Chapter-7 Additional Studies

Transcription

1 Chapter-7 Additional Studies A. RISK ASSESSMENT 7.1 INTRODUCTION PAB Organic Pvt. Ltd. is an R&D based existing fine chemicals manufacturing company mainly involved in the manufacturing of N- Hydroxy Succinamide, 4 (1-Pyrrolidine) Butro Nitrile, 2-Chloro Ethylamine Hydrochloride, 4-Chloro Phenyl Hydrazine hydrochloride, 5 Amino Phthalide, 5 Bromo Phthalide, 1,3-Dihydro-1-Oxo-5-Isobenzofuran Carbonitrile (5-Cyano Phthalide), Schiff Base (1-Cyano(2,3 Dichlorophenyl Methalene Hydrazine)/Hydrazine Carboximidamide 2- [Cyano (2, 3-Di chlorophenyl)] Methylene and 4-(2,3 Epoxy Propoxy) Carbazole. Now, it has applied for expansion in 3 existing products, reduction in capacity of 6 products and addition of 39 new products as tabulated in Table Scope of Study The scope of work is to carry out risk analysis for the proposed expansion of plant covering all the hazardous chemicals to be handled and stored at the plant after expansion Study Objective The objective of the risk analysis includes the following: Identification of hazards Selection of credible scenarios Consequences Analysis of selected accidents scenarios Risk Mitigation Measures The Study Approach The risk assessment study broadly comprised of the following steps: System Description Identification of Hazards Selection of Credible Accident Scenarios Consequence Analysis Risk Mitigation Measures EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-1

2 7.1.4 System Description This step comprised the compilation of the location, design and operational information needed for the risk analysis Identification of Hazards Hazards associated with the plant after expansion was identified. Summary of relevant accident cases was reviewed Selection of Accident Scenarios The release sources and potential accidents scenarios in the plant were listed. For each selected release source several scenarios were developed depending upon the failure mode causing loss of containment Consequence analysis Effects & consequence estimation were done to determine the potential for damage or injury from the selected scenarios. The incident outcomes were analyzed using release rate, dispersion, combustion and heat radiation and explosion models from fires Risk mitigation Measures Based on hazard identification and consequence analysis, risk reduction measures were suggested to reduce risk and enhance safety at the plant. 7.2 HAZARDOUS IDENTIFICATION Hazard is defined as a chemical or physical conditions those have the potential for causing damage to people, property or the environment. This chapter describes hazards associated with the plant after expansion due to handling and storage of hazardous chemicals. Maximum credible accidents scenarios involve in release of hazardous materials are selected and vulnerable zones are computed. Hazard identification is the first step in the risk analysis and entails the process of collecting information on: The types and quantities of hazardous substances stored and handled the location of storage tanks & other facilities, potential hazards associated with the spillage and release of hazardous chemicals. The assessment of vulnerable zones resulting from an accidental release of hazardous substance into the environment is one of the key elements of risk analysis. Quantification of the effects of such releases requires, data of EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-2

3 the chemicals stored or handled in the area, quantities stored, operating parameters, quantity that would be released in case of an accident, meteorological conditions and physical attributes of the area. The starting point of risk analysis study is the identification of hazards and selection of scenarios that are then addressed for further consequence analysis. The proposed plant will be engaged in handling and storage of various flammable and toxic hazardous materials. Important characteristic of these hazardous materials are described in details below: Hazardous Substances to be handled at PAB Organics M/s. PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. has been engaged in handling and storage of various flammable and toxic hazardous materials. Important characteristic of these hazardous materials are described in details below: Table 7.1 Main properties of Hazardous chemicals Hazardous Properties of Chemicals to be Consumed Sr. Name of Hazardous Chemicals BP 0 C FP 0 C LEL % UEL % TLV ppm LD 50 Oral mg/ Kg 1 IPA HCl Iso Valeraldhyde NA 5600 (Rat) 3 Methanol Tetrahydrofuran Acetone Acetonitrile Cyclohexane Ethyl Acetate LD 50 Dermal mg/kg [Rabbit] 2730 (Rabbit) [Rabbit] LC 50 mg/l 1562 ppm 4 hrs mg/m 3 (Rat) 4 hrs ppm 4 hours NA mg/m 3 NA 1250 [Rabbit] [Rabbit] Specific Gravity (water = 1) Vapour Density (air=1) Acute: mg/m 3 8 hours mg/l 96 hours [Fish (Fathea d Minnow) ] NA NA ppm EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-3

4 Sr. Name of Hazardous Chemicals BP 0 C Hazardous Properties of Chemicals to be Consumed FP 0 C LEL % UEL % San Envirotech Pvt. Ltd., Ahmedabad TLV ppm LD 50 Oral mg/ Kg 9 Hexane Isopropyl alcohol Toluene Chloroform 61 NA NA NA LD 50 Dermal mg/kg LC 50 mg/l Specific Gravity (water = 1) Vapour Density (air=1) 6 hours NA ppm 4 hours NA [Rabbit] ppm 24 [Rabbit] hours [Mouse] >20000 [Rabbit] mg/m 3 4 hours 13 Nitric acid 121 NA NA NA 4 NA NA 244 ppm 0.5 hours 14 Hydrochloride Acid mm Hg 15 Cyclohexanone NA NA NA NA 900 [Rabbit ] Acetic acid Conc. Sulphuric Acid NA NA NA [Rat.] 18 Liquid Bromine NA NA NA NA 4701 ppm 0.5 hours 948 [Rabbit] 1060 [Rabbit] 510 mg/m 2 hours hours 5620 ppm 1 hours [Mouse ] 320 mg/m 3 2 hours [Mouse ] NA hours [Mouse ] 19 Thionyl Chloride 76 NA NA NA 1 NA NA 500 ppm 1 hours 20 n-butanol NA QUANTITIES OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 3400 [Rabbit] hours Many chemicals will be stored at the plant in small to large quantities as per requirement. Majority of chemicals are stored in very small quantities. After proposed expansion of the project, numbers of product will be formulated at the plant as per demand. As per Manufacture, Storage and EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-4

5 Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 and amendment subsequently, there will be only few hazardous chemicals which have potential for creating risk to life and property in an unlikely event of leakage of spillage followed by fire. The bulk quantities of hazardous chemicals are stored at the plant in tank farm area with adequate dyke. Other chemicals will be stored in cylindrical tanks, barrels and carboys. Details of storage of hazardous materials are given in Table 7.2. Sr. Table 7.2: Facilities for Storage of Chemicals Name of hazardous substance State (Solid/ liquid/gas) Type of container MOC Max. Storage (MT) 1 IPA-HCl Liquid Drum HDPE Iso valeraldehyde Liquid Drum MS 40 3 Methanol Liquid Drum/Tank HDPE/MS 15 4 Tetra hydro furan Liquid Drum MS 2 5 Acetone Liquid Drum MS Acetonitrile Liquid Drum MS Cyclo hexane Liquid Drum MS 5 8 Ethyl acetate Liquid Drum MS 10 9 Hexane Liquid Drum MS IPA Liquid Drum MS Toluene Liquid Drum/Tank MS Chloroform Liquid Drum MS Nitric acid (98%) Liquid Carboys HDPE Conc. HCl Liquid Tank PP-FRP Cyclohexanone Liquid Drum MS 5 16 Acetic acid Liquid Drum HDPE Conc. sulphuric acid Liquid Tank PP-FRP Liq. Bromine Liquid Bottle Glass 1 19 Thionyl chloride Liquid Drum MS N-Butanol Liquid Drum HDPE HAZARDS DUE TO LOSS OF CONTAINMENT Hazardous chemicals to be handled and stored at the plant are in mostly liquids form. In the event of leakage or accidental release of these chemicals, it will create only localized effects within the short distances from fixed or spread pool in case of fire. There is possibility that release of some hazardous chemicals may cause as formation of vapour cloud which can move towards down wind direction and may explode in the event of EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-5

6 fire if mass and concentration of air and vapour mixture is within the LEL and UEL limits. However, mass of vapour and air mixture may not adequate to generate explosive mass. Storage and handling of hazardous chemicals will not pose any hazardous situation if these are handled or stored correctly with adequate safety provisions and fire fighting facilities. Therefore, suitable safety measures including fire fighting facilities will be provided at the plant to attend any emergency due to accidental release of these hazardous chemicals. Among the hazardous inventories, there are few potential toxic materials which can form toxic vapour cloud in unlikely event of release. 7.5 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT SCENARIOS The plant will be dealing with many hazardous substances described in details. Most of hazardous chemicals are in the form of liquid and considered as flammable and provided with dyke for loss of containment. Subsequently, their consequence due to thermal radiation will be confined within short distances. If released quantities are not ignited, therefore, vapour formation can result in vapour and air mixture and may generate explosive mass which can be explode if getting source of ignition. Toxic cloud of hazardous chemicals may also be formed and moved towards wind direction Methodology for Selection of Accident Scenarios In this study, following steps were followed for scenario selection for risk analysis study: The hazardous materials to be handled at the plant and the associated hazards have been identified and assessed. Operating and storage conditions of handling and storage of hazardous materials were studied. An assessment was made of what inventories can get released accidentally. Release rates were calculated considering deferent cases. For further analysis of selected release sources, representative failure modes and failure sizes were identified. EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-6

7 7.5.2 Maximum Credible Accident Scenarios Following maximum credible scenarios have been selected for consequence analysis as a result of accidental releases: Sl. Type of Release Outcome Cases Considered 1. Release of Methanol Formation pool and thermal radiation from tank due to fire Vapour cloud explosion Dispersion of toxic cloud of vapours 2. Release of Toluene from Formation pool and thermal radiation tank due to fire Vapour cloud explosion Dispersion of toxic cloud of vapours 3. Release of Liq. Bromine Vapour cloud explosion from Bottles Dispersion of toxic cloud of vapours 4. Chloroform Toxic cloud of Chloroform 7.6 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Consequence analysis for the selected accident scenarios has been carried to estimate the vulnerable zones. Thermal radiation distances have been computed based on various heat flux values vulnerable to men and materials at the plant while modeling of dispersion cloud is based on IDLH (Immediately Dangerous for Life and Health) values. On identification of vulnerable zones for failure cases, measures can be taken for risk mitigation and to eliminate or minimize damage to the plant and injury to personal Hazards associated with Flammable Chemicals Pool fire: The released flammable material which is a liquid stored below its normal boiling point will collect in a pool. The geometry of the pool will be dictated by the surroundings. If the liquid is stored under pressure above its normal boiling point, then a fraction of the liquid will flash into vapor and the remaining portion will form a pool in the vicinity of the release point. Once sustained combustion is achieved, liquid fires quickly reach steady state burning. The heat release rate is a function of the liquid surface area exposed to air. An unconfined spill will tend to have thin fuel depth (typically less than 5 mm) which will result in slower burning rates. A EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-7

8 confined spill is limited by the boundaries (e.g. a dyke area) and the depth of the resulting pool is greater than that for an unconfined spill. Flash Fire: It occurs when a vapor cloud of flammable material burns. The cloud is typically ignited on the edge and burns towards the release point. The duration of flash fire is very short (seconds), but it may continue as jet fire if the release continues. The overpressures generated by the combustion are not considered significant in terms of damage potential to persons, equipment or structures. The major hazard from flash fire is direct flame impingement. Typically, the burn zone is defined as the area the vapor cloud covers out to half of the LFL. This definition provides a conservative estimate, allowing for fluctuations in modeling. Even where the concentration may be above the UFL, turbulent induced combustion mixes the material with air and results in flash fire. Jet Fire: Jet flames are characterized as high-pressure release of gas from limited openings (e.g. due to small leak in a vessel or broken drain valve). Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) or fireball: A fireball is an intense spherical fire resulting from a sudden release of pressurized liquid or gas that is immediately ignited. The best known cause of a fireball is a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). Fireball duration is typically 5 20 seconds. Vapor Cloud Explosion: When a large quantity of flammable vapor or gas is released, mixes with air to produce sufficient mass in the flammable range and is ignited, the result is a vapor cloud explosion (VCE). Without sufficient air mixing, a diffusion-controlled fireball may result without significant overpressures developing. The speed of flame propagation must accelerate as the vapor cloud burns. Without this acceleration, only a flash fire will result. Damage Criteria: Damage estimates due to thermal radiations and overpressure have been arrived at by taking in to consideration the published literature on the subject. The consequences can then be visualized by the superimposing the damage effects zones on the proposed plan site and identifying the elements within the project site as well as in EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-8

9 the neighboring environment, which might be adversely affected, should one or more hazards materialize in real life. Thermal Damage: The effect of thermal radiation on people is mainly a function of intensity of radiation and exposure time. The effect is expressed in terms of the probability of death and different degrees of burn. The following tables give the effect of various levels of heat flux. Table 7.3: Fatal Radiation Exposure Level Radiation level (kw/m 2 ) Fatality 1% 50% 99% EXPOSURE IN SECONDS Overpressure Damage Table 7.4: Overpressure Damage Criteria Over Pressure Mechanical damage to equipments Bar kpa Annoying noise (137 db if of low frequency Hz) Occasional breaking of large glass windows already under strain Loud noise (143 db). Sonic boom, glass failure Breakage of small windows under strain Typical pressure for glass breakage Safe distance (probability 0.95 of no serious damage below this value); projectile limit; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken Limited minor structural damage Large and small windows usually shattered, occasional damage to window frames Minor damage to house structures Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable Corrugated asbestos shattered, corrugate steel or aluminum panels, fastenings fail followed by buckling; wood panels (standard EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-9

10 housing) fastenings fail, panels blow in Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses Concrete or cinder block walls, not reinforced shattered Lower limit of serious structural damage % destruction of brickwork of houses Heavy machines (3000 lb) in industrial building suffered little damage; steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundations Frameless, self framing steel panel building demolished. Rupture of oil tanks Cladding of light industrial building ruptured Wooden utility poles snapped, tall hydraulic press (40,000 lb) in building slightly damaged Nearly complete destruction of houses Loaded, lighter weight (British) train wagons overturned Brick panels, 8-12 in. thick not reinforced, fail by shearing or flexure Loaded train boxcars completely demolished Probable total destruction of buildings, heavy machine tools (7.000 lb) move and badly damaged, very heavy machine tools (12,000 lb) survive Limit of crater lip Release of Methanol from Tank Jet Fire This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes 50 mm leak in Storage tanks at various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities of 2.5 D and 4 F. The computed damage distances for Leak Sizes of 50 mm at heat loads of 37.5 KW/m², 12.5 KW/m² and 4.0 KW/m² are given in below Table. Pool Fire This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 50 mm in Storage tanks at various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities of 2.5 D and 4 F. The computed damage distances for Leak Sizes of 50 mm at heat loads of 37.5 KW/m², 12.5 KW/m² and 4.0 KW/m² are given in Table. Flash Fire This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 50 mm in Storage tanks at various heat radiation levels under the different EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-10

11 atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities of 2.5 F and 4 D. The computed damage distances for Leak Sizes of 50 mm are given in Table Vapor Cloud Explosion This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 50 mm in Underground Storage tanks at various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities of 2.5 D and 4 F. The computed damage distances for Leak Sizes of 50 mm at overpressure of , and bar are given in Table. Scenario description Weather data Leakage (Methanol Tank) 2.5 m/s D 4.0 m/s F Damage Distance Flash Fire UFL LFL Jet Fire (kw/m 2 ) Not Reached Not Reached 37.5 Not Reached Not Reached Overpressure (bar) Early Pool fire (kw/m 2 ) Late Pool fire (kw/m 2 ) Figure 7.1 Radiation vs distance for pool fire (Methanol) EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-11

12 Figure 7.2 Flash fire envelope (Methanol) Release of Toluene from Tank Jet Fire This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes 50 mm leak in Storage tanks at various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities of 2.5 D and 4 F. The computed damage distances for Leak Sizes of 50 mm at heat loads of 37.5 KW/m², 12.5 KW/m² and 4.0 KW/m² are given in below Table. Pool Fire This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 50 mm in Storage tanks at various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities of 2.5 D and 4 F. The computed damage distances for Leak Sizes of 50 mm at heat loads of 37.5 KW/m², 12.5 KW/m² and 4.0 KW/m² are given in Table. Flash Fire This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 50 mm in Storage tanks at various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities of 2.5 F and 4 D. The computed damage distances for Leak Sizes of 50 mm are given in Table. Vapor Cloud Explosion This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 50 mm in Underground Storage tanks at various heat radiation EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-12

13 levels under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities of 2.5 D and 4 F. The computed damage distances for Leak Sizes of 50 mm at overpressure of , and bar are given in Table. Scenario description Weather data Leakage (Toluene Tank) 2.5 m/s D 4.0 m/s F Damage Distance Flash Fire UFL LFL Jet Fire (kw/m 2 ) Not Reached Not Reached Overpressure (bar) Early Pool fire (kw/m 2 ) Late Pool fire (kw/m 2 ) Not Reached Not Reached Not Reached Not Reached Figure 7.3 Radiation vs Distance for pool fire (Toluene) EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-13

14 7.6.4 Release of Bromine from bottles San Envirotech Pvt. Ltd., Ahmedabad Outcome: Bromine Bottle failure, Spillage and Toxic Vapours Toxic hazards are mainly due to Bromine gas leakage and their impact can cross the plant boundary (if not controlled in time). The impact due to Bromine (IDLH) may go up to ~ 65 m i.e. it may cross plant area/storage area. Bromine release will have adverse impact outside the plant battery limit and may involve district authorities to contain the damage. Scenario Table 7.5: Hazards Scenario Impact Scenario Impact Zone (m) Material Remarks RM-1 Bromine IDLH ~ 65 Stability Class D Figure 7.4 Figure 7.4: Bromine Bottle failure, Spillage and Toxic Vapours 7.7 RISK MITIGATION MEASURES For risk mitigation/reduction, attempts should be made to either reduce inventories that could get released in the event of loss of containment or failure likelihood s or both as feasible. Risk analysis identifies the major risk contributors, which enables prioritization of the plant that deserve special attention in terms of inspection and maintenance in particular and over all safety management as a whole. EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-14

15 For the risk reduction at the plant, the following salient suggestions and recommendations are made: On site and off site emergency response plan should be prepared and circulated to concern persons. Personnel at the proposed plant and public in surrounding area should be made aware about the hazardous substance stored at the plant and risk associated with them. A written process safety information document should be compiled for general use. The document compilation should include an assessment of the hazards presented including (i) toxicity information (ii) permissible exposure limits. (iii) Physical data (iv) thermal and chemical stability data (v) reactivity data (vi) corrosivity data (vii) information on process and mechanical design. The process design information in the process safety information compilation must include P&IDs/PFDs; process chemistry; maximum intended inventory; acceptable upper and lower limits, pressures, flows and compositions and process design and energy balances. The adequate numbers of heat and smoke detectors should be provided at strategic locations in the plant and indication of detectors/sensors should be provided in main control room. Predictive and preventive maintenance schedule should be prepared for equipment, piping, etc. and thickness survey should be done periodically as per standard practices. A written procedure (Management of Change) must be developed to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment and procedures that affect a covered process. Safe work practices should be developed to provide for the control of hazards during operation and maintenance such as: i. lockout /tag out ii. Confined space entry ii. Opening process equipment or piping iii. Control over entrance into a facility by maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other support personnel. EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-15

16 Personnel engaged in handling of hazardous chemicals should be trained to respond in an unlikely event of emergencies. The plant should check and ensure that all instruments provided in the plant are in good condition and documented. Safety measures in the form of safety instruction: should be displayed at strategic locations especially in local language and English. Regular mock drills should be carried out regularly and shortcomings should be recorded and rectified. Records should be maintained for the response of Mock Drills and corrective actions should listed and taken accordingly Personal Protective Equipment Personal protective equipments are devices that are provided to each worker personally for his or her exclusive use. They are intended for temporary use and emergency response action only. If a worker must enter a contaminated area, he must wear adequate protective equipment. Employees should be taught when and how to use respiratory apparatus provided, and how to recognize defects in the equipment. Full dress escape drills should be conducted at least once a year. If such safety equipment is not available, entry into the contaminated area should not be attempted. Keep personal protective equipment where it can be accessed quickly, outside the hazardous material storage area and away from areas of likely contamination. Facial hair should not be permitted for those who are issued escapetype or self-contained respirators because it prevents a proper seal. Each employee should maintain his/her personal protective equipment in clean, working condition at all times. All equipment should be used and maintained in accordance with the manufacturer s instructions Handling of Hazards Personal protective equipment used by the person during handling of hazardous chemicals, should be replaced after certain time. If any spillage of hazardous chemicals, it should be cleaned and disposed as per standard practiced. Empty drums of hazardous chemicals should neutralize immediate. EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-16

17 Personnel engaged in handling of hazardous chemicals should be made aware of properties of hazardous chemicals General Working Conditions (a) House Keeping All the passages, floors and stairways should be maintained in good condition. The system should be available to deal with any spillage of dry or liquid chemical at the plant. Sufficient disposable bins should be clearly marked and these should be suitably located in the plant. In the plant, precaution and instructions should be displayed at strategic locations. All pits, sumps should be properly covered or securely fenced. Roads/walkway within the plant should be maintained neat and clean. (b) Ventilation Adequate ventilation should be provided in the work floor environment. The work environment should be assessed and monitored regularly. Local ventilation is most effective method for controlling dust and gaseous emissions at work floor Safe Operating Procedures Safe operating procedures should be available for mostly all operations and equipment. The workers should be informed of the consequences of failure to observe the safe operating procedures Work Permit System Work permit system should be followed at the plant. Work permit should be used for hot work, Confined space, electrical works, etc Fire Protection Adequate fire fighting facilities should be available at the plant, including, dry chemical type, ABC type, mechanical foam type, CO 2 type and sand buckets. The fire fighting system and equipment should be tested and maintained as per relevant standards. EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-17

18 The fire drills should be conducted once in six months Emergency Preparedness On-site emergency plan should be prepared and readily available for an unlikely event of emergency. Emergency telephone numbers should be available and display properly strategic locations Static Electricity All equipment and storage tanks/containers of flammable chemicals should be bounded and earthed. Electrical resistance for earthing circuits should be maintained. Periodic inspections should be done for earth pit and record should be maintained Material Handling Material handling areas should be clearly defined. The workers should be made aware about the hazards associated with manual material handling Communication System Adequate communication facilities should be available at the plant and supported with uninterrupted power supply. Communication facilities should be checked periodically for its proper functioning Accident Reporting, Investigation and Analysis A system should be initiated for accident and near miss reporting, investigation and analysis. To motivate and awareness among the personnel at the plant about safety, total accident (lost time injury) free days can be displayed on the board prominently at strategic location Safety Inspections The system should be initiated for checklist based routine safety inspection and internal audit of the plant periodically. Safety inspection team should be formed from various disciplines and departments Safe Operating Procedures Safe operating procedures should be formulated and updated, specific to process & equipment and distributed to concerned plant personnel. EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-18

19 7.8 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES Unit has following facilities to meet any fire in plant premises. Location: Plnat-1A Sr. Fire Extinguisher 1 P-1A 01 2 P-1A 02 3 P-1A 03 4 P-1A 04 5 P-1A 05 6 P-1A 06 7 P-1A 07 8 P-1A 08 9 P-1A P-1A P-1A P-1A P-1A P-1A P-1A P-1A P-1A P-1A 18 Type Capacity Location List Filling Carried Out On Next Filling Due On CO Kgs Inside panel room Mechanical ABC Dry ABC Dry Mechanical ABC Dry Mechanical ABC Dry ABC Dry Mechanical ABC Dry ABC Dry Mechanical Mechanical ABC Dry Mechanical Mechanical Mechanical 50.0 Ltr. Ground floor near plant entrance 25.0 Ground floor near Kgs. plant entrance 5.0 Kgs. Near entrance of dryer area Ltr. Near entrance of dryer area Near entrance of Kgs. dryer area Ltr. Near entrance of dryer area Ground floor back Kgs. side entrance 25.0 First floor near Kgs. plant quarantine 50.0 First floor near Ltr. plant quarantine 25.0 First floor near in Kgs. process store 10.0 First floor near Kgs. entrance of B Ltr. First floor near entrance of B Ltr. First floor near entrance of B First floor near Kgs. entrance of Plant- 1B 50.0 Ground floor near Ltr. entrance Plant-1A 9.0 Ltr. First floor Outside structure Plant-1A 9.0 Ltr. First floor Outside structure Plant-1A Sr. Location: Plnat-1B Fire Extinguisher Type Capacity Location List Filling Carried Out On CO Kg Inside Panel room Plant-1B. Mechanical 25.0 Kgs. Ground floor near plant entrance ABC Dry 5.0 Kgs. Ground floor back side door Mechanical Next Filling Due On 1 P-1B 01 2 P-1B 02 3 P-1B 03 4 P-1B 9.0 Ltr. First floor Ladder 04 5 P-1B ABC Dry 9.0 Kgs. First Floor HVN EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-19

20 05 Plant 6 P-1B 06 ABC Dry 10.0 Kgs. Ground floor HVN Plant 7 P-1B ABC Dry 5.0 Kgs. Ground floor HVN 07 Plant Location: Plant-2 Sr. Fire Extinguisher 1 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P Location: QC Type Capacity Location List Filling Carried Out On Mechanical 50.0 Ltr. Ground floor near plant entrance Mechanical 9.0 Ltr. Ground floor near plant entrance ABC Dry 25.0 Kgs. Ground floor back side door ABC Dry 5.0 Kgs. Ground floor back side door ABC Dry 10.0 Kgs. First floor near plant ladder Mechanical 50.0 Ltr. First floor near plant entrance ABC Dry 25.0 Kgs. First floor near plant entrance ABC Dry 10.0 Kgs. First floor near plant entrance ABC Dry 5.0 Kgs. First floor near change room ABC Dry 9.0 Ltr. First floor near plant ladder Mechanical 9.0 Ltr. Second floor near plant ladder ABC Dry Mechanical 9.0 Ltr. Second floor near plant entrance ABC Dry 25.0 Kgs. Second floor near plant entrance Mechanical 50.0 Ltr. Second floor near plant entrance ABC Dry 10.0 Kgs. Second floor near plant ladder CO 2 (Carbon Dioxide) Mechanical Next Filling Due On 10.0 Kgs. Second floor plant 4.5 Kgs Inside panel room 50.0 Ltr. Second floor near plant entrance Sr. Fire Extinguisher 1 QC QC Location: Security Office Type Capacity Location List Filling Carried Out On ABC Dry 10.0 Kgs. Outside QC Wet Lab. Mechanical 50.0 Ltr. Outside QC Wet Lab. Next Filling Due On Sr. Fire Extinguisher Type Capacity Location List Filling Carried Out On Next Filling Due On EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-20

21 1 2 SEC SEC Mechanical ABC Dry 9.0 Ltr. Security entrance 50.0 Kgs. Security entrance Location: Store (Ware house) Sr. Fire Extinguisher 1 Store 01 2 Store 02 3 Store 03 4 Store 04 5 Store 05 6 Store 06 7 Store 07 Type Capacity Location List Filling Carried Out On Mechanical ABC Dry ABC Dry 5.0 Kgs. Packing material area ABC Dry Mechanical ABC Dry 10.0 Kgs. Opp. Methanol Store Mechanical Next Filling Due On 9.0 Ltr. Store office Inside 5.0 Kgs. Finish Product area 5.0 Kgs. Raw material store 9.0 Ltr. Raw material store 50.0 Ltr. Outside store office. Location: Office Building Sr. Fire Extinguisher 1 Office 01 2 Office 02 Type Capacity Location List Filling Carried Out On ABC Dry ABC Dry Next Filling Due On 5.0 Kgs. Main Entrance 5.0 Kgs. Near Entrance R&D Lab. Location: Electric Panel Room Sr. Fire Extinguisher 1 EP 01 2 EP 02 Type Capacity Location List Filling Carried Out On CO Kg Inside main Panel room EP 01 CO Ltr. Outside main Panel room EP 02 Next Filling Due On CO 2 CO 2 Location: R & D Lab Sr. Fire Extinguisher 1 R&D 01 Type Capacity Location List Filling Carried Out On ABC Dry Next Filling Due On 5.0 Kgs. R & D Lab. List of Fire hydrant System Sr. Fire Hydrant Hose reels Pipe length/ Diameter meter/ 0.75 inch meter/ 0.75 inch Water Pressure Auto start pressure Water storage capacity Location 5-6 KL 6 Kg/cm 2 15 KL Plant-1A 5-6 KL 6 Kg/cm 2 15 KL Plant-II EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-21

22 7.9 ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN The Onsite Emergency Plan describes planning, preparation and training for on-site action in the event of emergency. Preparedness of On Site Emergency Plan For On-Site Emergency Plan Advance planning and proper training of each employee s into the emergency function is very essential to make emergency control measure more effective. It is not possible to eliminate emergency but is definitely possible to control them. The scope of onsite emergency plan is to prepare for activate the emergency time activities, to controlled and contained within the shortest time if emergency arise after failure of our pre-emergency control measures. Following stage activities are consider for the purpose, as they are co-related and provide better points for emergency preparedness Emergency Time Activities It is not possible to include and discuss every action, which should be taken first during emergency. It is also not possible to describe entire actions on emergency situation. The basic principle of handling emergency, that may be relied upon, who have the knowledge and experience to assess the situation and give direction as per the objectives as quickly as possible. Sometimes, it is a natural gift and it is an art by heart. However, the aim is to control the situation by safest way in a limited time within existing available resources. Further, it should be handle with such a care that minimum loss of life, property and environment. In short, the objective of the plan should be successfully complied with Sequential actions during emergency Incident There are possibilities of occurrences of various types of the accidents or mishaps in the factory premises or around the factory. Most of the occurrences will be of minor nature, while few occurrences may be of major type. If the factory is fortunate enough, there may not be a single incident or mishap during its lifespan. However, when any incident occurs, it cannot be distinguished immediately whether it is minor or EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-22

23 major, the subsequent development, or gravity of situation, or seriousness of such occurrence is required safe handling irrespective of its nature, if it cannot be controlled. It should be general practice that whenever any person notices the accident/fire/explosion/mishap at the site, he should immediately shout FIRE, FIRE or HELP, HELP and such message should reach to the Supervisor/Shift Officer/Senior Person of the unit Responding Actions The root cause of occurrence should be removed immediately if possible. Similarly, if any incident takes place in the premises, using available resources, within the factory as well as nearby, to their optimum, it should be so responded that the incident is contained immediately before spreading. If the incident looks severe and could not be controlled by simple efforts, the Shift Officer or Senior Personnel should rush to the place and make every effort to control the incident using various resources at the site. Further, if the incident is uncontrollable even using own resources, he should immediately call for additional helps form outside resources such as Mutual Aiders, Fire Brigade, etc. He should act the Incident Controller and immediately start the following actions: Sound the siren or ring the emergency bell. Take continuous responding actions with the use of other helps. Call the higher authorities and Site Main Controller. Site Crisis On arrival, the Site Main Controller (Factory Manager) will take the charge of Incident site. He will immediately assess the situation and mange the Situation as site crisis. The incident can be said as on-siteemergency. Activate the emergency teams like fire team, first aid team, communication. Team, rescue team, essential workers, key personnel, etc. The Emergency control room will communicate the messages regarding. EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-23

24 Prevailing situation to requisite authorities, outside resources, agencies, neighbors, etc. Non-essential person will rush to safe shelter and roll call will be taken. He will order to shut down the plant, if situation so warrants. Try to contain the situation using all available resources within his command. Now, if the situation is uncontrollable by the management of the unit, he will immediately call for the local crisis group to handle the situation Messages While conveying the messages regarding the incident, the following details should be incorporated. Brief description of incident Type of help required & direction Chemical involved & Quantity Action immediately taken Development of the incident Discipline The plan assuming certain discipline at site during emergency, as follows; Do not get panicky. Do not approach the site of incident as a spectator. Do not engage telephone unnecessary. Do not move about unnecessary. Do not approach unnecessarily for information or more inquiry. Arrange medical first aid care to the injured. Do not allow unnecessary crowd nearby incident Emergency Actions On receiving information, the Emergency Control Centre will activate and urgently establish the contact with the required persons, agencies and authorities. The essential workers, responsible to carry out certain specific functions, will have to start work immediately. EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-24

25 The non-essential workers should go to the assembly center. The cordoning the incident area will be ensured. The water should be sprayed on the flammable storage tank, even if not caught under fire. The experts for the responding to emergency situation will be consulted, if required. vii. Authentic information for incident will be provided to Press/Public by the authorized officer only. Removal the flammable, dangerous material, cylinders, etc. should be arranged along with isolation from fire. The trapped personnel, if any, in incident will be rescued. All assistance will be provided to the Fire Brigade to control spreading of fire. Any remotest possibility of re-ignition or explosion should be looked into and controlled Shut down Procedure It is advisable to shut down the plant for safety, if situation so warrants. The safe shut down procedure should be adopted during such eventualities. First of all, main electrical supply should be cut-off/switchoff. Similarly, the pipelines supplying flammable gas, liquid or chemicals should be immediately shut-off by valves and should be isolated from the process line. The water shower on flammable storage tank, if installed, to be started to keep it in cool condition, if tank is in vicinity of fire. The shut down procedure should be laid down in the process manual, which will be useful during such emergency Post Emergency Activities Post emergency activities comprise of step taken after the emergency is over. To Find out the reason of emergency after the investigation and suggest the preventive measure. For the investigation different level personnel from different dept, are selected and an investigation team is formed. The following steps are taken after the emergency is over. Collection of record Conducting the investigation/inquiry committee with the suggestion for preventive measure EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-25

26 Making the insurance claim and necessary procedure Implementation of the recommendation of inquiry reports Rehabilitation of the affected persons within the plant and outside the plant. They are in continuous touch with the hospitalized person and give status report of them to the top management. Restart the plant if shut down happened Training, Rehearsal and Records Need of Training & Rehearsal Extensive experience in the chemical industry with on-site emergency planning has proved the need and value of rehearsal of emergency procedures. When finalized, the major emergency procedure should be set down in clear, concise terms and everyone on-site made aware of them, particularly the key personnel and essential workers. They should then be put to the test. This may best be done by arranging a series of preliminary exercises to test certain system, including the alternative arrangements in cases of failure. The speed of Mobilization of the factory emergency teams, search & rescue and treatment of casualties, emergency isolation and shut down procedures. These exercises will help to define the procedures by identifying deficiencies and difficulties. At this stage, more exercises that are elaborate can be planned to involve the outside services who should be closely involved at the planning stage. Each exercise should at various positions, e.g. At the scene, the emergency control center, work entrance; assemble points or casualty reception area. A following round-the-table discussion between managers, senior officers of the emergency services, factory inspectorate and observers will further assist to develop practical and effective procedures. It is recommended that a major emergency exercises should be conducted at regular intervals with arrangement with the outside agencies. There is much practical advantage to be gained in situations where people required working together in handling emergencies are already known to each other. Close local liaison and combined exercises are EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-26

27 invaluable in this respect. At the same time, familiarization visits to works especially of the fire service personnel, will help enormously to acquaint with the works layout and the nature of potential hazards. Emergency plans need to be tested when first devised and thereafter to be rehearsed at suitable intervals. Their normal training and experience in day-to-day operation will generally qualify individual personnel with duties under the plans. Some duties, however, such as fire fighting for the works fire team are not routine and special training will be needed. In addition, key personnel will need training in their emergency roles both individually and as a team. For the professional emergency services the general training may be taken for granted. Rehearsals or exercises are important for all personnel likely to be involved in an incident on or off-site because, for example:- They familiarize on-site personnel with their roles, equipment and the details of the plans. They allow the professional emergency services to test their parts of the plan and the co-ordination of all the different organizations. They also familiarize them with the special hazards. They prove the current accuracy of the details of the plan [phone no., etc.] and the availability of special equipment. They give experience and build confidence in the team members. In the initial shock and confusion of a real incident, ability to fall back on established initial actions is invaluable. Employers should ensure that the on-site emergency procedures for such process plants, storage facility, etc. are tested regularly and that all employees receive initial and refresher training. Exercises should be arranged to test each part of the emergency plan on each plant, state by state, starting with first immediate action. Emergency isolation and shut down should be rehearsed from the emergency services, the emergency planning officer [EPO] should be invited to attend on-site exercise, and familiarization visits should be encouraged. The complete plan for each site including both on-site and off-site components should be tested. Many organizations now use tabletop exercises to test emergency plans. EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-27

28 These are very cost effective because they do not interrupt the day-today running of the plant and because many events can be catered for in one session. However, they are theoretical in nature and should be communications and key personnel working from the locations they would use in an emergency. It is, of course, essential that the exercises be carefully prepared, the results analyzed and the lessons learned, circulated and discussed. Full-scale practices involving all concerned that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken. After each rehearsal of practice, the plan should be reviewed to take account of any shortcomings highlighted by the exercise. In addition, its effectiveness should be reviewed every time it is used to with a real emergency. Fix your periodicity to carry out table tope exercises and real rehearsal of this on-site and off-site emergency plan, including mutual aid agencies and mention here in this chapter OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN Need of Off-Site Emergency Plan A major accident, major emergency and disaster may affect areas outside the works. Explosions can scatter debris over wide areas, the effects of blast can cover considerable distances wild can spread burning brands of toxic gases. In some cases, e.g., as the result of an explosion, outside damage will be immediate and part of the available resources of the Emergency Services may need to be developed in the affected area. In any event, the possibility of further damage any remain, e.g., as the result of further explosion or by the effect of wind spreading burning brands of hazardous materials. Perhaps the most significant risk to outside areas is that associated with a large release of toxic vapors. Management will usually need expert advice in drawing up plans so that if such a release occurs, they will be able to collaborate with Emergency services to estimate as far as practicable which downwind areas are at the risk. It may be necessary to prepare in advance simple charts or tables relating the likely spread of the vapor cloud taking into account its expected buoyancy, the local topography and all possible conditions during the time of release. It may also be desirable to install instruments EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-28

29 indicating wind speed and direction. Advice on all these matters can be obtained from the Meteorological office. The fact of the major emergency and the spread or potential spread of its effects outside the work may require that road and rail traffic past the works has to be halted or diverted. The police, taking account of the advice of the Site Main Controller. They will also, where necessary, inform the Rail. The problem is usually exacerbated by members of the public driving to the scene to view the situation. The net effect can be cause problems to those who have a real need to get to the works, including the key personnel who will have been called out. Liaison at local level will help to devise a means whereby key personnel can readily identify themselves to the police controllers. The use of a windscreen sticker of other identify label may be advantageous. All emergency plans should consider the possible effects of incidents on the neighboring population and the remedial measures should be devised in consultation with the local authority and emergency services. The offsite emergency plan should be based on those events identified by the manufacturer, which could affect people and the environment outside his premises. The manufacturer should provide the necessary information on the nature, extent and likely effects of such incidents. The plan should cater in detail for those events identified as being the most likely but should be sufficiently flexible to allow the remedial measures to be able to be extended and increased to deal with extremely adverse combinations of circumstances and consequences. The factory inspectorate and the local authority should be satisfied that the information provided is sufficiently detailed unambiguous and clearly stated to be comprehensible and for the dangers to be provided. Several different planned responses may be necessary at a single site depending on the size and characteristics of the incidents. Thus in brief the two main purposes of the off-site emergency plant are: To provide the local/district authorities, police, fire brigade, doctors, surrounding industries and the public the basic information of risk and environmental impact assessment and to appraise them of the EIA report of PAB Organics Pvt. Ltd. 7-29