Charming African mammals need policies other than CITES listings Sam Ferreira SANParks Savanna Science Network Meeting March 2017 pinterest.com
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Protecting species from unsustainable trade Appendix I threatened, no trade in 931 species Appendix II may be threatened, restricted trade in 34419 species Appendix III range party asking help, restricted trade in 147 Working CITES Conference of the Parties Standing Committee, Animal Committee, Plans Committee Implementing resolutions Management Authority issue permits Scientific Authority detrimental trade assessments http://enb.iisd.org/cites/cop17/images/24sep/3k1a3743.jpg
Long histories of culture and trade Inelastic demand High profit potential Inadequate enforcement Unclear property rights Human-wildlife conflict disincentives Organised crime Social injustice Conrad, K. 2012. Tropical Conservation. Science 5: 245-254. Takepart.com
Sam Ferreira
Elephants in Africa 8% decline Chase,et al.. 2016. Continent wide survey reveals massive decline in African savanna elephants. PeerJ DOI 10.7717/peerj.2354 Sam Ferreira
The African Elephant Coalition Proposal Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, Togo, Uganda https://www.africanelephantcoalition.org/ List all African elephant populations on Appendix I Elephant protection is global Buying ivory is unacceptable https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/prop/060216/e-cop17-prop-16.pdf Information Sharing at CoP17 Poachers come from local poor people Facilitated by logging activities Facilitated by gang activities Serious levels of intimidation Acknowledge governance failure at local scale, but respond at a distant market scale Pinterest.com
Drivers of poaching CITES CoP17 Proposals* CITES CoP17 Resolutions # Trade histories Variable Reduce Inelastic demand Decrease Variable Profit potential Increase Increase Inadequate enforcement - - Property rights - - Wildlife conflict - - What we need Disrupt organized crime Fix social justice * Lee et al. 2016. Pachyderm 57: 125-127 Martin 2016. Pachyderm 57: 128-129. # https://newsroom.wcs.org Summarise the proposals at CoP17 Summarise the resolution at CoP17 Sam Ferreira
Charlene Bissett
The West African Lion Proposal Chad, Côte d'ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria and Togo List all African lion populations on Appendix I Reduce the impacts of trade, Stronger penalties, Encourage international efforts, Increase public awareness, Impetus for implementing strategies. https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/prop/060216/e-cop17-prop-4.pdf Information Sharing at CoP17 Lion prey declining due to poaching Poachers come from local poor people Direct lion poaching seldom https://media.mnn.com/assets/images/2015/10/african-lion.jpg.653x0_q80_crop-smart.jpg Acknowledge governance failure at local scale, but respond at a distant market scale
Cecil Summit Reinstate value of lions Increase pride of local people Establish fairness Increase international interest Do a robin hood on the elite Generate financial support WildCRU, University of Oxford www.hypable.com
Drivers of poaching Appendix I listing Cecil Summit Trade histories Impose Variable Inelastic demand Uncertain - Profit potential Increase Variable Inadequate enforcement Required Some Property rights - Yes Wildlife conflict - Yes What we need Disrupt organized crime Fix social justice Sam Ferreira
The Swaziland Rhino Proposal Alter Swaziland annotation on Appendix II Restricted trade in horn Generate revenue for protection https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/prop/060216/e-cop17-prop-4.pdf https://snapelsewhere.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/photo.jpg Advocate if a species pays its stays
Africa North Africa South Demand reductions Sustainable demand Trade restrictions Controlled trade Increased protection Extinction anxiety fund through donors Product use fund through commodities Africa needs to remain wild If a species pays it stays Betting Banking Extinction Bulte, E.H., C.F. Mason and R.D. Horan. 2003. Betting on extinction: Endangered species and speculation. Land Economics 79: 460-471. Moore, L. 2011. The neoliberal elephant: Exploring the impacts of the trade ban in ivory on the commodification and neoliberalisation of elephants. Geoforum 42: 51-60. Mason, C.F., E.H. Bulte and R.D. Horan. 2012. Banking on extinction: endangered species and speculation. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 28: 180-192. Cathy Greaver
Economic choices Disrupt crime Non-disruptive Status Quo Protection Demand Supply Integrate www.dailymail.co.uk Haas, T.C. & Ferreira, S.M. 2016. Combatting rhino horn trafficking: The need to disrupt organized crime. PLoS ONE 11(11): e0167040.doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0167040 Sam Ferreira
Haas and Ferreira Security Informatics (2015) 4:2 DOI 10.1186/s13388-015-0018-8 http://cajnewsafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/pangolin.jpg
Chance to make money Large politically unfeasible protection vs Low politically feasible job creation Poach rhinos Legal Job Intensified protection Don t poach rhinos Perceived risk for a poacher Legal Job Intensified Protection Haas & Ferreira 2017. Finding politically feasible conservation strategies: The case of wildlife trafficking. Unpublished data.
CITES listings are not a solution, but facilitate donor opportunities. Commodity opportunities may arise once you find the solution. Disrupt organized crime Fix social justice