JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO7I3 DEPARTMENT OF'DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA APO AE July 2006 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (S//NF) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSA{DRC Reference Name: Mohammed N al-juhani o Aliases and Current/True Name: Muhammad Naji Subhi al-mahayawi al-juhani. Abu Ayub Mohammad Naji. Hussein al-gohany. Muhamad. Saraqa. Surayqah al-sanani. al-sheba o Place of Birth: Jeddah. Saudi Arabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 5 October 1967 o Citizenship: Saudi Arabia o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-OOOO62DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. 3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). If a satisfactory agreement can be reached that ensures continued detention and allows access to detainee and/or to exploited intelligence, detainee can be Transfer-red Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD Control (DoD) on 3 June b. (S/NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-qaid and possibly a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden (UBL). Detainee admitted spending 18 months a CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: s E c R E T // NOFORN I

2 S E C R E T // NOFORN / I 2O3IO7I3 in Afghanistan (AF) where he reportedly fought on the frontlines of Kabul and in the Tora Bora Mountains. Detainee's name was found on various documents recovered from al-qaida areas of operation. These documents identified detainee as being affiliated with al-qaida training courses and guesthouses. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.I JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. o A LOW threat from a detention perspective o Of MEDIUM intelligence value. 4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee received an elementary school education in Jeddah, SA and attended the Jeddah Trade Institute for welding. Sometime between 1996 and 1997, detainee traveled to Ibb, Yemen (YM) where he spent a week sightseeing.' Detainee worked as a self-employed taxi driver for approximately 15 years.' b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee traveled to Afghanistan (AF) to perform missionary work after hearing several fatwas (religious edicts) issued by imams (prayer leaders) in Jeddah. Detainee left Saudi Arabia without speaking to anyone about his trip. He did not receive any assistance from outside parties regarding his travel plans. In June 2000, detainee left Jeddah, SA, to travel to Kabul, AF, via Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan (PK). Detainee used money that he had saved, between 7,000 and 10,000 Saudi Riyals (approximately $1,866 and$2,666 USD), to fund his travel and personal expenses.' c. (S/NF) Training and Activities: Detainee began his missionary work upon reaching the Masjid Yaqub (Yaqub Mosque) located in the Shar-E-Now District of Kabul. Abdul Hadi, the imam of Masjid Yaqub, allowed detainee to stay with him. Approximately one month later, detainee turned over his passport and half of his money to Abdul Hadi. During detainee's year-and-a-half in Afghanistan, he taught the Koran to young men between the t FBI-302 ISN 06206Feb02, Detainee said he went to Yemen during the Muslim Calendar year pgt-302 ISN 06230Mar02, KB , FBI-302 ISN 06206Feb02 ' Sep S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO7I3

3 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3IO7I3 ages of seven and seventeen. Detainee claimed he never swore bayat(loyalty or oath) to UBL,* and never participated in any type of military training or combat.'. 5. (S//NF) Capture Information: a. (S//NfF) On the l5th day of Ramadan,6 approximately 30 November 20_01, detainee claimed he left Kabul as it was no longer safe and traveled to Khowst, AF.' On the 22nd day of Ramadan, detainee left Khowsts with a group of 30 men traveling to Pakistan. Upon reaching an area near the Afghan-Pakistani border, the group observed Pakistani soldiers and walked towards them.v Pakistani border guards arrested detainee with a group of confirmed UBL bodyguards, al-qaida members and Taliban fighters. Admitted al-qaida member and close associate of UBL, Ali Hamza A Ismail ISN US9YM DP (YM-039), and assessed jihadist Mohammed Y al-zayley,isn US9SA DP (SA-055), both confirmed that detainee was captured with them and their group of 30.r0 On27 December 200I, Pakistani authorities transferred detainee from a prison in Peshawar, PK, to the Kandahar, AF, detention facility where he was placed in US custody.rr b. (S) Propefi Held: o 1 book, blue, with Arabic writing c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 14 January 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: Detainee's file does not indicate why he was sent to JTF-GTMO; however, his transfer was likely due to his perceived associations with the 30 UBL bodyguards, al Qaida members, and Taliban fighters with whom he was arrested. 6. (S/NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account:' Detainee's reporting lacks credibility. Detainee claimed he spent one and a half years in Afghanistan, but was unable to provide any details of his associate or locations for this period. Detainee claims to have never given bayat or to have participated in any type of military training or combat; however, reporting from other ' Sep-2002, Analyst Note: Yaqub variants Yakub and Yacoub, Shar-E-Now variant Sharinou. t FBI-302 ISN 062 o6febo2 '00062 MFR 26-Aus-2002 t oooo6z 302 o9-seplzooz t MFR 26-Aug-2002 ' Sep-2002, 'o IIR , IIR , IIR c " IIR b, TD-314t , Sep S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3IO7I3

4 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3IO7I3 sources possibly identified detainee as a UBL bodyguard and a fighter in Kabul since 1999, as well as in Tora Bora, AF. Detainee has failed to provide any information on his activities and support to Abd al-hadi al-iraqi dating from Detainee's placement within al-qaida and his lack of cooperation indicate continued support to Islamic extremism and increases the potential of him rejoining these elements if released. 7. (S/NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Gontinued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be an al-qaida member who participated in hostilities against US and coalition forces. Detainee's name was found in multiple al-qaida documents denoting attendance at militant training courses and various guesthouses. Detainee is possibly a UBL bodyguard who adheres to a false cover story of teaching the Koran. o (S/AIF) Multiple reports identified detainee as a fighter on the front lines at Kabul and Tora Bora covering a period from 1999 to o (S/A{F) Al-Qaida operative Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (aka Haytham aka al-kini aka Fupi) stated in 7999, detainee fought on the front lines under Abd al-hadi al-iraqi and visited Kabul for two weeks prior to retuming to,the fight. 12 (Analyst Note: al- Iraqi (aka Abd al-muhayman al-iraqi'' aka Qutaibah'") was one UBL's most senior commanders and the person in charge of non-afghan Taliban and al-qaida fighters (al-qaida's 55'n Arab Brigade) in the Afghanistan northern front. '') o (S/NF) Al-Qaida member and facilitator Abdu Ali al-haji Sharqawi, PK9YM DP (YM-1457), reported that detainee fought on the front lines north of Kabul in a place called Suraca El San'ani (NFI).tu o (S/AID Abu Zubaydah, senior al-qaida lieutenant, believed detainee to be a Yemeni national who possibly stayed at the al-qaida affiliated Hamza al-ghamdi guesthouse in Kabul and was seen on the front line in Kabul.lT o (S) Maad al-qahtani, ISN US9SA DP (3A-063), a confirmed al-qaida operative and the "20th hijacker," stated detainee was a mujahid at Tora Bora. SAt' TD-3r tt ro4rur 'o TD-314/322i3-03 't IIR , IIR 6034 r30r 04, IIR tu ool457 FM4o 24-Mar-2006 t' TD-3r4r , IIR S E C R E T // NOFORN / / 2O3IO7I3

5 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO7I3 063 added he and the detainee were on a'jihad mission" there.18 Additionally, SA- 063 previously identified detainee as an associate in Kandahar.le UBL's driver and al-qaida member Salim Hamdan, US9YM DP (YM-149), identified detainee as being at the guesthouse in Kandahar.2o lanalyst Note: YM-149's identification helps corroborate SA-063's statement of them both being in Kandahar.) o (S/ {F) Mohammed Basardah, ISN US9YM DP (YM-252), an admitted jihadist who trained with al-qaida, claimed detainee fought in the Ktal region of the Tora Bora Mountains.2l o (S/A{F) Detainee's name and phone number were found on multiple documents recovered from locations associated with al-qaida. o (S/AIF) Detainee's name and alias are included on lists noting al-qaida members and their trust accounts found during raids against al-qaida-associated safe houses in Pakistan.22 (Analyst note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-qaida, Taliban and other extremist guesthouses often for the purpose of training, or coordination prior to travel to training, the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts were simply storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that were used to secure the individual's personal valuables, including passports and plane tickets, until completion of training or other activity.). (S/A{F) Detainee claimed that he gave his passport to Abdul Hadi at the Yaqub Mosque in Kabul.23 (Analyst Note: Detainee probably gave his passport to Abdul Hadi prior to his attending an al-qaida affiliated training camp.). (S) A variant of detainee's alias, Abu Ayyoub al-najdi, was listed as one of the students scheduled for the al-qaida sponsored Tactics Course Number 2. This document, issued by the office of Mujahideen Affairs, listed over 150 al-qaida members scheduled for tactics, artillery, security, sniper and anti-aircraft training courses.2o (Analyst Note: Inclusion on this list indicates prior completion of basic militant training.). (S/A{F) Abdul Zahir,ISN US9AF DP (AF-753), an assessed al-qaida member and admitted interpreter for al-qaida military commander Abdul Hadi al- '* IIR , IIR l 03 tn IIR 6034 l 'o IIR r 05 " IIR , IIR rr73 03, IIR " rd4rua (#245), AFGP b (#245), Analyst Note: Listed as#245. Mohammad Naji al- Jouhni aka Sarrakal-Sana'ani, nationality: Saudi; , has possession ofa Saudi passpon. 23 FBI-302ISN 0623oMaro2 'oiir ) s E c R E T //NOFORN /

6 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO7I3 Iraqi, reported that detainee stayed at the Ashara guesthouse,2s which al-iraqi operated.'o. (S/A{F) Coalition forces recovered a variant of detainee's name, Abu Ayub Mohammad Naji, and phone number, , in a notebook on 8 January The notebook, with telephone numbers, was recovered in Kabul, AF (l{fi).'' Detainee confirmed his home phone was ' (S/AIF) A variation of detainee's name and alias, Muhammad Naji (aka Sarqah al San'ani, was documented in a list of captured mujahideen found on a hard drive associated with Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (KSM), a known al-qaida operative.2e o (S/AIF) Detainee is possibly a UBL bodyguard. Detainee was captured with a group of Arabs fleeing Afghanistan. Many members of this group were former UBL security or bodyguards. (Analyst Note: UBL security was a prestigious position. Bodyguards had closer contact with UBL and more access to sensitive information than other support personnel.)30 o (S/AIF) Former JTF-GTMO detainee Abdullah A Ahmed, ISN US9MO DP (MO-056), known as UBL's Security Chiei and Saif al-adg.l, UBL's Chief of Intelligence, were in charge of choosing UBL's security staff." (Analyst Note: There are numerous reports from various sources that reports on UBL bodyguards, primarily those caught with detainee, but YM-252 is the only one to specifically name detainee as a bodyguard." Some of the significant reports which identify the bodyguards, but do not include detainee, are from debriefings of YM- 1457:33 senior al-qaida facilitator Abu Zubayduh;'o senior al-qaida operational planner and former UBL bodyguard Walid Muhammad Salih bin Attash (aka Khallad);35 and UBL's driver YM Detainee's actual placement within UBL's security detail is, therefore, undetermined. UBL left his bodyguards in Tora Bora. It is possible the bodyguards may have information on his intended movements which Oct-2002 tu ooo Apr-2003 '' rrr " TD ,#L " TD 3l4ll3l74 03, Analyst note: Sarqah variant $rrayqah. 'o IIR oo 'tn3ruB6no-03 " IIR , IIR , IIR IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR r 'o TD-3 r4l24t5t TD 'u IIR , TD-3 r4/2875t-02 6 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO7I3

7 S E C R E T // NOFORN / I 2O3IO7I3 can provide clues to his current whereabouts. If he was a bodyguard, detainee possesses unique intelligence.)37 o (S/A{F) Ibn al-sheikh al-libi's inability to identifu detainee from al-libi's time at the Yaqub Mosque,38 and the detainee's inability to provide information about personalities and descriptive features of the Yaqub Mosque casts additional doubt on his cover story.3e o (S/AfF) Assessed member of the North African Extremist Network (NAEN) Hasan Zaniri, US9AG DP (AG-533), reported that al-libi was at the Haji Yaqub Mosque, which is located on the comer of Street Number Six in Kabul, during the last week of July 2001.ao o (S/AfD Detainee claimed he spent 18 months (June 2000 until December 2001) teaching the Koran to boys between the ages of seven and seventeen at the Haji Yaqub Mosque in Kabul,al but was unable to offer any verifiable proof that he was there for any length of time.*'. (S) SA-055, who was captured with detainee, reported that the Pakistani warden of the prison informed the group that the best thing they could tell US forces when interrosated was thev were in Afshanistan to teach the Koran and for religious studies.a3 issessed al-qaida membjr and UBL bodyguard Majid Abdu Ahmed, ISN US9YM DP (YM-041), also reported that the Koranteaching cover story was untrue.aa c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: The detainee is assessed a LOW threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has been mostly compliant and nonhostile to the guard force and staff. The detainee currently has l7 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on23 January 2006, when he asked a guard to pass his cereal to another detainee. The guard found a note in the cereal and confiscated it. Other incidents for which the detainee has been disciplined include failure to follow camp rules, participating in a disturbance, failure to follow instructions, possession of non-weapon type contraband, damage to property and assault. The detainee has I Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault, which occurred on 5 April 2003, when he spat on guards during a disturbance. " DAB Bodyguard Profile Summary tt TD-314/ " 00062MFR26-Aus-2002 oo IIR ,-Analyst Note: Report is by US-IR , which translates to AG-533 per his KB, IIR Haji Yaqub Mosque is an alias for Yaqub Mosque. o' o9-sep-2002 o' MFR 26-Aus-2002 o'iir6 o34o7o4oz,im6 034 o78o 02 oo oooo t -AUG-2002 s E c R E T //NOFORN I I

8 S E C R E T /i NOFORN I / 2O3IO7I3 8. (S/NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: JTF-GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 30 June b. (S/NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was reportedly in Afghanistan beginning in 1999 fighting on the front lines. Multiple sources have identified detainee as a fighter in both Kabul and Tora Bora. Detainee was possibly a bodyguard for UBL, and was captured with29 others that have been identified as UBL bodyguards, Taliban Fighters and jihadists. Detainee spent an extended period within the al-qaidaltaliban infrastructure to include guesthouses. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has failed to provide any information on the detainee with whom he was captured, even though two of those individuals have identified him. Detainee should be able to provide information on personalities, logistics, guesthouses, training, operations and ingress and egress routes at both the Kabul and Tora Bora areas of operation, and Afghanistan as a whole for the 1999 to 2001 period. Detainee can also possibly provide information on UBL to include: security, associates, operational planning, communications, and financial transfers. Detainee can probably provide unique information of intelligence value; however, his cooperation thus far makes it unlikely that he will do so. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o UBL o Al-Qaidapersonalities, training, guesthouses, logistics o Tora Bora o Other detainees o Leadership o "Jihad Mission" in Tora Bora 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 8 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. Rear Admiral. US Commandins 8 S E C R E T // NOFORN / I 2O3IO7I3