JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 s E c R E T //NOFORN / DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA APO AE Mav 2005 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued 1. (FOUO) Personal Information: JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSA{DRC Reference Name: Rasheed Kaid o Aliases and Current/True Name: Abu Raad. Rashid Abd Al Muslih Qaid Al Qaid o Place of Birth: Sakakah. Saudi Arabia (SA) o Date of Birth: I Januarv 1959 o Citizenship: Saudi Arabia o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in fair health and has no known drug allergies. He has diabetes, (non-insulin dependent) controlled by oral medication. He has a history of hypothyroidism, and takes medication for this. He needs sufficient quantities of diabetic and thyroid medications for travel. 3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends detainee be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD). b. (S/NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) on26 April2003. CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3OO5I3 For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a probable member of Al Qaida. He has traveled to Afghanistan using routes normally used by extremists entering Afghanistan. Detainee has also traveled with at least two individuals from Saudi Arabia that are probable members of Al-Qaida. He claims these individuals are good friends of his and that he knew them for three and four years. He has given contradictory stories to his interrogators at Baghram, Afghanistan (AF), and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (CU), about his time before capture, travel companions and a particular individual he met in Iran. In September 1994, detainee was arrested and detained for one month and remained under govemment surveillance for one year for unknown reasons. As of 29 October 200I, detainee has been added to a Saudi watch and arrest list likely due to his travel to Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia's suspicion of his involvement of terrorist activities. It is assessedetainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. 4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements. a. (S) Prior History: Detainee was a school principal/manager and taught geography for two years at the Salmon Fayez School in Sakakah, SA. b. (S) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee and his friend, Ibrahim Al Masrood, heard from a variety of media sources there were massive refugee problems on the Iranian border. On 30 September 2001, detainee and Al Masrood planned a ten-day trip to Mashhad, Iran, (IR). They traveled through the Jordanian Border, Damascus, Syria, (SY), and Tehran, IR. When they arrived in Mashhad, IR, they were told that the refugee problems were in Afghanistan. Detainee was granted permission to enter Afghanistan and later traveled on to Herat, AF. c. (S) Training and Activities: Detainee does not know how long he was in Herat, AF. Detainee exchanged his Saudi Riyals (SR) for Afghan currency and gave approximately 9000 SR (approximately $2400 USD) to the poor. d. (S) Capture Information: Detainee was forced to travel south through Pakistan because the Afghan-Iranian border closed soon after he crossed into Afghanistan. Pakistani border guards arrested detainee for not having a Pakistan visa on 15 December No further capture information is available. e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 13 February 2002 f. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following: financial support to refugees and refugee camps along the Iran/Afghan border. 1- S E C RE T // NOFORN I / 2O3OO5I3

3 5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: It has been determined that the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Gontinued Detention:. (S) Because of detainee's travel and associates, he is assessed as a probable member of Al-Qaida. o (S) Detainee traveled to Afghanistan using routes typically used by Arab extremists entering Afghanistan. o (S) Detainee traveled with at least two individuals from Saudi Arabia identified as probable members of Al-Qaida. o (S/NF) Detainee has been on the Saudi Arabia watch and arrest list since 29 October (Analyst Note: The detainee was on the watch and arrest list due to his travel to Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia's suspicion of his involvement in terrorist activities.) o (S/A{F) 14 September 1994, detainee was arrested and detained for one month and remained under government surveillance for one year in Saudi Arabia for his involvement in case 117. (Analyst Note: No further information is available concerning detainee's arrest.). (S/AIF) Detainee initially tried to withhold information regarding his traveling companions in an attempt to distance himself from them. These companions have been named in lists and documents as being Al-Qaida members. Detainee first claimed he traveled with Al Masrood. After nearly two hours of debriefing, he admitted he traveled in a taxi with Al Masrood, Hussim Al-Wassim, US9SA DP (ISN 338), and Anwar Hamdan Muhammed Al Nur, US9SA DP (ISN 226). He also admitted that he had known ISN 338 and ISN 226 for three to four years. He has provided no explanation for initially saying he did not know who these individuals were. o (SA{F) Detainee's associates have been involved or affiliated with extremist organizations:. (S/AIF) ISN 226's name has been found in a number of Al-Qaida documents retrieved from raids on various Al-Qaida safe houses. ' (S) ISN 226 was identified on two Jihadist websites listing captured mujahideen.. (S/A{F) ISN 226 is affiliated with the Al-Igatha organization, aka International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), a Tier 1 Non Government Organization (NGO). Tier I targets have demonstrated sustained and active support for terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests. 3

4 S E C RE T //NOFORN / I (U) ISN 338's name was on a list published on the intemet version of The Saudi Daily. They reported Pakistani forces were holding over 250 members of AI-Qaida in Pakistan.. (U) Open source reporting stated 18 foreign fighters were captured crossing into Pakistan illegally, including very close relatives of Usama Bin Laden. All were Muslim fighters and belonged to Al-Qaida. ISN 338's's name was listed among them.. (SAIF) ISN 338 was once put on FBI hold for suspicion he was involved in a plot to bomb the St. Louis Arch in St. Louis, MO.. (S) Detainee utilizes counter-interrogation techniques to explain his travels and distance himself from his associates. o (S) Detainee initially claimed he did not know how long he stayed in Afghanistan. During the next interrogation, he explained that he stayed in Iran for four months and Afghanistan for one month. o (S) Detainee claims he spent four months speaking to Iranian officials to gain permission to enter Afghanistan. He spent one month in Afghanistan speaking with officials to exit through Iraq and retum to his home in Saudi Arabia. If detainee had the proper paperwork and was given permission to enter Afghanistan, he should have had the credentials to leave the country. He did not indicate he was robbed of his documents or he lost his documents while in Afghanistan that could have extended his stay. o (S) Detainee was deceptive when questioned about the name Zaid Al-Harbi. He claimed not to remember that name, but when reminded of his travels with his friend Al-Nur, he said that Al-Nur knew Al-Harbi. Al-Harbi was Al-Nur's contact with the IIRO NGO. They all met in Mashhad, IR. o (S) Detainee has a significant gap in his timeline. Specifically, he stated he left September 2001 and claims to have been captured November Foreign reporting indicated that he was actually captured December 200I. He only provides activities for part of the time period. o (S) Detainee appears to be giving his family plausible deniability so they can avoid prosecution for his illegal activity. He initially claimed he never told his family where he was going. Later he claims to have told his wife. Detainee's initial statement is not plausible. He is married with four children and the primary source of income. Some arrangements would have been made to ensure his family was taken care ofduring his absence. c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee's behavior has been generally compliant, with some non-aggressive behavior such as refusing medication, talking across blocks, and loosening the grill on his cell. 4 s E c R E T //NOFORN

5 s E c R E T // NOFORT\ / / 20300s13 6. (S/NF) Detainee lntelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.. (S) Detainee can provide information on his travel routes, companions and their involvement in activities that have been directed against the Saudi Arabian govemment. Detainee has also had contact with IIRO members and could possibly provide intelligence on their activities and support network in the Iran and Afghanistan regions. Ibrahim Al Masrood, who traveled with the detainee, should also be investigated because no record can be found documenting his encounter with the Pakistani border guards or his status at the time of the detainee's arrest. b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Activities against the Saudi Arabian govemment o Activities while traveling between countries o IIRO activities in Iran o Information about the followins detainees o ISN 226 o ISN 338 o Zaid Al-Harbi o Ibrahim Al Masrood 7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 16 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. ktl"& rigadier General, USA Commandins 5 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 2O3OO5T3