JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 S E C R E T // NOFORN I / O6 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE October 2006 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL33172 '1. (S//NF) Personalnformation: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Khalid S Al Bawardi o Aliases and Current/True Name: Khalid Saud Abd al- Rahman al-bawardi. Khalid Saaud al-muardi. Khaled al- Tamimi. Mohammed al-afghani. Khaled Saud al-bouardi o Place of Birth: Riyadh. Saudi Arabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 21 November Citizenship: Saudi Arabia o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. 3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). If a satisfactory agreement can be reached that ensures continued detention and allows access to detainee and/or to exploited intelligence, detainee can be Transferred Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 15 October CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:203110

2 s E c RE T / / NOFORN I I b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-qaida. He trained at al-faruq, and two other assessed al-qaida members identified him as being in the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan (AF). Detainee was captured with a group of individuals comprised primarily of Usama Bin Laden (UBL) bodyguards. Detainee may have facilitated a terrorist's entry into the United States (US) as well as individuals involved in a maritime attack plot against US interests in the Strait of Gibraltar. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: o A MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. o A HIGH threat from a detention perspective. o Of MEDIUM intelligence value. 4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otheruvise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S/NF) Prior History: During his first year of high school, detainee switched to a trade school where he studied engine mechanics. After eight months, detainee quit school. He then became a telephone operator and receptionist in the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce. After about one year, detainee quit work and sold vegetables for a few months. On an unknown date, detainee traveled to Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), to conduct missionary work and teach the Koran.' b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel: Shortly before leaving Riyadh, detainee read an old fatwa issued by Shaykh Abdall AzizBinBazz" that directed all pious men to travel abroad and perform missionary work in underdeveloped Islamic countries. Detainee took this fahva to mean places such as Afghanistan or Pakistan (PK), and chose to travel to Pakistan. Detainee claims there was no mention ofjihad in the fatwa. Iq approximately May 200I, detainee traveled to Karachi, PK, on his Saudi passport via Dubai.' 'IIR o3t602 'IIR , l8-dec-2004, Analyst note: Shaykh Abdall AzizBinBazzis a mufti for all Arab nations, and former Minister of Saudi Arabia. He encouraged jihad against Christians and Jews. He is reportedly deceased. Shaykh variant Sheik; Abdall variants Abdul and Abdel; Bazz vaiants Baic, Baz, Beaz and Baaz; Bin variant Ibn. ' IIR oz 2 S E C RE T / / NOFORN I I 2O311006

3 S E C RE T // NOFORN I I c. (S/NF) Training a.nd Activities: Muhammad the Afghani (NFD met the detainee at the Karachi Airport, PK," and stated that he was a guide. Detainee spent approximately one month in the Karachi area teaching the Koran in small-unnamed villages. During this month, Muhammad translated for detainee. In approximately June or July 2001, Muhammad told detainee they could do great work in Afghanistan and suggested they go there. Detainee and Muhammad traveled to Kabul, AF,5 where detainee facilitated discussion groups on Islam for four months.o ln October 2001, after the air war started, detainee decided to go back to Saudi Arabia and left Kabul without Mohammed.' 5. (S//NF) Capture Information: a. (S/A{F) After seeking out someone to help him leave Afghanistan, detainee returned to his apartment in Kabul to find all of his possessions, including his passport, stolen in his absence. The detainee departed for the Afghanistan-Pakistan border by car, but his Afghani driver left him somewhere on the road between Kabul and the Pakistan border in fear of being seen with an Arab.8 Detainee walked for some time before reaching a small village where he stayed for three or four weeks. Sometime in November 200I, detainee, with an Afghan guide (I.IFI), left on foot for the border. On the way, detpinee ran into and joined a larger group of 10 to 23 male refugees heading toward Pakistan.v The group traveled for about a week before they were arrested at the border by Pakistani border officials.l0 He was held for a few days in a Pakistani jail and questioned by Saudi officials. On27 December detainee was transferred to US custodv.rl b. (S) Property Held: o These items are not held by JTF-GTMO but were reported as pocket litter belonging to detainee:12 o s100 usd o 300 Pakistani Rupees KB 02-FEB-2002, IIR , Analyst Note: Muhammad variant Mohammed, Muhammad the Afghani variant Muhammad al-afghani t IIR " KB 02-FEB-2002 t KB 02-FEB-2002, MAR-2002 t ooooog MAR-2002, IIR , MFR 08-Nov-2002 n oooo MAR-2002, rrr o3t6 02, MFR 08-Nov-2002 to MFR o8-noy-2002 tt KB 02-FEB-2002, MAR-2002, IIR ,TD (Analyst Note: Detainee is number B (8) on list), TD-314/ (Analyst Note: Detainee is number 55 on list.) t2 to-3t+lo6g S E C R E T // NOFORN I I O6

4 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 203IIO06 c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 14 January 2002 d. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: Detainee's transfer was likely due to the perceived association between him and the 30 UBL bodyguards, al-qaida members, and Taliban fighters with whom he was arrested. However, initial reports suggested he was able to provide information on the following: o Effect of the civil war on religion and ethnicity as they affect regional security issues 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee is utilizing a cover story passed to him while in a Pakistani prison. MohammedY al-zayley, ISN US9SA DP (SA-055), stated that a prison warden instructed members of detainee's captured group to claim they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran. Detainee continues to hide his true activities. 7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S/NF) Reasons for Gontinued Detention: Detainee is assessed a member of al-qaida who trained at al-faruq, fought in Afghanistan, and served in Tora Bora during hostilities. Detainee was captured with UBL bodyguards, al-qaida members, and Taliban fighters. An individual using a variant of detainee's name presented detainee's altered passport for multiple entries into the United States. Detainee is also assessed to be covering his activities during 1998 as he may have used the alias Khalid al-tamimi that year while trying to facilitate a USS COLE-type suicide bombing in the Strait of Gibraltar. o (S/AIF) Detainee attended al-qaida training at al-faruq Training Camp and fought in the Tora Bora Mountains in Afghanistan. o (S/AID Mohammed Basardah, ISN US9YM DP, stated detainee trained at al-qaida's al-faruq Camp for three weeks, two months before the US bombing campaign started in October 200L He also identified detainee as fighting in the Quodous area and as being in charge of determining where to dig caves and bunkers. (Analyst Note: The Quodous area is a likely reference to the center in Tora Bora commanded by al-qaida member Abdul Qadoos.)'' o (S/A{F) Maad al-qahtani, ISN US9SA DP ( ), met detainee in Tora Bora. (Analyst Note: 5A-063 is a confirmed al-qaida operative with direct ties tt oo02s2 sir l6-jan-2003, MAR-2003, IIR

5 S E C RE T //NOFORI\ I I 2O SIIBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for to senior al-qaida leadership, including UBL and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM).)'4 o (S/A{F) Detainee was captured with UBL bodyguards, al-qaida members, and Taliban fighters.'' o (S//NF) SA-055 identified detainee as one of the individuals who traveled with him from Khowst, AF, to the Pakistan border.r6 o (S/A{F) 5,4'-063 identified detainee as one of the individuals, including UBL bodyguards, al-qaida members, and Taliban fighters, who traveled with him to the Pakistan border.' ' o (S/A{F) Variations of detainee's name appear on al-qaida associatedocuments. (Analyst Note: These documents are indicative of an individual's residence within al- Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to training, the front lines, or abroad.) o (S/A{F) A variant of detainee's name, Khaled Saud al-bouadri, and the alias Khaled al-tamimi, were found in a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities, recovered from raids on al-qaida associated safe houses in Karachi. Khaled Saud Al Bouadri aka (Khaled Al Tamimi) was associated with the statement "has possession of a Saudi passport and wallet containing important ID cards."l8 o (S/A{F) A variant of detainee's name, Khalid al-bawadiri, and the alias Khalid al-tamimi, were found in a document listing 128 Arabic nrunes, aliases, and nationalities, recovered from raids on al-qaida associated safe houses in Karachi and Rawalpindi, PK. Khalid al-bawadiri was associated with the contents: "passport, ID cards and wallet."le o (S/A{F) Detainee may have been an al-qaida facilitator. o (S/A{F) A variation of detainee's alias, Abu Khalid al-tamimi, is the same as that used by a facilitator of a 1998 suicide plot against a US tanker ship in the Straits of Gibraltar.2o. (S/AVry In contrast to the 21 November 1972 birthdate listed on his passport, detainee claims that he was born on 13 March 1978 and started hish school 20 'o IIR 6 o34 n3l 03, IIR 't IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR 'u IIR , IIR , IIR 6034 l " rrr ttto-31+/ ,afgp-2002-go5527,analystnote: Detaineeisnumber6Tonbothlistsandhistrustaccount number is 30. 'n TD , Analyst Note: Detainee is number 67 on the list. TD appears to be a partial reissue of TD-314/ , but it does have additional name variant spellings. 'o TD-3r4rq5n4-ol 5

6 S E C R E T / / NOFORN I I 203IIO06 years later in (Analyst Note: Detainee would have been a little old to be starting high school at the age of 20. His claim may be a cover story to mask his participation in the above mentioned plot to blow up a US tanker in Assuming detainee's passporto be correct, detainee would have been at least 25 years old in Detainee would then fit the description of the facilitator in the bombing plot, who was mentioned as being in his mid-twenties.) o (S/A{F) An individual using a variant of detainee's name, Khalid Albawardi, and detainee's altered passport, visited Orlando, Florida, from late July to early August in 2000 and during the same period in 2001." latralyst Note: According to the FBI, detainee's passport, with a different photograph, was presented upon the individual's arrival in 2000 and 2001.) c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: The detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has been semi-compliant but mostly hostile to the guard force and staff. The detainee currently has 37 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 16 August 2006, when he refused to follow guard's orders not to throw bread from his window. Other incidents for which the detainee has been disciplined include failure to follow instructions/camp rules, assault, unauthorized communications, provoking words and gestures, damage to property, possession of non-weapon type contraband, and participating in a mass disturbance. On 4 March 2003, the detainee participated in a disturbance by throwing water, milk, food, bodily fluids, and feces at guards. On2l June 2006, during a cell search, it was found that the detainee used his mattress in order to reach and loosen the screw in the light fixture in his cell. The detainee has 4 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault, the most recent occurring on 6 June 2006, when he threw feces on a guard's face, legs, and chest using his cereal bowl. 8. (S//NF) Detainee lntelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: JTF-GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occuned on 8 August2006. b. (S/NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was captured with members of UBL's entourage and al-qaida and Taliban fighters. Detainee trained at al-faruq Training Camp,., INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT INFO 24-ruL-2OOO, TD-3I I INITIAL SCREENING FORM OI-JAN-2002 t' INTERNATIoNAL FLIGHT INFo 24-JUL-2000, INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT INFO 04-ruL- 2001, IIR

7 SIIBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for and he was in Tora Bora. Detainee had access to known and suspected al-qaida and Taliban members. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has provided few clues to his true identity. His passport was possibly used by at least one other al-qaida operative, so it is not clear what activities can be attributed to him versus other operatives. Furtherrnore, reports suggest detainee may have facilitated a terrorist's entry into the US and individuals planning a plot to conduct a USS COLE type bombing in the Straits of Gibraltar. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:. Straits of Gibraltar bomb plot o Facilitation of terrorist plots o Procurement of documents for the purpose of entering the US illegally o Al-Qaida and Taliban personnel and leaders 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 9 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. Rear Admiral. U Commanding IS, JR. Navy S E C R E T / / NOFORN I I