Inident report of aidental drowning Saturday, August 11 Tutukaka, Northland, Nz John Park 1967-2018 Author: Tim Eves
John s Paddle Launh 1444hrs John launhed from Te wai Parore Bay and headed soueast Turn Around Point 1529hrs After travelling approx. 3.5km John turns downwind (Nwest) For the next 2km John travels at speeds onsistent with dwind, reahing peak speed of 17km/h before apsizing Capsize 1538hrs At the 5km mark John apsizes and appears unable to remount. For approx. 2km he drifts in a N-west diretion at about 2km/h Coastguard is alerted 1635hrs Eyewitnesses report spotting John unable to remount and in the water lose to roks. 1636hrs, John detahes from raft, sets off LED Flare Coastguard departs dokside 1702hrs At 1717hrs Coastguard is advised they have overshot and to turn bak John is eva d to Coastguard at approx 1719hrs From 1552hrs to approx 1616hrs John makes multiple remount attempts 1722hrs St Johns alled 1729hrsJohn arrives dokside at Tutukaka Marina Attempts at CPR ommened immediately upon arrival dokside with two qualified medial personnel attending. John was alled unresponsive at 1736hrs Repeated alls to Coastguard between 1635hrs and 1642hrs 1751hrs Ambulane on sene 1807hrs:John pronouned dead
John s atual ski timeline and extration 1444hrs Launh 1519hrs Eyewitness sighting orange ski 1526hrs Turn 1541hrs Remount 1542hrs Capsize #2 1633hrs Eyewitness spots John 1636hrs Releases raft & Flares 1716hrs Coastguard alled bak after overshoot 1702hrs Cstgrd departs 1635hrs Coastguard Called 1717hrs Patient spotted 1719hrs Coastguard Patient onboard 1729hrs Coastguard Dokside Time elapsed in water: 53mins Time elapsed: 44mins Time elapsed: 10 mins
The following is a best guess estimation of the sequene of events. By using the GPS traking information, ollating eyewitness reports an ombining it with my knowledge of oean ski paddling and, in partiular, what I knew of John s paddling and my knowledge of the oastline where the inident took plae, the following is my summation. After enjoying a lunheon with neighbours John announed that, as the wind was up, he was going for a quik downwind before heading out to dinner with his family. This was at approx. 2.30pm. The GPS traker shows John launhing at 2.44pm and heading toward Rahomaumau Reef. Sea onditions were testy with a steady 15kn s-east wind gust 20kn+. There was a 2m easterly groundswell and the sea T was roughly 16 deg C. In these onditions the oastline from what is known as Northern Gable and Tutukaka Headland is partiularly triky. The roky oastline and protruding headlands not only produe a multi diretional refration swell, but also offer no safe or easily aessible extration points. John paddled diretly into the S Easterly wind for about 3.5km at avg speeds around 5km/h before turning to surf downwind in a N-west diretion bak toward Middle gable and his planned extration point. At some point, from the GPS information about 2km into the return journey, John reahed peak speed at or around 20km/h then apsized out of his raft. This was not his first apsize, there is at least one other apsize that I an note where he remounted suessfully. This time, however, John an be seen (on GPS) making multiple unsuessful remount attempts. Note also, that by now John had been in the elements for more than an hour, mostly paddling, but with at least one apsize and remount. By now John is approx. 300m due east and 400m dues south of his launh/extration point. He spends a signifiant amount of time swimming or drifting with his raft. By ollating eyewitness reports, phone all logs and his GPS traker, I alulate that he spent almost an hour (53mins) in the water before an eyewitness spots him experiening trouble and alls Coastguard for assistane.
As he drifts lose to Te Wai Parore the bay where he was aiming to extrat, John was seen struggling with his raft and edging loser to the roks. By this stage several eye witnesses were wathing his progress. At least two had unobstruted views with binoulars and/or telesopes. Three others had travelled by ar to a point lose to John s position in the water, two taking up position on roks shoreside and another on a set of stairs leading to the water. All report that John was showing signs of exhaustion, partiularly after he appeared to release his raft, set off his LED Flare, lasp his paddle and drift. Time was now ritial, repeated alls to Coastguard beame inreasingly desperate. By now John had been in the water for more than an hour, would have been feeling the effets of hypothermia and, even dressed in a suitable PFD, was seen to be struggling to keep his head above water. At some point, moments before Coastguard arrived, John was seen to go fae down in the water and remain non responsive. All reports after this, from Coastguard rew, first aid staff and eye witnesses (two of whom are highly trained medial profressionals) indiate that John was deeased when Coastguard extrated him from the water an got him on board. Efforts to resusitate were signifiant, but ultimately unsuessful. Coastguard began CPR immedaietly John was extrated, inluding defibrillation and manual CPR and efforts to warm and get response..
From a paddling perspetive I believe, with respet, that John s deision to paddle solo in onditions that were on the upper margins of his ability was the main fator in this tragedy. There are also some indiations, although not able to be determined beyond doubt, that John may not have dressed to the onditions. However, ontrary to my earlier suspiions, it appears as if John did use a suitable leg leash and take with him a waterproof VHF radio. I believe he inadvertently dropped his VHF radio then deided to drift loser to home before attempting a series of remounts, unsuessfully. One lose to the roky shoreline he deided to detah from his raft to avoid being washed ashore in the signifiant sea surges and wait for help. Unfortunately this may have been an error of judgement, as that help arrived moments too late. Had he adhered to oean ski lore and remained with his raft, aording to eye witnesses and my subsequent investigations, he may have been able to survive. Eyewitnesses report John luthing his paddle in a vertial position. Coastguard reports that, when they pull John onboard the paddle is threaded through the PFD horizontally. In the water this would have beome a detriment to his ability to keep his head above water and ontributed to his drowning as, in that position, the paddle would inhibit movement and his ability to deal with the sea onditions. By now, it must be noted, that John had been in the drifting in the water for approx. 55 minutes and hypothermia would most ertainly be set in. This is mere onjeture on my part however.
The impat on Coastguard resuers has been signifiant, and the ripples of shok through the paddling ommunity have been equally despairing. I wish to aknowledge all those involved, partiularly John s immediate family, but also witnesses, resuers, ambulane staff and loals who beame embroiled in the inident one Coastguard was dokside. I hope some of this information an help in many ways, for healing, proessing grief, and maybe most ritially, providing lessons for oean paddlers everywhere. This was a seemingly innouous quik downwind paddle that turned deadly. The ogent lessons that an be derived are very important to digest. As mentioned before, paddling solo in any onditions suitable for downwinding is dangerous. Make sure you are apable of remounting in ALL onditions. Always leash up and take ommuniation devies. Ensure all devies are leashed to you NOT the raft. Wear suitable lothing (a fit lean body does not protet you from the affets of hypothermia or add to your buoyany). Paddle a raft you are onfident and ompetent on. Competent means being able to remount in rough onditions and paddle in whiteapping water with onfidene when fatigued. Always tell someone you are heading out, but relying on people shoreside to provide help and/or ommuniate the need for assistane is not good pratie. VHF radio is a diret line of ontat to emergeny assistane. Cellphone ommuniation is good, but an be problemati at sea.