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1 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE August 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL SUBJECT: Recommendation to Retain under DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee, (S) 1. (FOUO) Personal Information: o JDMSAIDRC Reference Name: Hamidallah o Aliases and CurrenVTrue Name: Hammdidullah. Janat Gul. Mullah Hammi.dullah Akhund. Janat Gal o Place of Birth: Sapolad. Washir. Afehanistan (AF) o Date of Birth: 1972 o Citizenship: Afehanistan 2. (FOUO) Health: ISN 953 has a history of Irritable Bowel Syndrome. Otherwise, he is in good health. 3. (S/AIF) Detainee Summary: a. (S) Background and Capture Data: Unless otherwise noted, the following background notes are based solely on the detainee'statements. o Prior History: The detainee attended the Laskaghar, AF, high school, graduating in 1990, but he did not receive a degree. From I99l-I992 he attended the Polytechnic College technical school in Kabul, AF, where he received a degree in electrical engineering. During the years he ordered supplies, conducted maintenance, and logged fuel consumption at the Khandahar, AF, Airport. He was also assigned the duty of eavesdropping on English conversations. When the Taliban came to power, he again found employment at the Kandahar lnternational Airport. He maintained a log noting when anyone took fuel from the fuel storage dump. He filed fuel reports and was a security guard. CLASSIFIED BY: Multiple Sources REASON:E.O Section 1.5(C) DECLASSIF"Y ON:

2 S E C RE T // NOFORN I I o Training and Activities: Because he could read and write, he garnered the attention of the president of Ariana Airlines, Mohammed Khalis. In order to obtain decent wages under the Taliban rule, he pretended to be a member of the Taliban and changed his name to Hammidullah. He was known in college as Janat Gul, and he did not want the Taliban to know of his education. In 1996 he went to Kabul, AF, where he spent three years as a presidential assistant with Ariana Airlines. He then became president of the airline. This promotion was due to the recommendation of the outgoing president, who was promoted to a higher position in the Taliban organization. o Capture lnformation: Ariana Airlines was never used by Al-Qaida members or by any Arab citizens. He never heard of Al-Qaida until the term was used in American press reports. Ariana Airlines was not used to transport opium or any derivative of opium and all of the passengers were searched for drugs. During his assignment as president of the airline, he traveled to Kuwait (KU), Saudi Arabia (SA), and Pakistan (PK) on behalf of the airline, often carrying large sums of money. In Kuwait the detainee arranged to purchased a plane for nine million USD. He was captured by United States Special Forces (USSF) at Lashkar Gar, AF, on 30 January b. (S) Transfer to JTF GTMO: Detainee was subsequently transported to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, on22march2002 c. (S) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: Detainee may be able to provide specific information on:. Opium production and distribution in Afghanistan o Taliban and Al-Qaida use of proceeds from opium sales. Taliban and Al-Qaida use of Ariana Airlines. Ariana Airlines involvement with the opium trade in Afghanistan d. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention at JTF GTMO: o (S/NF) The detainee and Ariana Airlines are alleged to have provided logistical support, such as flights, to Al-Qaida's CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radialogical, Nuclear, and Explosives) program and fighters in Afghanistan. o UBL's supporters were able to fly on Ariana Airlines whenever and wherever they wished, with no reservations required or money paid. Ariana Airlines was also reported to have trained young Muslim "fanatics" to fly aircraft. o Analyst note: The detainee has not yet clarified his timeline. It is unhtown if the detainee had a period in which he was not employed at the Kandahar airport between 1994 and o (S/A{F) Despite the detainee's claims to the contrary, the Taliban used Ariana Airlines planes to transport Taliban and Al-Qaida associated fighters to the front lines. 2

3 S E C RE T // NOFORN I I (S/A{F) The airline's largest plane, the Boeing , was used for flights between Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-E-Sharie AF. Smaller aircraft were also used to ferry troops to the front lines.. (S) The Taliban chartered approximately two Ariana flights a month. The requests for charters were passed through the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Transportation and then to Ariana Airlines. Analyst note: It is unlikely that such high level requests were unhtown to the president of the airline, the detainee.. (S) Ariana Airlines provided free flights to Konduz, AF, for Jaish-E- Muhammad (JEM) fighters joining the fight against the Northern Alliance.. (S) At least three Al-Qaida associated detainees claimed to have used Ariana Airlines for travel to the front lines in order to fight the Jihad: US9SA DP, US9SA DP, and US9YM DP. o (S/A{F) As the President of Ariana Airlines, the detainee concluded a deal with the Kuwaiti government to purchase a747 for approximately 9 million USD. Mullah Omar canceled the order and transferred the money to his personal account. o The detainee has been identified as a Taliban member. o Analyst note: The detainee has elaimed that he never met Mullah Omar and that he was not a true Taliban member. The deal for the 747 was signed by the detainee in his capacity as president of the airline, however, he has never informed his interrogators that the deal was cancelled and the Taliban received the monies intendedfor it. This indicates interaction between the Airline and the Taliban, specifically Mullah Omar, with such interaction most likely originating through the detainee. o (S/A{F) A meeting of the Hezbi E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) was held in early September 2002 atthe Camp Shamshatu Refugee Camp near Peshawar, PK. Najmuddin (Konar provincial security official), Khan Jan (the Chief of the Asadabad Hospital), and Shir Shah (Ariana Airlines assistant manager in the Nangarhar province area) were present at this meeting. o Analyst note: Camp Shamshatu is a lorcwn training camp of the HIG. The leaders of the HIG often meet at Shamshatu. o This 2002 meeting was called to discuss Jihad against the Americans. This indicates that the airline was not only supporting the Taliban, but also the Hezbi e Islami Gulbuddin.. (S) The Ariana offices in Kabul, AF, were located next to the Libyan Islamic Fighter Group (LIFG) guesthouse. o Analyst note: The LIFG also ran the Sanabil NGO in Kabul. Sanabil and the guesthouse were located in the Wazir Akhbar Khan area of Kabul, which was a lcnown Al-Qaida and Taliban stronghold. Therefore, the Ariana ffices were located in Wazir Akhbar Khan and the detainee likely has associations with the LIFG and other Taliban and Al-Qaida/extremist elements that were located in the area.. (U) Ukrainian arms dealers have transferred weapons with the assistance of Ariana Airlines. 3 s E c RE T // NOFORN

4 s E c RE T // NOFORN o (S/A{F) A Taliban-sponsored Ariana Airline delegation traveled to the Ukraine on24 Janurary 2001 to sign a contract for the purchase of two 1988 Antonov aircraft and spare parts, including a new radar system. The delegation included the deputy director of the airline and an Al-Qaida fi nancial assistant. o (S/A{F) Ariana Airlines has a number of foreign bank accounts. o (S/A[F) The detainee claims that on l8 September 2001, he abandoned his post as president of Ariana Airlines and returned to Kandahar, AF. When he departed Kabul, he emptied the airline's safe of 700,000 USD. When the detainee fled Kabul, Mullah Rahmatullah, who had worked with the detainee as Ariana's senior finance minister, assumed the detainee's duties as president of the airline. o (S//NF) The detainee's personal assets were frozen by Pakistan and the United Nations. Analyst note: The detainee was designated a Mid-level Taliban member. o (S/A{F) The Taliban reportedly planned to use an Ariana Airlines jet to spray chemicals on US Aircraft Carriers operating in the Gulf region on29 OCT 01. e. (S) Intelligence Focus: JTF GTMO has determined that this detainee is of high intelligence value due to his knowledge ofi o Links between the Taliban and Anti-Coalition Militant forces o The associations Ariana Airline and its personnel had with: o Al-Qaida, including transport support for CBRNE program o High-level Taliban leadership o HIG O LIFG o Financial connections between the airline and Taliban o Sources o Financial control o Disposition of funds o Movement of Al-Qaida terrorists and operatives, both within Afghanistan and internationally 4. (S) Detainee's Conduct: Based on DAB analysis of the detainee's INTREP reports, the detainee's overall behavior has been generally compliant and non-aggressive. He has not shown hostility towards DoD personnel and, other than tryrng to hoard salt and a few failures to comply, he has not given any reason for cell block personnel to take notice of him. 5. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 24 February 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. + s E c R E T // NOFORN I

5 6. (S) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Summary: It is assessed that this detainee is an influential member of the Taliban and the global terrorist network. The detainee is highly educated and claims that this education was the means by which he obtained his job in Kabul, although the Taliban frowned on education other than of a religious nature. He knows influential people within the Taliban organization and likely terrorist organizations. He knew the former president of Ariana Airlines, Mohammed Khalis before the detainee went to work for the airline in Kabul. He admits Khalis was instrumental in obtaining the detainee's job as his assistant. Mohammed Khalis went on to become a Minister for the Taliban in a northem province. This airline was a Taliban air asset and Mullah Omar kept a close watch on its operations. The airline was used to move troops and terrorists to the front lines, though the detainee denies it. The detainee has demonstrated a commitmento supporting jihad and has links to key facilitators in the Taliban and Al-Qaida's international terrorist network. It is determined that the detainee poses a high risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be retained under DoD control. 7. (S) Coordination: JTF GTMO notified the Criminal lnvestigative Task Force (CITF) of this recommendation on 20 August 04. JTF GTMO and CITF agree on the threat assessment of this detainee as a high risk. CF: CITF-GTMO h.h JAY W. HOOD Brigadier General, US Army Commanding 5 s E c R E T // NOFORN