JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 s E cre T//NOFoRN/i DEPAITTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK F'ORCE GUAITTANAMO GUAIW{{A]IIO BAY, CT]BA Alo AE JTF GTMO-CC 19 May2006 MBMORANDIIM FOR Commander, United States Southem Command" 3511 NW 9lst Ave,nue, Miami,FL SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detertion Under DoD Confol (CD) for 1. (S//NF) Pers6nal Information: JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment. JDMSA.{DRC Reference Name: Murat Kunn r Aliases and Cur tfltrue Name: Murat Karnaz. Mourad Koumaz r Place of Birth: Bremen Germanv (GM) r Date of Birth: 19 March 1982 r Citizenship: Turkey (TU) r Internme,nt Serial Number (ISN): US9TU DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good healtl 3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendatlon: XTF GTMO recomme'nds this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD on 02 August b. (S/NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of Al-Qaida's global terrorism network with membership in the Breme,n Al-Qaid,a Cell and Jama'at Tabliebi (JT),' and probable assosiations with Lashkar-E-Tayiba (LET). Detainee traveled ' lte Xf is a Tier 2 NGO targeq where NGO Ti r 2 targets have demonstrated the intent ad willingness to $pport tseorist org riz4tions willing to atack US persons or interesa. CLASSIFIED BY: MI,JLTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIF T ON: s E c R E T /i NOFORN // 20310s19

2 s E c RE T//NOFORN/ /20310s19 JTF GTMO.CC SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detelrtion Under DoD Control (CD) for to Pakistan intent on receiving training and participating in hostilities against US and coalition forces operating in Afghanist n in preparation for the comm ncement ofoperation Enduring Freedom. AVAILABLE IN Alt SCI ADDENDUMI JTF GTMO detennined this detainee to be: r r r A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allie. A MODERATE tbreat from a detention perspective. Of MEDIUM intelligence value. 4. (S//NF) Detalnee's Account of Events: The followlng section is based, unlesa othenflise Indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included wlthout considsration of veraclty, accuracy, or reliability. (S/NF) Prior Hlstory: Detainee was bom and raised in Germany, but claims Turkish citizenship. From , he worked as an apprentice to a ship mechanic in Bremen, Gennany (GM).' Detainee attended tbree Mosques while in Germany: the Quba Mosque; the Abu Baket (variaat Abu BakeriBatrr) Mosque; and the Fahti Mosque.' a. (S/NF) Recrultment and Travel: Detainee attended the Quba Mosquq in Bremen, GM, whoe he met two JT members, Abdul Safi and Murat who preached there. In the summer of 2001, detainee decided to travel to Pakistan to leam Ambic and insease his knowledge of Islam." On 3.Octobel2001, detainee and his associale Selcuk Bilgun aftenrpted to travel to Pakistan, but German authorities detained Selcuk al the Frankftrt, GM, airpon co-ncerning various unpaid legal fees. Detainee continued traveling alone to Pak'stan.t b. (S//NF) Tmlning and Activities: Detainee arrived in Pakistan and stayed at a series ef lt afliated guesthouses and mosques before settling in Peshawar, PI! to teach the Koran,o t oaaarl r<b o2-^-2a02 ' 00006t urb' 15-MaR-2002, ApR-2003 a Analyst Note: As an organization, the JT does not advocate have exploited the JTs worldwide presence violonce. However, numerous extremist organiztions to ftcilitate intemational travels. Ssveral terorist groups have used JT dospa in their recruitment eforis and are known to bave used the JT as cover in their operations. This has allowed various Sunni terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida to disguise their travel under the extensive network ofjtsponsored missionary practices. " IIR , MAR m , MAR s E c RE T / / NOFORN //

3 s E c RE T // NOFORN // SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for 5. (S//NF) Gapture Informatlon: a. (S/NF) Soon a.fter arriving in Peshawar, detainee traveled by bus to the Miram Shah village on the Pakistan/Afghan border with an associate named Mohammed (NFI) who was helping him change his plane ticket for his return to Cermany. Upon their retum to Pchawar by bus, Pakistani officials arrested detainee. Detainee claimed that Mohamme4 who was in possession ofdetainee's second bag tbat contained his money and identifcatioq was unable to depart the bus and provide assistance to him. Pakistani authorities transferred detainee from Peshawar to US military custody in Kandahar, AF, on 2? Decemb er 20A1.7 b. (S) Propefiy Held: r I Turkish passport #3083/2001 r 2 German phone cards r I lank cards r 1 Gerrman driven license # E01000FQD1l r TurkishID Cad# r 7 Business Cards o I Comer of envelope with pictures: 2 passport pictures of self, 3 of males, 3 male childre'n, 1 female r 1 Bremer Bgnk statemen! 2 pages IBAN: DE e 2 Health Cards r 1 Turkish Revue Receipt r 1 Flughafen Boarding Pass dated 03 OCT. 1 Pakistani airline stub issued 12 OCT r 2 Passenger Ticket and baggage check dated 03 OCT, retum daretl 04NOV r 1 Piece of papff words "Morat Qomat''written on it r 1 Pacers credit card sleeve e 1 Piece ofpaper with "Acmet Kam TEL: " written on it r 1 Piece of paper with 'Murat Kumaz TEL: " written on it r I Piece of paper with '?53146 Emrah Abi" written on it r 1?iece ofpaper with Khadim Ali, Bas! Ghah Mian Kaloo Begum, Kot Shahdard Lahore, Pakistan" on the back * " and" " wittm on it. Some writing scratched out could be Turkish writing. 1 Receipt for Al-Madina Tour Rent a Car service, Islamabad Intemational Airport 7 ooooot soz zumar-2002,iir s 03, TD-314/ (ItemB-22),IIR ,IIR TD-314/ s E c RE T // NOFORN i /

4 s E c RE T/i NOFORN/ SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Contol (CD) for r I Trukishreceipt6,000,000 r I Turkish receipt 4000,000 r 1 Piece of paper '1vls KharL c/o,7'rnanl(fixq Shop No 12, near GPO. Sadar Bazar, Peshawar, Pakistan'" r 1 Piece ofpaper'tlayat bir, gemidir, yoktur, yelkeni, resmine, baktikeq hatirta beni, iznir Faden ' Other side " 0090 L7495U,325, Annenin No Cep."' r 1 Receipt for Avari Ialore No dated 8/10/01, cash, phone call receipt to Germany telephone number 't 56517,1 minutg total Pud'. c. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 13 February 2002 d. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following:. Jrma'at Tablighi in Pakistan r Jama'af Tablighi at the Quba Mosque in Bremen, GM 6. (S/NF) Evaluation Of Detalnee's Account: Detainee is deceptive in answering questions and coatradipb himsslfon several occasions. He is standing by his cover story to uuoid lsvsaling his connections to extremists. 7. (S//NF) Detainee Thrcat: a. (S) Assessmenti It is assessed the detainee poses a HIGH rislg as he is likely to pose a threal to the US, its interets and allis. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Gontinued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of Al-Qaida's global tenorism networlg with affiliations to the Jama'at Tablighi (JT). He was involved with the Bremen Al-Qaida Cell in Germany, accepted recruihent into jihad while attending the Abu Balr mosque in Bre'men, and taveled to Afghanisian to participate in militant training and hostilities aginst US forces. r (S/AJF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of Al-Qaida's global terrorism network o (S/n{F) Foreign source reporting illustrafed suspected ties between Germanbased extremists to include detainee and Mobammad Haydar Zammzr, the Al-Qaida recruiter of 9/1 I lead pilot Mohammad Atta-8 : (S/A{F) Zammag who is currently in Syrian custody, claimed that he was the one who se,nt detainee to Afgbanistan in the days following 9/11.' (Analyst Note: t m Z toz 0sCa 05, A$lystNote: Detainee is referred to by the variani Mourad Kournaz. 4 s E c R E T / / NOFORN / 203r05t9

5 s E c RE T / i NOFORN / / JTF GTMO-CC SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Zammar's comme,nt that detainee was sent by him to Ai:ghanistan for terrorist training'ijust like Atta's group before him" suggests tlat detainee was to possibly be groomed as a suicide operative. While no additional reporting suggest detainee was a potential operative, his agq etlnic appearance, admitted recruiter, and his time oftravel to the region would make him a desirable candidaxe for such a mission.) o (S/A.IF) Detainee taveled to Pakistan after the 9/l I atfacks, days before tle impending US campaign in Afghanistan to participale in hostilities against US and coalition forces.'' (Analyst Note: UBL's and Al-Qaida's suspected involvemelrt in the 9/11 attacks were well publicized in the weeks following tle attacks, as was the impending US 6amFaigr in Afghanistan. As such, travel to the region in the period following the terrorist attacks is an indicator of suppod to or me,mbership in Al- Qaida's global terrorist network as well as intentions to participate in hostilities.). (S/AIF) Admitted Al-Qaida senior operative Maad AI Qabtani, ISN US9SA DP.(SA-063), photo-ide,ntifie detainee as a German who was captured at Tora Bora-'' e (S/A.[F) Detainee is assessed to be a mernb r of the Bremen Al-Qaida Cell. (Analyst Note: The Bremen Al-Qaida Cell is also refened to as the Bre,l:ren Group, the Bremen Cell, the Bremen Temorist Recruitrrent Cell and the Bre,men Jihadist Network.) He had known associajions with members of the cell including Selcuk Bilgun and Ali Miri. o (S/A.[F) Selcuk Bilgun aka Abu Usama" an associate of detainee in Germany, stated he and detainee frequented the Abu Bakr Mosque. Selcuk staled they received assistance in their faith from a man named Kurcl Ali M. Detaine intended to travel to Pakistan with Brem n Cell member Selcuk Bilgrm. Detainee's passport and airline tickets for tlis travel are in US possession. However, Gerrraq police detained Selcuk at tle airport in Germany on 3 October 2001, forcing detainee to fravel alone, Both Selcuk's and detainee's families stated their (Seicuk and detainee) leader waslvliri. Detriinee reportedly joined Miri's radical Muslim group with full oonviction. " r (g//}.{f) A foreign gove,n:ment service iderxtified Selcuk Bilgun as the leader of the Bremen jihadist cell. ''. (S/Af; Kurd Ali M is probably Ali Miri aka Ali Miri Tahar, a Malamite Kurd. Ali Miri was the spiritual leader in the Al-Qaida assogialed Bre'men Cell and at the Abu Bah Mosque frequented by the detainee and Selcuk. Foreign source reporting illustraled suspected ties between German-based extemists to ' FBIS 8Up FBIS 8UP FBIS 8Up , KB " TD-314/ t' FgIS E{.,? (Listed in JDIMS as EBIS 28-JAN-20023), m , MAR 2-002, ci8. 316t , CrR 376 M7 48-0s ' TD s E c RE T /i NOFORN //

6 s E c RE T /i NOF',ORN i / 20310s19 SUBJECT: Recomme,ndation for Continued Detention Und r DoD Contool (CD) for include Ali Miri, detainee, Zammar, Mohammad Att4 and admitted senior Al- Qaida facilitatormohammadou Ould Slahi, ISN US9MR DP (I/R-760).14 o (S/NF) Detainee identified a Turk named Mural as one of his JT associates in Gerrrany who preached at the Abu Bakr Mosque. (Analyst Note: Detainee's acknowledged JT associatq Mura! may be suspected Bre'men Terorist Recnrihent Cell member Murat Yilmaz who was also identified as a JI functionary and an associale of Al-Qaida member Mohammadou O{d Slahi.)r5 The spiritual leader of the Bremen cell, Ali Mni, bas also been idsntified as a member of the JT. o (S/A.{F) Detainee is associajed x/ith both the Jama'at Tablighi and probably the Iashkar-E-Tayiba (LET). Detainee repeatedly stated he associaled with the Jama'al Tabtighi in Germany and received assistance from members of the JT in Pakishn. o (S/AJF) Analyst Note: Association with the JT is a common exter:rist cover story that detainees have used to hide their actual activities and associafions, as well as association with and receipt ofassistance from groups such as the LET. Al-Qaida and exfiemist use of the JT to facilitate intemational travels of their membsa is also well known- Although detainee claimed to have stayed at several mosques and guesthouses, he has provided little information on the,m, and instead probably stayed with LET members and received training af LET-sponsored guesthouses. The JT had established procedures requiring recommendafions ;e1 iasoming Tablighis. A council provided the recommendations a.fter the Tabtghi proved his knowledge, intent, and Islamic taining and the,n allowed the Tabligbi to tavel with members, proselytizq and stay at the mosques in various cities during a normal 210-tlay dawa- Although detainee aclnowledges contact with JT in Pakistan, he does not admit to participating in dawa or directly with the JT and is therefore assessed to have received assistance from the LET in Pakistan. Detainee did associate with JT nembers when in Cermany. These individuals included members of the Al-Qaida affiliated Breme'n Cell who possibly also used the JT as a cover and probably provided Islamic indoctrination and POC hforrnation to the detainee for his travel to Pakistan- The LET assisted numerous detainees in Pakistan during their flight from Afghanistan, or following their arrival in Pakistan after lhe 9/11 attacks. The LET probably has members and supporters e,lrtenched in JI mosques in Pakistan including the Makki Mosque in Karachi and the Tablighi Center in Lahore, PK where detainee visited. Detainee is not assessed to have attended militant training at an established camp due to cessation of haining in Afghanistan after September However, during this period the LET provided small arms training to incoming jihadists at various., guesthouses while atternpting to secure tavel for the jihadists to Afghanistat-'" 14 cr. 316/ , cl!t3r6n792444, rrr 7 l0z tt m-314/ ,td-3r4t3008+u, IIR to m K8 oz-2t s E c R E T //NO['ORN //

7 s E c RE T /i NOFORN i / SUBJECT: Rscommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for r (S/A.{F) Detainee's story is assessed as false. His claimed associations with the JT are addressed above. Additionally, he claimed that administators denied him acceptance to an Islamic school in Pakistan due to his western appearance.tt He said that Pakisani police stole his money, his associate Mubammad had his passporg and he stayed at various mosques studying the Koran prior to tsvsling to Peshawa to teaoh. A11 statements are assessed to be aspects ofa cover story designed to preve'nt disclosure of his links with extcmists and his intentiods for travel to Pakistan. They are believed false for the following reasols: o (S/A.{F) For foreigners traveling to Pakistan for educafional purposes, the Pakistani goven:me,rrt required various docum nts to include 'No Objection Certificares' and'student Visas". The visa in detainee's passport is for tourisnr and would not have sufficed for entry in the Islamic education systena in Pakistan. Detainee's passport visa is stamped with the notice "I.{ot valid for admittance to educational institutions or e,mployme,nt in Pakistan." Detainee would have been informed ofthis at tle time he obtained his visa and again had he atte,r:rpted to enter an Islamic institute in Pakistan. His claim that he app ared too westem has no basis in fact as Pakistani Islamis ssl6sfu rcceive and train thousands of foreign students annually. Additionally, detainee claimed to have attempted to enter a school in Iahorq PIC Detainee said he met Karzim Abma4 the individual in charge of the school. In other reporting detainee denied he met Kafiim. Detainee said the reason he was not allowed into the school was they thought he was a me,mber of the press. Detainee has introduced various contradictions such as this into his story to protect himself, his associates, and activiti*.r8 o (S/A.{F) Detainee stated in one report tlat the Pakistani police stole his money. Yet he contradicts his claim in another report, stating that his money and identification were left onboard the bus with Muhammad. He later contradicts this statement, slaiming that he kept his money and pas^sport in a small waist bag. Detainee's passport is included in his pocket liter.'v (Analyst Note: Such injeoted. contradictions are common in detainee's reporting resulting in gaps in his timeline. This example illustrates his ongoing deceptive,ness, and claims to be a youth who was in the wrong place at the wrong time.) o (S/^,[F) Detainee saned he taveled to leam Islam and the Koran. Detainee admitted he did not know enough about Islam, prompting his travels. As such, he would never have bee,n asked to travel and teach Islam in a foreign country where he could not speak the language. Detainee stated he was unable to undestand the individuals in the mosques in Pakistan and required the information be translated for t? oooool 3022s epr 03 r MaR 2002, rrr , IIR te MAR 02. IIR s E c RE T // NOF',ORN / I 2$l0slg

8 s E c R E T / / NOFORN / JTF GTMO-CC SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Conhol (CD) for him. Detainee stated he wanted to visit a'leal Islamic state." This term is used to dascribe Afgbanista:r under the Taliban regime, but has not bee,n used for Pakista::- This indicates detainee's tue destination was Afghanistan.2o c. (FOUO) Detainee's Gonduct The detainee is assessed as a MODERATE threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliatrt and occasionally hostile to the guard force and stajf. The detainee currently has 26 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DMS, with the most rece,lrt occurring on 15 March 2006 when he was observed practicing martial arts with two otler detainees. Other incidents for which the detainee ha" been disciplined include failure to follow insfuctionvcamp rules, using provoking words and gestures with the guards, possession ofnon-weapon t)pe contraband, damage to property, unauthorized communications, and assault. On 3 March 20M, detainee told a guard that the dzte 9/11 corresponds with the chapter and verse in the Koran that says to fight against infidels. He also stated that the World Trade Center had 110 stories and that the line was the 1lOe one in chapter 9 verse 11. The detainee was observed giving two detainees lessons in hand-to-hand combat on 28 November On 27 April 2005, detainee told guards that he is se,mi-famous in Germany because a made for television movie was done on his AFe and succgss in Ta Kwan Do. 8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessmenti JTF GTMO detemxind this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most receirt interrogafion session occurred on 24 April2006. b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee attended various mosques in Bremen affliated with extremist recruiting and is assessed to be a mernber of the Bremen Al-Qaida Cell. Al-Qaida facilitators reportedly recruited detainee for terrorist training in Afghanistan Detainee admitted associa.ting with the JT in both Germany and Pakistan. Detaine travsled to Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks and prior to the start of Operation Enduring Freedom. He admis to being assisted by the JT during his favels in Pakistan. He was photo-identifisd as being in Tora Bora during coalition operations. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessmen0 Detainee can provide information on extemist members and operations in Bremen, GM. Detainee may have information on connections betwee,r: the Bremen Cell and other cells/extemist groups tbroughout Germany, if not Europe. Detainee ca:: provide informalion on the t5pe of support JT provides to extre,mist groups in Germany and Pakistan. Detainee can provide information on recruitnent and '[R MFR 15 Mar s E c RE T //NOFORN //

9 s E c RE T // NOFORN// 20310s19 SIIBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Contol (CD) for Guananamo Detainee, ISN: US9TU DP (S) facilitation activities in Germany. He should be able to provide infomration about faoilitation, training and safe houses in Pakistan. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potentlal Exploitatlon: r Breme'n AlQaida Cell o Connections to 9/11 attacks, participants and conspirators o Mohammad Hzydar 7-ammt o kadership, menrbery recnrituent and facilitation. o Abu Batr Mosque c Jarna'alTablighi - links 1s eftsr exft mist groups, use of nosques r Operations and support in G rmany and Pakistan o Extremist operations in Tora Bora o Leadership o Facilitation o Patls of ingresdegress 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 30 September 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. 9 s E c R E T / / NOFORN //