JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE March 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (S) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Samir al-hasan Current/True Name and Aliases: Samir Naji al-hasan Muqbil, Samir Naji Hasan Muqbil Ghalib al-nashiri, Abu al- Layth al-taizi, Habib Place of Birth: Taiz, Yemen (YM) Date of Birth: December 1977 Citizenship: Yemen Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 5 September b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of al-qaida who served on Usama Bin Laden s (UBL) security detail. Detainee admitted fighting on the front lines, is assessed to be a fighter in UBL s 55th Arab Brigade, 1 and is assessed to have participated in hostilities 1 th Analyst Note: The 55 Arab Brigade served as UBL s primary battle formation supporting Taliban objectives, with UBL participating closely in the command and control of the brigade. NASHWAN ABD AL RAZZAQ ABD AL BAQI, aka (Abdul Hadi al-iraqi), ISN US9IZ DP (IZ-10026), had primary operational command of the CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 against US and Coalition forces in UBL s Tora Bora Mountain complex. Detainee was captured with a group referred to as the Dirty 30, which included UBL bodyguards and a 20th 11 September 2001 hijacker while, escaping hostilities during Operation Enduring Freedom. Detainee received basic and advanced militant training at the al-qaida al-faruq Training Camp, and was identified as an al-qaida guesthouse staff member. Detainee s name and aliases were found on al-qaida affiliated documents and he acknowledged he was recruited by known al-qaida member, Marwan Jawan, who also facilitated his travel to Afghanistan. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A LOW threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Assessed detainee to be a fighter in the 55th Arab Brigade Included reporting of detainee s name and alias on various al-qaida documents Added detainee s advanced training Added details of detainee s recruiter 4. (U) Detainee s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee is from the Al-Jumhuri Hospital District in Taiz where he and his family attended the al-mujamaa mosque. Detainee worked part-time in a plastics manufacturing factory in Taiz starting at the age of 12, and graduated from high school in At age 22 or 23, he obtained a full-time position at the factory and worked there for two more years. 2 th 55 Arab Brigade, serving as UBL s military commander in the field. See 55th Arab Brigade 01-Feb-1998, FBI , DIA CAR 55th Arab Brigade 18-Sep IIR , IIR , FEB-2002, Analyst Note: A variant of Jumhuri is Jomhouri. Variants of al-mujamaa include Mujama and Almujama. 2

3 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In the summer of 2000, Marwan Jawan (detainee s associate since the age of 8 or 10) 3 recruited detainee to travel to Afghanistan. Jawan prepared detainee for Afghanistan by providing him with training on the AK-47 assault rifle in al-dahna, located approximately 30 minutes outside of Taiz. Based on these lessons, which occurred every Friday for four weeks preceding his travel to Afghanistan, detainee felt fully competent to go to the front-lines in Afghanistan. In late-2000, detainee traveled to Afghanistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates (AE), and Karachi, Pakistan (PK). 4 The Pakistani travel visa in detainee s passport was obtained by Marwan. 5 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee traveled to Afghanistan, and stayed at a house in the Wazir Akbar Khan District of Kabul. Detainee left his passport at the house in Kabul before going to the frontlines to fight the Northern Alliance. He fought at the front lines north of Kabul as a fighter in the Sadiq Combat Unit, which consisted of approximately 15 or 16 fighters. Detainee received some pay as a fighter which enabled him to purchase needed items such as food and clothing. Detainee denied knowing UBL. 6 After the US and Coalition bombing campaign initiated in Afghanistan, detainee believed it was too dangerous to be an Arab in Afghanistan; therefore he fled the front-lines in December 2001 and stopped in Kabul. Detainee continued on to Khowst, AF, where he stayed for two weeks while he attempted to flee from Afghanistan (U) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) Detainee was captured by Pakistani forces on 15 December while attempting to cross the Afghanistan-Pakistan border near Parachinar, PK, after fleeing to the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan. Detainee was captured with a group of 31 other Arab al-qaida fighters referred to by US intelligence reporting as the Dirty 30, most of whom are assessed to be UBL bodyguards and other members of UBL s security detail. 8 Pakistani authorities transferred the group to a prison facility in Peshawar, PK, where they were held for 15 days. 9 On 26 December 2001, Pakistani authorities transferred detainee from Peshawar to US custody at the Kandahar Detention Facility FM40 21-Mar IIR , IIR , TD-314/ , Analyst Note: Variants of Jawan include Ja wan, Jarwan, Gaawan. Marwan Jawan is also known as Abu Ali al-yafii and is discussed in Reasons for Continued Detention. A variant of al-dahna is Ad Dahna FM40 09-Mar IIR , IIR , FM40 09-MAR TD-314/ , IIR Bodyguard Profile INTSUM 23-OCT-2006, IIR , IIR MAR-2002, MAY-2002, IIR , MFR 10-APR-2002, IIR FEB-2002, TD-314/

4 b. (S) Property Held: Pakistani rupees c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 11 January 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: 12 Operations of the Islamic Relief Organization (IRO) and associated individuals Khaled al-shaykh, a Kuwaiti national Detainee s work in Kashmir 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee s Account: Detainee remains deceptive during interrogations. He admitted lying to his interrogators in previous sessions in which he originally claimed to have traveled to Afghanistan for humanitarian purposes, yet continues to provide vague details regarding his timeline in Afghanistan. 13 Prior to this admission of lying, detainee claimed he worked for al-wafa and IIRO, providing humanitarian aid in Kashmir and later Afghanistan. 14 Detainee has also provided conflicting reporting on basic background information including who he traveled with to Pakistan. Detainee has reported his recruiter traveled with him, 15 and other times omitted any companions. Although detainee claimed he knew Marwan since he was 8 years old, detainee claimed he was unable to provide Marwan s full name. 16 Detainee has recanted his earlier cover story and acknowledged he spent some time on the front lines as a fighter. 17 This is assessed to be the most honest account he has provided; however, he has not provided detailed information on where he fought and his associates. Detainee has yet to give a complete account of his training and other activities prior to his capture. 11 Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $0.77 US 12 Analyst Note: The IRO is probably the IIRO. The IIRO aka (Hay at al-igatha al-islamiyya al-alamiyah), is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Counter-Terrorism (CT) Priority 2 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2 TSEs have demonstrated sustained and active financial support for terrorist organizations willing to attack U.S. persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2 terrorist groups SIR 19-FEB-2004, IIR TD-314/ , TD-314/ , AUG-2002, IIR , IIR , Analyst Note: Wafa al-igatha al-islamia, aka (al-wafa), is an NIPF CT Priority 3 TSE. Priority 3 TSE have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack U.S. persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups FM40 21-Mar SIR 02-Mar-2004, FM40 21-Mar IIR

5 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a member of al-qaida. Detainee served as a security guard for UBL and is listed on al-qaida affiliated documents. Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora and was a fighter in UBL s 55th Arab Brigade. Detainee was captured with a group referred to as the Dirty 30, which included known UBL bodyguards. Detainee received basic and advanced militant training at the al-qaida al-faruq Training Camp, and was an al-qaida guesthouse staff member. Detainee was recruited by known al-qaida recruiter Marwan Jawan, who also facilitated detainee s travel to Afghanistan. (S//NF) Detainee is a member of al-qaida and a former UBL security guard. Detainee s name and alias were found on al-qaida affiliated documents. (S//NF) Senior al-qaida facilitator Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-hajj, aka ( Riyadh the Facilitator ), ISN PK9YM DP (YM-1457), identified detainee as an individual who became a security guard for UBL in approximately August YM-1457 stated, I know all of the security staff members because I assisted them. 18 (Analyst Note: Assignment as a security guard or personal bodyguard was a prestigious position, and these personnel had closer contact with UBL than other support personnel. 19 ) (S//NF) Detainee s name and alias are included on lists of al-qaida members and their trust accounts found during raids against al-qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan. The documents identified the contents of detainee s trust account as a Yemeni passport and ID card. 20 (Analyst note: Such lists are indicative of an individual s residence within al-qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to traveling to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts were simple storage compartments, such as envelopes or folders that were used to secure an individual s personal valuables, including passports and plane tickets, until completion of training or other activities.) (S//NF) Abu Layth, assessed to be detainee, was identified as a Yemeni on an application for training in Afghanistan. The application noted detainee previously 18 IIR , IIR IIR , Bodyguard Profile INTSUM 23-OCT-2006, Analyst Note: See TD-314/ for additional comments on UBL bodyguards by senior al-qaida operational planner Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash, aka (Khallad), ISN US9YM DP (YM-10014). 20 TD-314/ , Number 104; AFGP b, Number 104; TD-314/ , Number 84; and TD- 314/ , Number 84 5

6 21 worked in a factory. (Analyst Note: Detainee acknowledged working in a factory in Yemen. 22 ) (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora and was a fighter in UBL s 55th Arab Brigade. (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM DP (YM-252), reported detainee was in Tora Bora. 23 (S//NF) Muhammad Mani Ahmed al-shalan al-qahtani, ISN US9SA DP (SA-063), reported detainee was a Yemeni mujahid. SA-063 stated he traveled with detainee out of UBL s Tora Bora Mountain complex to Pakistan. SA-063 added this group was the first to do so after UBL departed. 24 SA-063 and other members of the Dirty 30 hid in trenches to avoid the US and Coalition bombing campaign and then tried to flee the area by crossing into Pakistan where he and others were subsequently captured. 25 (S//NF) Abd al-hadi Omar Mahmoud Faraj, ISN US9SY DP (SY-329), reported all Arabs were issued AK-47s when they entered Tora Bora. 26 YM-252 reported individuals could have continued to Pakistan but chose to travel to Tora Bora to fight. YM-252 further stated, If you were in Tora Bora, you were not innocent. You were there to fight. 27 (Analyst Note: This statement supports the assessment that detainee was armed in Tora Bora and participated in hostilities.) (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a fighter in UBL s 55th Arab Brigade. In an undated letter to Abu Hafs al-masri (deceased), al-faruq commander Abu Muhammad al-masri identified detainee (al-layth al-taizi) as a student in the Tactics Course who was recommended for duty with the Mujahideen Brigades on the front lines. The document also identified detainee as proficient with the AKM (AK-47) and noted he was assigned to the Khalid Bin al-walid Brigade. 28 (Analyst Note: Detainee s assignment to the mujahideen brigade on the front is assessed to be a reference to the 55th Arab Brigade; foreign mujahideen fighters trained by al-qaida and placed under al-qaida and Taliban command on the front lines.) 21 TRRS IIR , IIR , FEB FM40 23-SEP TD-314/ , IIR TD-314/ , IIR , SIR 14-APR IIR SIR 31-DEC AFGP HT, Analyst Note: The document notes Huthayfa al-tabuki and al-fatih were also in the Khalid Bin Walid Brigade. Detainee identified these individuals with him on the front lines in FM Mar There is little reporting of a Khalid Bin Walid Brigade, but earlier documents identify a Khalid Bin al- Walid Training Camp near Khowst, and AFGP b notes the graduation of the Khalid Bin al-walid Battalion. 6

7 (S//NF) Detainee stated he was a fighter on the front lines in the Sadiq 29 Combat Unit north of Kabul. YM-252 corroborated detainee s front line association stating detainee was a fighter at Bagram. 30 (Analyst Note: Bagram is miles north of Kabul, corroborating detainee s account of fighting north of Kabul.) (S//NF) Detainee received basic and advanced militant training at al-faruq Training Camp. (S//NF) YM-1457 stated detainee traveled to Afghanistan during 1999 or 2000 and trained at the al-qaida al-faruq Training Camp in Kandahar. 31 (S//NF) Sanad Ali Yislam al-kazimi, ISN US9YM DP (YM-1453), reported detainee trained at al-faruq at the same time as YM-1453, but with a different group. YM-1453 remembers first seeing detainee at al-faruq in May or June (S//NF) On an application for training, detainee (Abu al-layth) was identified as attending the Tactics training course instructed by Hamza al-zubayr. The application also noted detainee arrived in Afghanistan on 22 February (Analyst Note: This report places detainee in Afghanistan earlier than admitted and supports the timelines provided by YM-1457 and YM Hamza al-zubayr (deceased) was a senior al-qaida operative and trainer. The Tactics course was an advanced al-qaida training course.) (S//NF) Detainee occupied al-qaida guesthouses, and was reported to be responsible for supplying food to an al-qaida guesthouse in Kandahar, AF. (S//NF) Detainee admitted staying at a guesthouse in the Wazir Akbar Khan area of Kabul. 34 (Analyst Note: The Wazir Akbar Khan area is the former diplomatic district of Kabul occupied by the Taliban and al-qaida for quarters and training.) (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-qaida guesthouse staff member. YM recognized detainee from a Kandahar guesthouse, where detainee was responsible for the food. YM-1453 admitted staying in al-qaida s al-nibras Guesthouse in Kandahar in May 2000, 35 probably the guesthouse at which he saw detainee. 36 (S//NF) SA-063 claimed he met detainee at a guesthouse in Kandahar. SA- 063 stated he stayed at the al-nibras Guesthouse in Kandahar in late IIR , IIR , FM40 09-Mar FM40 23-SEP IIR SIR 01-OCT AFGP HT, TRRS IIR IIR , FM40 14-JUN-2004, SIR 20-OCT-2004, Analyst Note: The al-nibras Guesthouse was also known as the Zubair Guesthouse, the al-ansar Guesthouse, and the Hajji Habash Guesthouse. 36 IIR , IIR

8 (S//NF) Salim Ahmed Salim Hamdan, ISN US9YM DP (YM-149), reported he recognized detainee from a Kandahar guesthouse. 38 (S//NF) Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, aka (Haytham al-kini), aka (Fupi), ISN US9TZ DP (TZ-10012), reported seeing detainee in Kandahar in (S//NF) David Michael Hicks, ISN US9AS DP (AS-002, transferred), reported seeing detainee at a guesthouse in Kandahar (S//NF) Al-Qaida recruiter Marwan Jawan, aka (Abu Ali al-yafii), recruited detainee and facilitated detainee s travel to Afghanistan. (S//NF) Detainee reported Marwan Jawan recruited and encouraged him to travel to Afghanistan. 42 Marwan was an active al-qaida recruiter in Yemen. He was a jihadist who had fought in Chechnya and Afghanistan, and was also a UBL bodyguard. 43 Marwan met potential jihadists at mosques and collected money from Taiz merchants to pay for airline tickets for the jihadists travel to Pakistan. The merchants knew Marwan used their donations for this purpose. Marwan also illegally procured and sold visas to individuals who could not obtain them on their own. Marwan may have been killed in Kandahar during US and Coalition bombing there. 44 (S//NF) YM-1457 also reported detainee may have been assisted in his travels by Abu Khulud or Abdallah al-rimi in YM-1457 also noted detainee was friends with Abu Khulud and Sakhr al-taizi. 46 (S//NF) According to Muhssin Muhammed Mugible al-askarry, ISN US9YM DP (YM-193, transferred), Ibrahim Muhammad Abd al-razzaq Baalawi, aka (Abu Khulud al-yemeni), a well-known al-qaida facilitator, worked with Marwan to facilitate recruits travel to Afghanistan. 47 (Analyst Note: Baalawi later traveled to Afghanistan and managed a guesthouse in Kandahar, which is believed to be the guesthouse where detainee stayed and was responsible for the food. Detainee s travels were probably assisted by both Baalawi and Marwan.) (U) Detainee lived in the Jumhuri (Republic/Republican) Hospital area of Taiz, YM. 48 Other JTF-GTMO detainees are also associated with Abu Khulud and the Jumhuri Hospital area including Muhammad Ahmad Said Haydar, ISN 37 TD-314/ IIR TD-314/ FEB For additional notes on Marwan Jarwan, see: IIR , IIR IIR , IIR IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR IIR , SIR 21-JUN-2005, IIR SIR 08-Oct-2004, IIR FM40 17-Jun IIR IIR , IIR , FEB

9 49 US9YM DP (YM-498), and Fahmi Abdallah Ahmad Ubadi al-tulaqi, ISN US9YM DP (YM-688). 50 (Analyst Note: Al-Qaida recruitment in the Jumhuri Hospital area requires further investigation.) (S//NF) At least seven other JTF-GTMO detainees who are assessed to be affiliated with al-qaida were recruited or facilitated by Jawan. 51 (S//NF) YM-193; Adil Said al-haj Ubayd al-busayss, ISN US9YM DP; Abdallah Yahya Yusif al-shibli, ISN US9YM DP; Khaled Qasim, ISN US9YM DP; 54 Riyad Atiq Abdu al-haj al-radai, ISN US9YM DP; 55 Khaled Muhammad Salih al-dhuby, ISN US9YM DP; 56 Abdul Muhammad Ahmad Nassir al-muhajari, ISN US9YM DP. 57 c. (S//NF) Detainee s Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a LOW threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been mostly compliant and rarely hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 19 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 24 November 2007, when he passed a water bottle through the fence during recreation. He has three Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 13 December 2003, when he threw water mixed with toothpaste on a guard. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include damage to government property, assaults, unauthorized communications, and possession of food type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of two Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and none so far in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee s most recent interrogation session occurred on 17 December b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was a member of UBL s security staff which provided him with security practices for top al-qaida leadership. He admitted fighting on the front lines north of Kabul providing him with battlefield tactics and movement, and is 49 GUAN-2006-B03337, GUAN-2005-A01664, 50 GUAN-2005-A03269, GUAN-2006-T02117, SIR 11-May-2005; Analyst Note: The following detainee s also have connections to the Taiz Jumhuri Hospital area: ISNs US9YM DP (TD-314/ ), and US9YM DP (IIR ). 51 IIR , IIR , IIR , 52 IIR , IIR , IIR IIR , IIR IIR , IIR KB 17-JUN-2002, IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR TD-314/ , IIR SIR 10-JUN

10 S E C R E T //NOFORN / I reported to have been at UBL's Tora Bora Mountain complex. Detainee received basic training at al-faruq Training Camp, and as a UBL security guard likely received advanced or specialized training. Detainee utilized al-qaida guesthouses, and possibly had a support role supplying food to an al-qaida guesthouse. Detainee was recruited by an al-qaida recruiter who also recruited a number of other JTF-GTMO detainees. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: As a member of UBL's security detail, detainee can probably provide specific information about UBL and other high-level al-qaida personnel. Detainee can probably provide information on other JTF-GTMO detainees, especially those who were members of UBL's security detail and the other individuals with whom he was captured. Detainee has received basic militant and advanced training and is knowledgeable on al-qaida militant training curriculum and guesthouse and safe house security practices. His activities in Afghanistan are not well exploited given what other detainees report about him and the fact he has not admitted any involvement with al-qaida other than serving as a foot soldier. Detainee is knowledgeable on al-qaida recruiters and facilitators in Yemen. d. (S/A[F) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Al-Qaida training camps and courses, cadre, missions, and logistics o Al-Qaida members, including fellow JTF-GTMO detainees, affiliated with fighting at the Kabul front and Tora Bora. The Sadiq Combat Unit o Extremists and radical Islamists affiliated with al-qaida and its global terrorist network o Extremist recruiting and facilitation in Yemen 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on I November 2004, and he remains an enemv combatant. ZBY US Navy Commandins 'Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence llarning Terminologt. 10 S E C R E T //NOFORN / I