Fishing Capacity and Efficient Fleet Configuration for the Tuna Purse Seine Fishery in the Eastern Pacific Ocean: An Economic Approach

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Fishing Capacity and Efficient Fleet Configuration for the Tuna Purse Seine Fishery in the Eastern Pacific Ocean: An Economic Approach Jeffrey Shrader and Dale Squires U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service IATTC SAC-04-INF B ISSF Technical Report 2013-06 May 1, 2013

Organization 1. Background 2. Basic Question 3. Basic Approach 4. Data 5. Results 6. Next Step 1

1. Background (1) ISSF funded Analysis in collaboration with IATTC IATTC Resolution C2-03 to maintain purse seine capacity at time of resolution 158,000 m 3 2

1. Background (2) Two Definitions of Capacity Used: (1) FAO Capacity = fishing capacity (2) IATTC Capacity = well capacity (m 3 ) This analysis excludes FADs on explicit basis, but indirectly accounted for as embodied technical change that shifts efficient production frontier each year 3

Background (3) Economic efficiency in this study is the maximum possible catch per vessel. 4

2. Basic Question 5

Basic Question What is the minimum purse seine well capacity (m 3 ) required to catch specified levels of skipjack, bigeye, and yellowfin tunas when vessels maximize potential catches by adjusting their annual vessel days? We analyze for each year, 1993-2010 Essentially a more formal but similar approach to current IATTC approach that gives 158,000 m 3 well capacity. 6

3. Basic Approach 7

Two-Stage Analysis 1. First Stage All vessels maximize their potential catch to full fishing capacity by adjusting their days 2. Second Stage Minimize well capacity required to catch MSYs when vessels are catching at full fishing capacity Subject to total fishing capacity catch for each species summed over all vessels so that for each year: Yellowfin capacity catch MSY Bigeye capacity catch MSY Skipjack capacity catch Observed catch 8

Data/Model Differentiates by Vessel Size Class & DML (1) Classes 2 and 3 (2) Classes 4 and 5 (3) Class 6 for vessels not holding DML (4) Class 6 vessels holding DML 9

Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Linear programming model for each vessel for each year Establishes best-practice frontier for vessels of similar size (capacity base) Deterministic, not stochastic 10

First Stage 1. Vessels efficiently harvest fishing capacity levels of catch By adjusting days at sea given measures of vessel size (capacity base) Remove technical efficiency (skipper skill) from capacity catch level Because largely constant between vessels Vessel-level data Control variables of biomasses and sea surface temperature 11

Second Stage 2. Given capacity catch per vessel, what is minimum well capacity required? After requiring total catches MSYs for bigeye and yellowfin and observed total catch for skipjack. Intuition Most efficient vessels should be kept in the fleet Inefficient vessels should be either removed or their operations scaled back subject to maintaining total production (MSYs). 12

FAO Technical Notion of Fishing Capacity for First Stage Fishing capacity is the maximum amount of fish over a period of time (a year or season) that can be produced by a fishing fleet if fully utilized, given the biomass and age structure of the fish stock and the present state of technology. Fishing capacity is the ability of a vessel or vessels to catch fish (FAO 1998, 2000). 13

Excess capacity A is due to differences in: (1) Days (2) Technical efficiency (skipper skill) A = excess capacity Capacity Catch = A + B B = observed production 14

Non-Convex Frontier Convex piece-wise linear best practice frontier Catch Non-convexity lowers capacity frontier & reduces excess capacity Non-convex piece-wise best practice linear frontier Due to indivisibilities among vessels Fixed Inputs 15

Sources of Non-Convexities Non-convexities due to lumpy (discrete) fixed factors Non-convex frontier Best-practice catch capacity frontier not piece-wide linear, but like step function Lowers capacity frontier & hence first-stage excess capacity Fleet divided into: (1) DML & non-dml holders (2) Vessel size classes 16

Day Restrictions Model also compares three different day restriction policies as X% of observed days for each vessel: (1) 80% (least restrictive) (2) 70% (3) 60% (most restrictive) Below 60%, vessels could not catch MSYs 17

4. Data 18

IATTC Data Annual vessel-level purse seine data from EPO tuna purse seine fishery for 1993-2010. Landings (mt retained catch) for yellowfin, bigeye, & skipjack tunas. Vessel gross tonnage and other measures of vessel size cubic meters of well capacity, net weight, or length, weight, & depth in meters, engine size Trip lengths (days, arrival date minus departure date for trip), & number of sets. 19

5. Results 20

Year-by-Year Estimation Accounts for Changes in: Biomass, TACs/MSYs, Environmental conditions, Market conditions, Technology, FAD numbers & design, Total days fished. Regulations (e.g. closures), No steady-state equilibrium, follows IATTC practice of periodically re-evaluating TACs 21

First Stage Results: Average Capacity Utilization Capacity utilization (CU): Observed catch/fishing capacity catch All vessels: 86% Total fish catch could be increased by 14% if all vessels operated on best-practice efficient frontier by adjusting days. Non-DML vessels: 83% DML vessels: 89% Capacity catch Excess capacity Observed catch observed catch CU = ------------------------- capacity catch 22

Summary of Overall Results Average observed level: 219,000 m 3. IATTC recommendation: 158,000 m 3. Model optimum: 167,000 m 3!! IATTC did not reward us for this result! Due to similarities of approach Model indicates: vessel number reductions of 22% to 24%, depending on TAC & catch restriction imposed. m 3 well capacity reductions of 18% to 24%, depending on TAC & catch restriction. 23

DML vs. Non-DML Prior to the year 2000, DML vessels were responsible for the majority of this excess capacity. Since 2000, DML and non-dml vessels have each contributed roughly half of the excess capacity. 24

Excess well capacity = observed - efficient Excess well capacity Observed Baseline: no TACs TAC Baseline: no TACs 25

Excess well capacity = observed - efficient Observed Baseline: no TACs TAC Excess well capacity Baseline: no TACs 26

Excess well capacity = observed - efficient Observed Excess well capacity TAC Baseline: no TACs Baseline: no TACs 27

TAC Baseline: no TACs Baseline: no TACs 28

TAC Baseline: no TACs Baseline: no TACs 29

TAC Baseline: no TACs Baseline: no TACs 30

TAC reduces fleet size much more than any of the day restrictions. More restrictive day policies leave more vessels in fishery than less restrictive day policies (see Appendix for explanation). TAC 31

Fleet Structure Relative number of vessels in each group remains about the same. That is, about same proportion of vessels/well capacity is reduced for each vessel group. See following slide 32

With & without TAC 33

6. Next Step (1) Change objective: From efficient fishing capacity catch to maximum profit (economic rent) What is maximum potential economic rent that can be achieved with optimum fleet size? 34

6. Next Step (2) Compare to estimate of current profits. Corresponds to fishery under rights-based management 35

6. Next Step (3) Equilibrium economic value (price) of a fishing right is given by the change in rent for a change in MSY Called the shadow price of the MSY For ideal market in rights Rights based management lets markets for rights decide optimum fleet size For World Bank ABFNJ Project 36

Questions? 37

Day Restrictions TAC reduces fleet size much more than any of the day restrictions. More restrictive day policies leave more vessels in the fishery than the less restrictive policies. Why? When vessels are free to fish any number of days, more efficient vessels will fish more often. Once days are restricted, vessels are no longer able to employ as much effort, Disproportionally impacts high efficiency vessels. To maintain catch levels, total industry must compensate by either increasing fishing days of less efficient vessels, add more vessels, or both. 38