JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE June 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (S) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abd Al Rahim Abdul Raza Janko Current/True Name and Aliases: Abd al-rahim Abdul Rassak Janko, Abd al-rahim, Gull Muhammad Habib al-rahman, Dujana al-kurdi, Kasmi al-suri, Abrahim Abdalhim, Yakub, al-janku, Abu Said, Khawa Kabrush Gango Place of Birth: Kafsanur, Turkey (TK) Date of Birth: 1 January 1977 Citizenship: Syria (SY) Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SY DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is on a list of high-risk detainees from a health perspective. Detainee is in fair health. He has several chronic medical problems. He has a psychiatric history of substance abuse, depression, borderline personality disorder, and prior suicide attempt for which he is followed by behavioral health for treatment. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee admitted traveling to Afghanistan (AF) to affiliate with a jihadist group, but it is unclear whether he was recruited by al-qaida or sent on a United Arab Emirates (UAE) sponsored intelligence mission targeting al-qaida and Usama Bin Laden (UBL). Multiple sources confirm detainee was accused by al-qaida of espionage after only a few weeks in Afghanistan and was held with other suspected spies and political opponents in a Taliban prison from March 2000 until January As a result of his imprisonment, detainee could not have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 forces. Detainee admits to receiving training at al-qaida s al-faruq Training Camp. Detainee was in contact with a number of mid-level and senior Taliban and al-qaida leaders both before and after his imprisonment, and he provided information about various operations and actions. As a result of his imprisonment at Sarpuza Prison, it is unlikely detainee would ever be trusted by an Islamic militant group for any operation. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A HIGH threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value b. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Added new aliases for detainee, Abu Said 1 and Khawa Kabrush Gango 2 Updated detainee s account of events Removed information claiming detainee was an al-qaida suicide operative Added information pertaining to possible explosives training and associations to high level terrorist 4. (U) Detainee s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee was born in Turkey, but was taken to Syria at age four and raised by his stepparents after his birth parents, ethnic Kurds living in Turkey, were killed by Turkish troops in In 1990, detainee s stepfather, a teacher of religious studies, left Syria for a job in Ajman, UAE. In 1992, when detainee was 12, he traveled with his stepmother and younger siblings to join his stepfather in Ajman. Detainee received extensive religious education both from his stepfather and in school. Detainee s stepfather was a strident Salafist imam who became involved in the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and another militant jihadist organization in UAE. Detainee s stepfather was controlling, abusive, and violent, and he pressured detainee and his other sons into religious studies and vocations. After graduating from secondary school, detainee enrolled at Muhammad Bin Saud al-islamia University in Ras al-khaimah, UAE. Detainee studied there between GUAN-2007-T JUN MFR 29-APR

3 and 2000, initially studying Sharia (Islamic law) for a year and a half under pressure from his stepfather, and later switching to Arabic literature. 3 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee stated Prince Fisal Sudid Qasmi had invited him to the Majad Hotel to spend time with detainee s other college friends. In the hotel room, detainee stated he participated in a sex party with his friends and a few women. Detainee said the party was video taped. Several weeks after the incident, detainee was confronted by Qasmi. Qasmi requested detainee to obtain information concerning other more devout classmates and gather information regarding their plans for jihad. Qasmi threatened to blackmail detainee with the tape. Qasmi told detainee that he would send the tape to detainee s stepfather or a television station. Detainee carried out the request and provided information on classmates from Qatar and the Philippines. Detainee gained the confidence of this group through a professor from the university. Detainee would go to Professor Saqiq Almana Mohammad's house often to talk with these individuals. Saqiq Almana Mohammad often spiritually guided the group concerning jihad. Saqiq Almana Mohammad told detainee he would make a good mujahedeen because detainee was Kurdish. Detainee would update Qasmi verbally each day and relayed that the classmates were trying to get fighters to return to the Philippines to fight against the government. Qasmi sent detainee to visit the Butti Bin Hamed mosque. At this mosque detainee was to meet Zaid al- Qubisy and sit in on meetings. Detainee returned to his university and then met an Afghan prince named Haroon. Detainee lived six months in a house with Haroon. During this period detainee was told that now the real work would begin. Qasmi told detainee that at the end of this mission, detainee would be rewarded with a sum equal to that of $50,000 US. If detainee did not go through with the mission, the tape would be exposed. The detainee explained that his mission was to collect information in Afghanistan concerning locations of guesthouses, locations of training camps, battle lines, the number of UAE citizens there and where they are, who sent the UAE citizens, and how they got to Afghanistan. 4 Detainee traveled to Abu Dhabi, UAE where he went to the UN office and the Canadian, Syrian, and US Embassies seeking various means to leave the country. Detainee sought his friend Rahman, who was an employee of the Embassy of Afghanistan in Dubai. Rahman informed detainee he was unable to issue a passport, but instructed him to pretend to be an illegal Afghan worker in order to get deported. Detainee did as instructed and was deported to Afghanistan. He traveled from Dubai through Peshawar, Pakistan (PK), to Jalalabad, AF at the expense of the UAE government. Detainee arrived in Afghanistan in January or February c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: After entering Afghanistan, detainee sought to affiliate with the mujahedin and was guided by a Taliban soldier to the Kallu Urdu military camp outside of Jalalabad, AF. Detainee was greeted by Mullah Abdul Salam Rocketti and 3 IIR , TD-314/ , IIR , TRRS SIR 18-JUL TRRS , TD-314/ , IIR , IIR

4 Abu Layth al-qasimi, the camp commanders. After detainee agreed to fight on the front lines in Afghanistan, al-qasimi wrote a letter to Nashwan Abd al-razzaq Abd al-baqi aka (Abd al-hadi al-iraqi), ISN US9IZ DP (IZ-10026), the al-qaida commander of the Northern line. 6 Detainee was taken to al-qaida s Ghulam Bacha Guesthouse located in the Karte Parwan district of Kabul, AF and was introduced to an individual named al-iraqi, who assigned detainee the alias Dujana al-kurdi. Detainee was sent to the al-faruq training camp where he received training on rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), assault rifles, pistols, and first aid. Al-Iraqi assigned detainee to work with Arkan Muhammad Ghafil al-karim, aka (Islam al-iraqi), ISN US9IZ DP (IZ-653), who was a trusted deputy to al-iraqi. Detainee and IZ-653 became friends. 7 In February or March 2000, after 18 days of training, detainee was taken back to the Ghulam Bacha Guest House, where he was confronted by al- Qaida senior military commander Abu Hafs al-masri, aka (Abu Hafs al-arab), aka (Mohammad Atef), and Taliban chief investigator Abd al-qahar, aka (Jenet Gul). Detainee was accused of spying with IZ-653 for the UAE, Israeli Mossad, and the US. 8 Detainee was taken to various al-qaida prisons in Kandahar, was tortured and interrogated by Abu Hafs, al-qaida Security Chief Sayf al-adl, and other al-qaida interrogators, and finally provided a false confession to espionage and sodomy to satisfy his interrogators. 9 Detainee was transferred to Taliban custody on 1 May 2000 and imprisoned at the Sarpuza prison in Kandahar with IZ-653 and other alleged spies and political prisoners until the Taliban were driven out by Northern Alliance forces in December (U) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) US forces arrived at Sarpuza prison on 24 January 2002, and Northern Alliance forces transferred detainee into US custody at the Kandahar detention facility along with four other Sarpuza prisoners on 28 January The others included Jamal Malik al-harith, ISN US9UK DP (UK-490, transferred); Ahmed Saddiq Turkistani Saddiq, ISN US9SA DP (SA-491, transferred); Ayat Nasimovich Vahatov, ISN US9RS DP (RS- 492, transferred); and Abd al-hakim Abd al-karim Bukhari, ISN US9SA DP (SA- 493) TD-314/ , TRRS , IIR , Analyst Note: Abu Layth al-qasimi is also known as Abu Layth al-libi. 7 TRRS , TRRS , IIR IIR , Analyst Note: Detainee s account is inconsistent, reporting his arrest by al-qaida security officers on various dates between January and March IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR , SIR 31- OCT-2006, SIR 11-OCT-2006, FM40 12-DEC-2002, FM40 03-JAN-2002, FM40 03-JAN-2003, FM40 08-AUG-2003, 10 IIR , IIR , HANDNOTES 15-DEC CAPDATA 24-JAN-2002, CAPDATA (2) 24-JAN-2002, WEBSITE 16-DEC-2001, IAP

5 b. (S) Property Held: None c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 1 May 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: Americans possibly detained in the Sarpuza Prison in Kandahar Methods used by Taliban embassy personnel in Abu Dhabi to smuggle individuals into Afghanistan A safe house in the Karte Parwan area of Kabul referred to as Ghulam Bacha Al-Faruq Training Camp Questioning and interrogation tactics of Al-Qaida and the Taliban Al-Qaida and Taliban intelligence personnel 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee s Account: Throughout detainee s story he admitted using lies and misinformation to achieve his objectives with interrogators. Detainee has frequently reported, recanted, and re-reported various claims. There are so many variations and deviations in his reporting, as a result of detainee trying to please his interrogators, that it is difficult to determine what is factual, what may be a cover story, and what may be embellishment or fabrication. Since August 2006, detainee has made significant changes to his account which have not yet been fully verified and validated. These changes include revelations about his family, his claim to have traveled to Afghanistan as a spy for the UAE, and allegations about a terrorist plot that his stepfather is involved in. Detainee s deception may also be motivated by a desire to protect his family members or associates from discovery or retribution (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer out of DoD Control: Detainee admitted traveling to Afghanistan to affiliate with a jihadist group, but it is unclear whether he was recruited by al- Qaida or sent on a UAE-sponsored intelligence mission targeting al-qaida and UBL. Multiple sources confirm detainee was accused by al-qaida of espionage after only a few weeks in Afghanistan and detainee was imprisoned with other suspected spies and political opponents in a Taliban prison from March 2000 until January As a result of his imprisonment, detainee could not have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces during this time frame. Detainee admits to receiving training at al-qaida s al-faruq 12 IIR , IIR , IIR , SIR 23-JAN-2007, SIR 12-JAN-2007, SIR 20-NOV-2006, SIR 29-AUG-2006, SIR 25-JUL-2006, SIR 18-JUL

6 Training Camp. Detainee was in contact with a number of mid-level and senior Taliban and al-qaida leaders both before and after his imprisonment, and he provided information about various operations and actions. (S) Detainee traveled to Afghanistan and affiliated with militant groups. The purpose behind his travel is unclear. (S) Detainee has stated he traveled to Afghanistan in support of jihad. 13 Detainee may have been recruited by a Taliban embassy official. Detainee has reported on the recruitment of al-qaida members and route of travel from UAE to Afghanistan. 14 (S) Detainee reported recruitment for al-qaida took place in the Mosab Bin Omer Center in the Mishref area of Ajman, UAE. 15 (S//NF) Detainee reported he attended the Jamia al-amam Muhammad Ibn Saud University in the UAE, together with Fayiz Muhammad Ahmad Jamal Muhammad al-kandari, ISN US9KU DP (KU-552), and Abd al-aziz Sayer Uwain al-shammeri, ISN US9KU DP (KU-217, transferred). Detainee stated their instructor, Sadiq al-mana Mohammed, urged students to go to Chechnya for jihad. 16 (S) Detainee has reported on al-qaida operations that occurred or were planned for the future, including nuclear attacks and suicide attacks around the world. 17 Detainee provided the aliases of al-qaida sleeper agents who had volunteered for airline hijackings and other suicide missions. These operatives had allegedly trained in Afghanistan and then returned to their home countries. 18 (Analyst Note: Detainee later retracted some of these statements, and his reliability is suspect. It is unclear where detainee would have obtained information about future al-qaida attacks.) (S//NF) Detainee was accused by al-qaida senior leaders of spying for the UAE, Israeli Mossad, and the US, and was imprisoned for two years in a Taliban prison. (U) Detainee was captured at Sarpuza Prison in 2002 with other prisoners held on suspicion of spying for Western or Arab intelligence services. 19 (S//NF) RS-492 and SA-493 have identified detainee as a fellow inmate at Sarpuza Prison in Kandahar. 20 (S//NF) Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil told reporters in May 2000 that detainee was caught committing espionage against the Taliban regime, trying to target UBL on behalf of Arab, Israeli, and US intelligence agencies. Muttawakil told reporters that six documents were found in the possession of detainee 13 TD-314/ IIR , IIR , IIR IIR SIR 20-DEC-2004, IIR , IIR TRRS , IIR , IIR IIR SIR 23-OCT-2006, IIR , IIR , 20 IIR , IIR

7 and an Iraqi named Arkan as evidence of their espionage. 21 (Analyst Note: The Iraqi named Arkan is IZ-653. The timeline reported above indicates that detainee was imprisoned by the Taliban between at least May 2002 until January 2002 which eliminates possibilities that detainee participated in any hostilities against the US and Coalition.) (S//NF) A confession video of detainee was discovered in the house of al-qaida senior military commander Abu Hafs al-masri, along with four other tapes which contained martyrdom messages by four al-qaida suicide operatives. Detainee s tape, however, appears to be of an interrogation for suspicion of espionage and sodomy, not a martyrdom message. 22 (U) A London Islamic militant newspaper published a transcript of another al-qaida interrogation of detainee in May The transcript is consistent with the confessions reported by the Taliban Foreign Minister and the Abu Dhabi TV reporter, but is a different interrogation. 23 (S//NF) Al-Qaida associate Sharif al-masri stated detainee confessed to Abu Hafs that detainee was an agent for the UAE and the West. According to Sharif al-masri, Abu Hafs took detainee to Kandahar for interrogation. UBL made the decision to turn detainee over to the Taliban for interrogation and imprisonment. 24 (S//NF) Sharif al-masri stated al-qaida came to be convinced that detainee was recruited by the UAE intelligence service as a student in Abu Dhabi. Sharif al-masri said detainee met with US and Israeli intelligence officers in Dubai, was trained, and was sent to Afghanistan. Sharif al-masri reported detainee would not have been discovered if not for his sexual indiscretions. Sharif al-masri stated detainee claimed in interrogations that IZ-653 was the Iraqi emir of the espionage ring. 25 (U) Press reports from 2000 confirm that al-qaida believed detainee was part of a significant spy ring and changed its security arrangements as a result. 26 (S//NF) Detainee trained at al-qaida s al-faruq Training Camp. (S//NF) Detainee admitted he trained at al-faruq for 18 days. Detainee stated he trained in small arms, AK-47, M-16, G-3, RPK and PKC. 27 (S//NF) Sharif al-masri stated detainee completed 45 days of training at al- Qaida s al-faruq training camp. 28 (S//NF) Detainee has provided significant details about the curriculum and training of suicide operatives. Detainee stated any Muslim would die for Islam Arabs Arrested 04-JUN-2003, Arab Spy 03-MAY TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ OSC GMP TD-314/ , TD-314/ TD 314/ OSC SAP , OSC GMP , OSC SAP , OSC SAP CSRT ISN489 Transcript 28 TD-314/

8 (S//NF) Detainee provided information pertaining to an unspecified UAE-based training camp. 30 (Analyst note: It is unknown if detainee attended the camp. However, detainee has provided significant information of its curriculum, attendees, and support.) (S//NF) Abbas Abed Romi al-naely, ISN US9IZ DP (IZ-758) stated detainee told him (IZ-758) that detainee knew IZ-653 while in Kurga, a town near Kabul. Detainee went on to say there was an al-qaida training camp in Kurga and while there, IZ-653 taught detainee how to use TNT and other explosives intended to be used in future operations directed by al-qaida. Detainee stated this training took place in (S//NF) Detainee has connections to mid-level and senior leaders of the Taliban, al- Qaida, and other extremist groups. (S//NF) An individual named Said Rahim escorted detainee to a Taliban headquarters camp in Jalalabad, AF. 32 (Analyst Note: Rahim is possibly Taliban leader Said Rahim, aka (Sakhem), who, along with his group of Taliban on 5 June 2004, conducted a bombing attack in the Maiden District, Wardak Province, AF. 33 ) (S//NF) Detainee admitted he met senior al Qaida commanders IZ-10026, Mullah Abdul Salaam Rocketti, Abu Layth al-qasimi, and al-saidi at the Kalla Urdu Military Camp, as well as during his indoctrination and training at the Ghulam Bacha Guesthouse and the al-faruq Training Camp. Al-Faruq camp commander al-saidi accused detainee of espionage, took him into custody, and transported him to the Ghulam Bacha Guesthouse for interrogation by Abu Hafs and Sayf al-adl. 34 (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM DP (YM-252), stated that detainee personally received a letter from IZ in order for detainee to receive medical treatment at a Taliban ran hospital. 35 (S) Detainee saw Abu Musab al-suri, when detainee was taken by Taliban interrogators to Kargar, an explosives training camp, to identify two Kurdish spies. 36 (S//NF) Mustafa Abd al-qadir al-sitt Mariam, aka (Abu Musab al-suri), was the head of the Syrian group in Afghanistan. He was also involved in the Syrian Guesthouse in Kabul. He also supervised the al-ghuraba Camp, aka (Abu Musab al-suri Camp), located near Kabul IIR , SIR 27-JAN IIR SIR 30-MAR TRRS , Analyst Note: A variant of Said Rahim is Sayed Rhaheem 33 IIR TD-314/ , TRRS , IIR , TD-314/ , TRRS , TRRS , TRRS , IIR , TD 314/ SIR 29-MAY-2007, SIR 05-JUN IIR TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/

9 (S//NF) RS-492 reported an individual named Abrahim Abdalhim may have been connected to the UBL intelligence service and may have been an opium and hashish smuggler from Afghanistan to Europe and Russia. RS-492 further stated that Abdalhim claimed to be a big terrorist in Time Magazine and will say anything to appease interrogators. 38 (Analyst note: Detainee is assessed to be Abrahim Abdalhim. This is based on similarities in name variations, nationality, background, spoken languages and current JTF-GTMO detainment status.) (S//NF) Detainee's father's closest friends were people who knew UBL since These men used to come to detainee's father for advice. 39 (S//NF) Detainee stated Harun al-afghani US9AF DP (AF-3148) escorted him and stayed the night with detainee at a safe house near Kabul, in January (S//NF) AF-3148 is assessed to be a HIG commander and IED expert in charge of operational Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) cells targeting US and Coalition Forces. 41 AF-3148 is also associated with and has strong ties to IZ c. (S//NF) Detainee s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has rarely been compliant and sometimes hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 112 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 15 April 2008, when he pulled his restraints during a move from the recreation area. He has 15 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 21 May 2008, when he threw food at the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, provoking words and gestures, conveying threats, forced cell extractions, attempted assaults, assaults, exposure of sexual organs, attempted self harm, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 26 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and 20 so far in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee s most recent interrogation session occurred on 8 January IIR SIR 08-JAN RFI RESPONSE R-GTMO ISN IIR TD-314/ , IIR , IIR , IIR

10 S E C R E T // NOFORI\ I I b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee attended basic training at al-qaida's al-faruq camp and had knowledge of the camp leadership, instructors, and fellow trainees. Detainee also has knowledge of training subjects, methods, camp locations, organization, and operating procedures supporting guesthouses, other logistical support arrangements, and follow-on assignments for trainees. For approximately two years, detainee was incarcerated in Kandahar for suspicion of espionage, where he was frequently interrogated by senior al- Qaida and Taliban intelligence personnel. Detainee had knowledge of Taliban and al-qaida intelligence personnel, interrogation methods, and others who were sheltered or incarcerated at Sarpuza Prison, possibly including a US citizen. Detainee spent time at the Ghulam Bacha Guesthouse, which provided him access to other extremist and facilitation procedures. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee is assessed as substantially exploited and the reliability of his reporting is frequently in question. Detainee can possibly provide additional information or substantiate reporting by other detainees concerning the identities of al-qaida and Taliban members, details of training camps (curricula and attendees), planned operations, logistical matters, financial dealings and narcotics related information, as well as first and second hand information concerning other detainees being held at JTF- GTMO. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o o o o o Detainee's own background information Sarpuza Prison o Operational procedures and torture methods o American prisoners held by the Taliban in Sarpuza Prison in late 2001, one of whom reportedly died in captivity Other extremists associates to include detainees in custody at JTF-GTMO Travel routes used by al-qaida recruits between UAE and AF Extremist training and recruitment conducted in UAE 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 4 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. MD. M. THOMAS, JR Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding ' Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminologt. 10 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I