Infantry Operations in DWK

Transcription

1 Infantry Operations in DWK This is an illustrated review of DWK Infantry Operations. My aim is to highlight only the key elements of Infantry movement and combat and to give some idea of the depth of the subject. This topic is arguably as big as the game itself because Infantry played such a central role in WWI. It is also difficult to keep the discussion purely on Infantry because interaction with other arms is an important area too. The primary subdivisions of this topic are movement and deployment; and combat offensive and defensive. I will have to address in the course of this how terrain; morale and supply affect Infantry operations. Movement and Deployment Concentration Figure 1: The Battle of the Frontiers, August The German stacks shown as defending have 48 SP (4th Army) and 40 SP (5th Army) respectively. This is during the French mandatory offensive in 1914 and the Germans have given the French no choice but to attack their well concentrated armies. The counterattack combat strengths will be 144 and 120 respectively and likely to cause the French huge loss. The French are also impressively concentrated for attack but will nevertheless be heavily outmatched by the Germans who have assumed optimum positions. 1

2 To begin I want to emphasise what is perhaps the preeminent quality of Infantry in DWK which is their ability to concentrate force. The Strength Point ( SP ) is the basic currency of combat units and most SP are Infantry. A stack of 6 Cavalry Divisions might have 6 12 SP but a stack of 6 Infantry Divisions could easily have 4-6 times as much force. Only some Fortresses and exceptionally strong Artillery concentrations have comparable concentrated force and these are much rarer and are much less versatile in how that strength may be expressed. National differences are particularly expressed through the Full Strength Symbol denoting the normal maximum size of Divisions. Thus Germany can get 48 Infantry SP into one hex whereas Turkey can manage only 18. With Assault Infantry these limits are raised for Germany to 72 Infantry SP. Germany s nearest rival would be Great Britain which can normally manage 42 SP. Given that the combat system is based on incremental strength and results are proportionate exactly to the size of the participating force there are very significant consequences on the ability of the respective armies to concentrate for both attack and defence. All combat opportunities have better results the more SP there are on the friendly side. Deployment It is not possible to have more than a few hexes at a time stacked to the maximum strength. DWK equally requires that the players modulate their forces so that the appropriate force is applied to each situation. The result will be extremely variable concentrations of forces where the correct strength to apply might be anything from the maxima right down to zero SP. Using too much strength in a location where there is no need for it is as bad as having too little at a critical locale. The density of the forces or the average front line strength will dictate a lot of the character of the different fronts. It is also worth distinguishing continuous fronts, in which every front line hex is occupied, and non-continuous fronts in which part of the front may be covered by Zones of Control only or perhaps by nothing at all. This would also cover the situation of open flanks where a line is terminated with undefended hexes beyond. The continuous front is a defence against easy penetration by the enemy. The strength of such a line then depends on various factors including the terrain; whether it is entrenched; the availability of reserves; supply; morale; and the number of SP concentrated in each hex. The terrain may vary and it is also an important factor whether an individual hex can be attacked from one or several adjacent hexes as a salient is more vulnerable. A line can also be regarded as only as strong as its weakest link so a good rule of thumb for defence is to defend each hex equally but to make allowances for terrain and exposure to attack. The non-continuous front is perfectly viable in DWK when penetration or flanking of the front is not likely to be a problem and it is often adopted when concentration has to take priority. In Figure 1, above there is a gap between the main forces on either side, but that is not problematic because neither side expects to hold those positions long enough for enemy movements into the gaps to become disadvantageous. Non- continuous fronts therefore work well in fluid situations and also in cases where the enemy is constrained from moving in certain directions. 2

3 Figure 2: Carpathians, February In this illustration there are elements of a continuous front and an open flank. The Russian line is under a little pressure because the Russians have a serious supply shortage. This means the Austrian salient is not in much immediate danger even though it is only defended by 3 SP. The termination of each sides line is protected by wooded rough terrain and ZOCs. To move into hex X would cost 6 MP and only cavalry or mountain units could make that move from a hex adjacent to the enemy (consider SR 6-9). The Austro-Hungarian 1-4 brigade would take two turns to reach X and 4 turns to reach a deeper position in the Russian rear flank giving them plenty of time to react. Because this is such a minor threat, the Russians need not worry too much about further extending their line into the mountains if they have other priorities. Surrounded This topic should be confronted early on. The ultimate disaster in DWK is to suffer the loss of a large force while surrounded. Even the loss of a single Infantry Division surrounded is a notable victory. Surrounded and surrendering SP lost will count double demoralisation (DM) and, since this penalty doesn t apply to fortresses, we are referring really to the loss of a large Infantry force. 1 A unit is surrounded when it does not have a line of communication (LOC) to a friendly board edge or friendly country interior (SR 20-1). Surrounded units are exceptionally vulnerable. They retreat if they suffer losses equal to a quarter of their strength (SR 20-7). They are not permitted to retreat from enemy ZOC to another enemy ZOC and if they cannot retreat they surrender (SR 20-8 and 20-9). Units in and around fortresses have some protection from these rules as do units in pockets but these may just be temporary reprieves (SR and 20-14, German and British units are partly immune to SR by nation specific rules SR 37-7 and 38-2). Unless there is a fortress within the pocket then the surrounded units have only one turn to escape isolation or they will surrender. 1 Artillery has its own special type of disaster as they are destroyed when they are forced to retreat (SR 29-13). 3

4 Despite these dire consequences, surrender should be a fairly rare event in DWK. Mostly this is because the enemy should be able to see the threat developing and withdraw or protect an otherwise threatened force. However, there is a risk of unexpected moves as there are real opportunities for surprise and loss of control in DWK which means a player may not see the danger until it is too late. Examples of this include the use of column attacks which mean a thin line may be unexpectedly penetrated by a double attack; defending forces can also be trapped by retreat priorities and forbidden moves also. Figure 3: Catastrophe in the Ardennes, August The units above are positioned for the French mandatory offensive similar to that shown in Figure 1. The French force in the Ardennes (A) consists of 10 Divisions and has a LOC which is safe from any ordinary German movement in the next turn but is not safe against advances from combat. The French attack goes in against the German 4 th Army and is pretty bad for the French they suffer 27 SP losses out of 62 SP committed (the Germans are supported by Artillery). In their turn, the Germans move uncommitted units against the French A force and first attack the eastern stack. This attack is strong enough to force a retreat and by the retreat priority this is towards the HQ which provided supply (3 rd Army). This is a bad mistake. If another HQ had provided supply a retreat southwest would have been possible and the LOC protected. With the German advance after combat, the western half of the French force is now surrounded. The French force stacked with 21 Division has 17 SP left and will have to surrender if it suffers 5 SP lost in the second German attack. With 40 SP attacking the Germans have a 50% chance of utterly destroying 5 French Divisions and inflicting another 34 DM on a force which had already suffered terrible losses. Even if the French survive this they will have difficulty withdrawing to safe positions south of the Meuse River. 4

5 Movement DWK Infantry has a Movement Allowance ( MA ) of 4 or 5 Movement Points. The difference in quality between 4 and 5 MA is very noticeable in situations where movement ability is at a premium, often when manoeuvring around enemy units. Column movement (SR 6-10) raises the MA to 6 or 7 which is not so bad when compared to the 9 MA of Cavalry column moves. Infantry movement is distinctive perhaps because it allows the redeployment of a significant mass of force which can change the situation on a front. Even where there is stalemate there can and should be rapid movements laterally behind the front which create uncertainty as the enemy will find it hard to predict where a blow may fall. Infantry movement is also highly variable. Due to terrain, entrenchments and ZOC the effective movement rate in different directions may be equivalent to to the Column MA measured in hexes or alternatively movement may be forbidden altogether. Figure 4: Southern Poland, February A strong German stack has been moving backwards and forwards along a line A B. As it moves it threatens to attack different Russian positions. The Russians are keen to deter this as their morale is critical and they do not want to give the Germans easy combat opportunities. This forces the Russians into continual adjustments of their own positions. This is made difficult by the marshes, rivers and trenches which complicate their lateral movements. Rail Movement Rail movement greatly increases the range of Infantry movement in particular. With units able to move up to 50 hexes per turn (less if there is entraining) strategic redeployment between fronts is relatively easy. 5

6 The aspect of rail movement in DWK which is worth highlighting here is the manner in which railways can enhance lateral movements behind the front and deliver a strong concentration suddenly against a section of the enemy line. This may be called a railway concentration. It is one of the ways by which an enemy front can be surprised and unable to react before a potentially devastating blow is delivered. Because the forces for a railway concentration can come from different places some distance away it is very hard to spot this happening. The defender will also benefit from the use of railways to rapidly move reserves to sectors under attack but unless the defender has a standing reserve already entrained the attacker usually has the advantage initially. Railway concentrations generally need double track rail in order to deliver massed forces into a small area quickly. The quality of the rail net is also important. On the western front it is often found that only a few front line hexes are more than one hex away from a double track rail. On other fronts the rail net is less dense but, with good planning, opportunities can be taken. The Germans and British also have some advantage in their ability to combine rail movement with movement into enemy ZOC (SR 7-8). However, the most superlative capability is that of the Germans who have a unique ability to ride railways right into the ZOC of Russian units (SR 37-3). This is potentially devastating and the Russians should be wary if they are adjacent to German Operative railways. Figure 5: In October 1915, the Italians have concentrated their reserves immediately behind the Isonzo Front on the railway lines. They could strike at the strong defences the Austrians have on the Isonzo but equally they can use their full rail capacity to move seven Infantry Divisions (42 SP) quickly to the Trentino which is served by one double track and four single track railways. The same moves could be done in reverse and are akin to the classic chess fork. The Austrians simply cannot equal this mobility because there is no double track railway linking the Isonzo Front with the Trentino and it would take several turns to move an equivalent force to match the Italian move. Presence of the Enemy One of the most distinctive rules in DWK is SR 6-9 which is what might be called the minimum move rule. In many comparable games the rule will often be that regardless of terrain cost a unit can move one hex. That rule applies in DWK, but it is not applied when the move is between two enemies 6

7 ZOC. In that case a single hex move exceeding movement allowances (including ZOC costs) is only permitted when the cost of the terrain (excluding ZOC costs) is 3 or less. 2 That means mobility is significantly constrained by the presence of the enemy. This rule affects Cavalry and Artillery slightly differently because of their different movement capabilities. Mountain Infantry apply a different version of this rule which is much more generous (SR 32). This is the only real difference between Mountain Infantry and ordinary Infantry but it is a big one. Here is a list of single hex moves which are prohibited for both 4 and 5 MA ordinary Infantry moving between enemy ZOC : wooded rough; rough plus a minor river; mountains; major rivers plus any other terrain/trench; trench plus river and any other type of terrain; trench plus woods; trench plus rough; trench plus wooded rough. Devastated hexes also in the same combinations as trenches. Railways between the two hexes could alter the situation. Note that as trenches and marshes do not ever apply together a marsh can facilitate sneaky movement near the enemy. Figure 6: Difficulties of movement in the Vosges, March The blue line is the front line and can only be crossed by means of an attack. Hex 3021 is safe as there is nothing to attack and the French do not have Assault Infantry which could attack an empty space. The black lines are barred to moves by ordinary infantry and sometimes also cavalry. Mountain units would be able to cross those hex sides. The red lines are barred in the same way but only in one direction towards the entrenched hex. The German salient (occupied by 3 WR Division) cannot be reinforced by ordinary infantry (the hex is devastated as well as difficult terrain). In fact the German infantry could not withdraw either except by retreat from combat. The French position at Neu Breisach is nearly as exposed as it can only be reinforced by the green dotted route (by Infantry) and that takes three turns from Belfort. 2 A simpler expression of the rule might have been that it is not possible to move between enemy ZOC when the total movement cost (including ZOC) is 5 or more. 7

8 Mountain units can in contrast make all those moves and can even cross a mountain plus a minor river thanks to their better capability. Significantly ordinary Infantry cannot move between two front line trench/devastated hexes next to enemy units unless the hex side between them has terrain which is clear; broken; hilly or marsh. What this means is that in difficult terrain a gap in the front cannot always be penetrated. It sometimes means front line salient hexes cannot be reinforced or retreated from except as a result of retreats or advances after combat. It also means that shifting force laterally in the front line where there are trenches or devastated hexes is quite restricted. This is one of the ways in which the tactical/operational consequences of the six sliced hex terrain become critical. Infiltration Figure 7: Transylvania August The Romanians have just withdrawn from their positions marked by the black boxes and the Germans are about to move. The Romanian positions were untenable as the German mountain infantry threatened to infiltrate through gaps in the line. In particular no Romanian units could move to cover the hex marked with the black X because of minimum move limitations. The German Mountain Division (which arrived by rail) is not so restricted and with its better minimum move powers it can infiltrate to hex X. Had the Romanian 22 Division not anticipated this and withdrawn first it would have been trapped in its original hex to the northwest of its current position. If the German unit had been an assault Division it could have performed the further trick of attacking the empty hex Y and so advanced two hexes through difficult terrain in one turn. Instead of being a strong barrier the wooded rough terrain is exposing the poor manoeuvrability of the Romanians compared to the German Alpine troops. 8

9 Infiltration is the ability to move through gaps in an enemy front and it is one of the ways in which surrounding enemy units can be brought about. The threat of infiltration can also force the abandonment of positions without a fight. Infiltration depends chiefly on MA. Cavalry are best and 5 MA Infantry are significantly better than 4 MA Infantry. Mountain Infantry is superior to Cavalry in infiltration where the terrain is mountainous or where it is simultaneously rough and entrenched or devastated. Assault Infantry also have a unique infiltration capability which is derived from their ability to attack and therefore advance in to an empty hex (SR 33-7). There is nothing in this rule which says it cannot be used to cross a Major River though to do that across the Danube River would require compliance with SR 35 3 which demands the presence of an Engineer unit. Delay Figure 8: August 1914 (Turn 5). The French have divided the 5th Division into two Brigades. They are trying to prevent the powerful German 1G stack from reaching Hirson from where they could attack the 51R stack which would get the Germans through the French line and isolate the remainder of 5 th Division and the fortress. It is an imperfect defence which is also aimed at preventing the Germans have a good attack on any main Allied force including the British. It is still possible for the Germans to do their attack if either of the 2G and 32 XX stacks cleared out the 10/5 by column attack and forced it to retreat to Hirson. These are not guaranteed success and would use a lot of supply to destroy one or two French SP. It might then require a second column attack by the 1G to clear Hirson itself before attacking 51R in the combat phase. The 3 French SP sacrificed therefore could stop the German advance in its tracks if the French were lucky but in any event it forces the Germans to use disproportionate resources and keep very strong forces occupied if they try to barrel through to an ambitious objective. 9

10 There are many ways to delay enemy operations in DWK. Delay is best thought of as a means to prevent the enemy using its full force against you immediately. Sometimes simply establishing a strong defensive concentration forces the enemy to spend more time building up the force and supply they need to make a more effective attack. Retreat and any kind of withdrawal away from the enemy will reduce the enemy force in range able to attack. ZOCs and terrain should be used to enhance the advantages of distance. Larger scale retreats simply apply the delay purpose on a bigger canvas. Retreat can save a force which might otherwise be destroyed or have its morale shaken prematurely. It gives the defending force time to redeploy or reinforce and take advantage of better defence lines. The most successful retreats might cause a whole campaign to come to an end for a season. Sacrifice also has considerable potential to interfere with enemy movements. Sometime a sole SP can hold up a large force. Sometimes a bit more may be needed. Morale and Supply Before talking about Infantry combat something has to be said about these topics which have wider significance but which also have direct effects at the tactical level. Morale Progressive accumulation of Demoralisation Points ( DM ) is something tied to Victory Conditions and how the game is played strategically both at the level of the Grand Campaign and Scenarios. What is important here is how this works at the level of individual combats. In terms of rolling the dice and establishing the outcome it has no effect at all. It is quite possible to take a unit from a nation on the brink of surrender and it will attack and defend just as effectively as on the first day of the war when its morale was sky high. Nevertheless, the effect of morale is real in combat at the point of initiating or accepting combat. In both the campaign and scenarios individual nations will be either in a position where they should be loss tolerant or loss averse. There is no rule which tells the players which situation applies and it can switch very easily as a result of losses incurred and/or through the effluxion of time. Morale is also very much a relative concept both in terms of comparison between different nations and in reference to the same nation at different times. It is also a mistake to think morale never improves just because the DM total always increases. First, DM allowed does increase annually in the campaign game. Second, the rate at which losses can be tolerated can increase after a period when losses have been low. Third, morale can improve relatively against another nation even if both are increasing DM. In 1914, all nations morale is absolutely high and there is no other time in which one can be quite as careless about losses. However even then some nations must be more careful than others. Austria simply cannot throw their forces about with the same abandon as Germany can. Even Serbia and 10

11 Belgium whose morale is not controlled by DM have to have some circumspection. Their losses are very slow to replace so if they allow excessive losses they will simply cease to count as an effective force. Figure 9: Eastern Front in March The Germans have marched forwards into contact with the Russian line. The Germans are covering much of their front with nothing stronger than Landwehr Brigades. The German player is confident the Russians will not attack because of their low morale even though the Russians have stronger forces in the vicinity. Both sides are at Shaken Morale but relatively Russian Morale is much worse. At DM 880 they are only 70 DM below the level for Economic Collapse. The Germans are at DM 1650 but they are 400 DM below Economic Collapse. The Germans might be regarded as 5 or 6 times less sensitive to losses but only a portion of this willingness to fight can be allocated to the Eastern Front. There is also an allocation in time. In this case the Russian player might be wishing to save his limited morale resource for use later at a more critical moment. These allocations are in the players minds so they have some ability to motivate their own troops in the short term by determining how much they should bear losses and where this will power will be expressed. Abuse this ability and you will drive your forces to yet lower morale by allowing their losses to rise too fast. As time passes morale gets more and more critical. When nations become loss adverse they have to shut down the frequency of combat. Attacks then must be fewer and more selective and must always have a tangible advantage in sight. Defence may be less stubborn as the attraction of retreating from combat to reduce losses grows more important. Low morale also encourages multinational stacking where allowed so the player has more choice as to where the losses will fall. When morale is very low, perfectly solid defences can be cracked by even moderate attacks. 11

12 Supply Figure 10: Western Front, June The British are involved in an offensive where their priority is to inflict maximum loss on the Germans. Within two hexes the British are capable of stacking 84 Infantry SP and they have some Artillery as well. The Infantry attack alone would cost 21 supply points if fully supplied which would be the most effective way to make one attack. The British only have enough supply to make about three of those attacks and less if they use a lot of Artillery. British morale is still relatively high so they do not mind the extra losses of making extra attacks. The best approach would be to make some partially supplied attacks to stretch the same supply expenditure over 4 or 5 attacks. The more unsupplied units join the attack the more German losses there will be even though the loss ratios will be worse. The Germans are also still in a state of good morale so they should be content to supply their defence as much as they can afford. Infantry combat involves decisions about combat supply which do not have to be made with the other arms. Cavalry don't need it, Artillery always need combat supply, and Infantry has a choice of whether to fight with full supply, any level of partial supply, 3 or no supply. Supply is precious and effective. It is hard to resist the temptation to spend it all too rapidly. It is beyond doubt that not spending supply is not optimum. What is less clear is how and when supply points should be spent. The fact that the Grand Campaign has rules (GCR 22) preventing players stockpiling supply above certain limits which, in some cases, are exceptionally generous should be a clue that immediate expenditure on every opportunity is not the best course. 4 Infantry which attack with no supply or little supply might be regarded as making massed infantry assaults with great élan but poor doctrine and little support from field ordinance including infantry manned weapons such as mortars. This support and the ammunition needed is what the supply 3 Partial supply means providing some supply but not enough to fully supply. If 60 Infantry SP have 10 supply points used to attack they are partially supplied with a combat strength of (10*4) + 20/2 = 50. Partial supply is a complete continuum from more than no supply to almost full supply. 4 In 1917, Germany is allowed to stockpile 850 supply points. This suggests how much supply is needed to make effective preparations for the final culminating offensives of the war. 12

13 point really represents. Unsupplied attacks are the way to maximise enemy losses because there is really no limit on the number of such attacks you can make in addition to supplied combat. You need high morale to do this because friendly losses will be terrible and that is what makes it unsustainable. Increasing the amount of supply used allows the attacker to optimise the attack and increase the effectiveness while still economising on supply expenditure. Unsupplied units which join supplied units to make partially supplied attacks do not increase friendly losses unless there is an increase in the number of friendly attacks. Full supply represents preparation and caution. Infantry have to be supplied to attack when their morale is shaken. If attacks have to be fully supplied fewer attacks will be made which means the enemy losses will be lower. The advantage is that the more supply expended without increasing the number of attacks the better the loss ratio for the attacker. There is another level of preparation and caution available which is the Artillery supported fully supplied attack. Artillery does not add combat strength to an attack if Infantry involved are not themselves fully supplied as the supply point spent on the Artillery is cancelled out by the reduction in effectiveness of the Infantry. This full scale Infantry-Artillery combination further increases the loss ratio advantage for the attacker. The ultimate limit on this is the rule preventing a player using more than 50% of supply on Artillery (GCR 22-13). The increasing supply commitment so described therefore serves to provide a solution in part to declining morale. In attack, at least, the pressure to use supply and Artillery is increasing as morale declines. The matrix below shows the supply-morale trade-offs that underpin DWK s combat system. 13

14 Morale is not the only thing driving supply choices in attack. Because supplied attacks are more effective there is constant pressure on the player to choose to supply their attacks. Attack is also much more demanding on supply than defence because although a supply point only supplies 2 SP of defenders there are usually far more attackers than 2:1. Overall shortage of supply also forces some selection between different attacks and between attack and defence. Analysis of the increased combat strength of expending supply shows that you get more bangs for your supply point by spending it on defence. This can be regarded as the defensive premium. If you follow this logic in Infantry combat you would tend to try and use all your supply on defence. If both sides did this always the firepower advantage of defence would be 6:1. 1 Supply Point provides combat supply to: Combat Strength without Supply Combat Strength with Supply 2 Artillery SP Defending Shaken Morale Infantry SP Attacking 2 Infantry SP Stands in Defence Artillery SP attacking Infantry SP with Good Morale Attacking 2 Infantry SP Retreating in Defence Cavalry Full Full None Combat Strength Added by Supply Table 1: This table shows the opportunity costs of using a supply point. It is important to remember that most of the time Infantry has a combat strength even when not supplied. From this I derive the principle that it is preferred to spend supply on defence for Infantry unless their morale is shaken when it is better to expend on attack. This might seem paradoxical but it shows that low morale (or perhaps more experienced) infantry needed support to fight. The supply advantage of defence is also lost if they are retreating but that still has an advantage of reducing the efficiency of the attacker s supply if any was spent. Extending this question to other situations shows that the advantage of defence is not always so great. When morale is shaken then the Infantry cannot attack at all without supply. Arithmetically the advantage shifts to spending supply on attack instead of defence. If both sides spent supply exclusively on attack the firepower advantage of defence reduces to 1.5:1. 5 Thus it is in DWK the morale-supply game is the driver of a natural evolution in the game where offence steadily increases in power. The 1917 CRT adds to this trend especially because the higher losses increase the difficulty of holding ground. This is not a forced evolution either. Players do not have to subscribe to it and at the level of the individual attack and within short scenarios other factors dominate. It is in fact extremely difficult to ignore the pressure to make each combat (attack 5 This is assuming the defender is following the same logic. This will only be imperfectly true because nations demoralise at different rates and face the strategic burden of attack and defence at different times. Turks and Serbians also have different logic when their counterattack supply is free. 14

15 or defence) more effective by expending more supply. The most effective use of supply is not the last word for every situation. If a nation is on the brink of surrender it isn t going to launch a costly offensive just because that would be the best way to spend its supply points. On the other hand, it does help predict that a nation with declining morale may find that it has to make a last desperate bid for victory by attacking before its situation gets too bad. A last point on supply is that the absolute amount of supply available is a very big factor in troop quality. If a nation is short of supply then that means its Infantry will be unsupplied more frequently in combat and fight half as effectively. Germany has the most generous supply production and this one of the main factors which makes a German SP superior to a Russian SP for instance. 6 Defence Some of the principles of a good defence have been discussed above under the headings of concentration and deployment. It should also have been noted that defence has a premium and especially during the early war this should be heightened by giving it a generous supply priority so that the attackers suffer their share of notorious massacres. The greatest difficulty of defence is the surrender of initiative. It allows the attack to prepare at leisure and to choose the time and place of maximum advantage to unleash their blows. Somehow those advantages have to be diminished. Terrain The defender gets to choose where the line of resistance might be and whether it is straight or sinuous. Strategic factors will constrain this; the Germans cannot easily afford to retreat to the Rhine. Terrain generally aids the defence by reducing defenders losses and reducing the risk of involuntary retreat. In DWK the terrain also ensures that the attacker s losses increase. The perfect situation for a defender is a large attack into mountains against a strongly defended hex in winter. A very important terrain rule is SR which introduces stiffened defences from which the defender cannot be ejected unless losses are 100% of the defender s strength. Difficult terrain tends to encourage lower troop density. Fewer defenders are needed to effectively hold ground and large attacking forces are less effective than they would be if deployed on the plains. Troop density therefore on average reflects terrain difficulty. However, as often happened historically, the sudden appearance of a large force in an area weakly held is going to be able to change the weather and railways are often the means to deliver such surprises regardless of terrain. 6 The other main factors would be superior morale, greater ability to concentrate, and better Artillery support which also depends on supply. 15

16 Clever use of terrain works in many other ways in and around combat. Combat supply is more difficult in difficult terrain so it is harder to set up attacks in addition to them being less effective. On the other hand, the defender's reserves are often unable to intervene quickly enough. Figure 11: Mountain Combat, February The Italians are massing for an offensive which has been compelled by supply stockpile limits (GCR 22) which they would have preferred to delay until the spring. The Austrian defences have some advantages of terrain. Some hexes in the defence line are only defended by 4 SP but this is sufficient for the situation though there should be concern about how fast reserves might arrive. The terrain also effectively forces the Italian to place their HQ as shown as no other positions would be able to supply the whole attack. The main Italian threat is to the hex which can be attacked from four directions. The defender can choose either mountain terrain or rough. Mountain terrain reduces the effectiveness of the attack by 50% and in winter can give a maximum + 4 modifier to the counterattack (so long as not all of the attackers are in trenches). The rough terrain defence would also benefit from the trench to give a - 4 modifier to the enemy attack and the counterattack would be +2 in winter but the Italian combat strength would be reduced by 25% due to the Italian Front winter rule (SR34-5). Which choice is better depends on the size of the Italian attack. Mountains are less resistant to sneaky small attacks. The defence has two terrain related weaknesses. The Austrian HQ is 7 MP distant from the threatened hex (a long supply line) which in winter (SR 34-3) means the defenders have a -1 reduction in strength for each Division which after multiplication would reduce counterattack combat strength by 6 (for two Divisions). In addition this hex can only be reinforced by mountain units so repeated attacks will use up the reserves of a valuable type of unit and the defence will fail if too few are available. Trenches Trenches have both movement and combat effects. Devastated hexes are ex-trenches which simply retain the movement effect only. Trenches are man-made terrain and the -2 combat attack modifiers significantly depress the defenders losses in combat. If combined with other terrain, trenches make positions a very difficult proposition which may easily benefit from the maximum -4 combat modifier to attacks (SR 13-25). Trenches are what makes it possible to hold a line through clear terrain against powerful enemy concentrations. The other big impact of trenches is that they reduce the risk of forced retreat from 16

17 combat which is only required if the defender suffers 100% losses (SR 22-8). Trenches are also needed to make attacks in winter without penalty (SR 34-4). The strength of a trench line depends very much on the size of the force manning it. Where a hex is held by 1 SP a trench adds very little to the defense. It can only save that lone SP against relatively weak attacks. A trench defended by 30 SP has a very large impact on any combat. This could increase to 30 the number of losses needed to cause a retreat from 10 or 15. As a well defended trench can only be effectively attacked by a large attacking force the impact of the negative attack modifier is also increased. Large garrisons in trenches also allow for the possibility of solid defenses which improve the benefit of the defense and increase attackers losses if they attack trenches in clear or broken terrain without adequate Artillery assistance (SR and 20-21). Figure 12: Palestine, December Here the Turks are defending against a superior Allied force. The Turks have between 3 and 6 SP in each front line hex. Were it not for the trench line their position would be hopeless already. From the dates on the trenches it can be seen this front has held for more than 6 months. The trenches in the hilly terrain increase the attackers negative modifier from -2 to -4. Where the Allies were making supplied attacks with combat strength of about 40, Turkish losses in each attack were reduced by 1 to 3 SP due to the impact of the trenches. To make more effective attacks the Allies used up their supplies and have been obliged to continue with unsupplied attacks which effectively double their losses relative to the Turks. Despite this the Turkish defence has weakened and in the east the trenches were breached. However, stiffened defences are available and although the Turks are building new trenches in the rough terrain this will only have a marginal benefit. The Allies did not build trenches because that would have interfered with their ability to use mobility to strike rapidly at different ends of the Turkish line. The devastated hex which the Turks left behind makes it much harder for the Allies to change positions on the right flank. From this position it took another two months before the Turkish resistance collapsed. Trenches are less significant in difficult terrain such as rough and wooded rough. This is because the defensive modifier is already at the maximum -4 or near to it so that he trench adds nothing more or just a little. Also in this terrain from 1915 onwards stiffened defenses (SR 22-16) are available and this makes the trenches advantage in preventing retreats redundant. 17

18 Trenches are also useless in marsh terrain or mountains (SR 22-2) though they can cover hex sides with different terrain and therefore give other combat choice options. Trenches represent investments of time and effort as it requires continuous construction for a month. This can lead to combats which have no other objective than to try and disrupt trench construction before it is completed (I prefer the optional SR which permits construction to start in any player turn). Trenches can only be built by Infantry (which would include Strengthened Cavalry (SR 31-4)) and until April 1915 they have to be continuously occupied by Infantry to maintain them (SR 22-12). The period between September 1914 and March 1915 is the only one during which trenches can be built which are not on the front line. The Salonika Entrenched Camp (GCR 33-7 and 33-8) and the Hindenburg Line (GCR 24) are exceptions to this. Apart from immobilizing units there is no cost to building trenches but it should not be an automatic decision to build trenches everywhere. We have already seen that trenches in enemy ZOCs are the cause of severe difficulties of movement laterally within the front line and the extra movement cost of a trench hex makes it hard for reserves to be fed into the line quickly. Often the only hex from which a trench hex can be reinforced is the one or two hexes directly behind it. That means that trenches in difficult terrain can actually impede effective defense. Superior attacking forces may also disdain trenches because they will reduce their mobility and prevent their main concentrations from successively striking at different points of the enemy front. Channeling Since counterattacks are potentially more powerful than attacks and are less demanding on supplies, the defender should be happy not to have the burden of attack. The icing on the cake is when time pressure or lack of options forces the attacker to attack at a place where the defender is well prepared and the attacker can get no benefit from the initiative. This is most likely to happen on narrow fronts or as a result of the defender withdrawing so that the attacker s only viable attacks are dictated by the defender and from which they are unlikely to get an advantage. Another common situation for channeling is when the attacker is fully committed and cannot without significant time cost redeploy his concentration elsewhere. This should invite the defender to reinforce and make the attacker s gains more costly. 18

19 Figure 13: Paris basin, December Here the Germans are at the last gasp of their 1914 offensive in the West. They have just made a successful attack between the Marne and the Seine forcing back the French 60R and 82T Divisions. This followed the creation of another salient which is currently occupied by the 1 Bavarian Reserve Division. Despite these advances, the French are really channelling the German advance into dead ends which cannot be exploited. The German position is precarious unless they first turn on the stronger concentrations of French covering Paris or the French trench positions to the east. In subsequent turns, the Germans made unsuccessful attacks on both hexes marked with red X s and failing in these was forced to suspend the campaign and redeploy. Fall Back The ability to make a voluntary retreat from combat is an important tool in the defender s arsenal. Individual hexes are not necessarily worth very much. The advantage (not available to Italians or Austro-Hungarians (SR 42-3 and 40-6)) is a reduction in losses by the defender by one-third. It does reduce the losses inflicted on the attacker by the same proportion. Effectively the intensity of the combat is reduced which is an advantage to any loss averse nation so this skill is most important when morale is shaky. The advantage of this is magnified the bigger the original loss as more SP will be saved by the retreat. In some situations, the retreat will not even lose the hex if there is reason to believe the enemy cannot or will not advance after combat so that it can be reoccupied in the friendly player turn. This can happen in cases of artillery only attacks against infantry. Perhaps the biggest advantage of the retreat from combat (where the hex is unimportant) is that the attacker may be considered to have wasted supply to conquer the hex and may do relatively limited damage when the defender s loss is restricted perhaps by several factors, terrain, trench and retreat. 19

20 Figure 14: Prussia, September This situation is from a Tannenberg Scenario game showing the arrival of the German West Front reinforcement. The Russian 2 nd Army has escaped disaster further south and the Germans are desperate (given the Victory Conditions) to inflict a crushing blow on the Russian 1 st Army. The Germans use their unique ability of detraining in a Russian ZOC (SR 37-3) and attack with 52 SP, the biggest attack of the war in the east so far. However, it is a major disappointment as the die roll is a 1 and the Russians retreated with their losses reduced from 4 to 3. This was not a voluntary retreat but it is likely the Russians would have chosen withdrawal anyway. They are not especially concerned to hold on to this anonymous bit of Prussian territory and the Victory Conditions tell them to preserve their Army instead. The Germans also used more than 4 supply points per loss inflicted on the Russians which is not great. Only one man left standing There are contrary cases, where holding a hex is important and the defender wishes to prevent a forced retreat. Economy of force demands that the defending force has to be as small as possible so it pays to be aware of the retreat thresholds. German units will retreat if there are at least 50% losses and a defense with an odd number of defender SPs is equally as good as a defense with the immediately higher even number of SPs. If the defenders are of a nation which retreats with 33% losses then the sweet numbers are 1, 4, 7, 10. It is at the lower end of these sequences that the advantages are most felt (saving more strength for elsewhere) so this is particularly important in low troop density spots. 20

21 Where the defender can confidently expect to hold the hex for at least one turn then the strength of a defense line starts to be measured more in terms of what reserves and replacements might there be for those who fell in the first round. Figure 15: Western Poland, November The Russians are under some pressure from the Germans who are trying to push them back to the Vistula River. The Russians have little supply and are short of SP relative to a very long front line. They are reduced to defending as best they can while the Germans make opportunistic attacks. As far as possible, the Russians avoid stacking hexes with a number of SP divisible by 3 which would make it easier to engineer Russians retreats when their losses equal 33% of the defending stack. Single SP units (including Cavalry) help the Russians man their front line with 4, 5 or 7 SP typically. Reserves Defender s reserves should be thought of as units which may be available to reinforce an attacked hex. In DWK a strongly defended hex may not fall after one attack but it could be taken with a successive attack if the first were repeated. This is a common situation and the defender needs to be sure that the line he is defending can be held through persistent attack. That involves repairing the losses in the vulnerable sector. This can give rise to a race over several turns in which the defender is trying to maintain the strength of the line or at least prevent it falling so low that it could be penetrated in a further attack. Ideally reserves should be able to move within one turn to the threatened hex. These are the most local reserves. Others might only arrive in the second or later turns after the first attack. That might be too late. Attacking forces will take advantage of this, looking for hexes that cannot be reinforced quickly and capture them over more than one turn. Another common vulnerability is salient hexes in difficult terrain which may be reached only by mountain units. Only mountain units can be considered reserves for such a hex. 21

22 It is instructive to consider what local reserves each front line hex has. The nearest place may seem to be adjacent hexes on the front line but that is often not the case as we have seen when considering the minimum move problem (SR 6-9). Often the local reserve has to be behind the front line immediately behind the attacked hex. Reserves can arrive from some distance thanks to railways but they will usually take two turns to reach a front line entrenched hex. German and British units can do better due to superior detraining ability (SR 7-8). The Germans and British can have local reserves for entrenched hexes, which have a clear or broken terrain link to the rear, if there is a rail line in the rear hex, and if the reserves have 5 MA, and started the turn entrained, and within 10 hexes of the rear hex. Figure 5: Western Front, Summer The line of the Western Front is shown with the thick black line. Both sides of the front are entrenched or devastated. As the terrain is open or broken then it is possible for Infantry to move between adjacent trenches on the front (Artillery cannot) but there is an exception where the rivers break the front and then it is not possible to directly move from one side to another. This has a big impact on the comparative strength of German positions at Peronne and Laon. The red and brown outline shows where the local reserves of each of these hexes may be located. Laon can receive aid from all adjacent hexes on its side of the front and 5 MA units can arrive from 2 hexes distance. At Peronne, the river prevents immediate reinforcement by Infantry unless they are located in hex 1111 immediately to the rear. Furthermore Laon could be reinforced by already entrained Infantry at Maubeuge or anywhere within 10 hexes of the two hexes covered by the detrain box. The rail move would cost 1 MP and to enter the Laon hex costs the remaining 4 MP. The river behind Peronne prevents a comparable move. If there is nothing in hex 1111 then Peronne would have to hold out 2 turns before any reserves arrived. To hold Peronne would require a much stronger defence than is needed Laon. 22

23 Defense in Depth Defense in depth would refer to a system of defense which in some way trades ground and/or sacrificial units in order to make it difficult for the attacker to deliver an effective immediate attack on the main line of resistance. This is related to delay tactics because the method may be designed to help give time for the gathering of reserves. A simple defense in depth would be to establish a strong line of defense a little withdrawn from the enemy. This would mean the attackers would have to leave their trenches to make an attack. This would be an ideal situation from which a strong defender would switch the initiative and attack in turn the now vulnerable enemy force depleted from losses from their own attack and exposed in open country. Another variation would be the deliberate retreat from combat to invite an advance after combat. The attacker then has to divide their force into those who advance and those who do not and again this might be an ideal opportunity to attack from all sides to recover the ground lost and worsen the attacker s losses. Figure 6: Battle of Arras, April In the Nivelle Offensive Scenario, the British have just made a smashing attack on the German line on the Western Front but capturing a hex is not the same as a breakthrough. The British have to consider an advance after combat and it is clear that the Germans could make a huge attack in return which would catch the British out of their trenches. In order to limit their losses but wishing to destroy the German trench line the British only advance 33 Division. With good morale the Germans could easily handle this situation, as an unsupplied German attack with 100 SP would destroy the British 33 Division with little cost (even as an overkill) and this would help balance out the disadvantageous losses they have incurred in the first attack. Because their morale is shaken, the Germans have to use supply. If they wished to guarantee eliminating every British SP which advanced that would require 13 supply points. In this situation, the Germans will not advance back into the hex they lost because the British morale is still good. Both sides therefore show reticence at pushing deeper into the enemy positions because to do so exposes them to powerful counterblows. A third example would be holding the front with a small force with the main front massed behind. This works especially well against Shaken Morale attackers because they cannot optimize their supply expenditure. As such they risk either an overkill or alternatively risk failing to remove the 23

24 obstacle. Either way, by the time the attackers get to the main front (which could repeat the maneuver) the attackers may have wasted a lot of supply relative to the defense. This would be a good way to meet a Kaiserschlacht type of offensive. It is unlikely these examples do more than illustrate the possibilities, but defense in depth does seem to be particularly suited to situations where the attacker is under a strategic burden of attack but the defender has accumulated strength and resources which would be best employed when the attacker has overextended in some way. Attack The advantages of defense in WWI can be overcome. Largely this is by means of outnumbering the defender at the point of attack. In DWK attack is the means by which you strive to create the conditions of victory. Only by attacks can a player directly manipulate the DM scales which are controlling who will win. So long as the attacker is not under such pressure that they lose all power of discrimination the selection of advantageous attacks should ensure that the DM scales move in their favour. This does not necessarily require inflicting a greater loss on the enemy than the attacker suffers. On the contrary, the morale situation often allows the attacker to suffer heavily disproportionate loss and still be winning. Ultimately this morale pressure forces the defender to attack in turn because that will be the only way they can avoid their opponent absolutely controlling the relative rates of demoralization. The butcher s bill When an attack is made the attacker should have some idea of the outcome and there must be some minimum possible advantage that would flow from it. A few attacks in the game are compulsory such as the Plan XVII attacks and some other mandated August 1914 situations. Other attacks are mandated by the supply stockpile rule (GCR 22) and the Infantry-Artillery coordination rule (GCR 22-13). Nevertheless, although such attacks have to be made there is considerable discretion in how and sometimes when they are done and the player has little grounds to complain that his hands are completely tied. These attacks also need not be disadvantageous and part of the skill is preventing or limiting the adverse consequences. Furthermore, you gain the advantage of recovering your complete freedom by dealing with these situations. For all the other attacks you may conduct it is entirely down to you how you assess the advantage of an attack. It may be to capture ground but in DWK victory often depends in very large part on relative success in inflicting attrition and relative depletion of morale. The outcome of individual combats can be roughly calculated. It should be apparent what the maximum and minimum losses of each side may be. The attacker does not know, however, how much supply the defender might use and often it will be unclear whether the defender will hold the hex or retreat. The risk is also related to the scale of the combat. Where both sides have a combat strength below 10 the losses that will be suffered will be within a narrow range regardless of die roll. In combats with 100 or 150 combat strength the difference between a 1 and a 6 is that between 24

25 tragedy and triumph. Also uncertain is how this one combat will influence both sides in a more complex situation where it might provoke or subdue further combat this same turn or in later turns. Figure 18: Isonzo, May The Isonzo is one of the places where the game rules require less than optimum attacks. The broad front rule (GCR 33-38) requires that prior to 1917 if there is an attack by either the Italian 2 nd or 3 rd Army, the other one has to make a separate attack. This violates one of the principles of combat selection in DWK which is that the number of enemy counterattacks should be minimised. In this case the 3 rd Army attack is advantageous but the Italians are forced to make a costly attack with the 2 nd Army in addition. The Austrian defence here is not optimum. It would be better withdrawn to the four hexes of the black line. This would force the Italians to make their double attacks from just three hexes. The Italians could easily suffer losses 3-5 times those of the Austrians on this front but they will still do the attacks because the relative morale of the two sides is much more favourable to the Italians at this stage of the war and they are not very sensitive to losses they can replace. One thing to bear in mind is that whereas the attacker is choosing the combat each attack gives the defender a free shot at least to the extent it is an unsupplied defense. If there were no attacks the defender s forces would simply be inert doing no harm. The more attacks which are made the more the defender s strength is allowed to play. That means the attacker should in preference reduce the number of attacks so that no counterattack is permitted unless the attacker is getting a bigger advantage from the attack. Seize the day Sometimes hesitation is unacceptable. Every attack should be seeking some advantage but occasionally the yield can be especially attractive. In a war in which attrition plays a big part it is rewarding to sometimes get trophies that exceed the normal run. Often this will involve the exploitation of an opponent s mistake which will often be a fleeting opportunity. These successes can sometimes be nothing more than destruction of a valuable enemy unit a Cavalry Division. A less common case is perhaps the destruction of Artillery forced to retreat (or an 25

26 HQ). Finally surrounding enemy units even just one or two - is rare but always likely to be a valuable victory. Figure 19: Eastern Front, June Here the Russians are under great pressure in the summer of 1915 with little supply. The front is very fluid moving into different positions almost every turn. In their turn the Central Powers concentrated to make three moderate to large attacks. Owing to the length of the front, the sectors where they are not attacking are held fairly weakly. The Russian sees a chance from the configuration of the line. First it attacks the 1 Croat Reserve Brigade which is stacked with another Brigade (2SP). The Russians only need to inflict one loss in combat and the survivors will retreat towards the Austrian 4 th Army HQ. Next the 4 th Hungarian Cavalry Division is destroyed. This needs an infantry attack supported by Cavalry but only 8 supplied SP are needed to do this (same with the attack on the Croats). In both attacks the Russians advance after combat and this means the AH 2 and 25 XX are surrounded. A third and fourth attack with no more than 7 SP each will guarantee these two Divisions surrender because they cannot retreat into an enemy ZOC when surrounded. By committing 30 SP and 8 supply points, the Russians inflicted 17 DM on the Austrians and forced a pause in the enemy campaign. The surgical strike was more effective than the rather larger Central Powers attacks which had preceded it. 26

27 The Big Battalions DWK rewards the big battalions. Combat outcomes favour those who mass the greatest strength and the greatest amount of supply against the weakest possible defense. Most of the combat strength should come from Infantry but additional combat strength from Artillery or tanks is important against the stronger defenses. Figure 20; Eastern Front, June This shows the position the turn before the start of a Russian Brusilov Offensive using the Russian Artillery Surprise (GCR 33 3). The Russians have on a 10 hex length of front concentrated 60 Infantry Divisions in the front line. Additional forces are now moving into reserve positions and there are preliminary diversionary operations occurring further north. There is also some heavy Artillery and considerable supply. All this force has been slowly gathering since the beginning of the year. The Russian supply build up depended on generous subsidies from the USA. It has also meant that the Russians have had to forego much supply expenditure during the build-up period so the price of the offensive is several months of inactivity and passive defence. The Austrians can see the attack coming but the Russian build-up has outpaced the Austrians ability to increase their own defences because this is not the only front the Austrians have to defend and their resources are spread more thinly. Typically maximum combat strength means filling as many friendly hexes as are adjacent to the targeted enemy hex with six full strength Divisions plus all the Artillery that can be fitted in as well. Furthermore this force will need sufficient supply to attack with HQ close enough to the front to ensure that there is no diminishment of combat strength due to long supply lines. Since it might be prudent to consider planning to attack more than once to get the most out of this astonishing 27

28 concentration then sufficient supply might mean enough to repeat the attack a few times and since combat losses should not cause this attack to weaken then replacements and attacker reserve divisions should be nearby to rotate into the line. For such a force to gather in one place is unlikely to be achieved in one or two turns. In fact it could easily take a few months if the necessary supply has to be accumulated and past losses replaced so that the committed units will all be at full strength. It may also be objected that with such ponderous preparation the defender will see what is happening and prepare accordingly. This is not so easy however. First the preparation does not always need to be that visible. The resources can be gathered in a dispersed manner and only brought together at the last moment by a railway concentration. Further the attacker s dispositions need not be threatening to only one hex during the period of preparation. It will be easy enough to threaten a significant section of a front or, if the railway is good, the whole front. The defender also has a problem with the dispersal of its extra strength. If for instance, during a period of preparation, the defender receives an extra 40 SP and 20 hexes of front are threatened then unless some central reserve is used (which will not be on the front line) then on average only two extra SP go on each front line hex. In contrast, if the attacker gets an extra 40 SP they can 100% be assigned to the reserve which will form the concentration for the attack. Overkill Figure 21: Near Trent, March The Austrians have opportunistically thrust 51 Mountain Brigade forwards while the Italians were busy in another sector. The new Austrian position is vulnerable as there are few other mountain brigades available to reinforce the position and it is unlikely the Austrians will hold this hex determinedly. The Italians still have good morale and elect an unsupplied attack to persuade the Austrians to withdraw. With 20 SP an unsupplied attack in mountains has a combat strength of only 5 but in 1917 it has a 33% chance of destroying the defending unit and a 66% chance of inflicting loss. Even if the Italian attack fails completely it has a good chance of encouraging a retreat because this was a supply free attack and it could be repeated easily next turn. 28

29 Wasting supply should be avoided. Very weak defenses should be taken out with unsupplied attacks if possible. One of the problems of Shaken Morale is that weak defenses cannot be efficiently reduced. The forlorn hope Figure 22: Gallipoli, December The Turks have a concentrated defence of SP in each hex. In counterattacking they will inflict extremely heavy losses on the invasion force. More than 10 Allied SP could be eliminated in an attack endangering the bridgeheads. Also the British forces face trenches and terrain with a 4 modifier so even their biggest attacks may struggle to inflict more than 2 SP. A solution is to attack with 4 SP and naval support. This is an attack with 10 combat strength points which will be guaranteed one hit. The Turks will destroy the attacking unit (the Royal Navy Division) but the outcome will ensure some attrition on the Turks and a tolerable 4:1 loss ratio which the British are prepared to stand. Sometimes attacks must be made knowing there are going to be no survivors (at least no surviving SP). In this case the best you can do is to limit the number of losses by keeping the attack force to a minimum. It is the tactic to use when an attack is necessary but the defending force is overwhelmingly strong. The two instances of this I have encountered are in the initial attack on Liege and in attacks which are supported by naval gunfire or river flotilla. At Liege, in August 1914, an attack of 8 or 10 German SP (depending on whether the river is crossed) has to score a single hit on the Belgian garrison in order to induce the Infantry to withdraw and remove their ZOC from the vicinity (GCR 39-8 and TWF 3-10). At Gallipoli repeated attacks with 4 Infantry SP supported by naval gunfire could in a year inflict 24 DM on the Turks at a cost of 96 British SP and DM. There may be better opportunities than this but if not then this is the course that should be followed. 29

30 The limited attack Figure 23: Western Front February The British have been attacking hex A. The German defence is very strong and the Germans have replaced their losses. A final British attack causes extremely high losses to all three of the attacking stacks. Attrition is already in Germany s favour but they make an attack from both hexes A and B against the weakened British force. The Germans are on the strategic defensive, they are not interested in advancing and do not expect to drive the British back other than temporarily. Nevertheless, this fairly large limited attack serves a purpose. Without it the British losses from the offensive are bad relative to the Germans. With this attack they are even worse for the British. They will take longer to recover and this gives the Germans more respite. We will consider a limited attack as one in which the attacker has no great plan to capture the hex or even to destroy the enemy. This is combat for the sake of combat. Primarily this will be an opportunity to inflict losses on the enemy at an acceptable price. Sometimes it could be part of a longer attritional campaign which might steadily weaken an enemy line but, in other cases, it will just respond to a short term opportunity. Limited attacks are also good ways for the strategic defender to take some control of the relative attrition rates. For instance, if one side has suffered a bad one-sided result in combat then a well selected combat in response will tend to make the overall loss ratios more acceptable. This also can be a factor in coalition warfare. Should one enemy major power be sitting out the conflict for an extended time then some limited attacks may be necessary so that it is not excused from attrition altogether. Small limited attacks are also relatively free of risk. With weak defenders it is fairly easy to engineer an even exchange of losses which may be all that is required. Take that Hill Capturing hexes is sometimes just the happy consequence of attacks which are made for other purposes. In other cases the capture of a hex is the objective. Generally DWK prioritizes defeat of the enemy Army over capturing territory but the two goals are not unrelated. Hex capture unhinges advantageous defense lines; reduces attacker losses because of the retreat; and captures trenches that are valuable assets in themselves. Hex capture is also important to wider strategic goals 30

31 because some territories are valuable for production, including food production, and/or are otherwise demoralizing for the enemy to lose. When considering what it would take to capture a hex and, assuming the terrain selected can be predicted, the attacker can at least calculate what combat strength is needed to be sure of capturing a hex and what is the highest combat strength that would never capture the hex. Between those two values is the range in which the outcome depends on the dice. Table 2 below shows examples of those figures from the situation in Figure 19. This shows that if the defender has one or more of a trench, terrain, or a significant number of SP, then the attacker needs a fair sized force (supplied) in order to be sure of capturing a hex. Trenches and any situation where retreat only occurs with 100% losses make capture a very sizeable proposition and if the attacker does not have sufficient force in the vicinity these positions are practically impregnable. The power of the 1917 CRT is very apparent as well so that in the defender will need about 11 SP to hold what 7 SP could hold against the same attack in These considerations do not take into account the counterattack. A large force with no trenches might retreat more easily than a much smaller force in a trench but the larger force will still have a more impressive counterattack. Figure 24: Eastern Front, January The Russian defences are mostly entrenched but the trench lines are incomplete because of recent movements of the front. The Russians cannot afford to give every hex a strong defence and the Central Powers are looking for weak points. It is perhaps not obvious where those weak points are. In this example we focus on hexes marked A, B and C which have 4, 11 and 7 SP defending them respectively. In Table 2, the force required to capture such hexes is considered. At this time, Russian forces retreat with 33% losses. We will also consider hex B in the alternate scenarios that this was in 1916 or

32 Table 2: Combat Strength Required for Capture of Hexes. Hex (Year) Defense (attack modifier) Terrain A (1915) 4SP (-4) Trench, River, Broken B (1915) 11 SP (-2) Woods B (1916) 11 SP (-2) Woods, Stiffened Defense B (1917) 11 SP (-2) Woods, Stiffened Defense C (1915) 7 SP (-4) Trench, Woods Attack Will Fail to capture hex Attack may Succeed Attack cannot Fail to capture hex Column Attack Column attacks (SR 16) are rare in DWK but potentially extremely powerful. It is a type of attack that is right down at the bottom of the effectiveness scale, worse than unsupplied attacks. However, they maximise the elimination of enemy strength. A column attack has its combat strength halved while the defender's combat strength is doubled. Ouch. It also has to be performed by a set of combat units (not Artillery) which began the turn stacked together (SR 6-5 applied) so that is the limit of your optimisation. It only works if you set it up before the opponent s last move deliberately or by accident. The positive thing about a column attack is that it allows a unit to attack twice in the same turn. That is a force multiplier exercised at the expense of the extra losses it will face from the additional and stronger counterattacks it will suffer. As a successful column attack gets an advance into the vacated hex (SR 16-9) it also potentially results in a double advance if followed up by a successful combat. A column attack, if supplied, is only as weak as an ordinary unsupplied attack. Since it is restricted to a single hex, even the Germans should not be able to manage very high combat strength column attacks very easily (two Assault Corps could column attack with 36 combat strength). However, a single defending position could be subject to more than one column attack and the possibilities increase if the defender is retreating. These attacks are also additional to the culminating combat in the combat phase. 32

33 This kind of attention could overwhelm a defender. Certainly their counterattacks are multiplied but if their supply runs out then the situation is a lot less unequal. The defender is also having no chance to replace losses or reinforce between attacks as is normally the case so there is a greater risk of losing the position. Many of the disadvantages of column attack become fairly modest when there are only a few defending SPs. For this reason column attack may be seen as a sort of overrun capability which it often will be. However, it also stands for the most desperate attacks and it can be the method by which an apparently invulnerable position can be taken. Figure 25: France, September The Germans can capture Amiens starting with a column attack A. It is not a dead certainty but the French Infantry Division can be forced to retreat 5 times out of 6 by 45 SP which can deliver a 22 Combat Strength column attack using 11 supply points. The French Division retreats to the same hex as the 5 th Army HQ with only 4 SP left. The Germans face a doubled strength counterattack which if fully supplied and retreating is Combat Strength 24 and inflicts a maximum of 5 hits. The Germans would be able to advance after combat with nearly 40 SP though another unit will have to move in to keep the line of communication open. The German stack (42SP) led by the 22 Reserve Division is now able to get to B adjacent to Amiens (hex 0912) which was not possible without the preceding column attack. This force could column attack Amiens and would need 11 supply points to have 21 Combat Strength. This is enough to inflict between 2 and 4 losses. The French defence will be reduced from 9 SP down to between 5 and 7 SP plus an Artillery Regiment. If the French used supply on the previous counterattack they will have only 5 supply points left and doubled that would give a maximum of 68 Combat Strength and inflict losses between 7 and 14. With average results the Germans would then have about 72 SP adjacent to Amiens. Fully supplied that force could guarantee the capture of Amiens in the combat phase. If the French in Amiens were weaker than 7 SP or if the Germans wanted to take risks then it is very probable that the 5 th Army HQ could be destroyed as well by dividing the attacking forces. The French defenders in these combats would not be supplied either so the extra losses in the column attacks are partially offset by this. The German attacks used 40 supply points which is a lot. The column attacks gained the use of an additional 42 combat strength not normally available to this force. If they lost the city, the Artillery and the HQ then the French would have 31 DM before counting Infantry losses in addition. 33

34 One more push lads Figure 7: St Mihel Salient, April This is an attack from the Nivelle Offensive Scenario where the French have made their main effort against the St Mihel Salient instead of on the Aisne. The illustration shows the position on the first turn of a four turn offensive. The French have 126 supply points in view but they have more that can be railed in later. The German positions are difficult to defend and in particular the Germans did not risk their Artillery in the salient as they cannot move Artillery in and out to the most exposed positions (SR 29-16). The Allies are already doing well in this Scenario and have no need to be reckless. The French, however, will suffer Shaken Morale when they have any significant Infantry loss. The sequence of attacks was: 6 April: French Artillery only bombardments, 42 Combat Strength, 21 supply points; Germans suffer 5 losses. 7 April: French 124 Infantry SP; 18 Artillery SP and 40 Supply against 31 German Infanty with 16 supply. Both sides roll six. The Germans lose 28 SP and the French 24 SP. The French almost captured St Mihel in one assault but the Germans hang on in their trenches and their reserves are arriving. The French are also at Shaken Morale. 1 May: French Artillery only bombardments, 26 Combat Strength, 13 supply points; Germans suffer 3 losses. The French conscious that they wish their next assault to be as strong as possible are railing in fresh Divisions from the Aisne and tanks as well. The Germans are also struggling to reinforce and will be little stronger next turn. 2 May: French 115 Infantry; 14 Artillery; 4 tanks; 40 supply points; the German defence is 29 Infantry with 14 supply points. Losses are 18 French and 14 Germans. Both sides were slightly weaker than during the first attack. This offensive then ends. Altogether, the French committed 346 Combat Strength and 115 Supply Points. The total German commitment was only 178 Combat Strength (including the counterattack multiples) and 30 supply a reflection of their difficult position and lack of Artillery. Total losses were 42 French Infantry and 50 German Infantry. In the context of the Scenario, this is a small victory for the French attributable to their conservative play and high reliance on Artillery. The advantages of defence were minimised as the Germans only had two counterattacks. 34