JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO8II DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE JTF.GTMO-CC 11 August 2006 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander. United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami. FL (S/NF) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Yahya S Al Sulami o Aliases and Current/True Name: Yahva Samil Suwaymil al- Ulayani al-sulami. Zubayr al-jedawi o Place of Birth: Jeddah. Saudi Arabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 3 Februa4v 1979 o Citizenship: Saudi Arabia o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. 3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). If a satisfactory agreement can be reached that ensures continued detention and allows access to detainee and/or to exploited intelligence, detainee can be Transferred Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 19 September b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-qaida. Detainee was identified as the commander of a 15-man group in the Tora Bora Mountains of CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO8II

2 S E C RE T / / NOFORN I I 2O3IO8II Afghanistan (AF) and may have participated in hostilities against US and coalition forces. Detainee probably received specialized training at two al-qaida affiliated camps. Detainee was captured with a group of individuals that consisted primarily of bodyguards for Usama Bin Laden (UBL). JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: o A MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. o A HIGH threat from a detention perspective. o Of MEDIUM intelligence value. 4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is based, unless othenvise indicated, on detalnee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S/NF) Prior History: In 1999, after graduating high school, detainee attended the Religious Institute in Mecca, SA.' b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel: After graduating from the Religious Institute, detainee decided to teach Islam to non-arabs in accordance with various religious decrees that had been issued by religious scholars. In approximately August 2001, detainee departed Jeddah, SA, and traveled to Karachi, Pakistan (PK), with the assistance of Khalid al-muslih (NFD,2 whom detainee had met while studying at the Holy Mosque in Mecca (NFI). Upon arrival in Karachi, detainee contacted the Dar al-ifta (the House of Religious Affairs (I.IFD) and informed them of his plan to teach the Koran in Afghanistan. Detainee crossed into Afghanistan via the Miram Shah border crossing and proceeded to Khowst, AF.3 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee denies receiving any type of military training.a An individual named Muhammad al-afghani5 took detainee to Abu Hanifah's mosque (Nn9". Detainee resided at the mosque for four-and-a-half months while teaching the Koran to children.t Once the war in Afehanistan started. detainee contacted al-afehani 'ooooo6 KB olfebo2, IIR 6034 o2b202 'Analyst Note: Muslih variant: Musleh. Muslih is-possibly an al-qaida facilitator. ' I6FEB02, IIR O2,Analyst Note: Miram variant: Maram. o sir 22-JUL Analyst Note: Al-Afghani variants: al-afghan and al-afghini. Muhammad al-afghani is a possible al-qaida facilitator. 6 Analyst Note: Hanifah variants: Haneef and Hunayfah. T OOOOOO 302 I6FEB02, IIR }z,analysinote: Dar al-ifta variants: Dar al-afdah, Dar Alafdah and Dar Alaftah. 2 s E c R E T // NOFORN / /

3 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO8II and requested that he arrange for detainee's return to Saudi Arabia. Al-Afghani introduced detainee to two Afghan guides who led detainee and 30 other Arabs from Khowst back to Pakistan.8 5. (S//NF) Gapture lnformation: a. (S/A{F) Detainee stated that the group he was with traveled for six days in the mountains before they arrived in Pakistan.n After crossing the border near Parachinar, PK,10 they were arrested by Pakistani border.l' On27 December 2001, Pakistani authorities then transferred detainee from Peshawar, PK, to the Kandahar Detention Facility where he was placed in US custody.l2 b. (S) Property Held: o Leather wallet, containing 1,231 Rupees (approx $20 USD). These items are not held by JTF-GTMO. '' c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 14 January 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: o To provide background information on members of the group with whom detainee was captured. o To provide information on the tactics and logistics of the al-qaida fighters in Afghanistan from 2000 until the fall of Tora Bora. o The effect of the civil war on the Afghanistan educational infrastructure. 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's claim of traveling to Afghanistan to teach the Koran is highly suspect. The only language detainee speaks is Arabic; however, he claims that without a translator, he taught to children who only spoke Pashtu. Assessed jihadist Mohammed Y al Zayley,ISN US9SA DP (SA-055), stated thataprison warden instructed the members of detainee's group, when they were captured, to claim they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran. Detainee continues to hide his true activities while in ' KB 01FEB02, IIR , IIR n KB 01FEB02, IIR , IIR r0 Analyst Note: Reporting states that detainee was captured at Bert-Chinar, PK, but it is assessed that the city was actually Parachinar, PK. " KB 01FE802, MFR 25FEB02, sir 22-ruL-2004 t'td-3r4r t3 TO-314/ , Analyst Note: TD listed detainee's pocket litter, but no other documentation shows this. J S E C R E T / / NOFORN / /

4 S E C RE T / / NOFORN / I 2O3IO8II Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9 SA DP (S). Afghanistan, such as in which cities and guesthouses he stayed. Further exploitation is necessary to assess detainee's true threat and intelligence potential. 7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to pose a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Gontinued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-qaida and has associations to assessed al-qaida members. Detainee is assessed to have been the commander of approximately 15 fighters at Tora Bora and may have participated in hostilities against US and coalition forces. Detainee probably attended special training at al-faruq training camp. The Saudi Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Investigations (Mabahith) identified the detainee as being of low intelligence and law enforcement value to the US Government. o (S/A{F) Assessed al-qaida member Mohammed Basardah, ISN US9YM DP (YM-252), reported numerous times that detainee was the commander of approximately 15 fighters responsible for guarding a river crossing leading to a Tora Bora camp.to YM- 252 also stated that detainee had become one of UBL's bodyguards while detainee was at Tora Bora.ls lanalyst Note: YM-252 stated that detainee was a bodyguard on only one occasion. In every interview where YM-252 was questioned on detainee, YM-252 has changed his story. Detainee's identity as a bodyguard has not been substantiated through other known sources.) o (S//\lF) A well-known al-qaida facilitator, Abdu Ali al-haji Sharqawi aka Riyadh the Facilitator, ISN PK9YM-00I457DP (YM-1457), believed detainee went to Afghanistan after 11 September YM-1457 also believed detainee was part of Hanzahal-Qaiti'sl6 group in Kabul, AF, since YM-1457 saw him at al-qaiti's guesthouse.'' o (S/A{F) Fadel Roda al-waleelio ISN US9EG DP (EG-663, transferred), met detainee once in Bagram, AF.i8 (Analyst Note: This corroborates YM-1457's placement of detainee in the Kabul area, which is located near Bagram. Detainee denied traveling to Kabul.) to MAR-03, MAR-2003, IIR l014 03, IIR tt ooo252 FM4o l4-feb-2005 tu TO , TD-314/ , Analyst Note: Al-Qaiti was an al-qaida facilitator and Kabul guesthouse manager for fighters traveling to and from the front lines. He is best known for establishing a large training camp._ for fighters in Afghanistan. " rrr tb rd s E c RE T / / NOFORN //

5 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO8II o (S/A{F) YM-252 speculated that detainee probably received special mission training. YM-252 stated that there was a special group at al-faruq that trained and then disappeared. Additional special training for the group was also conducted at the Kandahar Airport.'' (Analyst Note: A former member of UBL's 55tn Arab Brigade, Mohammed Rafil Arkan, ISN US9IZ DP (12-653), stated, "It was well known that those individuals associated with the Kandahar Airport were automatically associated with being a member of UBL's group.")2o The trainees were taught to watch cars, embassies, embassy cars, how to acquire cars like embassy cars, explosives and how to conduct assassinations. YM-252 stated that detainee once possessed a computer disc showing this training. YM-252 also stated that detainee knows important people in I Yemen and Afghanistan.2 o (S/A.IF) Dretainee was captured with high level UBL bodyguards and al-qaida commanders." o (S/A{F) After the 2002 Saudi delegation visit, detainee was identified by the Saudi Mabahith as one of the seventy-seven Saudi nationals of low intelligence and law enforcement value to the US Govemment, but whom the Saudi Government would attempt to prosecute if transferred to their custody from JTF-GTMO.23 c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: The detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant and sometimes hostile to the guard force and staff. The detainee currently has 12 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on27 May 2006, when he refused to stand behind the black line to retum his meal tray, requiring the use of the FCE team. Other incidents for which the detainee has been disciplined include failure to follow instructions, failure to follow camp rules, unauthorized communications, possession of contraband and assault. On23 May 2006, the detainee assaulted a guard by throwing a cup of urine and feces into the face of the guard. On22 July 2004, he assaulted several guards by spitting on them. The detainee has several Reports of Disciplinary lnfraction for throwing water or food on guards. 'n IIR ri2i 03 2o IIR r32g 03 2rIIR t'kb supplemental 066 AUG 05, IIR 4 20r , IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR ro3ur3o789-oz 5 S E C R E T // NOFORN //

6 S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 2O3IO8II 8. (S/NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Due to the lack of available information about detainee, JTF-GTMO determined this detainee is of at least MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on26 January b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee may have been the commander of a 15 man group at Tora Bora. Detainee was at an al-qaida affiliated guesthouse and possibly attended at least two terrorist training camps. Pakistani forces captured detainee with a group of individuals comprised mainly of UBL bodyguards and al-qaida commanders. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Based on available information from detainee and others, detainee should have information about al-qaida's recruitment and facilitation network, guesthouses, and possibly training facilities. Detainee should be able to provide background information on personnel he was captured with as well as tactics and logistics of the al-qaida fighters in Afghanistan from 2000 to the fall of Tora Bora. Detainee's true intelligence value remains unknown. d. (S/NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:. Al-Qaida o Recruiters o Facilitators o Guesthouses o Training Camps o Personalities o Tora Bora activities 9. (S) EG Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 13 October 2004, and he remains an enemv combatant. Rear Admiral. Commanding 6 S E C RE T / / NOFORN / /