JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I I DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE r Apil2007 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southem Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami. FL (S/NF) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSA{DRC Reference Name: Turki Mish'awi Za'id ALi-Amri o Aliases and Current/True Name: Turki Mash Awi Zayid al-asiri. Mutasim al-mecci o Place of Birth: Tabuk. Saudi Arabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 8 March 1975 o Citizenship: Saudi Arabia o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. 3. (S/NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment: ^. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessedetainee as Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 20 March b. (S/NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-qaida who traveled to Afghanistan (AF) to participate in jihad. Detainee stayed at al-qaida facilities, received training at an al-qaida camp, and served under al-qaida leadership in Tora Bora, AF. Detainee's pocket litter links him to significant Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) personnel and groups. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: S E C R E T // NOFORN / I

2 S E C RE T //NOFORN I I o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. o A HIGH threat from a detention perspective. o Of MEDIUM intelligence value. c. (U) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ) next to the footnote.) o (S/A{F) Detainee's intelligence value was elevated from LOW to MEDIUM. After further evaluation of available information on detainee, it is assesse detainee has more information which has not been exploited about his activities, al-qaida, and extremist training. Many of the telephone numbers in his pocket litter have been associated with multiple ACM personnel, indicating he may have played a greater role in militant activities than previously assessed. o (S/A{F) Noted that pocket litter had been translated. Previous assessment noted that RFIs had been submitted for translation. 4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S/NF) Prior History: Sometime between 1996 and 1998, detainee began religious studies at the Imam Muhammad Bin Sa'ud Islamic University in Riyadh, SA.' Between 1998 and 2000, detainee left the university and worked as a book distributor for a bookstore in Riyadh until the spring of b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel: ln May 2001, detainee traveled through the United Arab Emirates (AE) and Karachi, Pakistan (PK) to Quetta, PK, in answer to afatwa (religious ruling) issued by Shaykh Hamu^d Bin Uqla al-shuaibi calling on every Muslim to perform missionary work in Afghanistan.' While in Karachi, detainee met three Arab t 000t8s KB 0I-FEB-2002, INITIAL SCREENNG 01-JAN-2002, Analyst Note: The initial screening sheet is mistakenly dated I January As detainee was transferred to JTF-GTMO in February 2002, the actual screening date was probably 1 January Detainee stated he left school three years prior to the interview, thus the approximate years for school attendance are based off of a 2002 date for the screening. Imam Muhammad Bin Sa'ud Islamic University has been linked to exffemist activities and personnel. See TD , TRRS ^0370, Nouakchott Embassy AUG-2003 " OOOI 85 INITIAL SCREENING O I -JAN-2002 t ro4utoozg6-02, sir 08-MAR-2002, MFR 15-AUG-2002, Analyst Note: A variant of Shaykh Hamud Bin Uqla al-shuaibi is Sheikh Hamud Alaugua. Shaykh Hamud Bin Uqla al-shuaibis deceased. Al-. a S E C RE T // NOFORN / I I

3 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I r members of Jama'at Tablighi (JT),4 Sufyan al-hadrami, Abu Layth, and Abu Hija aka (Faysal al-dosari), who detainee later met again at the al-qaida sponsored al-faruq Training Camp. Detainee traveled throughout Pakistan teaching the Koran to children and a few adults at Hyderabad, Safar, and Baqar, PK. In late July 200I, detainee traveled to Kandahar, AF, to attend jihadist training at al-faruq.' c. (S/NF) -Training and Activities: In Kandahar, detainee stayed in an unidentified guesthouse.' While in the guesthouse, detainee turned over his passport, money, and personal belongings and was assigned the number ui69," with instructions to use the number when he wanted his property returned.' Around the beginning of August 2001, near the end of his stay at the guesthouse, detainee traveled to al-faruq with the three JT members he had previously met in Pakistan. At al-faruq, detainee received physical fitness training, as well as training on the AK-47 assault rifle and Makarov pistol. As a result of asthma problems, detainee departed training in approximately early September 2001, and traveled to Jalalabad, AF, for treatment. Detainee remained at the hospital in Jalalabad for three weeks (during which the events of 11 September 2001 occurred) before being released in early October 200i. Upon release from the hospital, detainee traveled to a safe house in Jalalabad where he stayed for approximately one and a half months.8 Around mid-november 2001,e detainee retreated to the surrounding mountains. Coincidentally, detainee met up once again with the three JT members who were hiding in the mountains with Johan Almeni.lo 5. (U) Capture Information: Shuaibi issuedfatawa which justified the l l September 2001 attacks on the US and asked Muslims to defend their Taliban brethren. a Analyst Note: JT is a Priority 2A Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2A TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide frnancial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2,A, terrorist groups. 5 oootg APR-2003; IIR , paragraph 2.b; IIR }3;Analyst note: A variant ofsufyan is Sohan. A variant of Lavth is Lvth. Variants of Favsal are Faisel and Faisal. A variant of Dosari is Dosarv. u IIR og7 6o:. paragiaph 2.b' 'IIR603+ ot IIR , paragraph 2.b; IIR ll43 03;TD ' Analyst Note: Jalalabad fell to coalition forces on 14 November to tn-3 t +/ , Analyst Note: Johan Almeni is assessed to be Abu Ayoub al-emarati aka (Abu Juhaina), an al- Faruq trainer and commander of Arab and Afghan troops in the Tora Bora mountain region in late Abu Juheina and detainee's three JT associates were all probably killed at Tora Bora. Abu Haija'a Faisal al-dousari in this TD is assessed to be detainee's companion Abu Hija aka (Faysal al-dosari). Detainee's companion Abu Layth is possibly Abu al-laith al-najdi Adel al-qaseer, whose name follows Dousari on the list. Sufyan al-hadrami is possibly Abu Sufyan al-jazraw whose name follows al-qaseer on the list. Abu Juhaina may be Juhaina Saba'e al- Levl. whose name is two below al-jazrawi on the list. ) S E C R E T // NOFORN I I

4 S E C RE T //NOFORN I I I ^. (S/A{F) Detainee fled Afghanistan with a group of al-qaida and Taliban fighters led by UBl-appointed military commander in Tora Bora, AF, Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-faldti aka (Ibn al-shaykh al-libi), ISN US9LY DP (LY-212). The group crossed the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in the Nangarhar region on approximately 14 December The group felt safe in the hands of their Pakistani host, who convinced them to surrender their weapons. The host then gathered the group in a mosque where Pakistani forces immediately arrested them. During transit to prison, one of the prisoners attacked a guard, leading to a struggle in which six Pakistani guards were killed and some prisoners escaped.ll Pakistani authorities.recapture detainee transferred him from Kohat, PK, to US custody on 31 December 2001.'' b. (S) Property Held: o 500 Saudi Arabian riyals (SAR) o Miscellaneous items, including an address book with phone numbers (translated), notebook paper with Arabic writing (translated), and a piece of paper with Arabic writing (translated) c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 17 January 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: o o o Pakistani and Afghan travel routes Malek Haled al-askari (King Haled) military district Imam Muhammad Bin Sa'ud Islamic Universitv in Rivadh 6. (S/NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's timeline is assessed to be a partial cover story. He failed to provide information on his activities between May and July Detainee admitted training at al-faruq, but he denied completion of training due to alleged asthma. Detainee also failed to provide information on his activities immediately following the 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee has withheld information conceming significant extremist links, which are indicated by his pocket litter. It is assesse detainee, in an effort to protect himself and others, only divulged the nanies and actions of his three associates killed at Tora Bora (Sufyan al-hadrami, Abu Layth, and Abu Hrja). Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM DP (YM-252), stated detainee had extensive medical training, " IIR , Analyst Note: Detainee is on list as Turki al-asiri; Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis;.^ Analyst Note: In TD ,LY-212 described Tora Bora and the egress " route. TD paragraph 3.D.(6) 4 S E C R E T / / NOFORN I I

5 s E c RE T / / NOFORN I I r and believed detainee might in fact be a doctor; however, detainee told YM-252 he did not want anyone to know of detainee's education or skills, and detainee has never himself mentioned receiving any medical training.l3 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al- Qaida who admitted to attending an al-qaida supported training camp and transited through known al-qaida guesthouses before occupying al-qaida positions in Tora Bora. Detainee admitted to associations with the JT and his pocket litter contained several telephone numbers linked to ACM-related individuals and groups. o (S/AIF) Reporting identified detainee as a member of al-qaida (NFI).ta Detainee received training at the al-qaida sponsored al-faruq Training Camp and stayed at al- Qaida affi liated guesthouses. o (S/AIF) In late July 2001, detainee probably resided with al-hadrami, Abu Layth, and Abu Hija at the Hajji Habash aka (al-ansar) guesthouse.'t In August 2001, after approximately one week at the guesthouse, detainee, al-hadrami, Abu Layth, Abu Hija and approximately 30 additional men (20 Arabs and 10 others) traveled by bus to the al-faruq Training Camp.16. (S/AIF) Detainee received small arms and physical training at al-fa1gq.17 Detainee stated Abu Juheina al-yemeni was the lead trainer at al-faruq.'o. (S/A{F) Detainee stated he left training early and traveled to Jalalabad seeking medical attention for his alleged recurring asthma attacks.le (Analyst Note: Leaving training early for medical reasons is a common cover story among many detainees. Detainee's medical history indicates no known asthma conditions. This is a strong indication the story is false. Detainee's actual timeline from al-faruq through Jalalabad to Tora Bora parallels Abu Juheina's " FM40 05-JAN-2005 (Part two of two) ' o. td 3 t q I , paragraph EE "IIR ,paragraph2.b; SIR20-OCT-2004;AnalystNote: In SIR08-MAR-2002, detainee stated the guesthouse was across the street from the Arabic Language Institute of Kandahar, confirming this.- is the Hajji Habash 'o guesthouse. IIR , paragraph 2.b " IIR , paragraph 2.b;TD , SIR 08-MAR-2002 tt INITIAL ScREENING 01-JAN-2002, IIR 6034 or42 02,IIR r4303 tt ApR sir 08-MAR S E C R E T // NOFORN I /

6 S E C R E T // NOFORN I / I o movements as al-qaida members abandoned al-faruq and attempted to flee Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001attacks on the US.) o (S/A{F) Detainee admitted handing over his money and belongings while staying at the guesthouse in Kandahar, stating he was given the number "169" to cite if he wanted to have his property returned.2o Detainee said the guesthouse was located across the street from the Arabic Language Institute.2l The institute was operated by senior al-qaida member and religious advisor to llbl, Mahfouz Ould al-walid aka (Abu Hafs al-mauritani;.22 lenalyst Note: It is assessed the guesthouse where detainee stayed was the Hajji Habash Guesthouse, acknowledged by other detainees as being located across the street from the Arabic Language Institute aka the (Islamic Institute). This guesthouse was used as a stopping and preparation point for trainees coming or going to the al-faruq and Abu Obeida aka (Tarnak Farm) training camps.). (S/Alrf; A variant of detainee's name was found on documents recovered during joint raids conducted with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) against al-qaida associated safe houses in Karachi, PK, in September 2}02,and in Rawalpindi, PK, in March The raids yielded information about detainee's safety deposit box, which contained a passport and a bank card. Detainee's box number was , which contains the number ui69" that detainee was given as the number to cite if he wanted to retrieve his belongings. (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Safety deposit boxes, also referred to as safety boxes or trust accounts, were simple storage compartments such as envelopes or folders guesthouse administrators used to secure an individual's personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity.) (S/A{F) It is assessedetainee participated in hostilities in Tora Bora. o (S/AfD Detainee claimed after leaving Jalalabad, he hid with al-hadrami, Abu Layth, Abu Hija, and Abu Juheina al-yemeni, in a group of approximately 100 Arabs and Afghans in the Tora Bora mountains. Detainee stated he spent three days hiding before setting off for the Pakistani border.2a (Analyst Note: Detainee is assessed to have served under Abu Juheina al-yemeni in Tora Bora. Juheina 'o IIR or4z 02 " ooor85 MFR 15-AUG-2002 " > ooo757 DIR 17-ruL-2002 " to-3t , paragraph JJ; Analyst Note: Phone numbers associated with detainee in this document retumed NFL TD , paragraph number 45. TD -3 4 I , par agr aph number 48. TD -3 4 I , paragraph number 45 2o IIR , paragraph 2.b; Analyst Note: A variant of Abu Juhein al-yemenis Johain Almeni. 6 s E c R E T // NOFORN I / r

7 S E C RE T // NOFORN I I I reportedly commanded Juheina Mountain, identified as one of a series of seven mountains or bunker areas Arab and Pakistanis defended in the Tora Bora mountain region during November and December s) o (S/AIF) Yaser Esam Himdy, ISN US9SA DP (SA-009, transferred), reported detainee stated, "I was fighting against the US government and the Northern Alliance. I do jihad against the unbelievers." SA-009 added detainee is openly hostile.26 o (S//NIF) Det?inee acknowledged answering afatwa from a radical Islamic shaykh in Saudi Arabia."' (Analyst Note: Detainee's hostile statements about the US, coupled with his acknowledged acceptance of the fatwa, point to the likelihood that detainee would continue to violently oppose the US if he were no longer in US custody.) o (S/A{F) Detainee was captured with a gro}p of individuals, including senior al-qaida commanderly-2i2, while fleeing Tora Bora.'o o (S/A{F) Detainee's name is recorded on a document listing 84 captured Taliban and al-qaida fighters, whom Pakistani forces captured after the fighters crossed the border from Nangarhar Province, AF, into Pakistan on 14 Decemb er 200I.t" (Analyst Note: This is assessed to be the group led out of Tora Bora by LY-2l2,who was captured with the group. This group was involved in the "bus incident," in which one of the prisoners attacked a guard while the group was being transported in trucks, leading to a struggle in which six Pakistani guards were killed and some prisoners escaped.30 While several senior al-qaida members claim LY-2I2 was not a member of al-qaida,ly-212 himself stated UBL personally appointed him as the military commander of Tora Bora.3l LY-212 had also previously served as a senior mujahideen trainer and the former manager of the Khaldan Training Cu-p.") o (S/A{F) A phone book in detainee's pocket litter contained at least six telephone numbers associated with extremist-related entities." (Analyst Note: Further investigation is required to fully identify the extent of detainee's association with the groups or individuals associated with these numbers.) 25 iir , IIR 'u IIR 7711 oo t TD " IIR (Twki al-asiri alias al-moatasim al-mecci), TD-314/ , Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis 'n IIR ,pangraph2-44;TD ,paragraph 29; IIR (Turki al-asiri alias al- Moatasim al-mecci) 'o IIR 7 73g , Analyst Note: Detainee is on list as Turki al-asiri; Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis; ^.AnalystNote: InTD ,LY-2l2describedToraBoraandtheegressroute. "' TD " td3rur5z6o9-05 " >IIR , MFR r5-aug-2002 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I

8 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I I o (S/A{F) Two phone numbers in detainee's phone book, and , belong to the Khan Agha Communications Company located in the Paktika Province just south of Kabul, AF.34 (Analyst Note: Detainee reported he spent time in Khowst, AF, which is the capital of Paktika Province. It is possible detainee associated with the Khan Agha tribe, known al-qaida and Taliban sympathizers, before attending training at al-faruq, offering an explanation for the 3- month gap in detainee's timeline.). (S/AIF) Thuraya phone number was discovered on a seized Taliban-associated Thuraya phone and in an ACM associated phone book.3s The number was used by Pacha Khan Zadran,who is a Khan Agha tribe leader and Afghan People's Deputy. At time of detainee's capture, Zuty was a senior ACM leader linked to numerous attacks against Coalition forces.'o ' (S/Nf; Satellite phone number is listed with the name Samir in detainee's phone book. It was also found in the possession of several suspected al-qaida operatives OIFI).37 The number is linked to Amanullah Khan Zadran, the former Afghan Interim Administration's Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs and the brother of Pacha Khan Zadran.38 The number was also found in a document listing names and numbers of possible al-qaida and Taliban sympathizers or members in Afghanistan, Pakistan, South Korea, Singapore, and United Arab Emirates." The number was also associated with narcotics smuggling activity between Pakistan and Afghanistan.a0 o (S/ {F) Thuraya number was also discovered on a seized Taliban-associated satellite phone and linked to Taliban member Matin Ustad, who ran a large narcotics lab south of Jalalabad.alAnalyst Note: If detainee has an association with Matin Ustad, he might be able to provide information on narcotics trafficking, which was the Taliban's and al-qaida's primary means for raising money in Afghanistan.) o (S/AIF) Phone number was also found in a phone book associated with currently active senior Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)a2 commander 'o >IIR tt >IIR i ro5 03, IIR 'u > TD-3 14/ , TD -3 t4 I '' >TD-314/ ,IIR ,IIR " >11zenReN) IACHA KHAN (BIo)- oiensrc 'n >IIR r oo >tn-3t+/ ot >IIR z,TD-3r4n54r4-04 a2 )Analyst Note: HIG is a Priority lb target. Priority lb targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor tenorisrn, countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests. 8 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I

9 s E c R E T // NOFORN / I JTF.GTMO-CDR Haji Gholam Mohammad Hotak. The number is also associated with Ahmad Wali Karzai, the brother of the current Afghan President Hamid Karzai.a3 o (S//l{F) The phone number was also seized from Yemeni mujahideen who entered Croatia from Bosnia in January 1996, and is associated with known al- Qaida operative Yasin Ubayd Salim al-sharif, who is assessed to be Salim al-sharif aka (Yasin ljbayd al-mari) who is currently in Saudi Arabian custody.aa Al-Sharif played a major role in smuggling SA-7 man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) into Saudi Arabia in support of UBL's plans to attack Saudi-based US military aircraft.as (Analyst Note: The fuli number may be Possible links to al-sharif indicate detainee's possible extremist activities prior to traveling to Afghanistan.) o (S//l\fF) The London, United Kingdom (UK), phone number was discovered in numerous seized phone books and phones associated with extremist-linked individuals. The number is associated with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).46 (Analyst Note: Numerous extremist links to this BBC number indicates a possible propaganda media network connection. Network analysis might provide leads to individuals with either slmrpathetic ties to extremists or possibly possessing information on ACM operations.) c. (U//FOUO) Detaineeos Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 88 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on24 December 2006, when he was reported participating in a mass disturbance by kicking his bean hole. Detainee has 17 Reports of Disciplinary Infractions for assault, with the last reported incident taking place on 1 August 2005, when he was reported pushing a guard and attempting to move him out of the way in order to shake hands with another detainee. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include inciting and participating in a mass disturbance, threatening harm toward the guard force, possession of non-weapon type contraband, use of provoking words and gestures, damage to govemment property, medication misuse or misappropriation, failure to follow instructions and camp rules, unauthorized communications, offenses requiring use of the FCE team, and tampering with the lock of his cell. Detainee has two incidents of medication misuse. On 6 March2006, detainee was reported to be in possession of 16 pills of various sizes and colors. Detainee had nine Reports of Disciplinary Infraction in 2006, and none so far in2007. o' >IIR r3i 04, IIR 7 90r , IIR * >td-314/t ot >000t32 RESEARCH sum 11-JflN-2002, DITSITM ApR-2002, (Tear Line) ou >td , IIR I 1506, IIR S E C R E T // NOFORN I I

10 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on26 February b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was urro.ru,rd with al-qaida between May and December In August2}}I, detainee stayed at the Hajji Habash Guesthouse before attending al-faruq. In October 200I, detainee probably stayed at an unidentified guesthouse in Jalalabad. In late November through mid December 2001, detainee was at Tora Bora and was captured with the group led by LY-212. c. (S/NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee's time at al-qaida guesthouses and training facilities afforded him the opportunity to leam about facility leaders, residents, trainees, operations, and visitors. His residence at the guesthouses afforded him the chance to leam about cross border operations to include egress routes, safe houses, and identities ofsupport personnel. Detainee's time in Tora Bora presented opportunity to learn tactical procedures, the identities of Taliban and al-qaida personnel, local support mechanisms, and egress procedures into Pakistan. Available information indicates detainee did not have direct access to senior members of al-qaida or Taliban, typical of the average mujahid; however, further exploitation or explanation of detainee's associated phone numbers in his pocket litter and gaps and inconsistencies in his account may provide a more accurate assessment of his role in al-qaida and intelligence value. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Hajji Habash Guesthouse o Al-Faruq trainers, trainees, visitors, and operational procedures o Paktika Province-related individuals and activities. JT support to al-qaida operations o Tora Bora personnel, defensive and egress procedures o Recruitment from mosques in Saudi Arabia 10 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I r

11 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I r 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 18 October 2004 and he remains an enemy combatant. Rear Admiral JR. Navy ' Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminolog,t. 11 s E c RE T //NOFORN I I