JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE April 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (S) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Sami Muheidine Mohamed al-haj Current/True Name and Aliases: Sami Muhi al-din Muhammad al-hajj, Sami Mukhiddin, Sami al-sudani, Abu Sami, Abu Irva, Abu Riyadh, Zol Masud Place of Birth: Khartoum, Sudan (SU) Date of Birth: 15 February 1969 Citizenship: Sudan Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SU DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 4 July b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of al-qaida and logistics expert with direct ties to al-qaida, al-haramayn non-governmental organization (NGO) 1, and 1 Analyst Note: Al-Haramayn is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 2 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2 TSEs have demonstrated sustained and active financial support for terrorist organizations willing to attack U.S. persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2 CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 2 Taliban leadership. Detainee is reportedly a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood s Shura Council and was involved in plans and operations to distribute weapons, to include Stinger missiles, and financial support to extremists in Chechnya. Detainee provided logistical support to Islamic militants in Chechnya through al-haramayn in Baku, Azerbaijan (AZ), and acted as a money courier and propagandist for the al-qaida network under the cover of his employment with the Union Beverage Company (UBC) and al-jazeera Media. Detainee is on a DIA list of potential terrorist recidivists. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A LOW threat from a detention perspective Of HIGH intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Added information pertaining to detainee s ties to al-qaida Added detainee s admission of knowledge of narcotic smuggling Added further information pertaining to detainee s involvement in the facilitation of funds for extremists 4. (U) Detainee s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: In 1988, detainee graduated from high school in Khartoum, SU. After high school, detainee worked a variety of odd jobs. From June 1989 through 1994, detainee attended Pune University in India and earned a Bachelor s Degree in Liberal Arts. Detainee was able to bypass compulsory military service in Sudan by taking a teaching job in Khartoum. On or about 1 January 1996, detainee moved to the United Arab Emirates (AE) to live with his uncle and spent six months providing private English language tutoring to families there. Approximately 12 December 1996, UBC hired detainee as an executive terrorist groups. Saudi officials profess that the entire organization is "closed." However, intelligence information indicates the organization remains in operation under aliases with the same office personnel and office locations. 2 Analyst Note: The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, is the name of a world-wide Islamist movement. 2

3 secretary to Abd al-latif al-omran, manager of UBC. While employed with UBC, detainee traveled frequently to Baku, where UBC had a plant. On at least three occasions, detainee couriered money into Azerbaijan in excess of $15,000 US. 3 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: During a company business trip to Baku in 1999, detainee was stopped and questioned at the airport concerning the $220,000 US he had in his possession. He stated $120,000 US was for an unspecified flour factory, while the other $100,000 US was designated for the al-haramayn NGO. Azerbaijani Security told detainee that al-haramayn was aiding the Chechen mujahideen, but eventually allowed detainee to enter the country. In March or April 2000, detainee left UBC to work for al-jazeera Media in Doha, Qatar (QA). After learning that a reporter position in Chechnya was available, he agreed to take the position and went through three months of training that included grammar and punctuation tests and using a camera and other media equipment. In July 2000, detainee put his trip to Chechnya on hold in order to travel to Sudan for his father s funeral. While in Sudan, detainee s wife s family, who lived in Azerbaijan, unsuccessfully attempted to obtain an entrance visa to Chechnya for detainee. Detainee claimed al-jazeera wanted him to obtain a visa on his own rather than provide one for him. Detainee spent about one-and-a-half months in Sudan before al-jazeera requested that he return to Doha, instead of Chechnya, to cover an Islamic conference. He completed the assignment in October 2000, but could not travel to Chechnya due to winter weather. He worked in the newsroom for al-jazeera in Doha. Detainee attempted to travel to Chechnya again in May or June He went to Turkey in an attempt to obtain a visa to enter Chechnya, but was unsuccessful. Al-Jazeera then requested that detainee go to Kosovo, where he spent two months covering the situation there before returning to Doha. On 11 October 2001, al-jazeera sent detainee to Kandahar, AF, to meet with another al-jazeera employee, Yusuf al-sholy. They were there to cover news of the war between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Detainee and al-sholy stayed in a house with other reporters, where a Taliban guard prohibited them from leaving the house without permission. The Taliban guard would send his driver on occasion to brief the reporters. 4 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: While in Kandahar, detainee and al-sholy interviewed a number of senior Taliban and al-qaida officials, including the Treasury Minister, the Minister of Electricity Omar Tayyib Agha, who was the secretary to Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Wakil Ahmad 5 Mutawkil, ISN US9AF DP (AF-548, released) ; and Abu Hafs al-mauritani, who JUN JUN-2002, IIR Analyst Note: AF-548 was never detained at JTF-GTMO and was released from custody in Afghanistan. 3

4 6 acknowledged being an al-qaida member. After 29 days in Kandahar, detainee decided to leave because it was getting too dangerous. Detainee left Afghanistan on 16 November 2001 in an al-jazeera vehicle driven by an individual named Hafez and traveled through Spin Boldak, AF and Quetta, Pakistan (PK), to Chaman, PK. Detainee later returned to Spin Boldak for a press conference to be given by Omar Tayyib Agha. However, the conference was cancelled. On 26 November 2001, detainee traveled to Islamabad, PK to extend his visa for two months. Detainee attempted to return to Kandahar with al-jazeera reporter Saddah Abdul Haq, but only made it to Spin Boldak due to roadblocks. Detainee and Haq returned to Chaman because they heard that there was going to be fighting in Spin Boldak (U) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) On approximately 15 December 2001, detainee and Haq tried to obtain exit visas from the Pakistani authorities in order to return to Afghanistan, but detainee was held at a checkpoint because his name appeared on a watch list. Pakistani reporting identified detainee and approximately 25 others captured on 15 December After holding detainee for 24 days, Pakistani authorities turned him over to US forces on 6 January b. (S) Property Held: Various miscellaneous items to include: Travel documents, books, writing tablet, phone cards, business cards, several passport-sized self photos, several photos of an infant, and paper effects from the Hotel Islamabad. c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 14 June 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: The relationship between UBC and al-haramayn, to include specifically the role played by UBC Director Abdul al-latif al-imran The al-jazeera News Network s training program, telecommunications equipment, and newsgathering operations in Chechnya, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, including the network s acquisition of a video of UBL and a subsequent interview with UBL 6 Analyst Note: Mahfouz Ould el-walid, aka (Abu Hafs al-mauritani) was a senior lieutenant to Usama Bin Laden (UBL), the legal affairs adviser for UBL s Shura Council, and UBL s chief confidante on religious matters. He normally accompanied UBL on his visits to the al-faruq Training Camp in Kandahar. Al-Mauritani also had a role in operational planning and training when UBL was headquartered in Sudan in the mid-1990s. 7 IIR , KB 16-JUN KB 16-JUN-2002, TD-314/ , Analyst Note: Detainee was identified as Sami-Muhi al-din Muhammad al-haj. 4

5 Financial interests of the UBC in Azerbaijan, Algeria, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia (SA), including a branch office in Riyadh, SA Al-Haramayn s financial support of the Chechen jihad through Azerbaijan The activities of the Hayyat al-igatha al-islamiyya (Islamic Relief Agency) on the Kosovo-Macedonia border 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee s Account: Detainee s timeline appears to be accurate, but with significant details of his activities omitted. Detainee admitted shipping supplies and carrying funds to Chechnya. Detainee still has not been forthcoming regarding his activities in support of terrorist organizations as reported by other sources. Detainee has revealed he is knowledgeable about certain illegal activities such as weapons and drug smuggling. However, he is careful not to implicate himself as a member of an extremist organization, or to have had any dealings with extremists beyond performing interviews as a journalist. 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a member of al-qaida and logistics expert with direct ties to al-qaida, al-haramayn, and Taliban leadership. Detainee, a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood s Shura Council, was involved in plans and operations to distribute weapons and financial support to extremists in Chechnya. Detainee used his ties to the UBC and al-jazeera Media to provide support for Islamic radicals in the Chechen jihad by functioning as a courier for the al-qaida network. Detainee is on a DIA list of potential terrorist recidivists. (S//NF) Detainee is a member of al-qaida who is an expert in logistics with direct ties to al-qaida leadership. (S//NF) The United Arab Emirates State Security Directorate identified detainee as a senior al-qaida member and logistics expert. 9 (S//NF) Al-Qaida operative Sharif al-masri stated the relationship between detainee s employer, al-jazeera Media, and al-qaida began in (S//NF) Khalid Shaykh Muhammad aka (KSM), ISN US9KU DP (KU ) photo-identified detainee as an al-jazeera correspondent whom he met at the Kandahar al-jazeera office TD-314/ TD-314/ TD-314/

6 (S//NF) A foreign government service reported detainee was a personal acquaintance of UBL. 12 On 4 January 2000, detainee was prevented from entering Azerbaijan and was sent back to Dubai, AE. The Azerbaijani Ministry of National Security had ordered the border guards to be alert for detainee s possible return to Azerbaijan, as detainee s visa was revoked and he was prohibited from ever re-entering Azerbaijan again. Detainee was believed to be a money courier for the UBL network and his role in Azerbaijan was to channel UBL funds to the rebels in Chechnya. 13 (S//NF) Detainee interviewed senior al-qaida official and UBL religious advisor Abu Hafs al-mauritani in Afghanistan in October Al-Qaida facilitator Mohamedou Ould Salahi, ISN US9MR DP (MR-760), stated according to detainee, detainee was the one who did the last known interview with Abu Hafs al- Mauritani in Kandahar, prior to Abu Hafs disappearance. MR-760 added that detainee, being a journalist, should be knowledgeable about the probable whereabouts of the al-qaida [members] who fled from Afghanistan after the American invasion. 14 (Analyst Note: Detainee s access to senior terrorist leaders demonstrates his probable connections to the al-qaida network and other militant jihadist organizations. Detainee has downplayed the importance of his role in this interview, maintaining that another reporter was responsible and that he merely assisted, while apparently bragging to other detainees about his ability to obtain the interview. Detainee has stated to his interrogators that he did not interview anyone powerful or important in Afghanistan. 15 ) (S//NF) Detainee is reportedly a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood s Shura Council and was involved in plans and operations to distribute weapons, to include Stinger missiles, and financial support to extremists according to a foreign government service. It is assessed that detainee worked directly with Taliban Supreme Commander Mullah Muhammad Omar to procure the missiles. o (S//NF) Detainee went to the United Kingdom (UK) in March 2000 to discuss increasing contacts between the Muslim Brotherhood and the extremist organization al-muhajiroun (ALM). 16 In early to mid 2001, detainee met with a representative of 12 IIR TD-314/ IIR , IIR SIR 15-SEP Analyst Note: The ALM is a NIPF Priority 5 CT target. Priority 3 targets include other foreign terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism, which are considered to be anti-u.s. but are not included in Priorities 1-4. ALM began as a UK-based Islamic extremist group advocating armed struggle against the US and the West in pursuit of a world Islamic state. While ALM professes to be a non-violent proselytizing and intellectual movement, the group s rhetoric espouses violent jihad as a duty of all Muslims and opposes democracy as being contrary to Islam. ALM is predominantly involved in the recruitment, radicalization, and travel facilitation of potential jihadists in the UK and Western Europe. ALM recruits integrate into other terrorist networks that directly support or engage in jihad. In October 2004, ALM disbanded its UK 6

7 the Muslim Brotherhood in Afghanistan at Taliban Supreme Commander Mullah Omar s home, along with Muhammad al-tayyib, to discuss the movement of Stinger missiles from Afghanistan to Chechnya. 17 (S//NF) Detainee traveled to Qatar to meet with the head of al-jazeera and Yusef al-karadavi (a main proponent of the Muslim Brotherhood) to discuss creating a banking system controlled by the brothers in European countries, the US, and Canada. 18 (Analyst Note: It is assessed that the brothers is a reference to members of the Muslim Brotherhood.) (S//NF) Detainee stated he applied for a lottery visa three times in 1993, 1996, and 1998, to travel to the US to study journalism. 19 (S//NF) Detainee maintained close contact with Muslim Brotherhood Chairman Shaykh Salekh. Shaykh Salekh was in charge of the committee created in June 2001 for financing mujahideen in the Balkans, Middle East, and Chechnya. 20 (S//NF) In 1997, Shaykh Salekh went to Baku as a representative of al- Haramayn and supervised material and technical supply and financing of Chechen separatists and foreign mercenaries in Chechnya. 21 (S//NF) Detainee s position in the UBC and al-jazeera Media gave detainee access to logistical and financial support for Islamic radicals in Chechnya. Detainee set up several businesses in order to help facilitate this support. (S) Detainee s responsibility at UBC was to assist the Riyadh-based al-haramayn office to deliver humanitarian goods to Baku. Detainee admitted assisting in three shipments between 1997 and early Detainee hinted that once the containers were unloaded in Baku, they would not return to Dubai empty. Sometimes the containers would be filled with hashish on the way back. 22 (Analyst note: Detainee willingly assisted in the smuggling of narcotics.) (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged couriering funds for al-haramayn in Baku, when Jamal Muhammad Alawi Mari, ISN US9YM DP (YM-577) served as al- Haramayn director there. 23 Detainee acknowledged delivering funds from Saudi Arabia to YM-557. YM-577 admitted he met detainee in Azerbaijan when detainee organization due to increased law enforcement focus on the group following its vocal support for various terrorist attacks and al-qaida led from Mecca to Medina to escape persecution. ALM is also referred to as followers of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah, al-ghurabaa, and The Saved Sect. 17 IIR , 18 IIR AUG IIR , Analyst Note: A variant of Salekh is Salikh. 21 IIR IIR Analyst Note: Al-Wafa is a NIPF Priority 3 TSE. Priority 3 TSE have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack U.S. persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups. 7

8 delivered funds to the al-haramayn organization. YM-577 stated he could not recall the amount of money detainee delivered or the circumstances surrounding the delivery; only that he knew the funds came from Saudi Arabia. 24 (S//NF) Adel Zamel Abd al-mahsen al-zamel, ISN US9KU DP (KU- 568) stated that the information YM-577 had given about the money delivered by detainee was a lie. YM-577 told KU-568 that detainee had delivered money to YM-577 on two separate occasions, once for $100,000 US and another for $5,000 US. KU-568 stated that he believed al-haramayn may have given money to couriers, such as detainee, to give to YM-577 so that there would be no record of the money transfer. 25 (U) In 1999, detainee couriered $220,000 US from the United Arab Emirates to Azerbaijan. Of this, detainee claims $120,000 US was for the purchase of a flour factory for Abdul Latif al-imran, and $100,000 US was for al-haramayn, which operated refugee camps in Azerjaiban. 27 (S//NF) According to Azerbaijani authorities, detainee and Mamduh Mahmud Salim, aka (Abu Hajer), were affiliated with Rumat International, one of Abdul Latif al-imran s UAE-based companies. Abu Hajer al-iraqi was arrested in Germany in 1998 and extradited to the US for his involvement in the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. 28 (C//REL GCTF) Detainee stated Abdul al-latif al-imran s UBC was powerful and that all charities working with the Chechen mujahideen used the UBC to smuggle money and goods between the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan, and Chechnya. 29 (S//NF) Azerbaijani authorities also reported detainee established a company called SAMICO Services in Azerbaijan in May SAMICO s purported mission was to produce, stockpile, and sell goods for national consumption, as well as tourism and other activities. However, it never did any business at the address used to formally register the company. Detainee has admitted to ownership of SAMICO. 30 (Analyst Note: SAMICO s profile and lack of business activities at its registered address are indicators that a shell company was possibly used for money laundering.) (S//NF) In early November 2002, the Azerbaijani government raided locations in Baku suspected of being tied to extremist facilitator Muhammad Rabia Abdul Halim Shaib aka (Mustafa Muhammad Ali Abdul Fatakh). Several documents relating to the SAMICO Company were found during the raid IIR , IIR , IIR , SIR 12-MAY-2005, SIR 06-MAY IIR TD-314/ , TD-314/ IIR TD-314/ , IIR TD-314/

9 (S//NF) Abdul Samad Din Muhammad, one of detainee s coworkers at UBC, is the brother-in-law of senior al-qaida operative KU Abdul Samad was arrested and questioned in the United Arab Emirates in November 2001 and extradited to Pakistan in (S//NF) Since 2000, detainee distributed propaganda materials, probably obtained from and in support of Chechen militants, on Internet sites and through the mass media in Arab countries. Detainee arranged to receive live radio reports from Chechen militant leaders Ibn Khattab and Shamil Basayev, and sent video recordings of mujahideen sabotage operations and terrorist acts in Chechnya. 33 (S) Detainee met with former Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev at Yandarbiyev s residence in Qatar on multiple occasions. Yandarbiyev provided media material, including video footage, to al-jazeera along with news developments from Chechnya. One piece of media in particular included the successful operation of a suicide bombing attack against Russian soldiers. 34 (S//NF) Khattab, one of four significant Arab mujahideen leaders in Chechnya, was killed in March The other three leaders were Maskhadov, Arab Ibraif, and Shamil Basayev. The four comprised a General Army Council which was headed by Shamil. 35 (S//NF) DIA and JITF-CT assessed detainee to be one of the top 55 detainees at risk to conduct terrorist activities upon release. 36 c. (S//NF) Detainee s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a LOW threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and rarely hostile to the guard force and staff, although he still carries on with a long-term hunger strike. He currently has 16 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 20 February 2008, when he failed to follow camp rules when instructed that he could not hang his sheets off the wall. He has two Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 20 August 2003, when he threw bodily fluids on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, damage to government property, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. On 22 April 2004 detainee was reported to be in possession of a machine screw on his window ledge. In 2007, he had a total of four Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and one so far in TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ IIR IIR IIR , IIR JITFCT ANALYTICAL PRODUCT TRANSNATIONAL TOP 55 9

10 8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainee s most recent interrogation session occurred on 24 January b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee worked as a courier for the owner of the UBC, transporting large quantities of money through Azerbaijan to support extremist operations in Chechnya. UBC employed a number of Islamic extremist with affiliations to al-qaida. During his employment with UBC and al-jazeera, he made numerous contacts with high-level extremists to include leaders of al-qaida and the Taliban. He traveled extensively during his employment with UBC and al-jazeera. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has not really begun to discuss his activities as a courier for al-qaida s international terrorist network while employed for UBC and al- Jazeera. His involvement as a money courier, involvement in the transfer of weapons and leadership position within the Muslim Brotherhood, along with his numerous connections made through al-jazeera and his pro-jihadist propaganda activities, illustrates his intelligence value. He likely has information about support provided through the UBC for Chechen extremists, as well as support provided by the al-haramayn NGO to extremist operations. He can probably provide information about al-jazeera Media s possible support to al-qaida, the Taliban, and other Islamic militant groups. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: Al-Jazeera associations with al-qaida leaders and activities in support of Islamic militant groups Al-Qaida o UBL o Abu Hafs al-mauritani o KSM o Kenya and Tanzania US Embassy bombings Courier operations in support of extremist groups o Al-Wafa o Al-Haramayn Extremist operations in Chechnya, including weapons supplying and drug smuggling Muslim Brotherhood and its links to extremism Terrorist psychological and biological profiles; radicalization methods; operations in CENTCOM Area of Operations; and recruitment of juveniles 10

11 s E c R E T //NOFORN I t (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 6 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. BY US Navy - Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence lmarning Terminologt. 11 s E c R E T // NOFORN