JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE January 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (S) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Mohmood Salim al- Mohammed Current/True Name and Aliases: Mahmud Salem Huran Muhammad Mutlak al-ali, Abdullah Ali al-shimari, Abu Isra, Adu Muhjin the Kuwaiti Place of Birth: Kuwait City, Kuwait (KU) Date of Birth: 15 May 1974 Citizenship: Syria (SY) Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SY DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) on 27 April b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an extremist who traveled to Afghanistan (AF) after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks explicitly to participate in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in support of al-qaida and the Taliban. Detainee has continued to express his desire to engage in hostilities and has threatened to kill US personnel at JTF-GTMO and in Iraq upon release. Prior to traveling, detainee was an extremist in Kuwait and has familial ties to other extremists including one identified as a CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 CENTCOM high value individual (HVI). In Afghanistan, detainee had little opportunity to make significant contacts or receive structured militant training. Detainee was captured by an Afghan warlord along with seven other individuals and anti-aircraft missiles. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Raised detainee s threat from MEDIUM to HIGH based on evaluation of detainee s threat upon release and extremist background, subsequently recommending detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control 4. (U) Detainee s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee was born and raised in Kuwait by Syrian parents, and has the equivalent of a tenth grade education. Detainee worked various jobs, to include working as a sales clerk at the Sultan Shopping Center and as an employee at the al-fahad International Aluminum Company. From 2000 to 2001, he was self-employed at a vegetable stand in Soulabia, KU. 1 Detainee has a wife and one young daughter who currently live in Syria. 2 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Various factors contributed to detainee s decision to travel to Afghanistan for jihad. Detainee heard fatawa (religious edicts) that declared support for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance; he watched al-jazeera television news coverage of Afghanistan, and he acquired commercially-produced videos depicting jihad in KB , Analyst Note: In TD-314/ , detainee claimed when he left Syria in 1990 with members of his family, and only completed the second year of secondary education; however, in MFR 30- MAY-2003, detainee contradicts his story and claimed he graduated in INITIAL SCREENING FORM 10-FEB-2002, TD-314/ , Analyst Note: Detainee s daughter was one year and two months old at detainee s date of capture, 13 November In 2006, he wrote his wife and daughter in Kuwait, not Syria. See GUAN-2006-T00325-HT 24-JAN

3 3 Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. Detainee planned to attend the al-faruq Training Camp in Afghanistan, and knew prior to leaving Kuwait that it was operated by al-qaida. 4 He was also familiar with the Taliban s role in assisting al-qaida s activities. 5 Detainee claimed one of his motives for travel to Afghanistan was to help fellow Muslims who are being massacred by the Americans. 6 In the first week of October 2001, detainee used a friend s car and went to the Iranian embassy to get a visa. Later that day, his friend received a phone call from the Kuwaiti police stating the car was involved in an accident and he needed to go to the police station to discuss the matter. Detainee suspected Kuwaiti police actually wanted to ask about detainee s desire to travel to Iran (IR), and not about the traffic accident. To avoid a delay of his travel plans, detainee fled Kuwait for Syria the next day. 7 Detainee then flew from Damascus, SY, to Tehran, IR, and took a bus to Tayyibat, IR. While in Tayyibat, detainee met Abu Ahmed, a Yemeni who was also trying to enter Afghanistan, and they traveled together to Afghanistan by way of Zabol, IR. 8 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee arrived in Farah, AF, at sunset on 24 October Detainee then went to the al-ansar Guesthouse in Kandahar, AF, where he met Abu Saad, Abu Said, and Abu Asir. They told detainee training was no longer available at Kandahar and prospective jihadists should go to Kabul, AF for training. 10 Detainee traveled to Kabul where he stayed at the Azzam Guesthouse. 11 At the house, he was told Northern Alliance forces were approaching and the individuals at the house should leave the area immediately. 12 After 12 to 17 days awaiting further orders for possible military training, detainee suffered severe diarrhea and vomiting. 13 A Tajik doctor named Abu Abrar treated him at a clinic affiliated with the Azzam Guesthouse. 14 At the clinic, detainee met a Saudi named Muhammad. The next day Abu Abrar invited detainee and Muhammad to stay at his (Abu Abrar s) house TD-314/ , MAY-2002, IIR , Analyst Note: Detainee is identified with his source id US IR in the IIR MAY MAY-2002, KB TD-314/ MFR 17-JUN-2003, Analyst Note: In TD-314/ , Kuwait State Security (KSS) reported detainee left Kuwait on 10 October 2001 for Syria, three days after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom MAY-2002, KB , TD-314/ , Analyst Note: In some reporting, detainee refers to his travel companion as Abu Amir. 9 IIR , TD-314/ TD-314/ , IIR , Analyst Note: In MAY-2002, detainee claimed the guesthouse operated by the three individuals was in Kabul and not Kandahar. 11 TD-314/ MAY TD-314/ , IIR , TD-314/ INITIAL SCREENING FORM 10-FEB TD-314/ , Analyst Note: Muhammad is assessed to be Muhammad Abdallah Saqr al-alawi al-harbi, ISN US9SA DP (SA-536, transferred), see SIR 16-MAY

4 5. (U) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) According to detainee, he and Muhammad Abdallah Saqr al-alawi al-harbi, ISN US9SA DP (SA-536, transferred) spent the night at Doctor Abu Abrar s house. The next morning, Abu Abrar informed them Kabul was under the control of the Northern Alliance and they should go home. 16 They attempted to escape but were stopped by forces under Afghan warlord Zulmei Toufan. 17 Detainee claimed his money, wedding ring, passport, watch, socks, and shoes were stolen. 18 Detainee and SA-536 were jailed in Kabul for two and a half months before being transferred to US custody. 19 Commander Toufan held detainee, SA-536, three Pakistanis (including Muhammad Anwar, ISN US9PK (PK-524, transferred); and Israr ul-haq, ISN US9PK DP (PK-515, transferred)), and three Kazakhs (Abdulrahim Kerimbakiev, ISN US9KZ DP (KZ-521); Haytugan Bakberganovich Abahanov, ISN US9KZ DP (KZ-526, transferred); and Abdullah Tohtasinovich Magrupov, ISN US9KZ DP (KZ-528, transferred). 20 Detainee s initial screening by US forces occurred on 10 February b. (S) Property Held: Pocket Koran with a red and black cover c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 3 May 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: Routes of travel by extremists into Afghanistan Illegal smuggling routes by extremists from Syria to Afghanistan 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee s Account: Most of detainee s short timeline (10 October to 13 November 2001) is probable or has been corroborated by other sources. Detainee initially adopted an NGO worker cover story in US custody, but quickly discarded it. Detainee acknowledged he traveled internationally specifically to fight US forces and has threatened to 16 Analyst Note: Kabul fell on 13 November Analyst note: BG Zulmei Toufan was a warlord in the al-ittahad al-islami Group until 2002 when he accepted a position in the newly-formed Afghan National Army; see HQ KMNB INTSUM DEC04 for more info on BG Toufan. A variant of Zulmei is Zalmai. A variant of Toufan is Touffon. 18 TD-314/ , SIR 16-MAY TD-314/ , MAY-2002, IIR , IIR IIR , TD-314/ INITIAL SCREENING FORM 10-FEB

5 kill US personnel. Detainee is a committed extremist and a likely candidate for future hostilities and is assessed to be a HIGH risk. 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is an extremist and al-qaida associate who traveled to Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks to participate in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee has continued to express his continuing desire to engage in hostilities. Detainee had little opportunity to make significant contacts or attend structured militant training during his month in Afghanistan. Detainee was captured by an Afghan warlord, along with three anti-aircraft missiles. Detainee stayed at two al-qaida affiliated guesthouses. Detainee was an extremist in Kuwait and has ties to other extremists. (S//NF) Detainee is an extremist and al-qaida associate who traveled to Afghanistan to receive militant training and participate in hostilities against the US and Coalition forces in support of al-qaida and the Taliban. (S//NF) Detainee confirmed he was aware of the cooperation between the Taliban and al-qaida, and stated it was his desire to fight non-muslims. 22 When detainee was specifically asked if he wanted to fight against US forces, detainee replied it was his firm desire to fight non-muslims. 23 (S//NF) Detainee believes jihad to be the sixth pillar of Islam and he stated would have joined the Palestinians if the borders had not been closed. 24 (Analyst Note: There are only five pillars of Islam, obligations and practices mandatory for Muslims. This statement indicates detainee would continue to actively support jihadist activities if he had the opportunity.) (S//NF) Detainee has threatened to kill US forces in detention and in Iraq when he is released. 25 (S//NF) Detainee admitted he was in Afghanistan to receive militant training at the al-qaida al-faruq Training Camp and to participate in Jihad against US forces. 26 (S//NF) Detainee knew, before traveling to Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001 attacks, that the al-faruq Training Camp was owned and 22 IIR , MAY MAY TD-314/ JDG INTREP entries dated: 10-Dec-2003, 16-Oct-2007, 16-Dec-2006, 17-Dec-2006, 25-May-2005, 21-Apr MAY-2002, TD-314/

6 operated by Usama Bin Laden (UBL). He knew UBL was a terrorist who targeted Americans. 27 (S//NF) In late December 2001, Afghan commander Zulmei Toufan captured detainee, KZ-521, KZ-526, KZ-528, SA-536, PK-515, PK-524 and an unidentified Pakistani in Kabul. The detainees were described as al-qaida members by the source who also reported three anti-aircraft missiles were housed at the location where they were captured. The source provided a videotape showing Toufan with one of the three missiles, a Blowpipe anti-aircraft missile, and all eight of the detainees. 28 (S//NF) Nasser Najiri Amtiri, ISN US9KU DP (KU-205, transferred), identified detainee by the name Mahmud, whom KU-205 remembered as a Taliban fighter caught in Kabul after being there two weeks. At the time of his capture, detainee possessed his issued AK-47 assault rifle. 29 (S//NF) Detainee stayed at al-qaida affiliated guesthouses in Afghanistan. (S//NF) Detainee stayed for one night at the al-ansar Guesthouse in Kandahar while attempting to enter the training program at the al-faruq Training Camp. 30 (Analyst Note: The al-ansar Guesthouse was a transit point for trainees going to or coming from the al-faruq Training Camp.) (S//NF) Detainee stayed at the Azzam Guesthouse in Kabul for about two weeks. 31 (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM DP (YM-252), reported the Azzam Guesthouse was one of UBL s private guesthouses. 32 (Analyst Note: The Azzam Guesthouse was a known transit point for fighters en route the front lines.) (S//NF) Detainee was an extremist in Kuwait prior to his travel to Afghanistan and is closely associated with other extremists. (S//NF) On 8 October 2001, the Kuwaiti Security Service (KSS) placed detainee and 43 other non-kuwaiti nationals on a list of expatriates targeted for detention and deportation for unspecified extremist activities or for contacts with known extremists. 33 (Analyst Note: The list was released just two days before detainee departed Kuwait. It suggests the KSS maintained a file on detainee related to his involvement with extremist individuals and organizations, and detainee may have become aware of his pending deportation.) (S//NF) The KSS reported detainee s half-brother, Khalid Salim al-muhammad aka (al-maqdad), had been to Bosnia. Al-Maqdad, a Syrian citizen, resided in Kuwait MAY IIR , IIR IIR TD-314/ TD-314/ , INITIAL SCREENING FORM 10-FEB FM40 23-FEB TD-314/

7 from May 1994 to May Since April 2002, al-maqdad had not returned to Kuwait, but the KSS continued to investigate his background for ties to extremist activity. 34 (S//NF) Detainee also has a familial relationship to Marwan Hadid, aka (Ahmad Muhammad Khalf Awadh), aka (Rawan), aka (Abu Muadh), who is detainee s maternal cousin. Hadid was responsible for administering extremist websites and served as an administrator of the Combined Extremist Media Forum (CEMF), an al- Qaida-related media group. Kuwaiti authorities arrested and released Hadid in mid- February 2006 and again in April 2006, prompting him to relocate to Syria. 35 (Analyst Note: Like detainee, Hadid is a Kuwaiti of Syrian descent. 36 Hadid was identified as an HVI on CENTCOM s HVI list of 31 August ) c. (S//NF) Detainee s Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and moderately hostile toward the guard force and staff. He currently has 54 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 26 December 2007, when he was talking while being shackled. He has six Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 29 August 2005, when he threw a cup with a mixture of urine and feces at a cameraman. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include participating in mass disturbances, flooding cell, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, threatening guards, damage to government property, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 16 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and none so far in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee s most recent interrogation session occurred on 27 September b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee entered Afghanistan in late October 2001 and was captured by mid-november During this period, detainee resided at al-qaida associated guesthouses. Detainee was identified by Kuwaiti authorities as an expatriate targeted for deportation due to unspecified extremist activities or contacts with known 34 TD-314/ TD-314/ TD-314/ , Analyst Note: This is not the same as the al-qaida explosives expert by the name of Marwan Hadid, aka (Marwan al-suri), who was killed in Pakistan in April CENTCOM HVI List 31-AUG-2006, Analyst Note: Marwan is a Tier 1 HVI target defined as individuals which are members, enablers, and/or facilitators affiliated with specific terrorists or Iraqi insurgent groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and/or the capability to attack US persons or interests. 7

8 s E c R E T //NOFORN I I extremists. Detainee was held with seven other suspected al-qaida members and three antiaircraft missiles. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Due to detainee's brief corroborated timeline, the information detainee can provide of intelligence value is assessed as limited. Detainee has knowledge of a post-11 September 2001 ingress route from Iran to Afghanistan. He may have additional biographical information on his brother Khalid Salim al-mohammed and his cousin Marwan Hadid, to include their past associates, travel history, and the nature of their ties to extremist organizations. Detainee has been uncooperative and unwilling to talk with interrogators since Detainee possibly has additional information about the three antiaircraft missiles seen at the location where detainee was held after being captured. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Al-Qaida guesthouses to include al-ansar and Azzarn o Ingress route through Iran to Afghanistan o Former CEMF administrator Marwan Hadid o Kuwaiti Islamic extremist groups recruiters and members o Anti-aircraftmissiles 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 23 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. r UIL, 7r/h,Mry MARK H. BUZBY Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding - Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminolog,,. 8 S E C R E T // NOFORN / / 2O33OI3I