JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE September 2007 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) 1. (S//NF) Personal Inmation: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Jaralah al-mari Aliases and Current/True Name: Jaralla Salih Muhammad Khala al-marri, Abu Abdullah al-sharaghi, Abu Tharr Place of Birth: Doha, Qatar (QA) Date of Birth: 12 August 1973 Citizenship: Qatar Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9QA DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee Continued Detention with Transfer Language on 15 September b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist who traveled to Afghanistan to participate in jihad. Detainee probably transferred al-qaida operational funds to his brother, Ali Salih Muhammad Khala al-marri, ISN US9QA DP (QA-10010), an alleged al-qaida sleeper agent who is detained in the US. Detainee acted as a courier senior al-qaida leaders. Detainee stayed at al-qaida supported guesthouses and attended an al-qaida training camp shortly bee 11 September CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Included a report from Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM DP (YM-252), indicating detainee trained at al-faruq Training Camp and Camp 9 in the spring of 2001 Added multiple reports discussing items found on detainee when he was captured, including a phone number that has been tied to al-qaida Included key gaps and supplemental inmation in the evaluation of detainee s account 4. (U) Detainee s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee completed the 7th grade in Detainee traveled on numerous occasions to Bahrain (BA), the United Arab Emirates (AE), and Saudi Arabia (SA), primarily leisure. Detainee also flew to Egypt (EG) and Sudan (SU) a wedding and a business trip. 1 In July 1993, detainee s father suggested detainee consider learning English in either the US or England. At the time, detainee s older brother, Muhammad, was attending Texas A&M University, so detainee decided to join him at the university to study English. Detainee attended an English language program approximately seven months. During Christmas vacation, detainee decided to transfer to a cheaper school, so he enrolled in English classes at Dexter Hall in Austin, Texas. Detainee stayed there three semesters (spring, summer, and fall) until leaving the US permanently in November Upon his return to Qatar, detainee began working in the family business, which supplied spare parts trucks and heavy equipment. Detainee s family sold the business approximately $400,000 US in the summer of Detainee got married in August 1995 and has three 1 IIR , IIR

3 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) children. Detainee s smoking and alcohol abuse caused marital problems, so he decided to examine his lifestyle. In the summer of 2001, detainee went to Mecca, SA, to pray in an attempt to change his life the better. 2 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Upon arrival in Mecca, detainee met Abu Walid al- Makki, a fellow attendee at lectures, and they talked about Islam and jihad. 3 Al-Makki told detainee about Afghanistan and said that detainee could get closer to Islam by joining jihad. Al-Makki introduced detainee to Muhammad al-saudi al-harabi who became detainee s point of contact joining jihad in Afghanistan. 4 Detainee knew his family would not support his participation in jihad, so he lied to them, claiming he was traveling to Pakistan (PK) in connection with the Jamaat Tablighi (JT) to attend a JT dawa, an annual three-day call to Islam meeting that takes place in Lahore, PK, and to memorize the Koran 4 to 6 months. 5 On 6 September 2001, detainee flew from Qatar to Karachi, PK, and called al- Harabi once he arrived at the hotel. Al-Harabi told detainee to wait in his room. Soon thereafter, a man named al-zubail arrived and asked 200 Saudi riyals (SAR) to transport detainee to Afghanistan. Once in Afghanistan, detainee and 11 other men traveling with him were taken to a guesthouse in Kandahar, AF. 6 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: On 10 September 2001, the entire group from the Kandahar guesthouse was moved to the al-faruq Training Camp. On 11 September 2001, Abu Barah, detainee s camp sponsor, announced that terrorist attacks had occurred in the United States and the camp had to move into the mountains to avoid US retaliation. After a couple of days in the mountains, the group went back to al-faruq to await transportation to Kandahar, and then subsequent travel to Kabul, AF. During this period, detainee began to understand that the jihad was a battle of Muslim against Muslim, and he began to reconsider his involvement. Detainee was taken to the Nine Central Guesthouse in an abandoned village about 30 days. Detainee became very open about wanting to return home, but 2 IIR Analyst Note: Detainee also named this person Muhammad al-makki, variant (Mekki) (see IIR , KB 18-FEB-2002). 4 Analyst Note: Muhammad al-saudi al-harabi, variant (Muhammad Saidi), may be the Muhammad al-harbi, variant (Harabi), who Sulayman Saad Muhammad Awshan al-khalidi, ISN US9SA-00121DP (SA-121, transferred), reported to be his recruiter in Saudi Arabia, and who gave SA-121 instructions on how to travel to Afghanistan in answer to jihadist fatawa (see IIR ). 5 Analyst Note: Dawa is Islam missionary work. Al-Qaida members often covered their al-qaida affiliation by claiming to be traveling JT-sponsored religious purposes. JT is a Priority 2A National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2A TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2A terrorist groups. 6 IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR , Analyst Note: Detainee identified two of the men as Abu Anwar and As Samir as being from Saudi Arabia. 3

4 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) cited dysentery (inflammation of the intestinal tract), from which he had been suffering from several weeks, as the reason his need to return home. When detainee finally arrived in Kabul, he met a man named Abu Yassid, and was told that Abu Yassid could arrange travel detainee to Pakistan. In late-november 2001, Abu Yassid made arrangements a car and driver to take detainee to Quetta, PK. 7 Detainee was first driven to Spin Boldak, AF, where they stayed the night. The following day, the driver took detainee to the border checkpoint where he was advised to get out of the vehicle and ride on a motorcycle that would pick him up and take him into Pakistan (U) Capture Inmation: a. (S//NF) Pakistani officials arrested detainee on 6 December 2001 as he attempted to enter Pakistan. Detainee had his passport and a plane ticket in his possession. 9 Detainee spent approximately 30 days in a jail in Quetta bee being transferred to US custody on 9 January b. (S) Property Held: None (S//NF) Though not held at JTF-GTMO, the following items were reportedly in 11 detainee s possession at time of capture: Passport Plane ticket Watch Note Phone number c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 11 February 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide inmation on the following: Recruiting techniques used by the Taliban 7 IIR , TRRS , Analyst Note: Abu Yassid is also reported as Abu Yasser. According to Abu Rahim Moulana Gulam Rabbani, ISN US9PK DP (PK-1460), an Abu Yasser managed a guesthouse in Kandahar, possibly referring to the same individual identified by detainee ( FM40 15-JUN-2004). 8 IIR , FM40 26-JUN INTIAL SCREENING 10-JAN-2002, IIR , TRRS IIR INTIAL SCREENING 10-JAN-2002, FM40 26-JUN-2003, FM40 12-JAN-2004, FBI (see SCI Addendum additional reporting) 4

5 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) Terrorist training camps in Kandahar Housing facilities in Kandahar 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee s Account: Detainee s timeline is plausible; however, his level of involvement in his brother s activities is still unclear. Detainee has provided conflicting inmation concerning fund transfers (totaling over $22,000 US) to his brother QA-10010, who was in the US in 2000, and about his prior educational experience in Qatar. Detainee was polygraphed and indicated deception on questions related to the fund transfers. Detainee also provides a highly unlikely story that he and his brother traveled nearly simultaneously from Qatar just prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and yet had no knowledge of each other s activities. Detainee continues to be deceptive with interrogators on major aspects of his story. 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist who traveled to Afghanistan shortly bee 11 September 2001 to participate in jihad. Detainee probably transferred al-qaida operational funds to his brother, QA-10010, who was arrested in the US on suspicion of being an al-qaida sleeper agent. Detainee was entrusted to courier a message between senior al-qaida leaders. Detainee stayed at al-qaida supported guesthouses and attended an al-qaida training camp. (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist who probably provided funds to his brother QA-10010, an al-qaida sleeper agent. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) Bank records show detainee sent three money transfers to QA s account in The first was in February 45,000 Qatari Riyals (QAR). 12 The second was in March 24,000 QAR. 13 The third was in June 2000 $3,985 US. 14 (S//NF) On 18 December 2001, US federal authorities arrested QA on suspicion of being an al-qaida sleeper agent in the US and determined him to be an enemy combatant Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $12,300 US. 13 Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $6,600 US. 14 IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR IIR , IIR

6 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) (S) Detainee identified several photographs of his brother QA-10010, including a mug shot taken in Peoria, Illinois, following QA s arrest. 16 (S//NF) Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, ISN US9KU DP (KU-10024), recognized detainee s name as that of QA s brother. 17 (S//NF) KU said that he arranged QA to receive funds from al-qaida financial manager Mustafa Ahmad al-hawsawi, aka Zahir, ISN US9SA DP (SA-10011), to give to the 11 September 2001 hijackers. KU said he gave detainee a letter in Kandahar just bee the city fell to present to Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-hajj, aka ( Riyadh the Facilitator ), ISN PK9YM DP (YM-1457), in Karachi. The letter requested $10,000 US be sent to QA in the US. YM-1457 claimed he never heard from detainee. 18 (Analyst Note: Detainee was likely captured bee he was able to deliver the message. However, the assignment indicates that KU had a high level of trust in detainee.) (U//FOUO) Phone records tie QA to a phone number linked to SA , 11 September 2001 hijacker Muhammad Atta, and convicted terrorist Zacharias Moussaoui. 19 (S//NF) QA had been living in the US in KU later sent QA back to the US shortly bee the 11 September 2001 attacks to serve as a point of contact to help other operatives settle in the US follow-on operations. KU also tasked QA to explore possibilities hacking into the mainframe computers of banks. 20 (S//NF) A Kuwaiti phone number found on detainee, which was associated with the name Abu Salem, had also been called twice in 1998 from an INMARSAT telephone that had been attributed to al-qaida. 21 (Analyst Note: See SCI supplement further inmation.) (S//NF) Detainee traveled to Afghanistan to participate in jihad, stayed at al-qaida supported guesthouses, and attended an al-qaida training camp. (S) Detainee admitted traveling to Afghanistan jihadist training. 22 (S//NF) KU stated detainee went to Afghanistan to fight as a mujahid against the US, but claimed that detainee was not an al-qaida member IIR TD-314/ TD-314/ , Analyst Note: The Taliban surrendered Kandahar on 6 December Immigration and Terrorism 01-SEP TD-314/ FBI IIR TD-314/

7 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) (S) Detainee admitted attending al-faruq Training Camp a couple of days bee it was evacuated in reaction to the 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee stated he learned the camp was owned by UBL while staying at the guesthouse in Kandahar. He added that the members of his group were issued AK-47 assault rifles prior to their evacuation. 24 (Analyst Note: Detainee probably stayed at the Hajji Habash guesthouse, an al-qaida affiliated guesthouse in Kandahar where trainees stayed en route to and from training at al-faruq.) S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) Detainee stated his group of approximately 30 Arabs traveled to Camp (Analyst Note: Camp 9, aka (Malik Camp), served as an advanced training site rocket launchers, heavy weapons, and shoulder-launched missiles.) (S//NF) YM-252 identified detainee as being at al-faruq in April YM- 252 stated that detainee had left the Murad Beg camp in March (Analyst Note: Based on coordinates provided the Murad Beg camp, it is assessed to be Camp 9. YM-252 s assertion places detainee in Afghanistan 6 months bee detainee s claimed timeline.) (S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) Detainee s egress route included a stop in Kabul, where he stayed at al-qaida s Azzam guesthouse, located in the Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood. (Analyst Note: The Wazir Akbar Khan area is a known mer diplomatic district taken over by the Taliban and al-qaida quarters and training. The Azzam guesthouse was the mer home of the Saudi Ambassador in Kabul.) 27 c. (U//FOUO) Detainee s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective. Detainee s overall behavior has been mostly compliant, but hostile to the guard ce and staff. Detainee currently has 52 Reports of Disciplinary Infractions listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 26 July 2007, when he threatened a guard. Detainee has 14 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction assault, with the most recent occurring on 15 December 2006, when he threw feces on a guard. Other incidents which detainee has been disciplined include failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, unauthorized communications, threatening guards, damage to government property, provoking words and gestures, inciting or participating in a mass disturbance, and possession FM40 28-JUN-2003, IIR , FM40 23-JUN-2003, JUN-2002, KB 18-FEB-2002, IIR IIR , IIR , KB 18-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: Sulaiman Awath Sulaiman Bin Ageel al-nahdi, ISN US9YM DP (YM-511), reported that after 11 September 2001, a series of 16 or 17 rear-echelon training camps was established to support and defend retreating Taliban and al-qaida terrorist ces (see IIR ) MFR 18-FEB-2004, IIR , TRRS IIR , IIR

8 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) of food and non-weapon type contraband. Detainee had a total of seven Reports of Disciplinary Infractions in 2006, and five so far in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee s most recent interrogation session occurred on 24 July b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee has spent time in the US and a short time in Afghanistan at al-faruq Training Camp. Detainee also was among fellow jihadist while spending time at Camp 9, the Hajj Habash Guesthouse, and the Azzam Guesthouse upon retreating from Afghanistan. Detainee reportedly met with KU-10024, who entrusted detainee to deliver an operational message to YM c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: The scope of detainee s operational relationship with his brother has not yet been determined; however, detainee can provide specific inmation concerning al-qaida recruiting techniques, including recruiters and facilitators. He may be able to provide inmation on his brother s operational plans after the 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee probably possesses specific knowledge on past al-qaida operations and perhaps methods financial support. Detainee can likely provide inmation on current JTF-GTMO detainee s that have similar routes of egress from Afghanistan to Pakistan. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: Al-Qaida recruiting process Al-Qaida sponsored guesthouses Al-Qaida s international money transfer process Inmation on an al-qaida sleeper operative Detainee s intentions after release from US custody Al-Qaida courier and communications procedures Terrorist biographical and psychological inmation Detainee s affiliation with KU-10024, YM-1457, and other high-level al-qaida members 8

9 S E C R E T // NOFORN / I SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 30 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. ri fuursu^r),rcru"1hi, it, tts,4 Jf n ' MARK H. BUZBY U Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding - Definitions intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence lilarning Terminology. 9 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I