R E P O R T RISK ASSESSMENT FOR PROPOSED INSTALLATION OF ADDITIONAL TANKAGES AT LPG BOTTLING PLANT IN PORT BLAIR ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS

R E P O R T ON RISK ASSESSMENT FOR PROPOSED INSTALLATION OF ADDITIONAL TANKAGES AT LPG BOTTLING PLANT IN PORT BLAIR ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS OF M/s INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED Prepared By PROJECTS & DEVELOPMENT INDIA LIMITED (A Govt. of India Undertaking) PO: Sindri - 828122, Dist: Dhanbad (Jharkhand) List A - Accredited EIA Consultant Organization by QCI-NABET Serial No. 119 as on 05.03.2018 PDIL JOB NO: 9702 MARCH, 2018

PROJECTS & DEVELOPMENT INDIA LTD. 9702-QRA-IOC LPG BP PORT BLAIR DOCUMENT NO. SHEET 1 OF 2 1 REV RISK ASSESSMENT FOR LPG BOTTLING PLANT AT PORT BLAIR ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS OF M/s INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED 1 March, 2018 REPORT 0 Feb, 2018 DRAFT REPORT BVH DKC AKS REV DATE PURPOSE PREPARED REVIEWED APPROVED FORM NO. 02-0000-0021 F1 REV 2 All rights reserved

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY FOR LPG BOTTLING PLANT OF M/S IOCL, PORT BLAIR, ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS 9702-QRA-IOC LPG BP Port Blair DOCUMENT NO. SHEET 2 OF 2 1 REV CONTENT Chapter Description Page No. 1.0 Introduction 1 4 2.0 Project & Process Description 5 10 3.0 Risk Assessment 11 35 4.0 Disaster Management Plan 36 68 ATTACHMENTS Drawing Description Page No. No. Drg. No. 1 Layout Plan of LPG Bottling Plant, Port Blair A1 Drg. No. 2 Iso- Risk Contour A2 Drg. No. 3 F-N Curve A3 FORM NO: 02-0000-0021 F2 REV 1 All rights reserved

INTRODUCTION 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 IDENTIFICATION OF PROJECT PROPONENT & PROJECT Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), the largest commercial undertaking in India and a Fortune Global 500 company, is engaged in the business of refining, transportation and marketing of petroleum products. The Indian Oil Group of companies owns and operates 11 of India's 23 refineries with a combined refining capacity of 80.7 MMTPA. Indian Oil accounts for nearly half of India's petroleum products market share, with sales of 83.5 million tonnes in 2016-17. Over 35% national refining capacity and 71% downstream sector pipelines throughput capacity are with Indian Oil, Keeping its commitment to supply cleaner, 100% BS-IV compliant automative fuels across the country from 1 st April 2017. Indian Oil is also the first among oil marketing companies to supply advanced BS-VI grade fuel to major automobile manufacturers for their test runs of vehicles that will be rolled out in 2020. Paradip Refinery in its first year of operation, Indian Oil refineries achieved a cumulative crude oil throughput of 65.1 million tonnes during the year 2016-17, which is the highest ever. Excluding Paradip Refinery, all other refineries together utilised 105% capacity. Mathura, Panipat and Bongaigaon refineries achieved the highest annual crude oil throughput during the year 2016-17. Indian Oil's 13,300-km cross-country pipelines network facilitates the transportation of crude oil to refineries and finished products to high-demand centres in an efficient, economical and environment-friendly manner. Its throughput capacity of 93.7 MMTPA for crude oil and petroleum products and 9.5 MMSCMD for gas makes it one of the largest pipeline networks in the world. The Corporation's pipelines network of over 12,800 km achieved a combined throughput of 81.70 MMT in 2016-17, thereby surpassing the previous highest figure of 79.82 MMT in 2015-16. Indian Oil remains the numero uno player in the market at the industry level. With sales of 77.57 million metric tonnes of petroleum products, Indian Oil registered an overall sales growth of 1.8%. It has its own Research & Development Centre situated at Faridabad, Haryana, near New Delhi. 1.2 PROJECT PROPOSAL IOCL is having an LPG Bottling Plant in Port Blair, which is located in South Andaman district of Andaman & Nicobar Islands. The bottling plant has an installed bottling capacity of 20TMTPA with storage capacity of 900 MT. Since, its commissioning the Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 1 of 68

INTRODUCTION demand of LPG has been increasing day by day and the present storage facility is unable to meet the growing demand. In view of the growing demand, IOCL proposes to augment the storage capacity of Port Blair Bottling Plant by installing two nos. of mounded bullets of 450 MT capacities each. 1.3 LOCATION OF THE PROJECT The proposed installation of additional tankages at LPG bottling plant is situated at village Hopetown in Port Blair, District South Andaman in Union Territory (UT) of Andaman & Nicobar Islands. The bottling plant is spread over an area of 22 acres of land owned by IOCL. The Licensed area of the plant is about 8.32 ha. The project site Geo-coordinates are at 11 40'37.96"N & 92 42'59.31"E, at 27m above MSL. The nearest town is Port Blair at 50km and its Airport is at a distance of 45km from plant. Location of new bottling plant has been presented through geographical map & Google Map in Fig 1.1. Details of surrounding of the plant boundary Eastern side Mount Harriet Western side Village Northern side Sea Southern side Forest 1.4 PROJECT COST AND IMPLEMENTATION The cost estimates for the proposed project has been worked out to Rs. 28 Crores. The date of start of construction shall be after grant of Environmental Clearance (EC) from State Administration/West Bengal PCB. The project is scheduled to be completed within 24 months after issuance of EC. 1.5 DETAILS OF CONSULTANT M/s IOCL has engaged Projects & Development India Limited (PDIL), a Government of India Undertaking, for preparation of EIA/ RA Reports for proposed LPG bottling plant in order to seek environment clearance from statutory agencies. PDIL is a premier engineering consultancy and NABET accredited EIA consultancy organization (Sl. No.116 as on 05.01.2018 in List A ). It has been retained as EIA Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 2 of 68

INTRODUCTION Consultant by IOCL for obtaining environmental clearance from Andaman UT Administration/SEAC/ SEIAA. PDIL is a Mini Ratna, Category-I, Govt. of India Undertaking under Department of Fertilizers. PDIL is an ISO 9001:2015 & OHSAS 18001:2007 Certified and ISO/IEC 17020:2012 accredited premier Consultancy and Engineering Organization, which has played pivotal role in the growth of Indian Fertilizer Industry. The Environmental Engineering Department of PDIL has an Environment Laboratory as its integral part, which is duly approved by CPCB/MoEFCC. 1.6 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF NATURE & SIZE The existing LPG bottling plant handles 20TMTPA of LPG. The LPG is stored in six nos. of Bullets of 150 MT capacity each. Every day about 6171 cylinders shall be filled and sent to authorized dealers for onward distribution to customers. The proposed facilities of the bottling plant may be summarized as under: Sl.No. Name of Items : Capacity 01. Storage Tanks for LPG : 6 Nos. Bullets (6x150 MT) 02. Safety Valves on Storage Tanks : 2 Nos.in each bullet, total 12 03. Set Pressures (kg/cm 2 g) : 19.25 04. Storage temperature, 0 C : 55 06. Unloading through : Ship Vessel 07. No. of Carousel : 1 x 12 filling points 08. No. of cylinders stored at a time : 640 09. LPG Pumps : 2 x 10 m 3 /hr 10. LPG Vapour Compressor : 2 x 87 Nm 3 /hr 11. Air Compressor : 2 x 288 m 3 /hr 12. Air Drying Unit : 1 x 125 Nm 3 /hr 13. DG Set : 1 x 250 KVA +1 x 125 KVA 14. Fire Water Storage : 2 x 3500 kl (A/G) 15. Fire Water Pumps : 6 x 410 kl/hr 16. Jockey Fire Water Pumps : 2 x 10 m 3 /hr Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 3 of 68

INTRODUCTION Fig 1.1: Location map of LPG Bottling Plant of IOCL, Port Blair Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 4 of 68

PROJECT & PROCESS DESCRIPTION 2.0 PROJECT & PROCESS DESCRIPTION 2.1 PROJECT PROPOSAL The demand of LPG for domestic purposes is increasing day by day. To cope up with increasing demand, Public Sector Oil Companies are setting up new bottling plants as well as augmenting their existing capacities. Accordingly, IOCL has also initiated the process of setting up new plants as well as augmenting their existing facilities in various region of India. M/s IOCL operates LPG Bottling Plant in Port Blair, which is located in South Andaman district of Andaman & Nicobar Islands. The bottling plant has an installed bottling capacity of 20TMTPA & storage capacity of 900 MT comprising 6 Nos above ground Bullets of 150 MT capacity each. The plant was commissioned on 09.04.2003. Since, its commissioning the demand of LPG has been increasing day by day and the present storage facility is unable to meet the growing demand. Besides this the days cover for LPG storage at Port Blair Bottling Plant is only for about 30 days which is very low considering the unavailability of ship and exhaustive background logistics for placement of cargo at Port Blair. In view of the growing demand, IOCL proposes to augment the storage capacity of Port Blair Bottling Plant by adding two nos. of mounded bullets of 450 MT capacities each. After augmentation, the storage capacity of the plant would become 1800 MT and the days cover would increase from 30 days to 60 days which is a safe days coverage. Moreover the tankers through which we receive bulk LPG has total storage capacity of approximately 2000 MT and we receive only 870 MT out of 2000 MT as our existing storage capacity is only 900MT. This is causing IOC to suffer a dead freight of 1100 MT in each parcel. Augmentation of storage capacity at Port Blair Bottling Plant will reduce the dead freight. 2.2 PROJECT SITE LAYOUT Port Blair bottling plant is spread over an area of 22 acres of land. The Licensed area of the plant is about 8.32 ha. The requirement of land for the proposed bullets is available within the existing plant premises. Hence, no additional land is required for locating the proposed mounded bullets. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 5 of 68

PROJECT & PROCESS DESCRIPTION The layout of the bottling plant has been prepared as per prescribed OISD-144 & 150. The road network is designed to ensure smooth movement of bulk/filled cylinder trucks. Layout plan of the proposed bottling plan including proposed facilities have been presented as an enclosure Drawing No.1. 2.3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION Following steps are involved in operation of LPG bottling plant: i. LPG receipt by Vessel Cargo Tanker imported from Singapore ii. LPG storage in Bullets iii. LPG pump/compressor house iv. LPG filling in cylinders by Carousal gun v. Leakage testing of cylinders vi. Air removal and LPG vapour filling in new and repaired cylinders, i.e. Purging Unit vii. Evacuation of leaky cylinders viii. Storage of filled cylinders & transportation BLOCK DIAGRAM OF LPG BOTTLING PLANT ACTIVITIES LPG RECEIPT THROUGH CARGO TANKERS LPG STORGE IN BULLETS LPG PUMP & COMPRESSOR HOUSE FILLING MACHINE CYLINDER FILLING DESPATCH THROUGH LORRIES Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 6 of 68

PROJECT & PROCESS DESCRIPTION LPG CYLINDER FILLING IN LPG BOTTLING PLANT CORRECTION UNIT EMPTY CYLINDER RECEIPT CVT CAPPING INLET TEST BATH WASHER REPLACEMENT & DEFECTIVE SEGREGATION CHECK & INSPECTION (SEGREGATION OF UNFIT CYLINDER WASHING & CLEANING OF CYLINDERS DEFECTIVE CYLINDERS FILLED FIT CYLINDERS DECAPPING OF CYLINDERS ADJUSTMENT OF TARE WEIGHTS SEALING FILLING MACHINE CRIMPING DELATCHING DESPATCH CHECK - SCALE Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 7 of 68

PROJECT & PROCESS DESCRIPTION 2.5 EXISTING PLANT CAPACITY Presently the storage capacity of Port Blair LPG BP is 900 MT which comprises six A/G bullets of 150 MT capacity each. Table 2.1: Existing Plant Facilities Sl.No. Description : Details 1. Project land : 22 Acres 2. Project Location : Village Hope Town, Port Blair Dist South Andaman Andaman & Nicobar Islands 3. Bullets for storage Storage Temperature & Pressure : : 6 X 150 MT -43 to 55 C 19.33 bar 4. Safety Valve on Bullet : 2 in each bullet, total 12 at 19.25 bar set pressure 5. Bullet Dyke : 40 x 60 x 0.5 m 6. Unloading through : Cargo Tanker imported from Singapore 7. LPG Pumps : 2 X 10 m 3 /hr 8. LPG Vapour Compressor : 2 X 87 m 3 /hr 9. No. of Carousels Carousel gun : : 1 12 10. Licensed capacity of cylinders : 640 11. Air Compressor : 2 X 288 m 3 /hr 12. Air Dryer : 1 x 125 m 3 /hr 13. DG Sets. : 1 X 250 KVA + 1 X 125 KVA 14. Fire Water Storage. : 2 X 3500 kl 15. Fire Water pumps. : 6 X 410 kl/hr. 16. Jockey Fire Water Pumps : 2 x 10 m 3 /hr. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 8 of 68

PROJECT & PROCESS DESCRIPTION 2.5 PROPOSED FACILITIES IOCL fulfils the LPG demand of consumers of not only Port Blair but whole of Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The existing storage facilities are unable to meet the growing demand of LPG. Proposes to augmentation of storage capacity, the storage configuration at Port Blair Bottling Plant shall be as under. Table 2.2: Proposed plant facilities Description MT Day s Cover Existing Storage 6x150 MT (A/G Bullets) =900 MT 30 days Proposed Storage 2x450 (Mounded Bullets)=900 MT Total Storage 1800 60 days 2.6 Firefighting Facilities The Plant has equipped with firefighting facilities as per OISD 144. The system is based on Electro pneumatic heat detection based automatic sprinkler system provided in all LPG facilities, gas monitoring system, personnel protection equipment etc. The entire Plant will be networked with pressurized fire hydrant lines which will have Fire Hydrants, long range Monitors and Deluge Valves at strategic locations as per OISD-144. a. Gas Detection System: Suitable Gas Monitoring System (GMS) with LPG detectors are already placed at critical locations in the hazardous operation area of the plant. Additional sensor will be installed for the proposed mounded storage area & will be hooked up with the existing detector system. Audio visual alarms showing the location of the gas leakage has been provided on a control panel located at the Plant Manager s office. First level alarm shall be set at 20 % of the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) and second level alarm at 60% of Lower Explosive Limit (LEL). b. Interlocking Shutdown Device (ILSD): All equipment & machineries on handling LPG are interconnected with ILSD for automatic shutdown & auto operation of fire hydrant network. c. PA paging System & Fire alarm: All important locations are provided with PA paging system & Fire alarm is provide at designate area. PA paging system with call points will be provided in the proposed mounded storage area also. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 9 of 68

PROJECT & PROCESS DESCRIPTION d. Fire Protection System: The existing plant has been provided with Firefighting system designed based on OISD-144 &150 standards. A dedicated firewater supply through ring main pressurised piping is available which will be extended to mounded bullet area also. The firewater distribution system will supply fire water to hydrants, monitors and medium velocity water spray systems. Adequate number of working and stand-by diesel driven fire pumps as well as jockey pumps exists in the fire pump house area along two no s of dedicated fire storage tanks as per OISD requirement. Hydrant main will be kept at a residual pressure of 7 kg/cm 2. All LPG storage vessels shall be provided with heat detection based auto operated sprinkler system with deluge valve with automatic fire protection system & electro pneumatic heat detectors. In view of the high hazard potential of LPG, extreme care is taken to maintain the safety needs of the installation. Safety audits are carried out regularly by a multidisciplinary team. The safety audit includes operating procedures, housekeeping, provision of firefighting and safety gadgets, mock drills etc. 2.7 Existing Manpower The details of manpower at existing LPB BP are mentioned below. Total strength in general shift : 4 Officers : 4 Workers : 20 Contract workers : 21 Clerical : 0 Canteen staff : 8 Security : 12 Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 10 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT 3.0 RISK ASSESSMENT 3.1 DEFINITIONS Risk is defined as a likelihood of an undesired event (accident, injury or death) occurring within a specified period or under specified circumstances. This may be either a frequency or a probability depending on the circumstances. Hazard is defined as a physical situation, which may cause human injury, damage to property or the environment or some combination of these criteria. Hazardous Substance means any substance, which by reason of its chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling is liable to cause harm to human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organisms, property or the environment. Hazardous Process is defined as any process or activity in relation to an industry, which may cause impairment to the health of the persons engaged or connected therewith or which may result in pollution of the general environment. Disaster is defined as a catastrophic situation that causes damage, economic disruptions, loss of human life and deterioration of health and health services on a scale sufficient to warrant an extraordinary response from outside the affected area or community. Disaster occasioned by man is factory fire, explosions and release of toxic gases or chemical substances etc. Accident is an unplanned event, which has a probability of causing personal injury or property damage or both. Emergency is defined as a situation where the demand exceeds the resources. This highlights the typical nature of emergency. It will be after experience that enough is not enough in emergency situations. Situations of this nature are avoidable but it is not possible to avoid them always. Emergency Preparedness is one of the key activities in the overall Management. Preparedness, though largely dependent upon the response capability of the persons engaged in direct action, will require support from others in the organization before, during and after an emergency. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 11 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT 3.2 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY Risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident consisting of an event or sequence of events. Risk analysis study has been carried out as per IS-15656. The description of the tasks of the various phases involved in RA is detailed below: Phase-I: Hazard Identification Hazard identification is a critical step in risk analysis. Many aids are available including experience, checklist, detailed process knowledge, equipment failure experience, hazard index techniques, what-if analysis, hazard and operability studies, failure mode and effect analysis and preliminary hazard analysis for hazard identification. Process information study and relevant data would help in the identification of hazard prone section of the plant. Inventory analysis and Fire and Explosion and Toxicity Indices helps in hazard identification. Phase-II: Hazard Assessment and Evaluation Safety of hazard prone section is studied using Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). PHA is a part of the US Military Standard System Safety Program requirements. The main purpose of this analysis is for an early recognition of hazards, thus saving time and cost, which could result from major plant redesigns, if hazards are discovered at a later stage. Many companies use a similar procedure under a different name. It is generally applied during concept or early development phase of a process plant and can be very useful in site selection. PHA is a precursor to further hazard analysis and is intended for use only in the preliminary phase of plant development for cases where past experience provides little or no insight into any potential safety problems, e.g. a plant with a new process. The PHA focuses on the hazardous materials and major plant elements since few details on the plant design are available and there is likely not to be any information available on procedures. The PHA is sometimes considered to be a review where energy can be released in an uncontrolled manner. The PHA consists of formulating a list of hazards related to: Pipeline / equipments; Interface among system components; Operative environment; Operations (tests, maintenance, etc.); Facility; and Safety equipment Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 12 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT The results include recommendations to reduce or eliminate hazards in the subsequent plant design phase. The PHA is followed by evaluation of MCA and Consequence Analysis. 3.3 RISK ANALYSIS LPG Bottling Plant of M/s IOCL, Port Blair mainly poses fire and explosion hazards due to handling/storage/dispatch operation of LPG. These operations may lead to unwanted and accidental releases of hydrocarbons. This section deals with listing of various failure cases leading to various hazard scenarios, analysis of failure modes and consequence analysis. Consequence analysis is basically a quantitative study of the hazard due to various failure scenarios to determine the possible magnitude of damage effects and to determine the distances up to which the damage may occur. The reason and purpose of consequence analysis are manifolds like: For computation of risk. For evaluating damage and protection of other plants. To ascertain damage potential to public and evolve protection measures. For formulating safe design criteria of equipment and protection systems. The results of consequence analysis are useful for getting information about all known and unknown effects that are of importance when some failure scenarios occur. It also gives information to deal with the possible catastrophic events and an understanding of hazard potential and remedial measures to the plant authorities, workers and the public living outside in the vicinity of the plant. Scope of risk analysis study includes the following: Identify vulnerable sections of the plant, which are likely to cause damage to the plant, operating staff and the surrounding communities in case of any accidental release of LPG from the plant facilities. Assess overall damage potential of the hazardous events in relation to Plant and environment. Assessment of total individual risk at various locations around the plant premises The present study is based on the information made available by M/s IOCL to PDIL before undertaking Risk Analysis Study. The study does not take into account the risk from any deliberate mal-operations or any act of sabotage. Risk analysis of the plant includes identification of various credible and non credible failure scenarios and consequences of those scenarios leading to various phenomena Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 13 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT like dispersion, pool fire, jet fire, vapor cloud explosion, etc. Frequency of the failure cases, magnitude of hazards and hazard distances have also been dealt with. The principal conclusions drawn from the risk analysis and recommendations based thereon are summarized hereunder. 3.4 Dow Fire and Explosion Index The Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) calculation is a tool to help determine the areas of greatest loss potential in a particular process. It also enables one to predict the physical damage that would occur in the event of an incident. The Material Factor (MF) is the basic starting value in the computation of the F&EI and other risk analysis values. The MF is a measure of the intrinsic rate of potential energy release from fire or explosion produced by combustion or chemical reaction. The MF is obtained from the flammability and instability rankings according to NFPA 704. After the appropriate Material Factor has been determined, the next step is to calculate the Process Unit Hazards Factor (F3), which is the term that is multiplied by the Material Factor to obtain the F&EI. The numerical value of the Process Unit Hazards Factor is determined by first determining the General Process Hazards Factor and Special Process Hazards Factor listed on the F&EI form. Each item which contributes to the Process Hazards Factors contributes to the development or escalation of an incident that could cause a fire or an explosion. The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of F&EI as per the criteria given below: F&EI Range Degree of Hazard 0-60: Light 61 96: Moderate 97 127: Intermediate 128 158: Heavy 159 up: Severe By comparing above range of the F&EI, the unit is classified into one of the following three categories for the purpose (Table-3.1). Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 14 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT Table 3.1 Fire Explosion Index Category Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) I F&EI < 65 II 65 < or = F&EI < 95 III F&EI > or = 95 Certain basic minimum preventive and protective measures are recommended for the three hazard categories. Fire and Explosion are the likely hazards, which may occur due to the storage of LPG. Hence, Fire and Explosion index has been calculated for plant storage. Detailed estimates of FE&TI are given in Table- 3.2 S. No. Fuel Total Capacity (MT) 1 LPG 6 x 150 MT and 2 x 450 MT (Proposed) Table 3.2 Fire Explosion Index for LPG Storage F & EI Degree Category Radius of Exposure (m) 114 Intermediate III 29 3.5 HAZARDS OF LPG SPILLAGE/ESCAPE FROM CONTAINMENT 3.5.1 General When LPG is released from a storage vessel or a pipeline, a fraction of LPG vaporizes immediately and the other portion forms a pool if the released liquid quantity is significant. LPG from the pool vaporizes rapidly entrapping some liquid as droplets as well as considerable amount of air, forming a gas cloud. The gas cloud is relatively heavier than air and forms a thin layer on the ground. The cloud flows into trenches and depressions and in this way travels a considerable distance. As the cloud formed in the area of spill moves downwind under influence of wind, it gets diluted. A small spark within the flammability limit can cause flash fire, explosion and if the liquid pool still exists and remains in touch of cloud under fire it can ignite the whole mass of liquid. However, in case of non-existence of any source of fire there will be no occurrence of hazardous event and the cloud may get diluted to such a level that the mixture is no longer explosive. But it can cause asphyxiation due to displacement of oxygen. The various phenomena that may likely to take place are listed as hereunder. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 15 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT 3.5.2 Jet Fire Escaping jet of LPG from pressure vessels/piping, if ignited, causes a jet flame. The jet flame direction and tilt depend on prevailing wind direction and velocity. Damage, in case of such type of jet fires, may be restricted within the plant boundary. However, the ignited jet can impinge on other vessels and equipment carrying LPG and can cause domino effect. 3.5.3 Pool Fire The liquid pool, if ignited, causes a "Pool Fire". In the pool fire, LPG burns with long smoky flame throughout the pool diameter radiating intense heat, which creates severe damage to the adjoining buildings, structures, other vessels and equipment causing secondary fires. The flame may tilt under influence of wind and may get propagated / blown several pool diameters down wind. Damage, in case of such fires, may be restricted within the plant area and near the source of generation. However, in case of plants having a good layout maintaining safe separation distances and other precautionary measures, the damage may be restricted to minimum distance. 3.5.4 Vapor Cloud Explosion Clouds of LPG vapor mixed with air (within flammability limit) may cause propagating flames when ignited. In certain cases flame may take place within seconds. The thermal radiation intensity is severe depending on the total mass of LPG in the cloud and may cause secondary fires. When the flame travels very fast it explodes causing high overpressures or blast effects causing heavy damage at considerable distance from the release point. Such explosions are called vapor cloud explosion and is most common cause of such industrial accidents. 3.5.5 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) This phenomenon occurs when pressure inside a storage vessel increases above the design pressure due to receipt of heat radiation from fire in the adjacent area. Due to impingement of flame or due to radiant heat, temperature in the vapor portion of the storage vessel increases rapidly compared to the portion filled with liquid. Increase in temperature weakens the shell. With the rise in vapor pressure and inadequate vapor space for expansion, the shell of storage tank bursts causing fragments of the shell flying like projectiles with release of whole mass of pressurized boiling liquid. The released liquid flashes and atomizes immediately often resulting in a large fireball in contact with an ignition source. Although the fireball lasts only a few seconds, its effect is devastating due to flame contact and intense thermal radiation. This phenomenon is Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 16 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT called as BLEVE. The effect of BLEVE may extend beyond the plant boundary in case of catastrophic failure of large pressurized storage vessels but occurrence of such phenomena is very rare and this is considered to be incredible in nature. 3.6 PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 3.6.1 The plant handles LPG, which is highly inflammable and explosive. The hazards involved in the plant are: Large scale fire and explosion in storage area due to damage of the bulk storage system. Equipment failure/malfunction like relief valve failure, flange gasket failure, pump mechanical seal failure etc. resulting in leakage of LPG to atmosphere. Accidents due to overfilled cylinders or fire in the vicinity. Lack of adequate fire protection facilities available at different places of LPG unloading, loading and usage. Lack of experience level of personnel involved and their capacity to cope with emergency situation. Apart from the above, accidents due to mal-operation, negligence and sabotage are also not ruled out. 3.7 RISK ANALYSIS 3.7.1 Quantitative Risk Analysis Quantitative Risk Analysis has been carried out with the help of renowned Software i.e. PHAST & SAFETI v8.0 (Latest) of M/s DNV GL. 3.7.2 Modes of Failure There are various potential sources of large/small leakages, which may release LPG to the surrounding atmosphere. This leakage may be in the form of a small gasket failure in a flanged joint or snapping of hoses, a guillotine failure of a pipeline or any other source of leakage. 3.7.3 Damage Criteria The damage effects are different for different types of failure scenarios. The physical effects of ignition of LPG vapors, e.g. blast wave, thermal radiation and BLEVE due to release of LPG from the containment are discussed below: i) LPG vapors released accidentally will normally spread out in the direction of the wind. If it comes into contact with an ignition source before being dispersed Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 17 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT ii) below the lower flammability limit (LFL), a flash fire is likely to occur and the flame may travel back to the source of leak. Any person caught in the flash fire is likely to suffer from severe burn injury. Therefore, in consequence analysis, the distance to LFL value is usually taken to indicate the area, which may be affected by flash fires. Any other combustible material within the flash fire is likely to catch fire and may cause secondary fires. In the area close to the source of leakage of LPG there is a possibility of Oxygen depletion since the LPG vapor is heavier than air. A minimum of 19.5% Oxygen in air is considered essential for human lives. Thermal radiation due to pool fire, jet flame or fireball may cause various degrees of burn on human bodies. Also its effects on inanimate objects like equipment, piping, building and other objects need to be evaluated. The damage effects with respect to thermal radiation intensity are elaborated in Table-3.3. Damage due to various levels of incident thermal radiation, overpressure and thermal dose level has been given in Table 3.3, 3.4 & 3.5. Table-3.3 DAMAGE DUE TO INCIDENT THERMAL RADIATION INTENSITY Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity, kw/m 2 Types of damage 37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment 32 Maximum allowable radiation intensity on thermally protected and pressurized storage tank 12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting of plastic tubing etc. Casualty Probability 1.00 1.00 0.50 8 Maximum allowable radiation intensity on 0.0 thermally unprotected and pressurized storage tanks 4.5 1st degree burn 0.00 1.6 Will cause no discomfort to long exposure 0.00 0.7 Equivalent to solar radiation 0.00 Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 18 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT Table-3.4 DAMAGE EFFECTS OF BLAST OVERPRESSURE Blast Overpressure. Damage Type (Bar) 0.30 Major damage to structures (assumed fatal to the people inside structure) Casualty Probability 0.25 0.17 Eardrum rupture 0.10 0.10 Repairable Damage 0.10 0.03 Glass Breakage 0.00 0.01 Crack of Windows 0.00 iii) iv) In the event of dispersion of LPG vapor cloud, the cloud comes into contact with an ignition source between its upper and lower flammability limit an explosion may occur. The resultant blast wave may have damaging effect on the equipment, buildings, structures etc. The collapse of buildings & structures may cause injury or fatality. Damage effect of blast overpressures are illustrated in the Table 3.4. In the case of fireball from LPG storage tanks, the effect will be similar to that of thermal radiation. Those who are located within fireball distance are likely to suffer fatal burn injury. Those who are beyond fireball diameter will be subjected to different levels of thermal radiation, which has been mentioned earlier in Table-3.3. In case of transient fires like fire ball, doses of thermal radiation (total incident energy) are also used to estimate threshold damage levels on human bodies. Table 3.5 shows the damage effects due to various dose levels. Table-3.5 PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THERMAL DOSE LEVEL Dose Threshold (kj/m 2 ) Effect 375 Third degree burn 250 Second degree burn 125 First degree burn 65 Threshold of pain, no reddening or blistering of skin is caused 1st Degree Burn Involves only epidermis. Sunburn is an example. Blisters may occur. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 19 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT 2nd Degree Burn 3rd Degree Burn Whole epidermis along with some portion of dermis is affected. Involves whole of epidermis and dermis. Sub-cutaneous tissues may also be affected. Dispersion and Stability Class In calculation of effects due to release of hydrocarbons dispersion of vapor plays an important role as indicated earlier. The factors, which govern dispersion, are mainly Wind Velocity, Stability Class, Temperature as well as surface roughness. Stability is essentially the extent to which it allows vertical motion by suppressing or assisting turbulence. It is generally a function of vertical temperature profile of the atmosphere. The stability factor directly influences the ability of the atmosphere to disperse pollutants emitted into it from sources in the plant. In most dispersion problems, relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the ground. Turbulence induced by buoyancy forces in the atmosphere is closely related to the vertical temperature profile. Temperature of the atmospheric air normally decreases with increase in height. The rate of decrease of temperature with height is known as the Lapse Rate. It varies from time to time and place to place. This rate of change of temperature with height under adiabatic or neutral condition is approximately 1 o C per 100 m. The atmosphere is said to be stable, neutral or unstable according to the lapse rate is less than, equal or greater than dry adiabatic lapse rate i.e. 1 o C per 100 m. Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from A to F A = Extremely unstable B = Moderately unstable C = Slightly unstable D = Neutral E = Stable F = Highly stable 3.7.4 Failure Case Listing The mode of approach adopted for consequence analysis is to first select the failure cases and then to conduct the consequence analysis of the selected failure cases. The failure cases selected are listed in Table-3.6. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 20 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT Table -3.6 SELECTED FAILURE CASES Sl. Failure Failure Case No. Mode 1. Bullet/Mounded Bullet Outlet line failure a. 15 mm Hole Random Failure b. 20% CSA failure Non - Credible c. 25 mm Hole Random Failure 2. Catastrophic Failure of Non - Bullet Credible 3. Pump discharge line Failure a. 10 mm Hole Random Failure b. Line rupture Full Non - bore (2 ) Credible 4. Mechanical shaft seal Random failure of LPG pump Failure 5. Compressor discharge line failure a. 10 mm Hole Random Failure b. 25 mm hole Random Failure c. Line rupture Full Non - bore (2 ) Credible Carousal filling line failure a. 10 mm Hole Random Failure 6. Random b. 25mm hole Failure c. Line rupture Full Non - bore (2 ) Credible Catastrophic Failure of Non - 7. 14.2kg & 19kg type filled Credible Cylinders Consequence Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, BLEVE, FIREBALL Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Cylinder fire ball/ BLEVE The purpose of listing of failure cases as given in Table-3.6 is to examine the consequence of the failure individually or in combination. The frequency of occurrence of failure varies and can be estimated by "Fault tree" or "Event tree" methods. Adoption of such methods for failure frequency estimation need use of reliability indices of equipment and components of the system under study, Such reliability indices are expected to be furnished by the manufacturers, which is seldom the case in practice. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 21 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT Generic data could be used as an alternative. However, besides such data not being available for every component, their use may sometimes give an erroneous picture if not used judiciously. It is seen that the guillotine failure of pipelines of higher sizes has a lower frequency of occurrence. Also catastrophic failure of LPG storage Vessels, may occur rarely and failures of such equipment may be considered incredible as these may contribute small risk because of low frequency of occurrence. Pump mechanical seal, etc. are relatively high and may be considered "foreseeable" or "credible" and may contribute higher risk. 3.8 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS SCENARIOS 3.8.1 Bullet/Mounded Bullet outlet line failure a. 15mm dia. hole leak, b. 20% CSA Failure c. 25mm dia. hole leak The existing six no s bullets and proposed two no s Mounded bullets shall be provided with an outlet line of 100 mm size respectively. In case of leakages viz.15mm & 25mm and 20% CSA failure of the inlet line, LPG will flow out from the pipe as jet. The outflow of LPG may be large and needs to be stopped at the shortest possible time to avoid a catastrophe. Features of Bullets are as following: Capacity : 06 x 150 MT Proposed Mounded Bullet: 02 x 450 MT Storage Temperature : -43 to 55 C Storage Pressure : 19.33 bar If the failure is downstream of ROV; presence of gas detector near ROV in outlet line may raise alarm or actuate closure of ROV and avoid larger LPG losses. However, the failure frequency of 20% CSA for pipe dia. of 150 mm is 1.127 x 10-6 /m/year, which indicates that chances of such failure are very remote. Therefore, this scenario may be considered as non - credible in nature. The hazard distances for the above-mentioned cases are given below: i) The hazard distance to LFL value of LPG has been calculated for wind speed of 3D (Day condition) and 2F (Night condition) are presented in Table 3.7: Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 22 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT S.No Table-3.7 MAXIMUM HAZARD DISTANCE TO LFL Scenario 1. 15mm Leak 2. 25mm Leak 3. 20% CSA line failure Weather (Wind Speed and Stability Class) Distance to LFL [m] Category 2/F 35 Category 3/D 33 Category 2/F 35 Category 3/D 33 Category 2/F 57 Category 3/D 81 It is evident from the above table that hazard distance to LFL may extend upto a max distance of 81 m for 20% CSA failure of bullet inlet line. S.No. 1 2 3 ii) Scenario 15mm Leak 20% CSA line failure 25mm Leak This scenario envisages leakages and 20% CSA failure of Bullet inlet line resulting in damage of surrounding equipments buildings in downwind distance due to Jet Fire. The hazard distances have been mentioned in Table - 3.8: Table- 3.8 HAZARD DISTANCES TO THERMAL RADIATION DUE TO JET FIRE Flame Distance downwind to intensity level [m] Weather length Category 4.5 8 12.5 32 37.5 [m] kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 2/F 24 43 38 34 28 28 3/D 21 42 36 32 26 26 2/F 75 149 129 117 96 93 3/D 67 143 123 110 90 87 2/F 24 43 38 34 28 28 3/D 21 42 36 32 26 26 It is evident from the above table that the hazard distance to 1st degree burn i.e. for thermal radiation level of 4.5 kw/m 2 in case of 20% CSA failure hazard distance may extend up to a max distance of 149 m. iii) Vapor Cloud Explosion: The hazard distances for over pressures of 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar and 0.03 bar due to vapor cloud explosion are given below: Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 23 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT Table-3.9 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION S. No Scenario 1. 15mm Leak 2. 25mm Leak 3. 20% CSA line failure Weather Category Distance downwind to overpressure [m] 0.03 bar 0.1 bar 0.3 bar 2/F 116 73 61 3/D 123 89 79 2/F 116 73 61 3/D 123 89 79 2/F 197 114 90 3/D 214 140 118 It is evident from the above table that the hazard distances to overpressure of 0.3 bar (heavy damage) may extend up to a max distance of 118m due to 20% CSA failure of vessels outlet line. This failure may cause damage to the storage vessels & other equipment/structures, hence utmost care shall be taken to prevent such failure. Hence, periodic NDT is suggested which may be helpful to assess the health of the pipeline. 3.8.2 Catastrophic Failure of Bullet LPG received is stored in Bullet. For consequence analysis, the single Bullet of 150 MT capacity has been considered. As the Bullet comes under pressurized storage vessels category, its failure frequency is very low i.e. 1.6 x 10-5 per year. In the event of heat received by the bullet e.g. by flame impingement or from fire in the vicinity, the liquid inside the bullet shall start boiling and the pressure inside the tank shall start building up. If the safety valve provided in the bullet does not work properly or if it has not been designed properly the phenomenon of BLEVE may arise. The vessel shall rupture and the immediate ignition of the expanding fuel/air mixture may lead to intense combustion resulting in fireballs. The fireball details, hazard distances are given in the Tables- 3.11 Table - 3.11 FIRE BALL DETAILS DUE TO BLEVE IN BULLET Sl. No. Items Value 01. LPG contained in the Bullet, MT 150 02. Fire ball diameter, m 236 Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 24 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT 03. Duration of fire ball, sec. 14.5 04. Maximum flame emissive power, kw/m 2 225 3.8.3 LPG Pump Discharge Line Failure S.No. 1. 2. Case: a. 10mm dia. hole leak; b. Line rupture full bore (2 ) The LPG pump takes its suction from the Bullet and pumps it to the filling shed for filling of empty LPG cylinders. The details of the pump are as follows: No. of pumps : 2 Type of pump : Centrifugal Capacity : 10 m 3 /hr Suction/Discharge pressure : 6/13 kg/cm 2 g Suction/Discharge line size : 2 inch Following scenario has been envisaged for consequence analysis: i. The out-coming liquid in form of jet may catch fire in presence of any source of ii. iii. ignition resulting in jet fire. The out-flow liquid does not catch fire but evaporates forming a vapor cloud and disperse safely to beyond its LFL. The evaporating vapor cloud may come in contact with an ignition source between its flammability limit resulting in flash fire and vapor cloud explosion. a] Jet Fire The hazard distances to different thermal radiation levels due to jet fire are given in Table-3.12. Scenario 10mm Leak Line Rupture Full bore Table-3.12 HAZARD DISTANCES TO THERMAL RADIATION DUE TO JET FIRE Flame Distance downwind to intensity level [m] Weather length Category 4.5 8 12.5 32 37.5 [m] kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 2/F 19 35 31 28 23 22 3/D 17 34 29 26 21 21 2/F 64 127 110 99 82 79 3/D 58 121 104 94 76 74 From the above table it is evident that the hazard distance due to thermal radiation of 4.5 kw/m 2 may extend up to a max distance of 35m & 127m for 10 mm and line rupture respectively in the pump discharge line. It is also evident that hazard distance to 1 st degree burn i.e. for thermal radiation level of 4.5 kw/m 2 remains confined within the factory boundary. b] Vapor cloud explosion: the dispersing vapor cloud meets an ignition source. The hazard distances to over pressures of 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar as well as LFL Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 25 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT distances are presented below in Table-3.13 for wind speed of 3D (day condition) and 2F (night condition). Table-3.13 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION S. No Scenario 1. 10mm Leak 2. Line Rupture Full bore Weather Category Distance downwind to overpressure [m] 0.03 bar 0.1 bar 0.3 bar LFL distance (m) 2/F 94 66 57 24 3/D 87 63 56 13 2/F 204 117 92 58 3/D 210 139 118 83 From the above table, it is evident that the hazard distance to heavy damage i.e. for over pressure of 0.3 bar may extend up to a max. distance of 57m & 118m for 10 mm leak & line rupture respectively in the pump discharge line. The distance to LFL may extend upto a maximum distance of 24m & 83m respectively. Since failure frequency of 2 dia. pipeline is 1.269 x 10-6 /m/year, which is very low so, full-bore failure of such line is non-credible (rare occurrence phenomena) in nature. 3.8.4 Pump Mechanical shaft seal Failure of LPG pump The frequency of failure of mechanical seal of centrifugal pumps specially handling light hydrocarbons is quite high and poses risk due to formation of vapor cloud. Failure of seals releases considerable quantity of hydrocarbons into atmosphere and creates a hazardous zone. Present thinking is to adopt double mechanical seal especially for light hydrocarbon services like LPG. This helps in reducing their frequency of hydrocarbon releases to atmosphere but still contribute to a great extent to the overall risk of the plant. The failure frequency of mechanical seal of pump considered is 4.973 x 10-5 /year. However, the type of seal, single or double, does not affect their release rate or the hazard distances. Hazard distances have been calculated for the LPG pump mechanical seal failure. A shaft diameter of 40 mm and a seal gap of 2 mm have been assumed for release rate calculation. The spilled LPG will disperse and may result in: a) Jet Fire b) Vapor Cloud Explosion a] Jet Fire The hazard distances to different thermal radiation levels due to jet fire are given in Table-3.14. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 26 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT Table-3.14 HAZARD DISTANCES TO THERMAL RADIATION DUE TO JET FIRE S.No. 1. Scenario Mech. Seal failure Flame Distance downwind to intensity level [m] Weather length Category 4.5 8 12.5 32 37.5 [m] kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 2/F 16 30 26 24 20 19 3/D 15 28 25 22 18 18 From the above table it is evident that the hazard distance due to thermal radiation of 4.5 kw/m 2 may extend up to a max distance of 30m in case of Mech. seal failure. It is also evident that hazard distance to 1 st degree burn i.e. for thermal radiation level of 4.5 kw/m 2 remains confined within the factory boundary. b] Vapor cloud explosion: the dispersing vapor cloud meets an ignition source. The hazard distances to over pressures of 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar as well as LFL distances are presented below in Table-3.15 for wind speed of 3D (day condition) and 2F (night condition). S. No Scenario 1. NR: Not Reached Table-3.15 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION Mech. Seal failure Weather Category Distance downwind to overpressure [m] 0.03 bar 0.1 bar 0.3 bar LFL distance (m) 2/F 77 53 46 19 3/D 70 50 45 NR From the above table, it is evident that the hazard distance to heavy damage i.e. for over pressure of 0.3 bar may extend up to a max. distance of 46m in case of Mech. seal failure. The distance to LFL may extend upto a maximum distance of 19m. 3.8.5 LPG Vapor Compressor discharge Line Failure Case: a. 10mm dia. hole leak, b. 25mm dia. hole leak c. Full bore rupture of 2 Line The LPG Vapor compressor takes its suction from the Bullet. Following scenario has been envisaged for consequence analysis. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 27 of 68

S.No. 1 2 3 RISK ASSESSMENT 1) The vapor coming out may be in the form of jet and in presence of any source of ignition may catch fire resulting in jet fire. 2] The vapor does not catch fire but evaporates forming a vapor cloud and disperse safely beyond its LFL. 3] The evaporating vapor cloud may come in contact with an ignition source between its flammability limit resulting in flash fire or vapor cloud explosion. The results of the above three consequences are presented in Tables - 3.16 & 3.17 Scenario 10mm Leak 25mm leak Line Rupture Table 3.16 HEAT RADIATION DISTANCES DUE TO JET FIRE Flame Distance downwind to intensity level [m] Weather length Category 4.5 8 12.5 32 37.5 [m] kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 2/F 5 5 NR NR NR NR 3/D 5 5 NR NR NR NR 2/F 11 15 13 12 NR NR 3/D 11 15 13 12 NR NR 2/F 18 27 24 21 17 16 3/D 19 27 24 22 18 17 Full bore NR: Not Reached It may be inferred from above table that hazard distances for 1 st degree burn i.e. for thermal radiation level of 4.5 kw/m 2 may go upto a max distance of 5m, 15m & 27 m in case of 10 mm, 25mm hole and full-bore rupture respectively in compressor discharge line failure. Table-3.17 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION S. No Scenario 1. 10mm Leak 2. 25mm Leak 3. NR: Not Reached Line Rupture Full bore Weather Category Distance downwind to overpressure [m] 0.03 bar 0.1 bar 0.3 bar 2/F NR NR NR 3/D NR NR NR 2/F 24 15 12 3/D 23 15 12 2/F 56 39 34 3/D 54 38 34 It is evident from the above table that hazard distances to heavy damage (0.3 bar) may extend upto a max distance of 12 & 34 m in case of 25 mm Hole and Rupture in compressor discharge line failure. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 28 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT 3.8.6 Carousal Filling Line Failure Case: a. 10mm dia. hole leak, b. 25mm dia. hole leak c. Full bore rupture of 2 Line S.No. 1 2 3 The LPG pump takes its suction from the Bullet/Mounded Bullet and pumps it to the filling shed for filling of empty LPG cylinders through carousal inlet line. Following scenario has been envisaged for consequence analysis. 1] Evaporation, vapor cloud formation and safe dispersion beyond its LFL 2] Jet fire if the released hydrocarbon forms a jet and finds an ignition source within its flammability limit. 3] Vapor Cloud Explosion, if the vapor cloud finds a source of ignition between its flammability limits. The results of the above three consequences are presented in Tables - 3.18 & 3.19. Scenario 10mm Leak 25mm leak Line Rupture Full bore Table 3.18 HAZARD DISTANCES TO JET FIRE Flame Distance downwind to intensity level [m] Weather length Category 4.5 8 12.5 32 37.5 [m] kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 kw/m 2 2/F 19 35 31 28 23 22 3/D 17 34 29 26 21 21 2/F 42 80 70 63 52 51 3/D 38 77 66 60 49 47 2/F 65 128 111 100 83 80 3/D 58 122 105 94 77 74 It may be inferred from above table that hazard distances for 1 st degree burn i.e. for thermal radiation level of 4.5 kw/m 2 may go upto a max distance of 35m, 80m, 128m respectively in case of 10mm, 25mm leak and line rupture of Carousal point. S. No Scenario Table - 3.19 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION Weather Category Distance downwind to overpressure [m] 0.03 bar 0.1 bar 0.3 bar LFL distance (m) 1. 10mm Leak 2/F 94 65 57 24 Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 29 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT 2. 25mm Leak 3. Line Rupture 3/D 87 63 56 13 2/F 175 100 79 50 3/D 173 113 106 73 2/F 205 117 92 58 3/D 211 139 118 83 It is evident from the above table that hazard distances to heavy damage (0.3 bar) may extend upto a max distance of 57m, 106 m & 118m in case of 10mm hole, 25 mm Hole and full-bore rupture in carousel filling line failure. LFL distance may extend upto a max distance of 83 m in case of line rupture of carousel inlet line. 3.8.7 Catastrophic Failure of 14.2kg & 19kg type filled Cylinders. For domestic and industrial purpose LPG is filled in cylinders of 14.2kg& 19kg capacities under a pressure of 15 kg/cm 2 (a). Beyond liquid full condition with any further expansion of the liquid, the cylinder pressure will rise approx. by 7 to 8 kg/cm 2 g for each degree rise in the temperature. This clearly explains the hazardous situation that could arise due to overfilling of cylinders. The filled cylinders are stored in filled cylinder storage shed as per OISD guidelines. In case of flame impingement or heat received by the cylinders from any fire in the vicinity or in the storage area, the pressure inside the cylinder may rise and may cause the cylinders to burst. The immediate ignition of the expanding fuel/air mixture leads to intense combustion giving rise to phenomenon of BLEVE. For BLEVE of filled cylinders the following cases have been considered. Case - I: 640 Cylinders of 14.2kg are stacked in the storage shed are considered. Case II: 478 Cylinders of 19kg are stacked in the storage shed are considered. Table - 3.20 FIRE BALL DETAILS DUE TO BLEVE IN CYLINDERS Sl. No. 14.2kg 19kg (640 Cylinders) (478 Cylinders) Radius of fire ball, m 46 46 Duration of fire ball, sec 7 7 Flame emissive power kw/m 2 291 291 Fireball center Height (at Lift off time), m 46 46 Flame out height, m 138 138 Table - 3.21 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 30 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT S. No Scenario Weather Category Distance downwind to overpressure [m] 0.03 bar 0.1 bar 0.3 bar LFL distance (m) 1. 14.2kg 2/F 574 331 265 167 (640 Cylinders failure) 3/D 557 317 269 174 2. 19kg 2/F 574 331 265 167 (478 Cylinders failure) 3/D 557 317 267 174 From the above table it is evident that overpressure (heavy damage) of 0.3 bar may go up to a maximum distance of 269m and 267m for 14.2kg and 19kg respectively. Also, the LFL distance may extend up to a max distance of 174m for 14.2kg & 19kg respectively. 3.9 RISK ASSESSMENT 3.9.1 Frequency Estimation An important component of risk analysis is the estimation of the likelihood or frequency of each failure case or release scenario. None of the events considered in this analysis are common and major catastrophic events are very rare. Leak frequencies were developed using a parts count, and event tree analysis was used to evaluate likelihood of success or failure of release mitigation safeguards onsite, specifically the potential for detection and isolation of leaks. Assuming that all releases occur at normal operating conditions provides overly conservative inputs to a QRA study. 3.9.1.1 Fault Tree Analysis A fault tree is an organized top down representation through logical gates (AND, OR) of the conditions or other factors causing or contributing to the occurrence of a defined undesirable event, referred to as the top event. To perform a fault tree analysis, a number of tasks have been executed. In chronological order these tasks are: Qualitative analysis: - System familiarization. Before a fault tree constructed, the system operation and on which failure modes have to be taken into account. - Definition of the top event and construction of the fault tree. - Determination of the minimal cut-sets. Quantitative analysis: - Collecting all relevant failure, repair, test and maintenance data. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 31 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT - Quantification of the minimal cut-sets. - Evaluation of the results. 3.9.1.2 Event Tree Analysis Event tree analysis is used for evaluating the likelihood of release of a hazardous material given the defined plant safeguards in place. The event tree analysis in this QRA determines the likelihood of mitigation working (HC detection and shutdown) or failing to operate on demand. Detection and isolation of an accidental release requires time to complete. Detection and isolation times for the QRA were developed using the detection and isolation times provided in the TNO Purple Book. Fig 3.1: Event tree for Continuous Liquid Release The literature data as indicated with Table 3.22: Failure Frequency Data has been referred to and failure frequency has been analyzed for applicability and use in the present QRA study. Table 3.22: Failure Frequency Data of possible events S.No Failure Scenario Failure frequency rate per m/ yr 1. 15 mm to 25mm leak for 6 line 6.192 x 10-6 20% CSA failure line rupture for 6 2. line 1.127 x 10-6 2. Catastrophic failure of Bullet 1.6 x 10-5 3. Safety Relief Valve release 1.24 x 10-6 4. 10 mm leak for 2 line 1.432 x 10-6 Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 32 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT 5. 20mm leak for 2 line 4.973 x 10-6 6. Full bore (2 ) failure of line 1.269 x 10-6 7. Pump Mech. seal failure 4.973 x 10-5 For the assessment of 'Individual Risk' due to the operation of LPG Bottling Plant at Port Blair, Andaman & Nicobar islands, the following has been taken into consideration: a) The individual risk has been calculated as cumulative effect of all the scenario mentioned for selected failure case as listed in Table No- 3.6 for 3D (Day condition) and 2F (Night Condition). b) Probability of dominant wind directions has been taken from IMD data. c) No mitigation factors such as shelters, escape etc. are considered which will result in conservative risk estimation. d) During risk assessment population data and source of ignition has been considered. 3.9.2 Risk Results 3.9.2.1 Individual Risk Results Drawing no.2 illustrates the individual risk contour for the LPG BP of IOCL Port Blair. As shown, the risk contour illustrating the risk of 1 fatality in 1 million years i.e., 1 x 10-6 is within the plant boundary. Therefore, the individual risk is in the acceptable risk level for public impacts with due care in implementation of safety guidelines and following the standards. 3.9.2.2 Societal Risk Results Drawing no.3 is the F-N diagram, illustrating the societal risk for the LPG BP of IOCL Port Blair. The following was determined from evaluating the societal risk results: It is evident from the above diagram the frequency per year 1x10-6 is in As Low As Reasonably Practicable- ALARP or tolerability region. Where further, prudent risk reduction shall be considered. 3.10 PRINCIPAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION The principal conclusion and recommendations that arise out of the risk analysis study are as follows. 3.10.1 Conclusion Iso-risk contours have been plotted by PHAST & SAFETI, Version-8.2 of M/s DNV GL, which is shown in Drg.no.2. The contour have been plotted by considering existing facilities and other allied facilities. It may be inferred from the Iso-risk contours that acceptable limit of individual risk of 1.0x10-6 per year is within the plant premises. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 33 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT Proper implementation of safety guidelines and following the standards can further reduce the hazard. It is also observed from FN curve (Drg. No. - 3), that Societal Risk observed in ALARP Region which is in tolerable range. Fire Fighting facilities including Hydrants, monitors and Sprinklers system, Fire water pumps, ESD system, Interlocking system, Gas Monitoring system have been installed in the plant. Vapor Extraction systems provided as required. Fire extinguishers of different types (10 kg DCP, 75 kg DCP, CO 2 extinguishers etc.) are placed as per OISD 144. Personal Protective equipments are being used. Hence, it may be concluded that with the normal operation, plant may be considered safe from environmental risk point of view. All the above systems shall be maintained in good working order at all times. Awareness programs shall be done for the people residing in nearby location of all types of emergency situations which may happen in the Plant with consultation with civic bodies. 3.10.2 Recommendation i) All the fire detection and firefighting arrangements in various locations of plant shall be kept in good working condition. ii) In order to reduce the frequency of failures and consequent risk, codes, rules and standards framed e.g. OISD 144, SMPV rules (Unfired), gas cylinder rules etc. shall be strictly followed. iii) Safety valves located on the storage vessels and other places must be tested regularly. The block valves before safety valve must always be kept in open condition when safety valves are in position. It is preferable to provide chain and lock to ensure that the valves provided upstream of Safety Valves are open. iv) Vehicular traffic as well as entry of personnel inside the plant area must be restricted. v) Use of naked light or hot work must be restricted to the areas designated for the purpose. vi) The sprinkler system and remote operated valves must be checked regularly for timely actuation of the safety system as being done. vii) Training of all the employees and security personnel for firefighting and use of safety apparatus must be conducted regularly. Mock drills for emergency shall be conducted at regular intervals of 6 months (as per MSIHC rule) keeping liaison with local administration and fire-fighting facilities available in the area. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 34 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT viii) ix) Mock drill for fire (as per OISD-144) shall be conducted once in a month and record shall be maintained properly. Safety Audits shall be done as per norms and recommendations of OISD and observation/deviation must be complied. Inspection and testing of the major equipments and pipelines e.g. LPG pumps, compressor connecting lines, Bullet/Mounded Bullets, etc. shall be done at regular intervals for ensuring their health and condition monitoring. x) Correct water level to be maintained in water bath for testing the filled cylinders. xi) xii) xiii) The use of PPEs shall be strictly followed. Mutual aid arrangement available with fire services and nearby Industries, to be strengthened by regular meetings. Gas detectors provided at vulnerable places like Storage Vessel areas, LPG pump and compressor house, LPG filling shed and filled cylinder storage shed etc., shall be checked regularly and calibrated periodically. xiv) High-level alarm & trip and other instruments shall be provided for xv) xvi) xvii) xviii) Bullet/Mounded Bullets and shall be checked at regular intervals. Fire Water Pumps shall be checked regularly as per recommendations of OISD- 144. Non-sparkling tools shall be used for maintenance purpose. Training to be imparted to all workers and officers periodically for operations & maintenance PPE shall be made available in good working condition. All officers, workers and security personnel should know the use & usage of safety apparatus. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 35 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 4.0 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (DMP) 4.1 DMP FOR THE LPG BOTTLING PLANT Disaster is an undesirable occurrence of events of such magnitude and nature that adversely affect production, cause loss of human lives and property as well as damage to the environment. Industrial installations are vulnerable to various kinds of natural and manmade disasters. Disaster management plan a well-coordinated, comprehensive response plan to contain loss of life, property, environment and provide speedy & effective recovery by making the most effective use of available resources in case of a disaster. The objective of any plant should be safe and trouble free operation as well as smooth production. This is ensured by taking precautions right from design stage i.e. design of plant, equipment/ pipeline as per standard codes, ensuring selection of proper material of construction, well designed codes/ rules and instruments for safe operation of the plant. Safety should be ensured afterwards by operating the plant by trained manpower. In spite of all precautionary measures taken, accidents may happen due to human error or system malfunction. 4.2 TYPES OF DISASTER a. Natural Calamities Earthquake Cyclone Flood b. Man Made Civil disturbance War Riots Industrial c. Manmade emergency, which are encountered in any industry are Fire Explosion Toxic Gas leak Poisoning (liquid, gaseous and or chemical poisoning) Those arising out of abnormalities in operation, maintenance, startup/ Shutdown, failure of equipment and use of sub-standard / wrong material Civil commotion and armed conflicts Sabotage Road accidents involving hazardous/ toxic/ radioactive/ corrosive chemicals. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 36 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 4.3 Statutory Requirement Disaster Management Plan is a statutory requirement for IOCL Port Blair LPG Bottling Plant (LPG BP). The applicable regulations are: a. Factories Act, 1948 and as amended b. Manufacture Storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals MSIHC Rules, 1989 and amended in 2000, notified under Environment Protection Act 1986. (EPA) c. Rules on Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response for Chemical Accidents, 1996. d. Stipulations of OISD-214 / 144 / 150 / 236 (LPG Installations) e. Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991. The Disaster Management Plan has been prepared based primarily on Schedule-11 of Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 and amended in 2000. 4.4 EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (ERDMP) Emergency means a situation or scenario which has the potential to cause serious danger to persons, environment or damage to property and which tends to cause disruption inside or outside the premises and may require the help of outside resources. In IOCL LPG BP, probable emergencies can be categorized into three broad levels on the basis of seriousness and response requirements, which are given as under:- 4.4.1 Level of Emergencies Level - 1 Emergency: This is an emergency or an incident i. Which can be effectively and safely managed, ii. Contained within the site, location or installation by the available resources. iii. It has no impact outside the site, location or installation. Level- 2 Emergency: This is an emergency or an incident that i. Cannot be effectively and safely managed or contained at the site, location or installation by available resource and additional support is required. ii. It is having, or has the potential to have an effect beyond the site, location or installation and where external support of mutual aid partner may be involved. iii. It is likely to be danger to life, to the environment, to company assets or reputation. Level- 3 Emergency: This is an emergency or an incident, i. Could be catastrophic and is likely to affect the population, property and environment inside and outside the installation. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 37 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ii. District Administration does management and control. Based on the nature of emergency & severity the levels of type of emergency to be declared and will be decided by the location in charge. Various possible types of emergencies are tabulated as below: Table: 4.1 Levels of Emergency S. No Type of Applicable Description of Emergency Emergency EAP 1 Level-1 On-site LPG leak from water draining valve while draining Breakage of glass of sight flow indicator on the pipeline Opening of pop-off action valve, gland/ packing etc Leakage through LPG pump Leakage due to bursting/ rupture of LPG hoses or swivel joints of body arms Excessive leakage from cylinders e.g. leaky valve, venting of excess filled cylinder, resulting in concentration of the vapor in the atmosphere During degassing/purging operations if method of free venting is followed Leakage from the filling guns Escape of liquid/ vapor LPG during maintenance/ repairs Leakage from flange joints Leakage of diesel in fire engine diesel line Blast of Batteries due to accidental short circuit Dry grass fire Panel fire due to contactor failure Collision of filled cylinders truck inside plant premises w/o fire 2 Level-2 On-site Excess filling in the storage vessel and the product coming out to the vapor line into LPG compressor and thereafter venting into atmosphere 3 Level-3 Off-Site Burst of product Pipelines inside & outside premises. Opening of SRVs in storage vessel Failure of storage tanks. Pool fires Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 38 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Vapor cloud explosion. Agitation/ forced entry by external group of people. Natural Perils Earthquake, flood, tsunami Sabotage, Bomb explosion/ Threat Important Note: - The earlier emergency classification at stations as per OISD-117 has been renamed as per PNGRB Regulation- 2010 as follows. OISD-117 classification Small Fire Major Fire Disaster Table 4.2 ERDMP Regulation-2010 ERDMP Regulation-2010 classification Level-1 Emergency Level-2 Emergency Level-3 Emergency 4.4.2 Types of Emergencies: The types of emergencies that can be expected in LPG Bottling Plants are 1. Fire 2. Explosion 3. Vapor cloud explosion 4. LPG Spillages and Leakages 4.4.2.1 Fire Hazards (a) Product Discharge Liquid Phase: LPG has been described as a safe fuel because of the fact that so long as it is contained within a cylinder, vessel, or a pipeline, fire hazard is nonexistent. It is only the accidental discharge of the product from the container, which creates a hazard. In the event of an accidental discharge, it is possible that either the liquid or vapor may discharge. A liquid discharge is always more serious than a discharge in the vapor phase. In the first place, the volume of the product, which may discharge, may be considerably less in the vapor phase than the liquid phase through the same size of opening. As liquid discharges and vaporizes, the volume of the liquid changes into vapor of volume approximately 250 times greater and therefore, a greater hazard exists. It is always important to arrange equipment so that if any accidental discharges do occur, it will be in the vapor phase. (b) Product Discharge Vapor Phase: The accidental discharge of liquid from a container or a pipe may result in the vaporization of liquid outside the container or pipe. This process will require heat and will in effect have a cooling action upon the container. If a container is exposed to surrounding fire, the cooling effect caused by Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 39 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN the vaporization within the container can aid in preventing the development of excessive temperatures of the container. (c) Ignition Source (i) Flame: As a general rule it may be said that if a flame is visible it has sufficient heat to be used as a source of ignition for the combustion of flammable LPG vapor mixture. A flame from a match stick is sufficient to provide temperature considerably above that is required, for ignition. (ii) Heat: A piece of metal heated to 600 C may not be particularly noticeable and might not attract attention. However, so long as the metal on its surface has a temperature in excess of the ignition temperature of flammable LPG vapor mixture, it can provide as an ignition source. Likewise heat of a lighted cigarette or a bidi is sufficient source to provide ignition. (iii) Electric: Source of ignition may be developed electrically through resistance in electrical circuit which heats an element or a portion of the circuit to a temperature equal to or in excess of the required ignition temperature. The making or breaking of an open switch or the disengagement of a plug from a receptacle may cause a Spark" which has sufficient temperature to cause ignition. (iv) Static Electricity and Friction Sparks: Static electricity or friction sparks may be the source of ignition for a flammable mixture of LPG vapor within the atmosphere. Static electricity may be caused by agitation or pumping of liquid; venting liquid to the atmosphere; sand blasting; non-conductive belts; the contact of separation of materials such as synthetic clothing and action of foot wear on certain type of floorings. Static electricity is also produced by natural causes. Static charge is induced from lightening discharges, by thunder clouds either directly overhead or in the distance; by dust storms; or in rare instances from a large volume of charged air. Friction sparks are usually caused by the striking of one hard object against another as in the case of striking a hardened steel tool against a pipe or a casting; hitting of a cylinder against a steel structure. 4.4.2.2 Combustion (i) Explosion: Rapid oxidation or rapid burning is the cause of explosion. It may also be accompanied by such a release of energy that structural damage may result. The rate at which energy is released, rather than the amount of energy released, is the criteria of an explosion. The distribution of LPG vapor within the atmosphere in proper proportions and within a confined space can create an explosion, should the source of ignition be provided. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 40 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Following an LPG explosion a fire may be caused by the ignition of other flammable materials or a continuing discharge of gas may burn. In some cases if the discharge of gas has been stopped prior to the explosion, there may be no fire following the explosion. (ii) Fire: Depending upon the circumstances, the accidental LPG Fire may take on any number of forms. In general, a fire fed by a liquid discharge will be seen at ground level and may be remote from the point of actual discharge. A fire fed by a vapor discharge may be elevated and not impinging upon tanks, buildings, etc. The vapor fed fire would normally burn relatively close to the point of discharge. (iii) BLEVE: Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE ) occurs when LPG containers are accidentally surrounded by fire. Vapor pressure in the container rises with the increase in temperature. At the same time, temperature of the container wall in contact with the vapor phase also rises. The wall strength deteriorates and eventually even though a pressure relief valve may be operating, the stress imposed by the vapor pressure exceeds the reduced strength of the wall. The container then ruptures and super-heated liquid is released, expands and vaporize, in fraction of a second. As the contents of the container are flammable, they form explosive mixtures with the air. Catastrophic damage usually results from the spread and/or ignition of the vapors. This phenomenon is true for any pressure vessels storing LPG, be it a storage vessel, tank truck bullet, or a LPG cylinder. However, larger the vessel, larger would be the catastrophe. UVCE: When large quantity of LPG is released to atmosphere and it forms vapor clouds which, when unconfined, may travel from one place to another. Vapor cloud within the flammability limit can ignite and burn as deflagrations. This is termed as Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion i.e., UVCE in short. Even though large quantities of LPG emission is necessary, only a fraction of this contributes to the percussive effect (more reac tive molecules such as ethylene in much smaller quantities). Rare though UVCE may be, their damage is large and sometimes enormous. 4.4.2.3 Other Hazards a. LPG is usually stored as a liquid under pressure. Leakage to atmosphere, especially as liquid, will result in rapid vaporization creating large volumes of flammable vapor. Because LPG is heavier than air, it will tend to flow along the ground or through drains, and will sink to the low level of the surroundings. Unless efforts are quickly made to disperse the accumulation of vapor it may Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 41 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN under normal conditions remain there for a long time, with the possibility of fire through a source of ignition at some distance away from the source of leakage. b. A very small proportion of vapor in the air will give rise to a flammable mixture, which can cause fire, if source of ignition is present. (i) Thermal expansion of LPG can lead to very serious hazards. LPG streams under pressure in pipelines and equipment expand rapidly as a result of only moderate increase in the temperature. For example, the sun shining on a blocked line full of LPG, not provided with a relief valve to protect against thermal expansion, can lead to excessive pressures being built up within the line with eventual rupture of the pipe. (ii) The problem of thermal expansion also applies to laboratory sample bombs where instructions must be clearly given not to fill the container fully. The container should be filled up to a limit which permits liquid expansion due to a normal rise in temperature without danger of overstressing the container. The maximum liquid level is usually marked on the sample bomb. c. The low boiling point of LPG is liable to create a number of operation hazards as under: (i) The vaporization of LPG results into considerable cooling and can lead to temperatures below the freezing point of water. This must be clearly recognized while depressurizing equipment containing liquid LPG and while draining water from vessels containing liquid LPG. (ii) While draining water from LPG storage vessel, vaporization of LPG resulting from the pressure drop across the throttle valve may result in the freezing of water making it impossible to close the valve. d The relatively low viscosity of LPG (0.3 CS at 45 0 C) adds to the problem of containing it within the pressurized system. LPG will leak through the flanged joints and glands more rapidly than Kerosene or Naphtha. e. When pyrophoric substances come in contact with air, they react with the oxygen generating heat. If the heat is not dissipated, the temperature would rise high enough to ignite a flammable mixture. In Oil and Gas industry, major source of pyrophoric substance is iron sulphide. Pyrophoric iron sulphide is a corrosive product that may form on the wall of the vessels, pipes, flare headers, etc. which contain or handle hydrocarbons containing Sulphur compounds (e.g. hydrogen sulphide, mercaptan etc.). Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 42 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 4.5 Hazard Identification Hazard means an event related to the property of substance or chemicals with a potential for human injury, damage to property, damage to the environment, or some combination thereof; Therefore, all the relevant aspects of LPG decantation, storage, and bottling and distribution process have been thoroughly examined to assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unintentional event or sequence of events, which can lead to an accident or disaster. Type, quantity, location, & conditions of release of LPG under various scenarios have been examined in order to estimate its damage potential, area affected, and the precautionary measures to be taken. 4.6 RISK ANALYSIS It deals with listing of various failure cases leading to various hazard scenarios, analysis of failure modes and consequence analysis. The reason and purpose of consequence analysis are manifolds like: For computation of risk. For evaluating damage and protection of other plants. To ascertain damage potential to public and evolve protection measures. For preparation of effective emergency planning both On-Site and Off-Site. For formulating safe design criteria of equipment and protection systems. 4.6.1 Failure Case Listing The mode of approach adopted for consequence analysis is to first select the failure cases and then to conduct the consequence analysis of the selected failure cases. Table 4.3 Selected Failure Cases Sl. Failure Failure Case No. Mode Consequence 1. Bullet/Mounded Bullet Outlet line failure a. 15 mm Hole Random Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Failure Cloud Explosion, b. 20% CSA failure Non - Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Credible Cloud Explosion, c. 25 mm Hole Random Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Failure Cloud Explosion, 2. Catastrophic Failure of Non - BLEVE, FIREBALL Bullet Credible 3. Pump discharge line Failure a. 10 mm Hole Random Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Failure Cloud Explosion, b. Line rupture Full Non - Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor bore (2 ) Credible Cloud Explosion, 4. Mechanical Shaft seal Random Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor failure of LPG pump Failure Cloud Explosion, Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 43 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 5. Compressor discharge line failure a. 10 mm Hole Random Failure b. 25 mm hole Random Failure c. Line rupture Full Non - bore (2 ) Credible Carousal filling line failure a. 10 mm Hole Random Failure 6. Random b. 25mm hole Failure c. Line rupture Full Non - bore (2 ) Credible Filled Cylinders Non - 7. Catastrophic Failure of Credible 14.2kg &19kg Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Dispersion, Jet fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Cylinder fire ball/ BLEVE For the assessment of 'Individual Risk' due to the operation of LPG Bottling Plant at Port Blair, Andaman & Nicobar islands, the following has been taken into consideration: a) The individual risk has been calculated as cumulative effect of all the scenario mentioned for selected failure case as listed in Table No- 3.6 for 3D (Day condition) and 2F (Night Condition). b) Probability of dominant wind directions has been taken from IMD data. c) No mitigation factors such as shelters, escape etc. are considered which will result in conservative risk estimation. d) During risk assessment population data and source of ignition has been considered. 4.6.2 Individual Risk Results Drawing no.2 illustrates the individual risk contour for the LPG BP of IOCL Port Blair. As shown, the risk contour illustrating the risk of 1 fatality in 1 million years i.e., 1 x 10-6 is within the plant boundary. Therefore, the individual risk is in the acceptable risk level for public impacts with due care in implementation of safety guidelines and following the standards. 4.6.3 Societal Risk Results Drawing no.3 is the F-N diagram, illustrating the societal risk for the LPG BP of IOCL Port Blair. The following was determined from evaluating the societal risk results: It is evident from the above diagram the frequency per year 1x10-6 is in As Low As Reasonably Practicable- ALARP or tolerability region. Where further, prudent risk reduction shall be considered. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 44 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 4.7 SAFETY MANAGEMENT PLAN 4.7.1 Fire Fighting Equipments a. Fire Water System The main components of the fire water system are: - Fire Water Storage - Fire Water Pumps - Fire Hydrant/ Monitor distribution piping network. - Water Sprinkler/ Deluge system. Table No. 4.4 Fire Fighting System at Plant Area of M/s IOCL Port Blair Sl. No. Unit Quantity Capacity 1 Fire water storage tank 2 3500 kl 2 Fire water Pump 6 410 m 3 /hr 3 Jockey pump (For Sprinkle system) 2 10 m 3 /hr b. Portable Fire Extinguishers i. Portable fire extinguishers shall be located at convenient locations and shall at all ii. iii. iv. times be readily accessible and clearly visible. The maximum running distance to locate an extinguisher in working areas shall not exceed 15 meters. The top surface of the extinguisher shall not be more than 1.5 meter high. The fire extinguishers shall be provided at various locations as under: Table No. 4.5 Proposed Locations for Portable Fire Extinguishers as per OISD-STD-144 Sl. No. Area Portable Fire Extinguisher 10kg No s 1 LPG Storage Vessel 12 (each) 2 LPG cylinder shed 10 3 LPG pump houses 06 4 Tank truck loading/loading 04 gantries 5 Other Pump Houses 04 6 Office/Canteen/Stores 4 x 10kg, 2x2kg CO 2 7 MCC/DG Room/HT Room 01 8. Spare Storage CO 2 Cartridge Spare DCP bags 9. Wheeled Mobile firefighting equipment New Filling shed Spare hose in store 37 275 x 50kg 02 08 Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 45 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 4.7.3 Fire Fighting Operations: a. Enlist support of local fire brigade and neighboring industries. b. If escaping vapor cannot be stopped, jets of water should be directed at the point of leakage to assist controlled release of vapor and in between water fog should be used for dilution and rapid dispersion of vapor cloud. c. Firefighting personnel working in or close to un-ignited vapor clouds or close to fire must wear protective clothing and equipment including safety harness and manned life line. Water sprays must protect them continuously. Water protection for fire fighters should never be shut off even though the flames appear to have been extinguished until all personnel are safely out of the danger area. d. Exercise care to ensure that static charge is not generated in LPG vapor cloud. For this purpose jets of water must be avoided, instead fog nozzles should be used. e. Fire fighters should advance towards a fire up wind if possible. f. Cylinder fire should be approached using proper barricades/ protection to avoid direct hit from flying cylinders. g. If the only valve that can be used to stop the leakage is surrounded by fire, it may be possible to close it manually. Trained persons only should direct the attempt. The person attempting the closure should be continuously protected by means of water spraying (through fog nozzles), fire entry suit, water jel blanket or any other approved equipment. The person must be equipped with a safety harness and manned lifeline. h. Any rapid increase in pressure or noise level of product discharged through safety relief valve of the vessel/ pipeline should be treated as a warning of over pressurization. In such cases all personnel should be evacuated immediately. i. As in case of any emergency, it is of paramount importance to avoid endangering human life in the event of fire involving or seriously exposing LPG equipment or serious leakage of LPG without the fire. 4.7.4 Personal Protective Equipments (PPEs): Following PPEs have been provided in Sufficient Numbers: S. No. Accessories Table No. 4.6 Personal Protective Equipments Provided No s As per OISD-117 1. Fire hoses 22 2. Safety helmet 40 3. Hose boxes (Alternate hydrant point) 16 4. Stretcher with blanket 2 5. First Aid box 02 6. Rubber hand glove for electric purpose 01 Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 46 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 7. Low temperature rubber hand gloves for LPG emergency 02 8. Low temperature protective clothing for LPG emergency 02 9. Explosimeter 02 10. Fire proximity suit 02 11. Fire entry suit 02 12. Resuscitator 01 13. Breathing Apparatus 02 14. Water gel blanket 01 15. Unitized type of gas detector 01 4.8 ON-SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN/ PREVENTIVE MEASURES Statutory requirement as per Rule 13, sub rule (1) of MSIHC Rules 1989 and amended in 2000 to be maintained by M/s IOCL and shall keep the record upto date in prescribed format as per Schedule 11 of above said rule. 4.8.1 Emergency Plan Emergency planning is primary for the protection of plant personnel and people in nearby areas and the environment that could be affected by unplanned hazardous events. The emergency may arise from the leakage, explosion caused by over pressure in equipment, chemical storage and handling, fire due to combustible material and social disorder. The best way to manage any emergency is to prevent it. Following guidelines for emergency prevention shall be followed: a) Sound engineering practice in the design, fabrication, installation and maintenance of facilities. b) Careful selection and correct use of equipment. c) Observance of safety and security regulations. d) Proper and constant training and guidance to all personnel working in the Plant, with particular reference to product knowledge and maintenance practices. e) Good House-keeping. f) Constant supervision and alertness. Plant Manager shall ensure that suitable instructions are issued to both Corporation's and contractor's personnel identifying the action to be taken by each one in an emergency. This should be achieved by display of organization chart/ posters not only for firefighting but also for other likely emergencies. Likewise, for emergencies of large magnitude Emergency Response Plan (or Disaster Management Plan) to be drawn out in coordination with related outside agencies, such as local administration, Police authorities, Fire Brigade, hospital authorities, home guards, neighboring industries etc. Periodic mock drills for all such plans to be Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 47 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN conducted, and plans to be updated/ modified based on experience gained during such drills. 4.8.2 Action during Emergency: Immediate action is the most important factor in emergency control because the first few seconds count, as LPG fires develop and spread very quickly unless prompt and efficient action is taken. In the event of fire/ gas leak within LPG Plant the following action shall be taken as quickly as possible: a) Take immediate steps to stop LPG leakage/ fire and raise alarm simultaneously. b) Initiate action as per Fire Organization Plan or Disaster Management Plan, based on gravity of the emergency. c) Stop all operations and ensure closure of all ROVs and isolation valves. d) All-out effort should be made to contain the spread of leakage/ fire. e) Saving of human life shall get priority in comparison to stocks/ assets. f) Plant personnel without specific duties should assemble at the nominated place. g) All vehicles except those required for emergency use should be moved away from the operating area, in an orderly manner at pre-nominated route. h) Electrical system except for control supplies, utilities, lighting and firefighting system, should be isolated. i) If the feed to the fire cannot be cut off, the fire must be controlled and not extinguished. j) Start water spray system at areas involved in or exposed to fire risks. k) In case of leakage of LPG without fire and inability to stop the flow, take all precautions to avoid source of ignition. l) Block all roads in the adjacent area and enlist Police support for the purpose if warranted. 4.8.3 Action in the event of LPG fire i. Cylinder Fire: If a filled cylinder is involved in fire, internal pressure may start rising and if not relieved, the built up pressure could rise above 70 kgf/ cm 2 g and ultimately rupture the container. Ignition of the escaping gas would aggravate the fire but the release of pressure would reduce the possibility of rupture of the container. No attempt should be made to extinguish the burning gas. Containers in the vicinity should be kept cool by water sprays until the contents of the container have burnt away. If the gas leakage does not ignite, the container should be approached from upwind (if in the open air) and be removed to a place of safety remote from sources of ignition. Cylinders not directly involved in the fire should be moved away from heat exposure, while applying cooling water sprays on cylinders directly involved. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 48 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ii. Fire on storage vessel: If a pressure vessel is exposed to radiant heat from external fire, it should be kept cool by water sprays to prevent excessive pressure rise in the vessel. Cooling water sprays must be applied without delay to the heat affected area using fixed water sprinkler system or equivalent spray water coverage, through fixed monitors or other equipment. Cooling the vessel with water sprays reduces the heat input to the vessel and thereby reduces the pressure, thus, reducing the rate of discharge from the relief valves. iii. Leakage of LPG burning at the outlet of a cylinder valve: Extinguish the fire by means of a portable fire extinguisher, or smoothening with a thick non-synthetic cloth (preferably wet) or sand/ earth etc. Fix safety cap on the valve to prevent further leakage. After the fire is extinguished, if the leakage cannot be stopped the cylinder should be moved carefully to a safe location to vent out the contents under controlled conditions. iv. Fire of LPG vapor escaping from a damaged vessel fitting (flame not playing on vessel) Allow fire to continue till exhaustion. Spray vessel with water to cool it, if vessel is being heated by radiation from the flame or if flame is endangering other plant equipment. Cool adjacent vessels and structures. 4.8.4 Emergency Organization & Responsibilities Detailed information on roles and responsibilities of various coordinators and other employees and action to be taken in case of emergency in Bottling Plant area are provided here. The success of control of an emergency situation depends upon the timely action by the key personnel of the organization. 4.8.4.1 Emergency Response Organization: Overall objectives of an emergency response organization shall be such as to: a) Promptly control problems as they develop at the scene. b) Prevent or limit the impact on other areas and off-site. c) Provide emergency personnel, selecting them for duties compatible with their normal work functions wherever feasible. d) Follow Standard Operating Procedures (SOP s) laid down for all types of emergencies. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 49 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN e) Employees must assume additional responsibilities as per laid down procedure of ERDMP whenever an emergency alarm sounds. f) In setting up the organization, the need for round-the-clock coverage shall be essential. Shift personnel must be prepared to take charge of the emergency control functions or emergency shutdown of system, if need be, until responsible personnel arrive at the site of emergency. The organization should have an alternate arrangement for each function. 4.8.4.2 Emergency Organization Chart Role of key personnel is clearly defined to avoid confusion and to meet the emergency effectively. The Chief Incident Controller and the Site Incident Controller are two main positions for effective control of an emergency at plant site. They shall be supported by Emergency Management Team of the plant comprising of technical resources from Operations & Maintenance, Mechanical, Electrical, Instrumentation, Civil, Communications, and Technical Services etc. Fire & Safety, Security, HR (Personnel & Administration), Finance & Accounts, shall also take due roles & responsibilities. Fig 4.1: Emergency Organization Chart Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 50 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Fig 4.2: Communication Flow Chart for Disaster Management 4.8.4.3 Roles & responsibilities: During an emergency situation, Roles & Responsibilities (duties) of Chief Emergency Controller are defined below:- 1. Preparation, review & Updating of ERDMP Document. 2. Assessment of Situation, declaration of emergency and activate the action plan. 3. Mobilization of main coordinators & key personnel at respective locations 4. Depending on seriousness of the emergency, seek assistance mutual aid members & external agencies like Police, Fire Brigade, and Hospitals etc. 5. Exercise control of the unaffected areas. 6. Continuous review of situation and monitor the emergency situation. 7. Ensure that injured are receiving prompt medical treatment, take stock of casualties, if any and that relatives are properly informed / advised. 8. Ensure correct accounting and position of personnel. 9. Taking decision in consultation with district authorities, when the Off-Site Emergency to be declared. 10. Regulate vehicular movement in the factory. 11. Arrange for chronological records of the incident / emergency. 12. If emergency is prolonged, arrange for replacement of emergency handling personnel. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 51 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 13. Authorize statements to external agencies, media. 14. In case of escalation of situation which may leads to damage to nearby population inform district authorities to warn nearby population. 15. Ensure that incidents are investigated and recommendations are implemented. a. Site Incident Controller The Site Incident Controller (SIC) shall be identified by the Chief Incident Controller (CIC) and will report directly to him. 1. He shall put in action workable emergency control plan, establish emergency control center, organize and equip the organization with ERDMP and train the personnel. 2. Immediately on knowing about the emergency, he shall proceed to the site. 3. Assess the level of emergency and apprise CIC/ Control Room about situation 4. Activate the emergency procedure / control plan as required. 5. Direct all operations within the affected area as per priority 6. Ensure affected area is cordoned off and all non-essential workers in the affected area are evacuated to the assembly point. 7. Ensure rescue and firefighting operation are started. 8. Minimize damage to Plant, property & environment 9. Alert medical center and any specialist support as required. b. Administration and Communication Coordinator Communications Coordinator shall ensure that: 1. Communication equipment and systems are maintained to a high standard and functional throughout the emergency. 2. Back-up communication system is available in the event of the Control Room is not available. 3. Providing quality and diverse communication systems for use in routine and emergency situations. 4. Rush to his office and take charge of medical, welfare and media. 5. Activate medical Centre and render first aid to the injured by assigning first-aid personnel to specific duties. 6. Arrange additional medical supplies, drugs and equipment s, spares for firefighting, as required. 7. Arrange ambulance for transporting casualties and coordinate with hospitals for prompt medical attention to casualties. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 52 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 8. Keep all the vehicles and drivers in readiness and send vehicles as per requirement of different coordinators and officials to mobilize transport to various teams for facilitating the response measures; 9. To monitor entry and exit of authorized personnel into and out of premises. c. Fire Safety Coordinator: 1. Activate local Siren(s). 2. Rush to the site and take charge of fire and rescue operations. 3. Work in close association with site incident controller/ chief incident controller. 4. Render technical guidance and logistics to fire personnel. 5. Establish danger zone and arrange barricading if necessary. 6. Ensure sufficient firefighting chemicals and rescue equipment s are available at site. 7. Ensure that fire water pump house is manned and sufficient hydrant pressure in fire water mains and monitor water level in reservoir. 8. Arrange for additional fighting resources help from mutual aid partners & other fire services if necessary, in consultation with site incident controller. 9. Coordinate with outside fire brigades and agencies for firefighting/ rescue operations. 10. Ensure that casualties are promptly sent to first aid Centre/ hospital. d. Support & Auxiliary Services Coordinator: 1. Assuming responsibility for any tasks delegated by Chief-Incident Controller. 2. Replenish firefighting equipments 3. Take care of public relation, inform relatives of injured. 4. Arrange canteen facilities and proper food/ refreshment. 5. Arrange to meet emergency clothing requirement. 6. Arrange to contact the families of the injured. 7. Maintaining public relation and arrange media briefing wherever necessary 8. To control the mob outside, if any, with the assistance of the police and to provide administrative and logistics assistance to various teams; 9. Issue press statement with the approval of Competent Authority 10. Take help of welfare bodies, social organizations, NGO s, local administrations, blood bank, blood donors, hospitals, doctors, ambulance services, water supply department, transport hire service, catering services as per requirement. 11. Inform police, civil authorities, statutory authorities etc., if necessary. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 53 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 4.8.4.4 Emergency Control Centre (ECC) Control Room has been designated as Emergency Control Centre (ECC) in Plant area. In case same is not functional, then OIC office shall act as back up ECC. Following supplies and dedicated equipment are made available at the ECC. 1. A copy of the ERDMP is made available. 2. Maps and diagrams showing buildings, roads, process lines, drainage trenches, and utilities such as air, LPG, water and electricity are displayed. 3. Maps showing the site, surrounding area, high-ways, rivers, etc. are displayed, 4. Names, addresses, and telephone numbers of employees displayed. 5. Updated lists of names, addresses, and telephone numbers of offsite groups and organizations are made available that might have to be contacted during emergency. 6. Dedicated and reliable communication equipments are provided at the ECC. 7. ECC has 2 nos. of 110V DC emergency lights and back up UPS power so that operations can continue in the event of power failure. 8. CCTV display system is available at control room to log events during emergency. 9. ECC also has dedicated computer with LAN/ internet facility to access the installation data and also it has the latest and updated soft copies of all standard operating practices (SOP) etc. 4.8.4.5 Assembly Points 1. Emergency Assembly Point in front of Administration building of bottling plant shall be predesignated areas in safe zone as per quantitative risk analysis, where the personnel like workers, staff, contractor workers etc. not involved in emergency operations (as per ERDMP) shall assemble in case of an emergency. 2. Designated assembly point shall be clearly marked with display board along the route. 3. During an emergency, pre-designated persons would take charge of this point and take the roll call of the people reporting. Provisions are made for assembly points, communication and headcount facilities at assembly points, and personnel to control the movement of assembled employees. 4.8.4.6 Communication facilities: Communication system like telephone/ PA or paging or walkie-talkie shall be provided. In the hazardous areas, flame-proof/ intrinsically safe telephones shall be Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 54 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN provided. Wherever possible Hot line connection between City Fire Brigade/ nearby major Industries shall be provided. Table 4.7 Important Phone Numbers S.No Name Contact Number 1. Plant Manager Office : 031920258101 Residence: 09432669650 2. Police Station 03192 258411 3. Hospitals nearby 03192 258004 4. Fire Brigade 03192 258011 5. Other companies 03192 258675 6. Factory Inspectorate 03192 258101 7. District Collectorate 03192 233089, 232253 4.8.4.7 Medical Facilities: There are good medical facilities available at Port Blair in vicinity of plant. The details of hospitals are as below: State run hospital 2km from plant Rural Health centres 2km from plant at Bamboo Flat 4.8.4.8 Liaison with local fire brigade: Fire service station is available within 2km from plant and has four personnel with two fire tender. Close co-operation with the local fire authorities is essential and shall take the following form: i. The fire brigade should be made familiar with the layout of the plant and the location of important equipment/ facilities provided, and their method of use. Mock fire drills/ exercise jointly by plant personnel and local fire brigades shall be planned. ii. Firefighting equipment at the plant shall be compatible with the fire brigade equipment, otherwise adapters shall be kept ready for hoses, hydrants etc. iii. The fire brigade shall be aware of the plant's firefighting organization plan and the views held at the plan regarding the most effective LPG fire control methods. iv. In the event of an emergency/ fire, the plant manager and/ or his representative shall advise the Fire Officer about particular or potential hazards that may be present e.g. stocks of filled cylinders at that particular point of time. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 55 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 4.8.4.9 Emergency Drills & Mock Exercises In emergency, time is very important, the initial few minutes are critical and timely action may contain the emergency. For persons to perform quickly their assigned roles, it is essential that each individual should be made aware of emergency rehearsals which will impart procedures and their individual roles through proper training. Mock Drill rehearsals are carried out as per scheduled frequency ( i.e. Mock drills for fire- Once in a month, On Site Emergency Response Drill on in every six months and Off site Drill on yearly basis) considering different scenarios to improve awareness and to build up the confidence among the employees for quick and correct action as per their role and responsibilities to mitigate the Emergency. The drills should cover various types of incidents, e.g. major spillage, LPG bulk lorry fire, cylinder fire etc. Extinguishers due for recharging/ due for hydrotesting shall be discharged during drills and replenished subsequently 50% (Min.) stock of re fills as replenishment for FEs should be maintained. The fire pump should be run, sprinkler system activated, emergency systems tested, water hoses run out and spray/ set techniques practiced during drills. Fire alarms shall be sounded/ tested (neighboring plants/ factories and the fire brigade shall be warned in advance of this test). Protective clothing, breathing apparatus and any other specialized safety equipment available shall be tried out during drills to train all concerned in their application. The local fire brigade should be encouraged to participate in fire drills periodically. Any shortcoming, noticed during the drill shall be rectified. 4.8.4.10 Training An ERDMP shall be easier to use if training material and general philosophy on emergency prevention and control are kept separate from the working plan. Training shall be imparted to all the personnel likely to be involved directly or indirectly to the emergencies including employees, contract workers, transport crew and security personnel. Contract personnel and contract laborer shall be allowed to start work only after clearance of attending and passing safety training. Refresher training shall be conducted at regular intervals. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 56 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Critical Safety Campaigns are being conducted monthly on various safety topics circulating by -HSE by involving all Employees, Contract Employees and Security Personnel. Moreover Training is being imparted to all regular employees, security personnel, contract employees on schedules as per approved. Training Calendar as per OISD-STD-154 for HSE training shall be implemented. Training modules are prepared by Fire & Safety specialists and external expert faculty also invited. Contract workers are allowed to work only after attending safety training. 4.8.4.11 Mutual Aid Table 4.8 System of Periodicity/frequency of training S. No Department Periodicity 1 IOCL employees Six monthly 2 Security Monthly 3 Contract Laborers Monthly 4 Drivers (Trucks) Monthly The mutual aid members of IOCL LPG Bottling plant at Port Blair is Surya Chakra Power station. To make the emergency plan a success, the following exchange of information amongst the member organizations of mutual aid association is considered essential: a. The types of hazards in each installation and firefighting measures. b. List of all the installations or entities falling along the routes of transport vehicles carrying petroleum or petroleum products. TREM CARDS (mentioned in below sections) c. The type of equipment, that would be deployed and procedure for making the replenishment. d. Written procedures which spell out the communication system for help and response. This is also required to get acquainted with operation of different firefighting equipment available at mutual aid members and compatibility for connecting at users place. e. Familiarization of topography and drills for access and exit details carried out by mutual aid members. 4.9 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES and MEASURES 4.9.1 Portable fire extinguishers shall be located at convenient locations and shall at all times be readily accessible and clearly visible. These are located in various locations Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 57 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN inside the plant premises as mentioned in the above sections. Mainly Dry Chemical Powder of different sizes are kept ready for firefighting in case of emergency. 4.9.2 Zoning and maps Containing the consequences of an emergency requires well planned and documented procedures to ensure prompt response and coordination among various task groups. Different zones as per the risk scenarios based on the risk analysis are already mentioned in Quantitative Risk Assessment Report. 4.9.3 Emergency Shutdown Procedures in Plant 4.9.3.1 General: LPG Bottling Plant, receives LPG through ships, which is stored, bottled for dispatch of packed cylinders are carried out as per OISD guidelines. The following Emergency Shutdown philosophy is to be adopted in the location in case of emergency. 4.9.3.2 Inter-Lock Shutdown (ILSD) 1. ILSD is the procedure to be invoked in case of any emergency at the location, purpose of ILSD is to STOP all ongoing process/power at the location. 2. Automatic fire protection (Fixed) system based on heat detection through quartz bulbs detectors is provided. Detectors shall be installed at all critical places wherever medium velocity spray system has been installed. 3. At 79 deg. C (max.) - Blow of Quartzoid bulbs- Opening of deluge valve of the affected zone as well as adjacent zones. Audio-visual alarm indicating the affected zone at the fire pump house, Security cabin and control room- Fire siren of 1 km range- Closure of all Remote Operated valves. 4. Valves- Tripping of main power supply barring the emergency Power- The water spray from all nozzles within 30 seconds- The firewater pump(s) shall start based on their set pressure to supplement/ to maintain the firewater pressure in the ring main. 5. Additionally, push button arrangements are provided and can be pressed from anywhere in the location. This Emergency Shutdown Button (ESD) activates the following Fire siren of 1 km range Closure of all Remote Operated Valves Tripping of main power supply barring the emergency Power 4.9.3.3 Location of ESD: ESD s are provided at the following locations in the premises with Break glass & hammer/ emergency markings. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 58 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Mounded bullet LPG Pump House TLD Loading shed Carousel Unloading shed ESD: Actuation of ESD switches of the power to all facilities except the following. Siren. Bore wells Power in Fire Pump House/DG Shed and PMCC. Lighting supply CCTV As soon as an emergency is declared, the security will raise the siren and Fire chief will take stock of the situation. As per the necessity of the severity & Nature of emergency (Level1, 2 & 3), the CIC will decide the action plan to be put in place with the help of Site incident controller and his fire combating teams. 4.9.4 Fire Alarm system 1. Manual call points near to filling shed, storage area, tank truck, pump house, etc. shall be provided and clearly marked in the installation. Operation of these points shall raise audio visual alarm in control room. 2. Electricity operated Fire Siren shall be audible to the farthest distance in the plant (1 K.M. from the periphery of the plant). 3. Manually operated fire sirens shall be provided at strategic places. 4. For fire condition, the siren shall be wailing sound for minimum 2 minutes and for all clear signal it shall be straight run siren for 2 minutes. 5. For Disaster condition the wailing sound given shall be repeated thrice with a minimum 10 seconds gap. Fig 4.3: Types of Siren for Fire Alarm system Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 59 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 4.9.5 Evacuation: The Chief Incident controller will intimate regarding evacuation. Evacuation of the personnel shall be carried out in a planned manner along the escape route to assembly points. People must be evacuated at right angle to wind or opposite to the wind direction. 4.9.5.1 Evacuation Plan When the emergency message received, all personnel should ensure that nearby personnel are aware of the emergency, quickly shutdown operating equipment by operating ESDs (e.g., ROVs, Carousel & Allied machines, Pumps, Compressors etc. gets closed/off). All personnel should know where primary and emergency exits are located, and be familiar with the various escape routes available. Be aware of all marked exits and evacuation routes from your area of the building. Know the escape routes from your work area. When officially told to evacuate, leave by the nearest exit and alert others to do the same. Assist the disabled in the exiting building, if requested. Once outside, move to the assembly point designated for your building. Stay there until an accurate head count has been taken. Keep streets and walkways next to exits clear for emergency vehicles and personnel. Keep the street side of buildings clear so that emergency equipment can reach buildings. Do not return to an evacuated Plant/ building until & unless directed to do so by the Safety & Fire Department personnel. 4.9.6 Actions by General Population On being warned of a major industrial accident, public should take the following actions: Immediately go outdoors Extinguish all flames Store water for emergency use Do not jam emergency phone lines by calling emergency services. Wait for further instructions from emergency services. 4.9.6.1 Information to Public Public who are likely to be affected shall be informed about safety measures to be taken in the event of an emergency. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 60 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN During On-site emergency Fire Mock Drill nearby public are informed & their participation ensured to have holistic experience of the emergency & precautionary measures to be adopted during emergencies. Awareness camp also being conducted regularly for sensitizing the people about the emergency nature. Display boards carrying Do s and Don ts shall be located outside the gate as well as in the neighboring areas and other habitat areas in the immediate vicinity. Use of Dos' and Don ts shall be prepared and furnished to the District Crisis Management Group. Do s & Don ts during emergency situation for the public as well as management is prepared & display along premises of the location. Safety leaflets are printed in vernacular language i.e. in Hindi and other languages i.e., in English having the information on Hazards of Petroleum products & action in case of emergency is distributed among villages near by the area. 4.10 EMERGENCY RECOVERY PROCEDURES After the emergency, the following activities need to be carried out in detail by the concerned coordinator. i. Information to statutory authorities. ii. Incident investigation. iii. Damage assessment. iv. Salvage of products, de-contamination, clean-up and restoration. v. A detailed report shall be prepared based on the entire experience of the incident, including restorations, limitations and lessons learnt. vi. Ambient air monitoring at the site as well as 5 km radius of the installation by State Pollution Control Board to determine the contamination level affecting health. 4.11 Emergency in Transportation: The road transport of Petroleum product i.e., LPG (Cylinders carrying truck) has significant presence and needs special attention. Complete details of treatment for handling emergency arising out of road transportations have been provided below: 4.11.1 TREM Card (TRansport EMergency) TREM Card along with Route Map shall be provided to the Tank Truck Crew, which shall be referred in case of an emergency. Details of TREM card shall be maintained by M/s. IOCL in prescribed format of Schedule IX of Regulation 28.2 of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006, codes of practices of ERDMP Regulations 2010. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 61 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN The format is designed & provided in English, Hindi and local language where crews are operating. 4.12 Disaster Management Plan of Natural and Other Forces It is basically a pre-plan to handle any emergency situation of a higher magnitude arising out of factors listed below: Natural Calamities a. Heavy Rains b. Lightening c. Earth quakes d. Cyclone or Tsunami Riots/Sabotage/War Security threat/ Bomb Threat 4.12.1 Natural Calamities a. Heavy Rain All structures/buildings in the depot have been designed to withstand heavy rain and hence not much of damage is anticipated. (b) Action Plan (a) Switch of all industrial electrical connections. (b) Ensure immediate closing of oil/water separator outlet (conventional) if any tank collapse happens. (c) Inform Chief Emergency Controller. (d) Keep constant touch with local authorities - District Magistrate & Police authorities of Bamboo Flat, Port Blair (e) Stop all operations and do not resume it till clearance is given by Chief Emergency Controller. (f) Bring all vehicles to a halt and ensure that hand brake is applied. (g) Evacuate persons from damaged buildings/structures. (h) Avoid going on top of high structures/storage tanks. (i) After the cyclone has struck, assess the situation and take necessary action as per the direction of Chief Emergency Controller. Lightning In the event of lightning strike, any of the following or all emergencies may occur: Fire on storage vessels Action Plan: Described under the clause ii of section 4.8.3. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 62 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (c) (d) Earthquakes All buildings/equipment are designed to withstand earthquakes and therefore, major disaster is not expected. However in case of an earthquake of much heavier scale may lead to (a) Fall of structures/buildings (b) Subsequent fire/explosion (c) Release of petroleum products Action Plan: Already described under the topic of fire at various locations. Cyclones or Tsunami General Measures Adopting integrated multi-hazard approach with emphasis on cyclone and tsunami risk mitigation in coastal areas Implementation of early warning system for cyclones and tsunamis Streamlining the relief distribution system in disaster affected areas (preparation of a data base of people living in tsunami hazard prone areas) Design, practice and implementation of evacuation plans with emphasis on self reliance for sustenance with the locals (coastal community) Component on planning for reconstruction and rehabilitation should be added in disaster management plans at all levels Emphasis on mental health and to socio-psychological issues during post disaster period should be accorded in every plan Identification and strengthening of existing academic centers in order to improve disaster prevention, reduction and mitigation capabilities Capacity building programmes to be taken up on priority basis Training of all concerned including community Public awareness programmes Enhancing capabilities of the Institutes working in field of disaster mitigation and management 4.12.2 RIOTS / SABOTAGE / WAR Action Plan (a) Close all gates. (b) Maintain tight security. (c) Chief Emergency Controller to keep contact with local authorities. (d) Keep round the clock patrolling. (e) Alert all employees of disaster control action plan and activate in case of requirement. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 63 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 4.12.3 SECURITY THREAT/ BOMB THREAT Telephone Threat When a bomb threat is received by telephone, the person receiving the call is to attempt as much information possible including (a) All information about the device itself, including set time, type, description, location etc. (b) Reasons for making call (angry with the company, extortion etc.) (c) Any information about the caller (apparent age, voice characterist ics, speech, language, accent, manner and use of unusual terms). (d) Any information of the location of the caller (inside or outside a building, background noise etc.) The person then contacts the Depot Incharge/ Safety Officer. Depot Incharge s Responsibility: The depot incharge will contact the police department immediately. The police will advise on the next course of action. Possible actions may include (a) Inform operation officers but do not search or evacuate. (b) Initiate search but do not evacuate. (c) Evacuate specific area and search. (d) Search and then full evacuation immediately prior to target time. (e) Immediate evacuation Searches are to be conducted by police with assistance of department personnel who are most able to spot pit of place" items. Only bomb squad personnel are to handle suspected device. Emergency Brigade: The emergency brigade is to be on standby to facilitate immediate response to an actual emergency (fire, explosion etc) Emergency Actions: (a) The persons inside the plant except emergency brigade should be evacuated. (b) All vehicles in the plant premises should be evacuated to safer places. (c) Any new or doubtful object should not be touched. (d) All pipelines and tank valves should be closed and all operations inside the plant should be stopped. (e) In case of fire, city fire brigade should be called. (f) If during searching, a bomb is found it should be defused by bomb squad immediately. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 64 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 4.13 OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLAN The plan addresses the wide range of issues that need to be dealt with, in order to ensure effective chemical safety, i.e., the actions that should be taken by industry (including labor), public authorities, communities and other stakeholders to: Minimize the likelihood that an accident will occur (prevention); Mitigate the consequences of accidents through emergency planning, land-use planning and risk communication (preparedness/ mitigation); and Limit the adverse consequences to health, the environment and property in the event of an accident (response). 4.13.1 Legal Provision: For preparation of off-site emergency management plans, Rule 14 of MS&IHC Rules, 1989 as amended in 2000 states that: It shall be the duty of the concerned authority as identified in Column 2 of Schedule 5 i.e. Chief Inspector of Factories, in consultation with District Collector to prepare and keep up-to-date an adequate off-site emergency management plan detailing how emergencies relating to a possible major accident on that site will be dealt with and in preparing that plan the concerned authority shall consult the occupier and such other persons as it may deem\ necessary. For the purpose of enabling the concerned authority to prepare the off-site emergency plan required under sub-rule (1), the occupier shall provide the concerned authority such information relating to the industrial activity under his control as the concerned authority may require, including the nature, extent and likely effects off-site of possible major accidents and the authority shall provide the occupier with any information from the off-site emergency management plan which relates to his duties under rule 13. The concerned authority shall prepare its emergency plan required under sub-rule (1): In case of a new industrial activity, before that activity is commenced. In case of an existing industrial activity, within six months of coming into operation of these rules. 4.13.2 Offsite emergency plan for the surrounding areas In the event of a major fire accident/ gas leak in the plant, we anticipate that it may have an effect on the surrounding areas adjoining the plant. The Chief-Incident- Controller with the assistance of other officers on duty will coordinate the following activities Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 65 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN a. Seek the assistance by telephone from Bamboo Flat Police Station. Police control room to control the movement of personnel on the plant approaching road. b. To alert the residents of the surrounding villages/ hamlets and other industrial units/ establishments c. Inform commissioner / superintendent of police, Divisional District Fire Officers at Port Blair and other industrial units/ establishments surrounding the plant area for alert and necessary assistance d. Contact any other protection forces such as CRPF, RPF fire officers/safety officers available in the respective offices/ establishments/ units of the surrounding areas e. Andaman & Nicobar Islands Electricity Department., Port Blair and the nearby Electrical sub-station in charges for continuous power supply/ total disconnection of power as the case may be according to hour to hour situation and firefighting needs f. Arrange for the security of the premises, pipelines, pressure vessels, employees and other vital installations g. Arrange for required number of transport vehicles for movement of key personnel/ employees for residence to location or from location to places of safety or residence as the case may be required. h. Contact and seek assistance of the Medical personnel from nearby hospitals and other available medical officers from the nearby factories, industrial establishments/ units. i. Assign a team for recharging fire extinguishers, monitoring the water pressure for continuous supply of water and other firefighting materials. j. To provide food, water etc., for the employees who managing the emergency situation. Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 66 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ED (LPG), HQ GM (OPS), HQ Regional LPG Manager Operations Head Location Incharge Fig 4.4: Hierarchical System for Ensuring Compliance with EC Conditions Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 67 of 68

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Fig 4.5: National Disaster Management Structure Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri 68 of 68

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY FOR LPG BOTTLING PLANT OF M/S IOCL, PORT BLAIR Drawing No.01: Plant Layout of LPG Bottling Plant of M/s IOCL, Port Blair Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri A1

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY FOR LPG BOTTLING PLANT OF M/S IOCL, PORT BLAIR ISO RISK CONTOUR & F-N CURVE Drawing No.02: Iso-Risk Contour for LPG Bottling Plant of M/s IOCL, Port Blair A2 Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY FOR LPG BOTTLING PLANT OF M/S IOCL, PORT BLAIR ISO RISK CONTOUR & F-N CURVE Drawing No.03: F-N Curve for LPG Bottling Plant of M/s IOCL, Port Blair A3 Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri