JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA APO AE APrrl2005 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (FOUO) Personal Information: JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Andullah Al-Tunis Bin Omar o Aliases and Current/True Name: Abdullah Bin Omar" Abu Zayed Al Tunisi" Abdallah Bin Umar Bin Ali Haji. Haji Abu Zayd Al Haili o Place of Birth: Massouttah. Tunisia (TS) o Date of Birth: 28 June 1956 o Citizenship: Tunisia o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9TS DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health, has no known drug allergies and is not on any chronic medications. He has latent tuberculosis and has been treated with medications. Detainee has no travel restrictions. 3. (S/NF) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends detainee be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD). b. (S/NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD Control (DoD) on23 August Based upon information obtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is now recommended he be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) to his country of origin (Tunisia) if a satisfactory agreement can be reached that allows access to detainee and/or access to exploited intelligence. If a CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: S E C R E T //NOFORN I I

2 S E C RE T // NOFORN I / satisfactory agreement cannot be reached for his continued detention in Tunisia, he should be retained under DoD control. For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed a probable member of the Al Qaida global terrorism network with specific membership in the North African Extremist Network G\fAEN). Detainee likely fled Tunisia due to his extremist activities. He relocated in Pakistan and provided supporto incoming extremists from Europe. Detainee likely assisted his son-in-law's facilitation and training activities. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM to HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. 4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee'statements. a. (S) Prior History: Detainee left Tunisia following the Tunisian govemment's crackdown on opposition groups. He traveled to his uncle's house in Algeria in 1990 and stayed for eight months. He traveled to Pakistan (PK), where he partnered with Abdul Alim from 1991 to 1995, selling fabric and butter in Saidabad and Lahore, PK. Following that, he was self-employed in Peshawar, PK, selling used clothing and kitchen utensils from 1995 to From 1995 to 1997, detainee was a Koran instructor at the Abu Bakr Saddiq School. Pakistani authorities were arresting Arabs around November 2001, so the detainee relocated his family to Lahore, PK, where he lived in a home owned by Nur Zaman. b. (S) Gapture Information: The detainee returned from a trip to Islamabad with his son in May 2002 and Pakistani authorities arreste detainee at the home of Nur Zanarr. Pakistani authorities imprisonedetainee along with Abdul Haddi Bin Hadiddi, US9TS DP (ISN 717) (detainee'son-in-law). c. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 5 August 2002 d. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following: o Lashkar-E-Tayyiba extremist group o Jama'at Tablighi Islamic organization o Al Itijah Al Islam extremist group in Tunisia (The Tunisian Islamic Front, predecessor to the Tunisian Combatant Group) ") - S E C R E T // NOFORN I I

3 5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed this detainee poses a MEDIUM to HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: o (S/AIF) Detainee traveled to Islamabad, PK, where he was met by a Tunisian named Seifeddine. Seifeddine provided him with a false passport and directed him to Jalalabad, Afghanistan (AF), where he attended militant training at the Durunta Camp. (Analyst note: Other reporting indicates detainee may have attended the Khaldan Camp near the Khwost Province, AF, instead of the Durunta Camp. Because of detainee's uncooperative nature, it is difficult to determine when this training took place.) o (S/A{F) Detainee has been a member of Al-Qaida since before his capture. Detainee's alias was found on Al-Qaida financier Mustafa Ahmed Al Hawsawi's computer. Detainee is listed as Abu Zayd Al-Tunisi, number 58 on the list. Detainee was a "brother" whose family received a stipend allowance. (Analyst note: This stipend was likely received by his family due to detainee's incarceration. This report verifies the number of children for detainee as noted in other reporting. It also acknowledged the location of detainee's residence at the time of his arrest. Detainee's alias was also found on a list of Al-Qaida personnel reported in IIR ; however, it cannot be verified that this is detainee and not the Abu Zaydwho died in 1998). (S/AIF) Detainee lived in the home of a known Al-Qaida facilitator. Detainee moved to the home of Nur Zamanin Lahore. Nur Zaman has been identified as an Al-Qaida and Lashkar-E-Tayiba (LET) facilitator that provided support to fleeing jihadists and their families. (Analyst note: The LET is a Counterterrorism Tier I Target, defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.) A Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander identified Zaman as an officer of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), who assisted Hekmatyar. (Analyst note: Hekmatyar is a HIG leader who commands a faction of up to 300 men. Hekmatyar is avowedly anti-us and anti- Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA).) o (S) Abu Zubaydahidentified Zartan as an individual who assisted moving Al- Qaida Arab members from Bannu to Lahore. This indicates detainee traveled from Afghanistan and not Peshawar. o (S/AIF) Detainee stayed in the same guesthouse in Iran as Nasir Al-Maghribi. The guesthouse was run by'abd Al-Ghaffar Al-Libi. Nasir, a member of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and other Moroccans who had operated in Taftan, Afghanistan ) S E C RE T // NOFORN I I

4 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I (AF), escap edto Zahidan, Iran, shortly after 11 September 200I. (Analyst Note: The LIFG, a member of the NAEN, is a Tier 0 Counterterrorism Target defined as terrorist groups, which pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests.) Before detainee anived at the guesthouse, Al-Libi informed Nasir that'abd Al-Latif Mourafik (aka Malik Al-Andalusi) and Rabia AitOuzzo (deceased) had told Al-Libi they planned to go with Karim Al-Mejjati to Morocco to conduct jihad. A few days later, detainee arrived at the guesthouse, along with Andalusi, Miki, Hasan Eddardary, 'Ali Eddardary, and Ouzzo. Ouzzo revealed to detainee he had plans to go to Morocco, settle down and procgre money for operations. (Analyst note: Detainee will not discuss these events frrther indicating continued support for terrorism to include future operations against allied force countries, while concealing associates, his personal timeline and travel details.) o (S/A{F) Detainee has provided historical support to extremist groups. Abu Nasim Al- Tunisi said he was introduced to 'Abd Al-Rahman Al-Electronici by Arab friends in Peshawar. Detainee has not disclosed details of associations with Al-Qaida facilitator Abu Nasim Al-Tunisi. His Arab friends included detainee, Abu Musab, and Abu Rayyad Al-Tunisi. Abu Nasim met detainee and Abu Musab in a Pakistani jail in Helater met them again in Peshawar in o (S/A{F) Detainee has connections to the Tunisian Combat Group (TCG) and Sami Essid Network through his familial relationship to ISN 717. TCG, as a member of the NAEN, is a Tier 0 Counterterrorism Target defined as terrorist groups, which pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. o (S) ISN 717 isa founding member of the TCG and detainee's son-in-law. ISN 717 and.muhammad Ibn Arftran Shahin, US9TS (ISN 168), were responsible for training all new recruits coming from Italy to Afghanistan. The Tunisian government considers ISN 717 as one of TCG's most dangerous operatives. It is likely detainee was aware of ISN 717's activities. o (S) ISN 717 isan associate of Salah ben Hedi Ben Hassen Karkar, founder of the Al Nadha Islamic Movement. This was the political arm of the Tunisian Islamic Front, the predecessor of the TCG. Detainee is believed to have associations with the Nadha group dating from the 1980's. This was likely a factor in detainee's flight from Tunisia.. (S) Detainee has employed Al-Qaida taught counter interrogation techniques to avoid disclosing information. There are contradictions in detainee's story when compared to other intelligence. For example: Detainee stated he lived alone when he fled Tunisia for Algeria, but other reporting states he lived at his uncle's house. o (S) Detainee has provided no substantive information on his associates except Nur Zatrran,whom he claims to have known only a few months. (Analyst note: Given detainee's choice to relocate to Pakistan instead of another Arab or European country, 4 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I

5 and the length of time spent in Pakistan, he likely had a direct (or at least supportive) role in the Afghan/Soviet Jihad. This role enabled him to maintain relations with extremist elements during the period prior to and during the US campaign in Afghanistan, but he has yet to acknowledge such associations despite his presence in a network facilitator's house.) c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee's behavior has been generally uncooperative but non-aggressive. Detainee has been reported for numerous failures to comply and three minor hostile/assault incidents. 6. (S/NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.. (S) Detainee has information regarding die-hard jihadists who remained in Pakistan and Afghanistan following the Soviet Jihad. He also can provide information on Al- Qaida, LET, LIFG, TCG, and other NAEN entities operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan throughout the 1990s through b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o North African Extremist Network: LIFG and TCG - Activities, support to Al-Qaida, training, facilitation, future terrori st planning, members. Al-Qaida - operations, training, facilitation network within Pakistan and Afghanistan, personnel o Lashkar-E-Tayiba - support to Al-Qaida, safe houses, personnel: o Nur Zaman o Link to the Qadhafi Foundation 7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 18 November 2004, and heremains an enemy combatant. JAY W. HOOD Brigadier General, USA Commanding \ SECRET//NOFORN il