DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360

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1 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE luly 2007 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southem Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL (S//NF") Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Abdul Bukhary o Aliases and Current/True Name: Abd al-hakim Abd al- Karim Amin Bukhari. Abd al-maqueeb Bukhary. Abu Yusef al-jazzera. Abu Yusef al-mekki o Place of Birth: Mecca. Saudi Arabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 13 February 1956 o Citizenship: Saudi Arabia o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-OOO493DP (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: ^. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessedetainee as Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on22 July b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a long-time member of al- Qaida since its inception. Detainee is a veteran jihadist, having participated in the Soviet- Afghan War in the early 1990s, and possibly traveling to Bosnia and considering travel to Chechnya. Detainee has acknowledged attending multiple training camps and associating with numerous extremists. Detainee was possibly associated with the non-govemmental CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: S E C R E T //NOFORN / I

2 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I organization Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) and its Saudi Arabia-based financier.' JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies o A HIGH threat from a detention perspective o Of HIGH intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by F next to the footnote.) o Added reporting of detainee's membership in al-qaida o Added information about detainee's affiliation with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (rmu) o Clarified capture statement 4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliabilify. a. (S//ND Prior History: Detainee attended nine years of formal schooling. In 1977,he began working for Aramco Oil Company on rigs offshore of Saudi Arabia.2 In 1978, detainee traveled to Iran to look for women.' In 1979, detainee traveled to England for two months to learn English. Upon his return to Saudi Arabia, detainee assisted his father with the family property rental business until 1998.* In 1982, detainee traveled to the US, making stops in Cincinnati, Ohio (OH); Pennsylvania; Daytona Beach, Florida (FL); Orlando, FL; atrd N"* York City, New York (NY).t In 1985 or 1986, while in Jeddah, SA, detainee met two members of Jamaat Tablighi (JT)." At some point, detainee traveled with a third JT member to Amman, Jordan, for 40 days. Seven to 10 days after detainee's return from Jordan, he borrowed money from his father to travel to Lahore, Pakistan (PK). One of the JT I Analyst Note: BIF is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 3 TSEs support entities that are considered to be anti-us but are not included in Priorities I or 2, or organizations that provide witting operational support to Priority 3 terrorist groups. 'IIR ooo+93 srr r4-ocr-2004 o IIR t sir l5-aug-zoos,00493 sir 07-sEP Analyst Note: JT is a NIPF CT Priority 2A TSE. Priority 24, TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2,A, terrorist groups. 1- s E c R E T / / NOFOR I / I

3 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I members procured detainee's visa for Pakistan, after which detainee and another Saudi traveled to Lahore. They stayed in Pakistan for a month and then traveled to New Delhi, India (N), where they stayed at JT headquarters in Nizam-e-Alden for a month. While in New Delhi, detainee was introduced to the leader of the JT and asked to make a life commitment to the organization. Detainee told JT that he needed to think about it because he did not want to commit his life to servitude, pilgrimage, and missionary work. Detainee returned to Lahore for two weeks and then traveled to Saudi Arabia.' In the late 1980s and early 1990s, detainee visited Pakistan and Afghanistan.8 While he was in Pakistan, detainee attended Sada Training Camp outside Peshawar, PK and Formidu, aka (al-fata), aka (Badr Camp), outside Jalalabad, AF.e In 1994, detainee attempted to travel to Chechnya via Turkey for Jihad. Detainee traveled back to Saudi Arabia and later changed his mind about jihad in Chechnya.lo In 1998, detainee worked for the Intercontinental Hotel in Taif, SA.r I In _ approximat ely 1999, detainee opened a building contractor company with his brother.12 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In August 2001, having decided to travel to Pakistan to obtain laser eye surgery, detainee called Khalid Gulam Baloushi, a veteran jihadist detainee met during the hajj before the 1991 Gulf War, and asked him about attending training. Khalid told detainee to go to Karachi, PK, and check into the Dubai Hotel, which detainee did. However, a short time later detainee checked into the Metropol Hotel because of poor conditions at the Dubai Hotel. Based on a doctor referral from the hotel, detainee obtained eye surgery. I(halid notified detainee to expect a visitor, and two days later Abu Omar came to detainee's room and asked him if he was ready to go to Kandahar, AF. Detainee checked out of the hotel and was taken to a house in a nearby village, where detainee selected a kunya (alias) and prepared to travel to Kandahar the next duy.t' The next day, detainee flew to Quetta, traveled to the Afghan border, crossbd and went on to Spin Boldak, AF. From there, detainee traveled on to Kand ahar.ta In Kandahar, prior to traveling to the al-faruq Training Camp, detainee resided in the al-nibras Guesthouse. While detainee stayed at al-nibras, Usama Bin Laden (UBL) arrived and gave a speech on the importance of jihad.'5 ' oooqg z MFR 02-AU G -2002, AU G t sir 07-sEp-2004, sir 29-sEp-2004, ooo493 sir 05-Nov-2004, sir l2-nov-2004 n Sada Camp referenced in SIR 14-OCT-2004, SIR 28-OCT-2004; Formidu camp referenced in srr 22-FEB-2005 'o ooo493 sir 22-FEB-2005 " ooo493 sir o9-jlrn-2005 tt IIR Analyst Note: Detainee chose Abu Yousef ashis kunya during this time. 'o IIR tt IIR , Analyst Note: Al-Nibras Guesthouse is also known as Nabras Madafa and the Haji Habash Guesthouse (see also IIR ). 3 S E C R E T // NOFORN / /

4 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: When detainee arrived at al-faruq in August 2001, he was requested to surrender his passport.16 Detainee was very sick and stayed at al-faruq for only one day and then departed. He traveled to Karachi for surgery for his hemorrhoids and laser eye surgery before returning to Saudi Arabia.lT Detainee spent approximately two weeks in Taif and then traveled to Amman to visit the missionaries at the Masjad Alnur, variant (al-nur Mosque), for spiritual growth. After the events of I I September 2001, detainee heard the call by Afghan officials for all Afghans to wage war against Christianity and the Americans, and decided to travel to Afghanistan to support the Taliban against the Americans.t8 Detainee traveled to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, paid an Afghan soldier $500 US to enter Afghanistan, and traveled to Spin Boldak. From Spin Boldak, detainee traveled to the al-nibras Guesthouse in Kandahar. Detainee was taken to another guesthouse, where he surrendered his passport and the money he was carrying. Detainee traveled to another guesthouse and remained there for five days before a Yemeni came and advised that the day "may be the start of the war." Detainee volunteered with nine other people to go to the Kandahar Airport. Detainee arrived at the airport in October 2001 and rernained for approximately four days, standing guard positions around and meeting with individuals at locations within the perimeter.re 5. (U) Capture Information: u. (S/A{F) Detainee stated that in October 2001, al-qaida forces arrested him on suspicion of espionage.'o Al-qaida interrogated and tortured him at an undisclosed location before incarcerating him in the Taliban's Sarpooza Political Prison in Kandahar. Detainee was at Sarpooza Prison when forces aligned with the Coalition took control and subsequently transferred foreign prisoners over to US control.2t Detainee's initial screening by US forces took place on 24January 2002 lnkandahar.22 'u IIR 4 2ot '7 ooo493 sir o8-sep-2005 't ooo I5-AUG-2002 'n r5-aug-2002, IIR 4 2ot 'oiir4 20r " MFR I9-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: On 24 November 2001, forces under command of pro-coalition Afghan warlord Gul Agha Shirazai encountered fivei Arabs, whom Shirazai's forces suspected of being associated with UBL, at a checkpoint outside Takhteh Pol, AF, not far from Kandahar. A firefight ensued, resulting in three of the Arabs being killed and two captured. The Arabs captured alive were Salim Ahmed Salim Hamdan, ISN US9YM DP (YM-la9); and Said Boujaadia, ISN US9MO DP (MO-150). One of the captured Arabs was carrying a passport bearing a name closely matching detainee's: Abd al-hakim Abd al-karim Bihamin Bukhari. The passport contains entry and exit stamps that exactly match detainee's timeline in August and September 2001, including his travel to Pakistan and Jordan (see TD-314/ , TD ). It is unclear how detainee's passport ended up with YM-149 and MO-l50 when they were captured. " INITIAL ScREENING 24-JAN s E c R E T // NOFORN I I

5 S E C R E T // NOFORN / I b. (S) Property Held: None held at JTF-GTMO. Pocket litter not held bv JTF-GTMO o Money:. $2,400 us. 7,000 Saudi riyals (SAR)23. 2,200 Pakistani rupees (PKR)24 o Saudi passport, number C s o Scraps of paper containing Iranian, UK, and Pakistani phone numbers and associated names o A red notebook, containing only the Pakistani mobile phone number o Miscellaneous items, including a photo, a watch, letters, papers containing computer diagrams and instructions, English language drills'' c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 13 February 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: Detainee's file does not indicate why he was sent to JTF-GTMO. 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee admitted that he provided information in a deliberately misleading manner in order to receive incentives from his debriefers.28 Detainee uses known counter-interrogation techniques in attempts to withhold incriminating information. Detainee has given varying accounts of his medical reasons for entering Pakistan. Detainee has acknowledged his travels, jihadist intentions, and additional periods of training, but has failed to detail the level of his exposure to and participation with al- Qaida and its senior leadership. 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US. its interests and allies. 23 Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $1,870 US. 2a Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $34 US. " to -3 r 4 r s r23 5 -o r, AFGp , AFGp ooo92 26 Analyst Note: This phone number was also found in the pocket litter of YM-149 and,mo-150 when they were captured by Afghan forces on 24 November 2001 (see TD-314/0561 l-02).,'' TD-314t '8 ooo+93 sir l6-aug S E C R E T // NOFORN / I

6 S E C R E T // NOFORN I / b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a long-time member of al-qaida. Detainee is a veteran jihadist, having participated in the Soviet-Afghan War in the early 1990s, and possibly traveling to Bosnia and considering travel to Chechnya. Detainee has acknowledged attending multiple training camps and associating with numerous extremists. Detainee is possibly associated with the BIF and its Saudi-based financier and US-based director. o (S/A{F) Detainee is assessed to be a long-time member of al-qaida. o (S/A{F) Jawad Jabber Sadkhan, ISN US9IZ DP (IZ-433), identified detainee as one of the original founders of al-qaida and noted detainee had previously worked with Abdullah Azzam.2e o (S/A{F) Abbas Abed Romi al-naely, ISN US9IZ DP (IZ-758), stated detainee was a member of al-qaida since Detainee was a leader and one of the advisors for UBL. Detainee associated with leaders, including Abdullah Azzarn, and Abu al-khattab, who commanded al-qaida forces in Chechnya until his death in IZ-758 also stated that detainee had knowledge of the 1 I September 2001 attacks in the United States. but mav have heard of them while detainee was in a Taliban prison.3o. (S/A{F) Detainee acknowledged meeting with UBL in 2001 and discussing a speech by UBL. Detainee claimed that prior to UBL becoming famous and assuming the role of the leader of the mujahideen, detainee had a meal with him in Peshawar.3l. (S/AIF) Detainee admitted knowledge of UBL's personal operations. Detainee stated that from the beginning (a probable reference to UBL's participation in Afghanistan) a prominent Saudi Arabian shaykh named Shafira al-farai did not agree with UBL. Al-Farai gave advice to UBL and told him not to get involved in Pakistan. The shaykh, according to the detainee, also told UBL that he should take his offices out of Pakistan and put them in Iran, with UBL agreeing to do so in June or July (Analyst Note: While the statements of UBL agreeing to move his operations from Pakistan to Iran are not deemed credible, the detainee indicates he has a close association with UBL by providing insight into the associations and apparent conversations between UBL and Saudi religious figures. Though not conclusive, this, combined withiz-433's andiz- 'n 000q33 SIR 02-MAY-2006, Analyst Note: Abdullah Azzam was UBL's mentor. Prior to the establishment of al- Qaida and Azzam's subsequent assassination, Azzam and UBL operated the Maktab al-khadimat, "Services Offices" in Peshawar, for mujahideen traveling to Afghanistan. Al-Qaida was formed following a split between UBL and Abdullah Azzam. 'o >ooo758 sir l3-nov-2006 " sir 08-ocr- 2004, o0o4g3 sir 25 -ApR ' ooo493 sir 03-JUN S E C R E T //NOFORN / I

7 s E c R E T // NOFORN 's statements, indicates a potential association with UBL from the early days of al-qaida.) o (S/A{F) Detainee was arrested by al-qaida forces for suspected espionage and held in the Taliban's Sarpooza Political Prison. ' (S/AIF) IZ-433 stated UBL put detainee in prison due to a disagreement about the transfer of money to Taliban commander Jumabay. This transfer was conducted without the knowledge of UBL who believed it was a plan for a coup against him.33 (Analyst Note: Jumabay is assessed to be a phonetic rendering of the name Jumaboy Namagani, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which is affiliated with al-qaida and the Taliban. Detainee's handling of money for the IMU indicates a possible leadership position or position of trust. His imprisonment was apparently response to a violation of that trust.) ' (S/A{F) Abd al-rahim Abd al-razaaqjanko, ISN US9SY DP (SY- 489), stated detainee was arrested by the Taliban at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border on suspicion of being a spy and brought to the Sarpooza Political Prison in Kandahar. SY-489 claimed that when detainee arrived at the prison, he had not been beaten by al-qaida and had $100 US in his possession. SY-489 stated the fact detainee had not been beaten was very unusual.3a (Analyst Note: SY-489's claim contradicts detainee's own account, in which detainee states that he was tortured before arriving at the Sarpooza Prison.35 If SY-489's statement is accurate, it may support the assertion that detainee was a long-time, respected member of al-qaida, who was treated differently than other suspected spies.) ' (S/A{F) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM DP (YM-252); Ahmad Saddiq Turkistani Saddiq, ISN US9SA DP (SA-491, transferred); and Aiat Nasimovich Vahitov, ISN US9RS DP (RS-492, transferred), all stated detainee was placed in prison by al-qaida or the Taliban for suspicion of being a spy.36 SA-491 and RS-492 were both at Sarpooza Prison with detainee. ' (S/A{F) Senior al-qaida facilitator Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-hajj aka (Riyadh the Facilitator), ISN PK9YM-00 I 457DP (YM- 1457), photo-identifi ed detainee, stating that detainee aroused suspicion while in Afghanistan because of his actions and was suspected of being a Saudi Arabian intelligence agent.3l " SIR 02-MAY-2006, Analyst Note: The IMU is a NPIF CT Priority 18 CT target. Priority lb targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests. to TRRS-04- l , HANDNOTE 29-MAR ooo493 MFR r9-feb FM40 r5-mar-2005, IIR , IIR IIR o22o os 7 S E C R E T // NOFORN / I

8 S E C R E T //NOFORN / I o (S/A{F) According toym-252, detainee arrived at al-faruq Training Camp unescorted and began asking questions. YM-252 stated that detainee was unknown to anyone at al-faruq and did not have a facilitator.38 (Analyst Note: It is unlikely that detainee could simply arrive at al-faruq Training Camp, located about 2 hours away from Kandahar, without a facilitator, unless he was familiar with the route and would be recognized enough to be accepted when he arrived. YM-252's statement that the detainee was unknown may only refer toym-252's own knowledge.) o (S/A{F) Detainee traveled for jihad multiple times and received basic and advanced training at multiple al-qaida affiliated cu-ps.'n o (C//REL TO USA, GCTF) Detainee admitted staying with the IMU in Peshawar for three weeks sometime in 1985 or Detainee stated that around that time, the IMU joined with UBL to fight against the Soviets. Detainee stated that there was an IMU training camp near Peshawar.a0 ' (S/A{F) Detainee stated that he was in the Konar Province, AF, in 1988 or 1989 during the Soviet-Afghan War.ar SY-489 also stated detainee worked with the Arab mujahideen on his first visit to Afghanistan.a2 o (S/A{F) While in Pakistan in 1992, detainee attended the Sada Training Camp outside Peshawar.a3 ' (S/A{F) In the founding minutes of al-qaida (found in the possession of BIF director Enaam Arnaout in the US), UBL and the other members, including Abu Ubaydah al-banshiri, laid the foundations for the establishment of the Sada Training Camp. a Detainee has also stated he received training at the Sada camp in 1987 or 19884s, which is the approximate time when al-qaida was created. (Analyst Note: It is unclear whether detainee trained twice at the Sada Camp, or if the differences in dates are detainee's attempt to withhold or confuse information.) o (S//NF) Detainee stated that in approximately 1992, detainee attended training at Khaldan Camp for three weeks. Detainee trained on 82mm mortars, anti-aircraft guns, Uzis, the M16, pistols, and the AK-47 assault rifle. Detainee stated that he met 38 IIR e >IIR o27g oj oo >IIR ooo4 07 ot ooo493 sir o6-jun-2006 o2 ooo489 HANDNoTE 29-MAR-2002 a3 Analyst Note: Sada Camp referenced in SIR I4-OCT-2004, SIR 28-OCT-2004; Formidu camp referenced in SIR 22-FEB-2005 aa usarnaoutl0603prof o5iir4 20r S E C R E T / / NOFORN / /

9 S E C R E T / / NOFORN I I Abu Ubaydah at this time, and that Abu Ubaydah transported him and other trainees to training.a6. (S/A{F) Detainee stated that trainees who were with him in Khaldan traveled from there to Bosnia to fight. Although detainee claims to have traveled home to Saudi Arabia after training in Khaldan,aT convicted terrorist conspirator Enaam M. Arnaout stated that an Abdul Hakim (assessed to be detainee) held a position with the BIF in Bosnia in Abdul Hakim had previously traveled inside Bosnia at an unspecified time with BIF financier Adel Batterjee. Arnaout stated he knew Abdul Hakim from Pakistan and added that Abdul Hakim had previously been employed by ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia.a8 (Analyst Note: Detainee has acknowledged working for ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia,ae traveled to Pakistan, and received training with mujahideen who subsequently traveled to Bosnia, supporting the assessment that he was associated with the BIF in Bosnia in 1992.) o (S//NF) Detainee stated he attended the Formidu pamp, aka (al-fata Camp), aka (Badr Camp), outside of Jalalabad in the early 1990s.s0 o (S/AIF) Detainee stated that in 1998, he spent about two weeks at an Uzbek Camp in the Hayatabab area of Peshawar.5l Detainee stated his group traveled to the north of Afghanistan to join the other Uzbek mujahideen on the Uzbek line." o (S/AIF) In March or April of 2001, while at an al-qaida training camp at Kandahar Airport, detainee saw a Yemeni explosives expert teaching a class on improvised explosive devices.s3 o (S/AIF) In August 2001, detainee claimed to have traveled to the al-faruq Training Camp and stayed one day. Detainee claimed he became very sick when in Afghanistan and departed al-faruq and traveled to Karachi for laser surgery and rur:g"ry on his hemorrhoids. Detainee then traveled back to Saudi Arabia.sa (Analyst Note: The passport containing detainee's name that was captured on24 November 2001 by Afghan forces contains an entry stamp into Karachi on 5 August, and an exit nu SIR 03-JIIN-2005, SIR 08-OCT-2004, Analyst Note: It is assessed that detainee's associate Abu Ubaydah is Abu Ubaydah al-banshiri, a former al-qaida military commander from Egypt who drowned in Lake Victoria sometime in the late 1990s. Al-Banshiri is connected to the East African US embassies bombings in Detainee noted he last saw Abu Ubaydah in It is not clear from the report if detainee acknowledged going to Bosnia, but he has reported on numerous other indivjduals who were in Bosnia. o' 0oo4g3 sir 03-JUN-2005, sir 14-ocr-2004 a8 usarnaoutl0603prof, Analyst Note: Batterjee is on a US Treasury list of Specially Designated Individuals, identifying individuals who are tied to terrorist financing activities. nn IIR ooo493 sir 22-FEB-2005 tt ooo493 sir ol-aug-2005 t' ooo493 sir o4-aug ooo493 sir l9-may-2005 to ooo493 sir o8-sep S E C R E T // NOFORN I /

10 s E c R E T //NOFORN I I stamp from Karachi on 20 August This is likely the period when detainee traveled to al-faruq.) ' (S/AIF) YM-1457 confirmed that he received detainee in Pakistan and brought detainee to Afghanistan and that detainee refused to stay at the camp. YM-1457 also had met detainee on another occasion when he facilitated detainee's travel to Lahore for medical treatment.ss lanalyst Note: YM-l457's account of detainee's travel to Lahore is probably related to detainee's claimed travel to Karachi for surgery.) o (S/A{F) Detainee was able to describe the Tarnak Farms camp, aka (Abu Ubaydah Camp), which was a camp approximately 15 to 20 minutes from the airport that provided weapons training. Detainee stated other jihadists told him that poisons and chemical training was also conducted at this camp.'o o (S/A{F) Detainee has employed counter interrogation techniques, including providing vacillating stories, in a possible atternpt to confuse or hide his ties to other information, activities, and individuals. o (S/A{F) Detainee gave conflicting dates of his attendance at the Sada Camp. Detainee claimed he stayed a few months in Jalalabad and attended training at the Sada Camp.tt Detainee stated that in l994,he againvisited the Sada training camp. In 1995, ditainee left the camp and returned to Saudi Arabia.58 Detainee stated he trained at Sada Camp in Peshawar for approximately one month.5e As previously noted, detainee has also stated he received training at the Sada camp in 1987 or 1ggg.60 o (S/A{F) Detainee has both admitted and denied knowing al-qaida member named al-suri. Detainee identified an individual named al-suri, stating al-qaida members were told to stay away from al-suri because he did not agree with the tactics used by UBL. Detainee further stated that al-suri went to Kabul and formed his own goup. (Analyst Note: This is probably a reference to Abu Musab al-suri.6t). (S/A{F) Detainee also claimed that while attending Sada camp in 1986 and 1987, he met Abu Musab al-suri. Detainee stated that al-suri was an associate of IJBL.62 When asked about his past reporting about Abu Musab al-suri, detainee stated that he never saw him. Detainee further stated that his memory was very tt rir o22o SIR 22-SEP-2005, IIR , Analyst Note: The poisons and chemical training camp is probably a reference to the Tarnak Farm Camp. Tarnak Farm was also called the Abu Ubaydah Camp in memory of Abu Ubaydah al-banshiri 57 ooo493 sir o3-ji-in-2005 t8 IIR ol e sir l4-ocr-2004, sir 28-ocr oIIR4 20r t IIR ot3't ooo4g3 sir 24-MAY S E C R E T // NOFORN I I

11 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I bad, and that he has no recollection of a lot of things he said and did.63 (Analyst Note: Feigning memory problems is a common counter-interrogation technique.) o (S/A{F) Detainee claimed that in l992,he was with former senior al-qaida operative, Hamza al-jawfi, in Torkham, AF. Detainee also described al-jawfi's associates, training, as well as missions in which al-jawfi was involved under UBL's direction.6a Detainee later stated he did not have a relationship with al-jawfi, claiming instead that al-jawfi only spoke to the high level al-qaida members at the al- Nibras guesthouse.65 o (S/A{F) Detainee stated he traveled to Indonesiain 1991, and in l994he traveled to Turkey because he wanted to go to Chechnya for jihad. He separately claimed the date of his travel to Turkey as o (S/A{F) Detainee claimed to have traveled to numerous countries, several as a member of JT. (Analyst Note: Detainee claims to have been vacationing; however, it is possible that the detainee possesses ties to extremists in these countries.) o (S/AIIF) Detainee claimed traveled to Jordan, Pakistan, and India as a member of JT.67 (Analyst Note: Affiliation with the Islamic proselytizin g organization JT is a frequent al-qaida cover story. Al-Qaida used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travel of its members.)68 o (S/A{F) In 1982, detainee visited the US. He traveled to Pennsylvania; Daytona Beach, FL; Orlando, FL; New York City, NY; and Cincinnati, OH. In the late 1990s, detainee reportedly visited New York City NY, for a second time.6e o (S/A{F) Detainee claimed to have traveled to Iraq, Egypt, and Syria for personal vacations at undetermined times.70 c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant and very hostile toward the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 145 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 18 June 2007, when he struck a guard with his water bottle. Detainee has 38 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault, the most recent being the water bottle incident. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard 63 ooo493 sir o8-mar-2006 uo IIR , sir 22-sEp-2005 u' ooo493 sir r2-ocr u sir 09-JUN-2005, sir 22-FEB-2005, sir 07-ApR-2006 u' ooo4g3 FM4o 2l-sEP IIR Ol3l03, Jamaat Tablighi Provides Cover 28-DEC-2005, JITFCT Special Analysis US Jamaat Tablighi, AFOSI Report on Jamaat Tablighi 27-OCT-2004, Jamaat al-tablighi (JT) Members - TRRS MAR un sir 07-sEp-2004, sir l5-aug-2005,iir to ooo AUG s E c R E T // NOFORN I /

12 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I instructions and camp rules, threatening guards, damage to govemment property, cross block communications, provoking words and gestures, major and minor assaults, possession of food and both weapon and non-weapon type contraband. Detainee had a total of 22 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction in 2006, and 38 so far in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: u. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of IIIGH intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 15 May b. (S/A[D Placement and Access: Detainee has provided information on a number of individuals that are mernbers of al-qaida and may have had unexploited personal ties to UBL. Detainee is likely able to provide additional information on al-qaida operations, terrorist individuals, and international extremist networks. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has provided unique accounts of extremist facilities. Detainee possibly has information on the al-qaida orgarization from a high-level perspective, including recruitment, facilitation, and knowledge of operatives. Detainee has been exploited on a number of issues; however, he can still provide more information of intelligence value. d. (S//ND Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Al-Qaida, Taliban, and IMU leadership, relationships, recruitment, and activities o Guesthouses and Training Camps o Manipulation of JT by extremist groups o Sarpooza Political Prison o Extremist financing through narcotics trade o Terrorist and foreign fighters training, motivation, leadership, and networks o Foreigt targeting of strategic nuclear assets and WMD o Islamic extremists in Chechnya and Bosnia o Radicalizationfactors o Terrorist biographical and psychological information o Terrorist operations in CENTCOM AOR I2 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I

13 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / I (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 22 December 2004, and he rernains an enemv combatant. MARK H. BUZBY Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding I Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminology. 13 S E C R E T // NOFORN I /