Panama Maritime Authority Directorate General of Merchant Marine Marine Accident investigation Department REPORT: M/V TERVE R-047-2014-DIAM IMO No. 9204348 DATE: 27 th February 2014
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE COLLISION OF m.v. TERVE IMO number 9204348 Register Number 2639499CH With FISHING BOAT ISLA ALBORAN TRES At Mediterranean Sea, Motril, Spain On the 27 th February 2014 In accordance to Resolution No. 106-135-DGMM of September 9 th, 2013 from the Merchant Marine General Directorate of the Panama Maritime Authority, on it s second article stipulates; Similarly investigations are not designed to exert actions criminal, civil or administrative, at which they will be subject only to the purposes stated in the Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 1
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS A/B ABS AIS ARPA BA BMA BNWS BTM BV CM COC COG COLREG CPA DNV DOC ECR ETA GPS HP HRS IMO ISM KG Kts kw LBP LR LRIT LT LOA MARPOL MB Able Seaman American Bureau of Shipping Automatic Identification System Automatic Radar Plotting Aid British Admiralty Bahamas Maritime Authority Bridge Navigational Watch System Bridge Team Management Bureau Veritas Crisis Manager Certificate of Competency Course over Ground Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea Closest Point of Approach Det Norske Veritas Document of compliance Engine control room Estimated time of arrival Global Positioning System Horse Power Hours International Maritime Organization International Safety Management Distance from the keel to the centre of gravity Knots Kilowatt Length Between Perpendiculars Lloyd s Register Long Range identification and Tracking Local Time Length overall International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships Longitudinal distance of centre of buoyancy from midships 2
MCA MCR MF MG MGN MSC Mt OOW OS PA PMA SMS SOG SOLAS STCW S-VDR UTC VDR Maritime and Coastguard Agency Maximum Continuous Rating Longitudinal distance of flotation from midships Longitudinal distance of centre of gravity from midship Marine Guidance Note Maritime Safety Committee (of IMO) metric tonnes Officer of the Watch Ordinary Seaman Public Address Panama Maritime Administrator Safety Management System Speed over Ground International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers Simplified Voyage Data Recorder Universal Co-ordinated Time Voyage Data Recorder 3
INVESTIGATION OBJECTIVES Ref. IMO Resolution MSC.255 (84)/MSC.257 (84) CODE FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF MARINE CASUALTIES AND INCIDENTS. The objective of any marine casualty investigation is to prevent similar casualties in the future. Investigations identify the circumstances of the casualty under investigation and establish the causes and contributing factors, by gathering and analyzing information and drawing on conclusions. Ideally, it is not the purpose of such investigations to determine liability, or apportion blame. However, the investigating authority should not refrain from fully reporting the causes because fault or liability may be inferred from the findings. 4
LIST OF CONTENTS LIST OF CONTENTS 1. SUMMARY 2. PARTICULARS OF VESSEL Bridge Equipment Ship Certificates 3. PARTICULARS OF ISLA ALBORAN TRES 4. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS 5. DAMAGES 6. ANALISYS 7. HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS 8. CONCLUSIONS COLREG 9. RECOMMENDATIONS To Operators of TERVE: To Crew of ISLA ALORAN TRES: 10. ANNEXES 10.1 Master Statement 10.2 Collision Report (SMS) 10.3 Log Book 10.4 Official Log Book 10.5 Crew List 10.6 General Arrangement of TERVE 10.7 General Arrangement of ISLA ALBORAN TRES 10.8 Chart 5
1. SUMMARY 1.1 On the 27 th February 2014, the Panama registered General cargo vessel TERVE collided with fishing vessel ISLA ALBORAN TRES at position 36º 12,7 N 003º 30,45 W, in the Mediterranean Sea. Figure 1.1 Area of collision 1.2 The TERVE was heading East in the West Mediterranean Spanish Waters South of Motril and the ISLA ALBORAN TRES was heading North Westerly towards Motril. 1.3 The TERVE was sailing from San Pedro, Ivory Coast to Istanbul, Turkey. 1.4 The vessel was loaded with a total of 3,058 metric tons of cocoa beans in bags. 6
1.5 At the time of the collision the visibility was good: Wind: Force 2 - Light Breeze (Mean wind speed of 5 knots) Sea: Force 1 - Calm (Wave heights 0-0.1) 1.6 Watch was handed over by the Chief Officer to the Master with nothing special to be of any concern. The weather forecast was reviewed and they had a talk on ventilation of the cargo holds. Chief Officer also mentioned that fishing boats were on the area. 1.7 The watch was handed over to the Master and the A.B. lookout 1.8 Minutes after the Master instructed the AB on the watch to proceed on deck to help to ventilate and inspect cargo holds as normal daily routine for this type of cargo. 1.9 Master saw one fishing boat but with the current heading and speed the boat was supposed to pass clear the aft. 1.10 Based on the above the Master continued with his watch without paying much attention to the fishing boat. 1.11 As the TERVE and the ISLA ALBORAN TRES got closer to each other, the ISLA ALBORAN TRES suddenly made a turn to her starboard heading straight to TERVE s starboard side. 1.12 The TERVE and the ISLA ALBORAN collided. 7
1.13 Bosun and one AB who were on deck at that time heard a noise and some shouting outside the ship. 1.14 At that time the Bosun saw a fishing boat too close to the TERVE with a number of crew shouting to them in Spanish. 1.15 At the time of the collision the bridge was attended by the Master only who had been on duty since 08,00 hrs UTC. 1.16 The collision occurred at 09.40 hrs UTC in position 36º 12,7 N - 003º 30.45 W while the vessel was in course 81º and heading with a speed of about 11.5 knots. 1.17 The TERVE stopped engine and gradually reduced speed and maneuvered to check boat s condition while reporting the collision to MRCC Almeria. 1.18 The ISLA ALBORAN TRES reported water ingress and a helicopter was deployed to the seen to deliver a portable pump to allow the boat to proceed to Motril, Spain. 1.19 Neither visual damages nor pollution was observed and only small coating scratches were seen on the TERVE s hull coating. 1.20 The TERVE resumed her voyage to Istanbul, Turkey same day at 11.18 hrs while the fishing boat was moving away back to shore. 8
2. PARTICULARS OF VESSEL NAME FLAG PORT OF REGISTRY OFFICIAL NUMBER CALL SIGN : TERVE : PANAMA : PANAMA : 2639499CH : 3FGZ9 IMO NUMBER : 9204348 TYPE L.O.A. L.B.P BREADTH DEPTH : General cargo Ship : 105.500 M : 99.00 M : 16.80 M : 8.80 M G.R.T : 4,362 N.R.T : 2,492 DEAD WEIGHT : 6,461 2.1 The vessel is powered by a five (5) cylinder MITSUI ENGINEERING, two stroke main engine type 5L35MC single acting which develops 2,795 kw at 200 rpm. 2.2 The cargo is carried in a total of nine (3) cargo holds with a total grain capacity of 8,838 m3. 9
2.3 The vessel was keel laid on 23 rd October 1998 and delivered on the 19 th January 1999 in Japan at SASEBO HEAVY INDUSTRIES CO. LTD., Shipyard. At the time of the collision she was owned by GULKA SHIPPING & TRADING Co., and managed by TGS SHIPPING SERVICES LTD of Turkey, registered with the company IMO ID 5263191. Figure 2.1 TERVE General Views 10
2.4 At the time of the collision the vessel was classed with Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NKK) Classification Society. At this time she hold up to date and valid statutory certificates. 2.5 The last Port State Control (Med MOU) inspection was carried out in Iskenderun on the 21 st November 2013 with no deficiencies or observations recorded. 11
Bridge Equipment 2.6 The vessel was fitted with the following navigational equipment on the bridge Equipment / S/N No. MANUFACTURE TYPE RADAR 1 J.R.C. JMA 7000 RADAR 2 J.R.C. NM2 173 AIS J.R.C. JHS 180 GPS J.R.C. JLR 6800 NAVTEX J.R.C. NCR 300A P.A. System J.R.C. NWA 1810MKIIA GYRO TOKIMEC TG 6000 12
Figure 2.2 TERVE Bridge arrangements 13
Communication equipment fitted on the bridge was as follows, Equipment MANUFACTURE TYPE 2 x VHF/DSC J.R.C. JHS-32A RTF J.R.C. JSS-850 MF/HF/DSC J.R.C. JSS850/CDJ-1085 SATCOM B J.R.C. JUE-310B WEATHER FAX J.R.C. JAX-90 2W VHF J.R.C. JHS 7 SATCOM C J.R.C. JUE 85 14
Ship Certificates CERTIFICATE NAME/ ID No. CARGO SHIP SAFETY CONSTRUCCION CERTIFICATE CARGO SHIP SAFETY EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATE CARGO SHIP SAFETY RADIO CERTIFICATE ISSUED NKK BY ISSUED ON EXPIRES ON 21.05.2012 30.03.2014 NKK 27.05.2013 30.03.2014 NKK 27.05.2013 30.03.2014 CONTINUOUS SYPNOSIS RECORD PANAMA 28.02.2013 - DOCUMENT OF COMPLIANCE NKK 13.06.2012 19.04.2017 INTERNATIONAL AIR POLLUTION PREVENTION CERTIFICATE NKK 21.05.2012 30.03.2014 INTERNATIONAL LOAD LINE CERTIFICATE INTERNATIONAL SEWAGE POLLUTION PREVENTION CERTIFICATE INTERNATIONAL SHIP SECURITY CERTIFICATE INTERNATIONAL TONNAGE CERTIFICATE NKK 21.05.2012 30.03.2014 NKK 21.05.2012 30.03.2014 PANAMA 22.02.2013 12.10.2017 PANAMA 22.05.2012 - MINIMUM SAFE MANNING DOCUMENT PANAMA 18.04.2012 PREVENTION OF POLLUTION BY OIL NKK 21.05.2012 30.03.2014 SAFETY MANAGEMENT CERTIFICATE NKK 05.12.2012 12.10.2017 BUNKER OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE PANAMA 12.04.2013 27.04.2014 MARITIME LABOUR CERTIFICATE NKK 19.08.2013 18.02.2014 15
CERTIFICATE NAME/ ID No. INTERNATIONAL TONNAGE CERTIFICATE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-FOULING SYSTEM ISSUED BY ISSUED ON EXPIRES ON PANAMA 22.05.2012 - NKK 26.04.2012-16
3. PARTICULARS OF ISLA ALBORAN TRES NAME : ISLA ALBORAN TRES FLAG : Spain REGISTRATION NUMBER : 3ª GR 1-1-07 CALL SIGN : EA2733 IMO NUMBER : 335375 TYPE : Trawler Ship L.O.A. : 25,34 M L.B.P : 29.00 M BREADTH : 6.00 M G.R.T : 111,07 Figure 3.1 ISLA ALBORAN TRES General View 3.1The vessel is powered by one (1) 287 HP main engines. 3.3 The vessel was classed with the Spanish Maritime Administration. 17
4. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS 4.1 All times noted in this report are given in the style of the standard 24-hour clock without additional annotations. Ship times used onboard were local times in Spain, i.e. UTC +2. 4.2 Narrative of events are taken herewith based on crew statements gathered during the interviews. 4.3 Weather condition at the time of the incident:. Wind: Light Breeze - Force 2 Sea and Swell: Calm - Force 1 Weather: Clear Visibility: Good and Clear 4.4 Crew involved during the collision Master: Holding a valid Master II/2 COC valid for the type of ship serving issued by the administration of Ukraine valid to 01 st April 2014. He has been working as a Captain for 12 years and signed on the vessel on 15th October 2013 although he was familiarize with the TERVE since being handed over to current operators on 24th April 2012. Chief Engineer: Holding a valid Chief engineer II/1 COC valid for the type of ship serving issued by the administration of Ukraine valid to 31 st December 2016. A.B.: Holding a valid watch keeping Rating II/4 COC valid for the type of ship serving issued by the administration of Ukraine valid to 13 th July 2016. 18
Watch OOW Lookout 00.00-04.00 2nd Officer AB 04.00-08.00 Chief Officer AB 08.00-12.00 3rd Officer AB 4.5 The TERVE loaded a total of 3,058 metric tonnes of cocoa beans in bags in the Port of San Pedro, Ivory Coast. 4.6 The vessel sailed from Ivory Coast on the 16th February 2014 destined to Istanbul, Turkey with a total distance to cover of approximately four thousand and four hundred (4,400) nautical miles. Figure 4.1 TERVE planned voyage 4.7 The Captain was given instructions to keep a daily inspection of the cargo holds since the cargo was sensitive to humidity. Therefore the cargo holds had to be ventilated as often as possible as well as checking: -Temperature - Condensation - Signs of water on paper cover 4.8 The above checks were scheduled by the Chief Officer on a daily basis after his watch around 09,00 hrs. 4.9 The sea passage was normal and with daily routines being carried out as scheduled. 19
4.10 On/about 25 th February 2014 higher swell was reported hence no ventilation or inspections of the holds were carried out to avoid water spray into holds. 4.11 On the 26 th February 2014 hrs at 23.45 hrs the vessel passed the Strait of Gibraltar. The 2 nd Officer, AB and Master were on the bridge. Figure 4.2 Strait of Gibraltar TERVE track 4.12 After passing heavy traffic corridor in the strait of Gibraltar, the Master went back to sleep. 4.13 On the following day, the 27 th February 2014 the Master woke up, took breakfast and went to the bridge at 07.50 hrs to relief the watch from Chief Officer. 4.14 During the hand over of the Chief Officer briefed the Master of the weather forecast, consumptions and fishing boats in the area. Thereafter they talked about ventilation of cargo holds which could have not been possible for the last two days due to weather reasons. 4.15 Since the weather was calm the Chief Officer decided to open holds to naturally ventilate them as well as to have natural light for visual inspection. 4.16 The Chief Officer left the bridge and the new AB lookout for the watch arrived. 4.17 Master asked the AB to leave the bridge and proceed on main deck to help Chief Officer and Bosun with opening and inspection of holds. 20
4.18 Meantime the Master remained on the watch alone. Checked position on GPS, speed, bearings, VHFs, radar. 4.19 He stood forward of the bridge and saw a number of fishing boats engaged in fishing. 4.20 One of the fishing boats was approaching the TERVE at an estimated speed of eleven (11) knots although her course was such that would cross the TERVE clear on the aft. 4.21 In view of that the Master continued with other tasks on the bridge without paying attention to the fishing boat. 4.22 Meantime the ISLA ALBORAN TRES kept approaching the TERVE to pass clear the aft at 09,30 hrs. 4.23 The distance between the TERVE, with a speed of 11.8 knots and the ISLA ALBORAN TRES, with a speed of 11 knots was of an estimated 1.5 Nautical miles. 4.24 All the sudden the ISLA DE ALBORAN TRES changed her course to her starboard hence in collision course with TERVE. 4.25 This was unnoticed by the Master of the TERVE. Figure 4.3 Collision sketch 21
4.26 Collision occurred at 09.40 hrs 36º 12,7 N 003º 30,45 W although unnoticed by the Master. 4.27 At the time of the collision one AB and the Bosun were on the main deck. 4.28 Both AB and Bosun heard a noise and some shouting. They overlooked overboard and found the ISLA ALBORAN TRES too close to the ship on the starboard side with four of its crew outside shooting to them in Spanish. 4.29 During that time the Chief Officer was inside the cargo hold making inspection of cargo. 4.30 The Bosun reported some cracks on the forward of the fishing boat. 4.31 The Master immediately moved to the starboard side bridge wing seeing the fishing boat being left behind. 4.32 Immediately the engine was ordered to stop and speed gradually reduced. 4.33 All ballast tanks and holds were sounded searching for damages. 4.34 No water ingress was observed on the TERVE 4.35 The Master made several attempts to contact MRCC in channel 16 but with no reply. 4.36 Meantime fishing boat was in contact with MRCC Almeria reporting water ingress but confirming all crew were in good health. 4.37 Communication with MRCC was achieved and confirmation to remain in channel 24 for SAR operations was agreed. 4.38 The vessel increased the speed towards the ISLA ALBORAN TRES. 4.39 All crew was mustered on the TERVE and pilot ladder was prepared for assistance 22
4.40 A helicpter and SAR boat arrived to the scene and delivered one portable pump on the ISLA ALBORAN TRES. 4.41 The TERVE remained at a distance of four (4) cables to allow Helicopter maneuvering on the ISLA ALBORAN TRES. 4.42 The ISLA ALBORAN TRES started to proceed at 10 knots towards Spain being escorted by the SAR boat. 4.43 The TERVE received confirmation to resume her voyage. 23
5. DAMAGES 5.1 The TERVE suffered no damages to her hull or structural items 5.2 The ISLA ALBORAN TRES suffered the following damages: 24
5.2.1 Holes and cracked hull forward port side Figure 5.1 Hull Damages on Port side 25
5.2.2 Cracked fiber next to gunwale and fissure in the methacrylate Figure 5.2 Damages on Port side gunwale 5.2.3 Handrail bent inwards 26
Figure 5.3 Damages on Port side handrail 5.2.4 Port side bridge fiber torn and window broken Figure 5.4 Damages on Port side bridge 5.2.5 Forward port side cabin damaged Figure 5.5/5.6/5.75.8 Damages on Port side accommodation 27
5.2.6 Bilge pump displaced Figure 5.4 Damages on bilge pump 28
6. ANALISYS 6.1 The statement given by the crew of the ISLA ALBORAN TRES estates that: 6.1.1 The TERVE appeared on the port side in collision course. 6.1.2 The TERVE did not response to any warning made to avoid the collision. 6.1.3 The ISLA ALBORAN TRES was in collision with an unknown vessel so they turned their course to starboard 6.2 VDR records showed that no warnings were made neither by VHF or sound by neither of the vessels. 6.3 VDR records show that the no other ships were in the near vicinity at the time of the collision. Figure 6.1 Sketch from explanations of ISLA ALBORAN TRES 29
6.4 The lookout maintained by the Master alone was not effective since he sent the rating lookout for other duties and Master was engaged on other paper work during his watch. 6.5 The watch keeping on the fishing boat was also not effectively implemented since they were not able to notice the TERVE approaching. Based on the sudden change in course could be assumed that either the lookout was busy with something eldese or that the bridge was unattended. 30
7. HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS 7.1 The Collision was clearly caused due to lack effectiveness of lookouts from both ships. TERVE ISLA ALBORAN TRES OOW sees boat which is not in collision course No change of course or speed No effective lookout OOW sets other working priorities on the bridge Sudden unexplicable turn to starboard puts boat in collision course COLLISION 31
8. CONCLUSIONS COLREG 8.1 Rule 5 on PART B, Section I estates the following: Every vessel shall at all times maintained a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevealing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. 8.1.1 Having heared on the VDR it is clear that Master alone could not maintain a proper and afficient watch. The same applies to the lookout of the ISLA ALBORAN TRES who could not see the TERVE and the starboard turn was wrongly assummed although it was not clear if a lookout was on the bridge at the time of the colllision. 8.2 Rule 5 on PART B, Section I estates the following: Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions. In determining a safe speed the following factos shall be among thise taken into account: (a) By all vessels: ii. The traffic density including concentrations of fishing vessels or any other vessels iii. The manoeuvrability of the vessel with special reference to the stopping distance and turning ability in the prevailing conditions. (b) Additionally with vessels with operational radar v. The number, location and movement of vessels detected by radar. 32
8.2.1 The TERVE did not alter the speed despite having seen the fishing boat. Neither an efficient lookout was maintained. 8.2.2 The ISLA ALBORAN TRES did not alter speed and the reasons for changing course into collision are unknown. 8.3 Rule 8(b) on PART B, Section I estates the following: Any alteration of course and/or speed to avoid collision shall, if the case of the circumstances of the case admit, be large enough to be readily apparent to other vessel observing visually or by radar; a succession of small alterations of course and/or speed should be avoided. 8.3.1 The action taken by the ISLA ALBORAN TRES was impossible to guess. 8.3.2 The TERVE did not alter speed or course despite having seen the ISLA ALBORAN TRES on the assumption that she would pass clear the aft. 33
9. RECOMMENDATIONS To Operators of TERVE: 9.1 An exhaustive internal audit of the company s SMS focusing on lookout procedures and implementation of Master s standing orders. OOW to understand the dangers of improper lookout. 9.2 Review of VDR and safety report compiled to be distributed throughout the fleet to be discussed during next safety meetings. 9.3 Encourage OOW to use AIS as an anti collision device not substituting the radar but complementing it. 9.4 Carry out OOW training including company procedures and COLREG. 9.5 Revise guidance regarding watch handovers. 9.6 Take appropriate measures to ensure that company shipboard policy and procedures are adhered to. 34
To Crew of ISLA ALORAN TRES: 9.7 Ensure that bridge is always manned 9.8 Implement and train lookouts with the use of radio equipment. 9.9 Further training of lookouts in basic maritime English 9.10 Carry out training referring to the importance of COLREG. 35
10. ANNEXES 10.1 Master Statement 10.2 Collision Report (SMS) 10.3 Log Book 10.4 Official Log Book 10.5 Crew List 10.6 General Arrangement of TERVE 10.7 General Arrangement of ISLA ALBORAN TRES 10.8 Chart 36
10.1 Master Statement 37
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10.2 Collision Report (SMS) 39
10.3 Log Book Merchant Marine General Directorate 40
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10.4 Official Log Book 43
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10.5 Crew List Merchant Marine General Directorate 49
10.6 General Arrangement of TERVE 50
10.7 General Arrangement of ISLA ALBORAN TRES 51
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10.8 Chart 54
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