JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE January 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (S) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Amir Mohammed Current/True Name and Aliases: Mohammed Yakoub, Abu Abdul Rahman al-ansari, Amir Bin Yaqub, Yaqub Muhammad al-tayisha Place of Birth: Omdurman, Sudan (SU) Date of Birth: 9 May 1971 Citizenship: Sudan Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SU DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 1 April b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an admitted member of the al-qaidaassociated Lashkar-E-Tayiba (LT). 1 Detainee is also assessed to be a senior recruiter in 1 Analyst Note: The LT is the armed wing of Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), a Pakistan-based Wahhabi Sunni anti-us missionary organization formed in LT is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Counterterrorism (CT) Priority 1B target. Priority 1B targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests. CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 Sudan and is directly linked to a Sudanese al-qaida cell. In early 2002, detainee and three other individuals traveled to Pakistan (PK) intending to enter Afghanistan (AF) to participate in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. This group utilized the LT s support network to travel to Pakistan, hide from Pakistani authorities and receive training, and was captured attempting to enter Afghanistan disguised as women. Detainee is a veteran jihadist who previously participated in jihadist combat in both Afghanistan and Pakistan in the early 1990s. Detainee received militant training at a Jamaat al-dava al-quran wa Sunnah (JDQ) camp and is assessed to have received explosives training under detainee s associate, Anti- Coalition Militia (ACM) commander Ikhlas al-masri. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A LOW threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Updated information pertaining to detainee s associate 4. (U) Detainee s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee speaks Arabic, minimal English and has a working comprehension of Pashtu. In 1990, after graduating high school, 2 detainee heard a presentation at a local mosque about the JDQ led by Jamil al-rahman, and decided to join the jihad in Afghanistan. In early 1991, detainee flew from Sudan to India (IN) via Kenya. On the flight to India, detainee met a representative of the Tabligh movement who told detainee about a large Tabligh center in New Delhi, IN, where he could go for assistance. 3 Detainee misrepresented himself as an interested Tabligh candidate in order to obtain a KB 05-AUG Analyst Note: The Tabligh is assessed to be the Jamaat al-tablighi (JT). JT is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Counterterrorism (CT) Priority 2A terrorist support entities (TSE). Priority 2A TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to priority 2A terrorist groups. As an organization, the JT does not advocate violence; however, numerous extremist and terrorist organizations, including al-qaida, have exploited JT s worldwide presence to facilitate international travels. 2

3 Pakistani visa. Detainee traveled to Lahore, PK and then to Peshawar, PK, where he stayed at the Bayt Dhiyafa al-mujahid Guesthouse operated by the JDQ. 4 Two days later, detainee and approximately two dozen other Arabs traveled across the border to the Topshi Training Camp operated by Sudanese national Abu Hajir in Konar Province, AF. 5 At the training camp, detainee received one month of militant jihad training in March before traveling to the front lines. Detainee trained on the use of the AK-47 assault rifle, M-16, rocket propelled grenade (RPG), 82 mm mortar, and a piece of Soviet artillery. At the end of 1991, detainee returned to the camp and met Abu Ikhlas al-masri, an Egyptian mechanic who worked at the camp on various projects. Detainee returned to the camp for a second time in mid-1992 and stayed for approximately one year, working on miscellaneous projects with Abu Ikhlas al- Masri. Responding to a fatwa in 1993, detainee traveled to the Kashmir region for three months to participate in hostilities against Indian forces with members of the al-birq and jihad forces. Detainee returned to the Topshi Training Camp for the last time in early 1994, after traveling to Kashmir to join the LT and Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI) for jihad. Detainee spent approximately two years at the camp with Abu Ikhlas al-masri. Detainee stayed with Abu Ikhlas al-masri again from 1995 to 1996, working as an accountant for al- Masri s new concrete pillar fabrication business and helping to rebuild mosques. Pakistani authorities arrested detainee in early 1996, an event detainee attributed to political infighting within the Pakistani government. A Sudanese national named Abu Mughira, a teacher detainee met while studying the Salafist doctrine, assisted detainee in returning to Sudan in February b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee studied accounting at Sudan University of Sciences and Technology until 1999, earning a degree in accounting. 7 At that point, detainee began working as a trader in the Omdurman Suq (market). Detainee believed television broadcasts, which stated the Americans were trying to take land away from the Muslims, and it was his religious duty to protect innocent women and children. Detainee was persuaded by the broadcasts and decided to travel to Afghanistan to participate in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. 8 Detainee met Mustafa Ibrahim Mustafa al-hassan, ISN US9SU DP (SU-719), while attending Friday prayers at the Masjid al-safiya Mosque in 4 TD-314/ ; Analyst Note: Detainee was a member of the JDQ from 1991 to The guesthouse name translates to The Mujahid Guesthouse; Bayt means house, Dhiyafa is a variant spelling for the Arabic word for guesthouse. 5 Analyst Note: The Topshi camp is not further identified, but Asadabad in Konar Providence, was held by mujahideen fighters in A variant to Topshi is Tupchi. 6 TD-314/ , KB 07-AUG-2002, SIR 20-AUG-2004, SIR 31-AUG-2004, SIR 26-OCT KB 05-AUG-2002, FM40 18-NOV FM40 18-NOV-2003, TD-314/ ; Analyst Note: In his initial custodial interviews, detainee claimed his travel to Pakistan was for studying Islam. Detainee later broke his cover story and reported his true intentions. See TD-314/ and TD-314/ for more information. 3

4 Khartoum, SU. In January 2002, Hazib, a mutual friend of detainee and SU-719 from the Masjid Safiya Mosque, passed along a message to SU-719 that Hazib had arrived in Pakistan. At that point in time, SU-719 departed for Afghanistan. Detainee applied for and obtained a passport, then traveled to Lahore via Syria and Qatar carrying approximately $500 US. 9 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: From Lahore, detainee continued to Peshawar and met with SU-719. Detainee s suitcases were stolen along with his spare clothes, some currency, and his passport. In early March 2002, detainee began questioning individuals about travel to Afghanistan. Detainee and SU-719 were instructed to find someone who would be willing to drive them to Parachinar, PK, and then cross into Afghanistan. SU-719 called two acquaintances in Karachi, PK, Anthony Kiyemba, ISN US9UG DP (UG- 701, transferred), and Muhammad al-amin Sidi Muhammad, ISN US9MR DP (MR- 706, transferred), and explained the plan. UG-701 and MR-706 traveled to Peshawar and the group stayed at a mosque in Bara, PK (near Peshawar), while attempting to find transport to Parachinar. One morning, detainee hailed a cab and promised the driver 5,000-6,000 Pakistani rupees to drive the four to Parachinar (U) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) On 19 March 2002, LT facilitator Abu Bakr drove detainee, UG-701, MR-706, and SU-719 toward Parachinar where they intended to rendezvous with other mujahideen and travel to Afghanistan for jihad. At the time, three members of the group wore burkas (a head-to-toe covering used to shield the face and features of females) to hide their identities from authorities. At a checkpoint, the Arabs were asked to exit the vehicle and lower their head coverings for inspection by a female Pakistani officer. The group was subsequently detained on 19 March Detainee was transferred to US custody in Kandahar, AF, after approximately eight weeks in Pakistani custody. 12 b. (S) Property Held: Republic of Sudan passport, with a Pakistan visa issued 20 December 2001 Passenger ticket and baggage ticket from Sudan Airways 9 TD-314/ , TD-314/ TD-314/ , TD-314/ ; Analyst Note: Although detainee claimed his passport was stolen, it is in US custody. 11 TD-314/ , TD-314/ TD-314/ , KB 05-AUG-2002, TD-314/ , TD-314/ , IIR ; Analyst Note: At least eight jihadists, including some in detainee s group, left Karachi following the death of US journalist Daniel Pearl believing association with the LT would place them in jeopardy from the fallout of Pearl s death. Several LT members arrested as a result of Pearl s death possessed fraudulent passports belonging to members of detainee s group. 4

5 Money 13 1,500 Pakistani rupees 1 Qatar riyal 6,600 Sudanese dinars 900 Syrian pounds Casio model A-159W watch c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 5 August 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: The Ansar al-suna al-mohamadia non-governmental organization (NGO) in Syria The Jamat al-dawa al-quran Wa Suna NGO in Afghanistan The Topshi jihadist training camp in the Konar Province The hostilities in the Kashmir region in the latter half of 1993 Internet websites used to spread information about significant Muslim-related activities and news about jihad and mujahideen fighters around the world 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee s Account: Detainee is forthcoming regarding his answering the call of jihad. Detainee has been fairly forthright in describing his jihadist activities beginning in 1990, including his relationships with Islamic extremist groups and individuals. Detainee admitted his original cover story, the one still espoused by his travel companion SU-719, was a fraud. 14 However, detainee downplays the depth of his training and areas of expertise and has probably withheld information of his activities and associates in the late 1990s through early (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is an admitted member of the LT. Detainee traveled to Pakistan in 2002 admittedly to participate in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Detainee and the group with which he was captured utilized the LT s support network to travel to Pakistan, hide from Pakistani authorities and receive training prior to their attempt to enter Afghanistan. Detainee is a veteran jihadist who fought in the Soviet Jihad along with the JDQ in the early 1990s. Detainee is assessed to be a 13 Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $76 US FM40 17-APR

6 senior recruiter in Sudan and is directly linked to a Sudanese al-qaida cell. Detainee received militant training at a JDQ camp and is assessed to have received explosives training under detainee s associate, ACM commander Ikhlas al-masri. (S//NF) Detainee is an acknowledged LT member and associate of the JDQ. The LT facilitated detainee s travels to and within Pakistan. (S//NF) Detainee stated in 1993 he joined MDI/LT and went to the Kashmir region to participate in jihadist combat. Detainee stated MDI/LT was directly involved in providing transport and safe haven to Arabs committed to joining anti-us resistance groups operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. 15 Detainee noted the MDI and LT are the same organization. 16 (S//NF) The LT is the armed wing of the MDI. LT was banned by the Pakistani government in 2002 and subsequently changed its name to Jamaat ul Dawa (Jud). In 2005, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) ordered the cessation of attacks in Kashmir and cut the operational funds to the LT and other Kashmir-focused terrorist groups, but the LT continues to conduct and support attacks outside of Kashmir including Afghanistan. 17 (S//NF) In Pakistan, the LT network facilitated detainee, SU-719, MR-706, and UG-701. The LT assisted detainee and his associates in their 2002 attempt to enter Afghanistan for jihad against US and Coalition forces. 18 The LT also operated the safe houses at which the group hid and provided AK-47 training to UG-701 and MR- 706 as they had not attended small arms training. 19 SU-719 reported it was detainee who procured the burkas and brought the driver of the vehicle for their trip to Afghanistan. 20 (S//NF) Zayn al-abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ DP (GZ-10016), said the operational association between al- Qaida and LT began after October 2001 when the LT assisted al-qaida personnel escape from Afghanistan into Pakistan. 21 (S//NF) Both detainee and SU-719 claimed they received Pakistani visas, airfare to Pakistan and $1,500 US from al-sir before leaving Sudan. 22 Al-Sir is a LT 15 TD-314/ MFR 29-May For additional information on the LT see PACOM JIOC IB LT Financial Network 22-Nov-2007, Lashkar-e- Tayyibah PAK T, and IIR KB 07-AUG-2002, TD-314/ IIR TD-314/ TD-314/ Analyst note: A variant of al-sir is al-seer 6

7 facilitator who collected donations at mosques in Khartoum to help finance travel for jihad recruits. 23 (S//NF) Prior to the attempt by detainee s group to enter Afghanistan, SU-719 traveled to Malaysia in probable support of the MDI/LT network. 24 (Analyst Note: Additional information regarding SU-719 s trip to Malaysia and associations with detainee and al-qaida are available in the SCI supplement. 25 ) (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged associating with the JDQ beginning in 1991 and fought during the Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan. 26 JDQ is reported to be an offshoot of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), having split off during the 1980s in an effort to align itself with the Arab nations espousing Wahhabism and Salafism. In 2007, the JDQ leader Mullah Hayatullah (identified as the brother of Haji Sahib Rohullah Wakil, ISN US9AF DP) coordinated with HIG to carry out operations targeting US and Afghan military forces in Konar and Nuristan provinces, 27 (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a senior recruiter in Sudan. (S//NF) Adel Hassan Hamid Abdul al-mutlib, ISN US9SU (transferred), reported detainee was the leader of an unidentified Salafist group. 28 (S//NF) An unidentified source stated a Sudanese emir (leader or commander) recruited him to join the jihad against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. The source described the emir as a black Sudanese who spoke Arabic, 72 inches tall with a large build, thinning black hair, a black mustache and a thin, short black beard. The source stated the emir recruited Muslims in a market located in the Omdurman area of Khartoum and directed the recruits to meet with a Sudanese national known only as al-sir. Al-Sir provided passports and travel via Syrian Airlines and then directed the recruit to make contact with the office of MDI/LT in Peshawar upon arrival in Pakistan. 29 (Analyst Note: Detainee s physical characteristics and background match those described by the source almost exactly. The emir being referenced to is assessed to be detainee. Al-Sir is detainee s acknowledged MDI/LT facilitator in Sudan.) (S//NF) Detainee is directly linked to Sudanese al-qaida cell member Imad Addin Mahmud Ahmad al-sudani aka (Abu Hasem al-sudani). (S//NF) Detainee stated Imad Abu Hasem recruited him in the early 1990s to participate in the Soviet Jihad. 30 (Analyst Note: Additional information on the 23 TD-314/ , TD-314/ , SIR 20-AUG TD-314/ TD-314/ TD-314/ , FM40 17-APR-2004, MFR 06-AUG Spartan S2X HUMSUM 21-Apr Aug IIR , TD-314/ TD-314/

8 background and information pertaining to Hasem s MDI/LT association is available in the SCI supplement.) (S//NF) MR-706 stated he was in Iran in December 2001 with three other jihadists traveling to Pakistan to contact Mustafa (SU-719) and continue to Afghanistan. Abu Hasem was one of the individuals with MR (S//NF) According to the Sudanese Intelligence Bureau (SIB), Abu Hasem is an al-qaida operative and an associate of Sudanese al-qaida cell leader Hafiz Mir Ghani Abd al-farah Khalafallah aka (Abu Yahia). 32 Abu Hasem intended to implement a kidnapping operation against US citizens and other nationals located in the Jabal Nuwabah area of Sudan. Abu Hasem planned to use the hostages to influence the US campaign against Iraq and exchange them for detainees held at JTF-GTMO. 33 (Analyst Note: Abu Hasem s cell reportedly conducted preoperational surveillance of targets.) (S//NF) Detainee received militant training at a JDQ camp and is assessed to have received explosives training. (S//NF) In early 1991, detainee received militant training at the JDQ Topshi Camp located outside of Asadabad, Konar Province, AF. Detainee trained on the use of the AK-47 assault rifle, M-16, rocket propelled grenade (RPG), 82 mm mortar, anti-aircraft weapons, and a Russian cannon. Detainee then fought against the Russian backed government in Afghanistan and the Indians in Kashmir. 34 After a SCUD missile struck his camp, detainee went to the Checkari area where detainee received limited training on the T-54 tank. 35 (Analyst Note: There is no other reporting on the Topshi Camp, and it may be identifiable with the JDQ s Abdallah Ibn Masoud Training Camp in Konar. 36 ) (S//NF) Detainee stated between 1992 and 1996, he spent approximately three years working on projects for Abu Ikhlas al-masri in the Topshi Training Camp. Ikhlas is a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and currently commands foreign fighters in the Konar Province. 37 (S//NF) Abu Ikhlas was involved in an attack against US forces in Konar in Ikhlas fabricated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and remote- 31 TD-314/ TD-314/ , TD-314/ ; Analyst Note: A variant of Mir Ghani Abd al-farah is Mirghani Abd al- Furhat. 33 TD-314/ TD-314/ , FM40 17-APR-2004, MFR 06-AUG FM40 17-APR-2004; Analyst Note: The Checkari area is probably identifiable as the town of Chaghasaray in Konar Province. In April 1991, the Russian-backed Najibullah government fired SCUD missiles against mujahideen fighters near Asadabad. 36 TRRS KB 07-AUG-2002, Abu Ikhlas INTSUM 16-Sep-2002, TD-314/ , 38 TD-314/

9 controlled improvised explosive devices (RCIEDs) used by al-qaida and Taliban fighters throughout Afghanistan. 39 Past reporting linked Ikhlas to MANPADS acquisition, and one report indicated Ikhlas was personally responsible for the June 2005 downing of a US helicopter in Afghanistan. 40 As of late November 2007, four al-qaida, Taliban, and HIG commanders in the Konar Province operated subordinate to Abu Ikhlas al-masri. 41 (S) Analyst Note: No reporting explicitly ties detainee to explosives training. However, due to Abu Ikhlas explosives expertise and detainee s long-term subordination directly to Ikhlas at a training camp, detainee is assessed to have received explosives training. Detainee was captured with a Casio A159W watch which supports the assessment that he received explosives training. (U//FOUO) The possession of a Casio F-91W model watch (or the silvercolor version of this model, the A159W), is an indicator of al-qaida training in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). A JTF-GTMO detainee identified the Casio watch as the sign of al-qaida, [which] uses the watch to make bombs. The Casio was known to be given to the students at al-qaida bomb-making training courses in Afghanistan, at which the students received instruction in the preparation of timing devices using the watch. Approximately one-third of the JTF-GTMO detainees that were captured with these models of watches have known connections to explosives, either having attended explosives training, having association with a facility where IEDs were made or where explosives training was given, or having association with a person identified as an explosives expert. 42 c. (S//NF) Detainee s Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a LOW threat from a detention perspective. Detainee s overall behavior has been mostly compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has four Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 9 October 2007, when he started a group prayer in an unauthorized location. Detainee has no Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include failure to follow instructions and camp rules, altering government property, and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, detainee had a total of one Report of Disciplinary Infraction and none so far in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: 39 IIR , IIR , TD-314/ TD-314/ ,TD-314/ , TD- 314/ , 41 CJSOTF-A_INTSUM_04-DEC-2007; Analyst Note: HIG is a NIPF CT Priority 1B target. 42 For additional details see MFR 24-APR-2002, Casio Watch Electronic Analysis Report 19-Aug-2004, Casio Watches and Relationship to Detainees 20-Apr

10 a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee s most recent interrogation session occurred on 15 March b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee has been a committed jihadist for most of his adult life. In 1991, detainee first gained combat experience fighting the Najibullah government in Afghanistan. Detainee has an extended history with MDI/LT since at least 1993, and participated in hostilities against Indian forces in Kashmir in the early 1990s. These experiences afforded detainee direct access to facilitators of MDI/LT in Sudan and Pakistan. Some of these connections are dated; however, detainee s connection to Abu Ikhlas al-masri is still relevant. Detainee received three years of tutoring from an identified al-qaida explosives expert. Detainee s coordinated travel to Pakistan with other Sudanese jihadists indicated his enduring connection to extremist networks until his capture. While some intelligence indicates detainee recruited other mujahideen in Sudan, reporting does not indicate detainee served in a combat leadership or operational planning capacity. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee s jihadist experiences in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sudan over the prior 13 years make him extremely knowledgeable on how jihadists are recruited, trained and controlled in the field of battle. Much of detainee s personal history has already been documented and exploited. While detainee had extended and first hand access to Abu Ikhlas al-masri, detainee was last with Ikhlas in Konar Province over a decade ago. Detainee is assessed to have knowledge of explosive training and can possibly shed insight on some of Abu Ikhlas s techniques, tactics, and procedures. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: LT/MDI organization Knowledge of LT/MDI activities in Malaysia Pakistani-based extremist elements Al-Qaida and ACM members Abu Ikhlas al-masri 10

11 s E c R E T // NOFORN I Guantartamo Detainee, ISN US9SU DP (S) 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 15 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. Vln- I /--).,,.,,1",/ \'ft/r,hal Ir/l t //t t/./ /\r1z' MARK H. BUZBY.) Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding ' Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence ll/arning Terminologt. 1 1 l l S E C RE T // NOFORN I I