols for multi-agency working at bariatric rescues 219 of 231

225 Control measure Use bariatric management equipment Bariatric management or lifting equipment may reduce hazards, and it is important to understand what equipment is available from the fire and rescue service and emergency medical service. Appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) for the situation should be worn. Make arrangements for the mobilisation of bariatric management equipment; for some organisations this may not be readily available out of normal office hours Consider requesting hazardous area response teams (HART), Special Operations Response Team (SORT) or equivalent for bariatric rescue bariatric rescue Consider requesting specialist fire and rescue service technical rescue teams for bariatric rescues Request the attendance of specialist bariatric medical support teams and ambulances Plan for the distance and the environment when transporting bariatric casualties Control measure Request specialist medical support for bariatric casualty Understanding the clinical issues associated with bariatric casualties for both trauma and medical 220 of 231

226 situations is helpful. Shift resources should be managed as availability may be limited outside of normal working hours Request an early deployment of advanced medical support because of an increased risk of complications to: Airway management Respiratory or ventilatory support Cardiovascular compromise Management of pre-existing medical conditions and co-morbidities Ensure that responders understand the acute health risks to bariatric casualties and the advanced medical support that may be required and available. Request deployment of advanced or specialist medical support for bariatric casualty Control measure Consider structural stability Normal domestic floor and staircases are designed with imposed and dead load rating equivalent to 1.5 kn per square metre or 1.4 kn for concentrated loads, this may be reduced due to age or alterations. The presence of specialist beds and other equipment for bariatric people may cause to floor load to be near capacity, the introduction of a large number of rescue personnel could lead to structural failure. At some incidents the casualty rescue may necessitate changes to the structure of the building such as widening of door openings or creating new openings in structural walls. Where such measures are required specialist structural advice should be sought at the earliest opportunity. 221 of 231

227 Provide information and instruction to responders on the risk of structural failure during bariatric rescue Consider the risk of structural failure at bariatric rescues and request specialist advice or USAR team Request specialist advice prior to creating new or wider openings in existing structural elements Hazard Thermal or chemical injury Hazard Knowledge The priorities and treatment of casualties who are involved in thermal, chemical or radiation events are the same as for any other trauma situation. Casualties with thermal injury may have other coexisting injuries. Having extinguished the fire or carried out decontamination, a full primary survey should be carried out using <C> Ac B C D E. If spinal injury is suspected or cannot be excluded, manual in-line stabilisation should be applied. The burning process should be stopped as quickly as possible and the patient removed from the source of thermal injury. Burnt clothing should be removed from the patient, along with any jewellery, unless either are adherent to the skin. Patients with chemical burns may need irrigation with large amounts of water to clear the contaminant and specialist advice should be sought if a chemical is involved. Dry chemicals should be carefully brushed from the burn. Irrigation for more than 10 minutes may cause hypothermia in the casualty. Be aware of the risk of hypothermia, especially in children and the elderly (NICE, 2012). Thermal or chemical injuries should be assessed as in: of 231

228 Control measure Provide treatment to burns casualties Effective treatment of thermal and chemical burn injuries can be treated through: SAFE approach: Shout/call for help Assess the scene Free from danger Evaluate the casualty Stop the burning process with irrigation (tap water) Cool the burn wound, warm the patient Dress the affected area Assess and manage immediately or imminently life threatening problems Request specialist advice and medical response Make burn treatments available to responders likely to encounter casualties Train responding personnel to understand the treatment of casualties suffering from burns Identify the nature and extent of casualty burns and communicate this to medical support teams Cool skin burns using the recommended method and request specialist medical assistance Dress burns according to service procedures and training Hazard Casualty with crushed body part 223 of 231

229 Hazard Knowledge Casualties that have body parts trapped or crushed pose serious problems for the responding fire and rescue service and medical support. Early release is always the goal. Emergency amputation is a very rare event and is seen as a last resort for extrication by medical responders. In the context of a crushed limb, the application of a tourniquet by trained personnel is appropriate to stop bleeding. Crush syndrome is not reduced by the application of tourniquets. Advanced medical support may be required for surgical release - this should be mobilised early (Greaves et al, 2003). Control measure Carry out structured assessment and treatment using Ac B C D E Structured assessment and treatment using <C> Ac B C D E aims to prioritise the needs of the casualty and focus activity towards those injuries or conditions that may do more harm to the casualty, or may cause death. A structured assessment of the casualty may involve: <C> Control of catastrophic external compressible bleeding The use of tourniquets, by trained personnel, forms part of the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care (FPHC) consensus statement. If there is a concern that a major bleed may occur on the casualty's release, tourniquet(s) may be applied loose, prior to extrication. These can then be quickly tightened if required - this action should only be undertaken by trained personnel. Airway A simple 'airway ladder' approach to airway care should be promoted Assessment and monitoring of the airway should be continuous Suction should be available to clear the airway c-spine If possible, self-extrication of the casualty is encouraged, following the guidelines promoted in the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care (FPHC) spinal consensus statement Manual in-line stabilisation is an acceptable method of stabilising the c-spine A long board is used for extrication only and the casualty is placed onto a spinal stabilising device. Ideally a vacuum mattress or split device (for example a scoop 224 of 231

230 stretcher) should be used to transport the casualty to definitive care If extrication cannot be effected quickly, a request for advanced medical support to deliver advanced medical care (doctor or immediate care practitioner) should be considered at the earliest opportunity Breathing Assessment of breathing / ventilation and the chest should be structured Suggest RV-FLAPS WET: Rate and Volume of breathing Feel the chest Look at the chest Armpits clear of injury Press the chest wall Search the back and side/shoulders Wounds on the neck Emphysema felt in the neck Trachea central in the sternal notch Assessment and monitoring of breathing should be continuous Minimum (rate and volume) The means to support a casualty who has stopped breathing should be available pocket mask and/or bag valve mask (BVM) Self-ventilating patients will receive high-flow oxygen via a non-rebreathe mask Sucking chest wounds should be covered with either a gloved hand or appropriate chest seal dressing with one-way air release valve Circulation All bleeding should be stopped or controlled Stopping bleeding is a priority and should be achieved using the 'bleeding ladder' approach: Pelvic injuries should be treated as per Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care (FPHC) consensus statement Shock is a life-threatening condition that occurs when the body is not getting enough flow of blood - if there is no evidence of external blood loss, there is likely to be internal bleeding Disability The casualty's level of consciousness is measured using AVPU: Alert Voice Pain Unresponsive AVPU assessment should be recorded every 3 to 5 minutes Casualties should have a pain score recorded The irritable or uncooperative casualty will require early specialist medical assessment and treatment If the casualty is presenting with a psychiatric illness or personality disorder the police should be involved early 225 of 231

231 Exposure, Extrication and Evacuation Casualties should be protected from the elements Active rewarming is encouraged Casualties may require stripping to skin to enable assessment The dignity of the casualty should be maintained If trapped, extrication should be, where possible, swift but controlled Casualty handling principles should be adopted as per Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care (FPHC) consensus statement Ensure that responders are trained to carry out a structured assessment and provide medical treatment to casualties Assign suitably trained responders to carry out casualty assessment and provide treatment Check casualty for presence of medical ID, jewellery and other indicators of pre-existing conditions Control measure Plan for the casualty deteriorating on release The fire and rescue service can assist the medical response in planning for a deterioration in the casualty's condition once released, by forming clearly designated areas for resuscitation and reassessment Ensure that all responding personnel have an awareness of acute medical care for casualties suffering from crush trauma 226 of 231

232 Create and resource a suitable casualty care point Assist medical responders with appropriate casualty care where resources allow Communicate status of the casualty to medical responders using accurate information Control measure Protect from hypothermia or hyperthermia The casualty that remains trapped is exposed to the environment and is unable to adjust to extremes of heat and cold. Both have a negative effect on the casualty's ability to survive injury. Ensure that responding personnel are aware of hypothermia and hyperthermia and their associated prevention and first aid treatments Protect casualties from environmental exposure to reduce risk of hypothermia or hyperthermia Hazard Impaled casualty Hazard Knowledge Fire service personnel may be called to respond to incidents where casualties have been impaled by objects that are still in situ. Such incidents require special medical advice and the priority of 227 of 231