JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 s E c R E T //NOFORN I I DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE Januarv 2007 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southem Command NW 9lst Avenue. Miami, FL33172 SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee. ISN: us9kz dp (S). 1. (S//NF) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Abdul Rahim o Aliases and Current/True Name: Abdulrahim Kerimbakiev. Dolkun Ilakhparovich Kerimbakiev o Place of Birth: Semei. Kazakhstan (KZ) o Date of Birth: 4 January 1983 o Citizenship: Kazakhstan o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9KZ DP ) 3. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment: ^. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessedetainee as Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) with Transfer Language on 13 January b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a first generation member of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP)I who fled Kazakhstan under suspicion of murder ' Analyst Note: ETIP is also known as the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Eastern Turkistan Islamic Organization (ETIO). ETIP is atier 2 target, defined as terrorist or extremist groups that have CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: S E C R E T //NOFORN / /

2 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I us9kz dp (S) and other extremist activities. Detainee is affiliated with al-qaida, the Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).' Detainee, facilitated by senior leadership in the ETIP and IMU, traveled to Afghanistan (AF) to fight alongside the Taliban against the Northem Alliance (NA) and subsequently participated in hostilities against US and coalition forces. Detainee is assessed to have received training, possibly in al-qaida or Taliban facilities, and was possibly captured with three anti-aircraft missiles. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. o A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective. o Of MEDIUM intelligence value. c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: There were no significant changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. 4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee finished ninth grade in From 1998 until June 2000, detainee worked as a local market clothes vendor. In June 2000, detainee began working on a small family-owned farm.3 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In September 2000, detainee met two Tajik mullahs, Abdullah and Rahmatullah,a at the Semei Mosques in Semei. Abdullah and Rahmatullah recommended that detainee move to Afghanistan for an easier life.6 In October 2000, demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less of a threat to US interests around the world than Tier I groups. 2 Analyst Note: IMU is a Tier I target. Tier I targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state - support, that have demonstrated intention and capability to attack US persons or interests. ' Iul-2002 o fn4rulqzq79-02, IIR , Analyst Note: Based on various reporting, Abdullah is assessed to be the alias of ETIP member Farkhat Ibragimovich Yusupov and Rahmatullah is assessed to be the alias of ETIP member Yaqub Abu Khanil ISN US9KZ (KZ-526). There is conflicting information about the true identity of KZ- 526 andof KZ-526's relationship to detainee. ' 000szt t<b , IIR ,TD , Analyst Note: Semei mosque is a Sunni-sect mosque led by the Imam Mullah Vali. Mullah Vali is a Taliban sympathizer who facilitated travel of young Kazakh males to Afghanistan. u JUL-2002, Analyst Note: In the late 1990s, the Taliban sent recruiters to Kazakhstan to entice Muslims to relocate to Afghanistan. The recruiters promised better working and living conditions in Afghanistan. a L S E C R E T //NOFORN I I

3 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I us9kz dp (S) believing these men detainee and his family sold their home and used the money to travel to Kabul, AF, via Karachi, Pakistan (PK). Upon arrival in Kabul, detainee set up residence in a home lent to detainee by the Taliban authorities.' c. (S//Nf) Training and Activities: In efforts to support his family, detainee began - growing and selling marijuana. Detainee studied the Koran at a nearby Tajik madrassa.o In October 2001, detainee found employment, along with Haytugan Bakberganovich Abahanov, ISN US9KZ DP (I<Z-526), as a cook at the Tarabakh military camp. Tarabakh military cpmp was a field kitchen and transit point for Taliban military units located northeast of Kabul." 5. (S//NF) Capture Information: ^. (S/AJF) On 2 December 2001, United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) troops captured detainee. On 6 December 2001, UIFSA authorities transferred detainee to US custody.lo b. (S) Property Held: None c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 19 June 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: o Information on detainee's brother, Yakub Abu Khanif s, work with Taliban o Ingress route into Afghanistan from Kazakhstan 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee has been neither cooperative nor forthcoming during detention and remains defiant and proud of his ability to "resist." Detainee Once in Afghanistan, the Taliban did not support the families as promised and families were forced to rely on the _charity of local Afghan families. ' TD-3 4 I , TD-3 14 I t lo-3ru/q , Analyst Note: Religious madrassas have historically encouraged militancy, religious extremism, and intolerance while thriving on anti-western sentiment. n ro-zrungzzg-oz t0 tl-3t+/ ,td , AnalystNote: UIFSA arrestedetainee, detainee's brothers, KZ-526,and Abdullah Makrubov, ISN US9KZ (KZ-528) based on their affiliation with the Taliban. l(z-528had moved in with detainee during the summer of 200 I. KZ-526 and I(Z-528 provide conflicting versions abouthe timeline leading up to their capture. KZ-526 andl(z-528 and are assessed to be attempting to hide the true nature of the group's activities in Afghanistan. 3 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I

4 S E C R E T //NOFORN I / us9kz-000s2ldp (s) admiued traveling to Afghanistan, but detainee's account conceming his means and reasons for traveling to Afghanistan, activities while in Afghanistan, and details leading up to capture are conflicting, erratic, and non-congruent. Detainee is probably hiding the truth concerning his actions and true intentions based on detainee's affiliations with Taliban military units and extremist personalities. 7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: ^. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a member of ETIP with associations to IMU, al-qaida, and Taliban personnel. Detainee possibly engaged in hostile actions against US and coalition forces. Detainee directly supported the Taliban and utilized established Taliban and al-qaida support networks to include guesthouses and training facilities. Detainee's capture event included the capture of known al-qaida operatives and the seizure of three surface-to-air missiles.. (S/A{F) The Kazakhstan Committee for National Security (KNB) identified detainee, KZ-526, and Abdullah Makrubov, ISN US9KZ (KZ-528), as first generation ETIP members who fled Kazakhstan under suspicion of murder and other extremist activities.l I o (S/AID In late 2000, ETIP split, with half of the group staying in Kazakhstan and the other half traveling to Afghanistan. The half traveling to Afghanistan, which reportedly included detainee; KZ-526; andkz-528, joined the ETIP and IMU leader Hassan Makhsum to become terrorists.". (S/AIF) IMU leader Hassan Makhsum aka (Abu Muhammad al-turkistani) aka (Aysu Maksum) called for all Uighur extremists to travel to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban in jihad against US military forces. Makhsum and fellow ETIP members fought alongside the Taliban forces against the NA under Abd al-hadi al-iraqi. ra. (S/AIF) Abd al-hadi al-iraqi was a commander of Usama Bin Laden's (UBL's) former 55th Arab Brigade and a deputy of the 22nd Division. Abd al- Hadi al-iraqi answered directly to Juma Boy Namangani (deceased), commander " TD-314/ " TD-3r4r t' td-3t+/ , Analyst Note: Hassan Makhsum was killed in Sheri Kowt, PK in October See TD- 3r4t 'o TD S E C R E T // NOFORN I I

5 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I US9KZ-OOO521DP (S) of the 22nd Division, which was a part of and subordinate to, the Taliban Ministry of Defense.l5 o (S/AIF) In September 2000, Farkhat Ibragimovich Yusupov, a senior ETIP and IMU leader with extensive travel and associations throughout Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran facilitated detainee's travel to Afghanistan.16 o (S/A{F) On 4 September 2000, Yusupov facilitated detainee's trip to Afghanistan. Yusupov made all the arrangements and paid travel expenses for a group of ten, which included detainee, KZ-526, Yusupov, and seven family members. The group flew to Karachi, and then traveled overland to Kandahar, AF, on 7 September The group stayed in an Uzbek madrassa (NFI) where the men studied the Koran under the tutelage of Imam Mullah Muhammad Omar (NFI).tt. (S/A{F) KZ-526 claimed detainee is the nephew of Yusupov.rs (Analyst Note: This would explain why Yusupov paid travel expenses for the detainee's entire family. Religious training is a common cover story for men engaging in militant training at al-qaida or Taliban-affiliated facilities in the Kandahar area as jihad was a common lecture topic at the camps. Given detainee's links to the ETIP and the Arab Brigade as well as his presence at a Taliban camp, noted below, it is improbable that he would not have received militant training and is therefore assessed to have received at least basic training either in Afghanistan or Kazakhstan.) o (S//l\fD In April 200I, detainee, Yusupov, KZ-526, and family members arrived in Kabul, where Yusupov qssisted the group in acquiring a Taliban-supplied house in the Chari Kambar district.'' o (S/ {F) In April 200I, detainee stated that Yusupov found himself (detainee) and KZ-526 employment as cooks at the Tarabakh Army camp, a Taliban military unit commanded by Saif Rahman.2o t' IIR , IIR , IIR , Analyst Note: The 22nd Division received its orders from Mullah Fazl, a senior Taliban commander and Mullah Obaidullah, the Taliban Minister of Defense. Mullah Fazl is assessed to be Mullah Mohammed Fazl, ISN US9AF DP (AF-007). 'u TD ,llR , Analyst Note: Based on Farkhat Ibragimovich Yusupov's presence at Semei Mosque during the time detainee was recruited and detainee's travel was facilitated, it is assessed Yusupov is Abdullah who facilitated detainee's movement. Variants for Farkhat are Fuqat and Rarkhat. A variant for.- Yusupov is Usupov. " rrr t'ooo521 sir r l-apr-2005 te IIR , IIR , Analyst Note: Chari Kambar is probably in reference to the Wazir Akbar Khan area of Kabul. The Wazir Akbar Khan area was the former Kabul diplomatic district taken over by the Taliban and al-qaida for quarters and training. 20 IIR , Analyst Note: Saif Rahman is assessed to be Jaut Sayfur Rahkman, a Taliban field commander whose mixed Uzbek and Afghan tank detachments were located near Kabul and whose forces engaged coalition forces in combat operations. See TD and MFR 25-JAN S E C R E T / / NOFORN I I

6 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee. ISN: us9kz-000s21dp (S). (S/A{F) In late October 2001, the KNB arrested Yusupov in a joint KNB- Ministry of Interior (MVD) anti-criminal operation. The KNB sentenced Yusupov to death for his long list of extremist activities.2l. (S/AIF) On 2 December 2001, UIFSA Kabul regional Commander Zalmai Tufal captured eight al-qaida members who reportedly did not possess proper identification documents. This group of individuals included three Kazaldtnationals: detainee,kz- 526, andkz-528. Commander Tufal also seized three anti-aircraft missiles in the Kabul area. The missile systems were packed in their original shipping containers and were marked "MT II Type A Made in London.""' (Analyst Note: Based on previous reporting and Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) analysis, the missiles are assessed to be British-made BLOWPIPE man portable (MANPAD) surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. It is not clear from reporting if detainee was captured with the missiles or separately.) o (S/A.[F) The KNB identified detainee as a fanatic and psychologically unbalanced. Detainee renounced his Kazakh citizenship and dropped his Russian patronymic sumame due to Kazakh nationalist sentiments. Detainee informed the KNB he would move to Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA) upon his release. The KNB believed KZ-526 recruited detainee into extremist activities and determined pursuing further interrogations with detainee would be a waste of time." c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile toward the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 26 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS. The most recent infraction occurred on20 July 2006, when detainee refused to stop cross block talking in the recreation yard. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, damage to government property, provoking words or gestures, unauthorized communications, assault, and possession of both non-weapon and weapon type contraband. On 31 December 2005, detainee was found in possession of a reinforced pen hidden in toilet paper. Detainee has a total of three Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault, the most recent occurring on 19 July 2005, when detainee threw rocks at a guard. In 2006 detainee had a total of eight Reports of Disciplinary Infraction. 8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: ^. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrosation session occurred on29 March " TD-3r4r , TD-314r , l4 r25ri 6-04 " rrz 3oo " TD-3r S E C R E T //NOFORN I I

7 S E C R E T // NOFORN J I ZOSZOTZZ SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee. ISN: us9kz-000s21dp (S) b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was a member of ETIP during During this timeframe, detainee had direct contact with senior extremist personnel to include IMU leader Farkhat Ibragimovich Yusupov, Taliban sympathizer Imam Mullah Vali, ETIP member Yaqub Abu Khanif, and ETIP member Abdullah Makrubov. Detainee stayed in Taliban and al-qaida associated guesthouses, and training facilities. In 2001, detainee probably served in a Taliban military unit and possibly had limited access to IMU leader Hassan Makhsum, senior al-qaida operative Abd al-hadi al-iraqi, senior Taliban commander Mullah Fazl, and former Taliban Minister of Defense Mullah Obaidullah. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Based on detainee's membership in ETIP and affiliation with extremist personalities, detainee has specific information on ETIP and IMU recruitment procedures in Kazakhstan. Detainee has information conceming ETIP and IMU processes for transport and training of new recruits destined for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Detainee's presence in Afghanistan and possible relationship to Farkhat Ibragimovich Yusupov could possibly yield to information concerning coordinated operations and training between ETIP, IMU, Taliban, and al-qaida throughout the region encompassing Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Based on detainee's capture event, detainee possibly has information relating to procurement and usage of MANPADs in Afghanistan. Detainee's timeline lapses from September 2000 to April2001 and September to December 2001 require further investigation. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o ETIP leaders and facilitators o ETIP training and transportation networks o Afghanistan guesthouses and training facilities o ETIP, IMU, al-qaida, and Taliban coordination activities o MANPADs 1 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I

8 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I us9kz-000s21dp (S) 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 8 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. 1"#& Rear Admiral, U Commanding S, JR. Navy " Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence lvarning Terminolog,t. 8 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I