Correlation of Equipment Failures in Seismic PRAs

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Correlation of Equipment Failures in Seismic PRAs PSA 2017 - Pittsburgh, PA September 25, 2017 Robert Drsek, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company Ed Guerra, RIZZO Associates

Discussion Topics Motivation Background What is Correlation of Seismic Failures? Fragility Calculations- General Information PRA Modeling of Correlation SSC Configuration Parallel Series Conclusions 2

Motivation In general, correlation of equipment in SPRA is often thought of as being conservative. Sensitivity studies show that in some cases breaking correlation could increase plant Risk level. 3

Background Fukushima Earthquake/Tsunami Issuance of 50.54(f) letter NTTF Recommendation 2.1 Seismic PRA Hazards Fragility Plant Response Modeling This interface is where decisions on correlation are performed. 4

What is Seismic Correlation Correlation between component failures occurs because the components respond similarly in an earthquake, have common materials and fabrication, or their fragilities are calculated assuming the same failure modes and models. Because redundant pieces of equipment are generally identical and located adjacent to each other, it is hard to defend any assumption other than fully correlated. EPRI 3002000709, Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Implementation Guide, (2013). 5

Fragility Calculations PRA Analysis Typically Provided Table of fragility parameters SSCs are grouped for fragility calculations Component Type Component Location These Groups are NOT Correlation groups 6

How is Correlation Modeled in a SPRA Correlated SSCs are represented by a single Basic Event Uncorrelated SSCs are represented by a basic event for each SSC The impact of Correlation on Risk metrics can be determined from the configuration of the SSCs in a potential correlation group. Two main groups of SSC configuration: Parallel Series 7

Parallel Configuration The components would be modeled under an AND gate. Normally represents components in separate trains. Lets Consider 3 components with seismic failure rates of 0.33. Uncorrelated Components P(A)*P(B)*P(C) 1 CUTSET with a frequency of 0.035 Correlated Components P(A) 1 CUTSET with a frequency of 0.33 8

Series Configuration The components would be modeled under an OR gate. Normally represents components in line. Lets Consider 3 components with seismic failure rates of 0.33. Uncorrelated Components 3 CUTSETs each with a frequency of 0.33 Using Min Cut Upper Bound equation: 1- (1-P(A))*(1-P(B))*(1-P(C)) gives you a total frequency of 0.699 Correlated Components P(A) 1 CUTSET with a frequency of 0.33 9

Parallel Configuration Plant Example Consider two Emergency AC power switchgear. SWGR A SWGR B Service Building Switchgear Room Originally Correlated Extremely Important Equipment Conservative to correlate (parallel configuration), but potential large impact on CDF. In this case, orientation and floor location matters. Most Benefit in PRA seen by simply breaking correlation (Don t need to calculate individual fragilities.) 10

Series Configuration Plant Example Consider Large Containment Penetrations Equipment Hatch & Personnel Air Lock Personnel Air Lock Containment Equipment Hatch Originally Correlated Extremely Important Equipment (LERF) NON-Conservative to correlate (series configuration). This is an example of what to look for because correlation here is nonconservative. 11

Conclusion Correlation assessment is a multi-discipline effort interaction among fragility and systems analysts is a must. Correlation is not always conservative Breaking correlation for parallel configuration (separate trains) could lead to lower frequency of failure. Breaking correlation for series configuration (components in line) could lead to higher frequency of failure When correlating Components in a series configuration there is an opportunity to reduce cutsets, which will ultimately reduce the Core Damage Frequency. 12

THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION. QUESTIONS???? Contact Information: Rob Drsek FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company rdrsek@firstenergycorp.com (330) 315-6792 Ed Guerra Rizzo Associates Eddie.Guerra@rizzoassoc.com (412) 825-2200 13