CONTENTS OF THE PCSR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION

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Transcription:

PAGE : 1 / 8 CONTENTS OF THE PCSR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION SUB-CHAPTER 1.1 INTRODUCTION SUB-CHAPTER 1.2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIT SUB-CHAPTER 1.3 COMPARISON WITH REACTORS OF SIMILAR DESIGN SUB-CHAPTER 1.4 COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATIONS SUB-CHAPTER 1.5 SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE CHAPTER 2 - GENERIC SITE ENVELOPE AND DATA SUB-CHAPTER 2.1 SITE DATA USED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSES SUB-CHAPTER 2.2 SITE ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS CHAPTER 3 - GENERAL DESIGN AND SAFETY ASPECTS SUB-CHAPTER 3.1 GENERAL SAFETY PRINCIPLES SUB-CHAPTER 3.2 CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, EQUIPMENT AND SUB-CHAPTER 3.3 DESIGN OF SAFETY CLASSIFIED CIVIL STRUCTURES SUB-CHAPTER 3.4 MECHANICAL AND COMPONENTS SUB-CHAPTER 3.5 SAFETY RELATED INTERFACES SUB-CHAPTER 3.6 QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT FOR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS

PAGE : 2 / 8 SUB-CHAPTER 3.7 CONVENTIONAL RISKS OF NON-NUCLEAR ORIGIN SUB-CHAPTER 3.8 CODES & STANDARDS USED IN THE EPR DESIGN APPENDIX 3 COMPUTER CODES USED IN CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR AND CORE DESIGN SUB-CHAPTER 4.1 SUMMARY DESCRIPTION SUB-CHAPTER 4.2 FUEL SYSTEM DESIGN SUB-CHAPTER 4.3 NUCLEAR DESIGN SUB-CHAPTER 4.4 THERMAL AND HYDRAULIC DESIGN SUB-CHAPTER 4.5 FUNCTIONAL DESIGN OF REACTIVITY CONTROL APPENDIX 4A COMPUTER CODES USED IN CHAPTER 4 CHAPTER 5 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND ASSOCIATED SUB-CHAPTER 5.0 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS SUB-CHAPTER 5.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SUB-CHAPTER 5.2 INTEGRITY OF THE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY (RCPB) SUB-CHAPTER 5.3 REACTOR VESSEL SUB-CHAPTER 5.4 COMPONENTS AND SIZING SUB-CHAPTER 5.5 REACTOR CHEMISTRY CHAPTER 6 - CONTAINMENT AND SAFEGUARD SUB-CHAPTER 6.1 MATERIALS

PAGE : 3 / 8 SUB-CHAPTER 6.2 CONTAINMENT SUB-CHAPTER 6.3 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM (RIS [SIS]) SUB-CHAPTER 6.4 HABITABILITY OF THE CONTROL ROOM SUB-CHAPTER 6.5 IN-SERVICE INSPECTION PRINCIPLES (EXCLUDING MAIN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ) SUB-CHAPTER 6.6 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (ASG) [EFWS] SUB-CHAPTER 6.7 EXTRA BORATION SYSTEM (RBS) [EBS] SUB-CHAPTER 6.8 MAIN STEAM RELIEF TRAIN SYSTEM VDA [MSRT] APPENDIX 6A MER CALCULATIONS - BDR RESULTS CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SUB-CHAPTER 7.1 DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SUB-CHAPTER 7.2 GENERAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SUB-CHAPTER 7.3 CLASS 1 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SUB-CHAPTER 7.4 CLASS 2 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SUB-CHAPTER 7.5 CLASS 3 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SUB-CHAPTER 7.6 INSTRUMENTATION SUB-CHAPTER 7.7 I&C TOOLS, DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND SUBSTANTIATION CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SUPPLY AND LAYOUT SUB-CHAPTER 8.1 EXTERNAL POWER SUPPLY SUB-CHAPTER 8.2 POWER SUPPLY TO THE CONVENTIONAL ISLAND AND BALANCE OF PLANT (BOP)

PAGE : 4 / 8 SUB-CHAPTER 8.3 NUCLEAR ISLAND POWER SUPPLY SUB-CHAPTER 8.4 SPECIFIC DESIGN PRINCIPLES SUB-CHAPTER 8.5 INSTALLATION SUB-CHAPTER 8.6 PREVENTION AND PROTECTION AGAINST COMMON CAUSE FAILURE CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY SUB-CHAPTER 9.1 FUEL HANDLING AND STORAGE SUB-CHAPTER 9.2 WATER SUB-CHAPTER 9.3 PRIMARY SYSTEM AUXILARIES SUB-CHAPTER 9.4 HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR-CONDITIONING SUB-CHAPTER 9.5 OTHER SUPPORTING CHAPTER 10 - MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER LINES SUB-CHAPTER 10.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION SUB-CHAPTER 10.2 TURBOGENERATOR SET SUB-CHAPTER 10.3 MAIN STEAM SYSTEM (SAFETY CLASSIFIED PART) SUB-CHAPTER 10.4 OTHER FEATURES OF STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SUB-CHAPTER 10.5 INTEGRITY OF THE MAIN STEAM LINES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT SUB-CHAPTER 10.6 MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM

PAGE : 5 / 8 CHAPTER 11 - DISCHARGES AND WASTE - CHEMICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL SUB-CHAPTER 11.0 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS SUB-CHAPTER 11.1 SOURCES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SUB-CHAPTER 11.2 DETAILS OF THE EFFLUENT MANAGEMENT PROCESS SUB-CHAPTER 11.3 OUTPUTS FOR THE OPERATING INSTALLATION SUB-CHAPTER 11.4 EFFLUENT AND WASTE TREATMENT DESIGN ARCHITECTURE SUB-CHAPTER 11.5 INTERIM STORAGE FACILITIES AND DISPOSABILITY FOR UK EPR CHAPTER 12 - RADIATION PROTECTION SUB-CHAPTER 12.0 RADIATION PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS SUB-CHAPTER 12.1 RADIATION PROTECTION APPROACH SUB-CHAPTER 12.2 DEFINITION OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN THE PRIMARY CIRCUIT SUB-CHAPTER 12.3 RADIATION PROTECTION MEASURES SUB-CHAPTER 12.4 DOSE UPTAKE OPTIMISATION SUB-CHAPTER 12.5 POST-ACCIDENT ACCESSIBILITY CHAPTER 13 - HAZARDS PROTECTION SUB-CHAPTER 13.1 EXTERNAL HAZARDS PROTECTION RESTRICTED INFORMATION SUB-CHAPTER 13.2 INTERNAL HAZARDS PROTECTION

PAGE : 6 / 8 CHAPTER 14 - DESIGN BASIS ANALYSIS SUB-CHAPTER 14.0 ASSUMPTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PCC ACCIDENT ANALYSES SUB-CHAPTER 14.1 PLANT CHARACTERISTICS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES SUB-CHAPTER 14.2 ANALYSIS OF THE PASSIVE SINGLE FAILURE SUB-CHAPTER 14.3 ANALYSES OF PCC-2 EVENTS SUB-CHAPTER 14.4 ANALYSES OF THE PCC-3 EVENTS SUB-CHAPTER 14.5 ANALYSES OF THE PCC-4 EVENTS SUB-CHAPTER 14.6 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS SUB-CHAPTER 14.7 FAULT AND PROTECTION SCHEDULE APPENDIX 14A COMPUTER CODES USED IN CHAPTER 14 APPENDIX 14B APPENDIX 14C 4900 MW SAFETY ANALYSES USED IN CHAPTER 14 ANALYSIS OF SINGLE FAILURE FOR MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK CHAPTER 15 - PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ANALYSIS SUB-CHAPTER 15.0 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND PSA OBJECTIVES SUB-CHAPTER 15.1 LEVEL 1 PSA SUB-CHAPTER 15.2 PSA FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL HAZARDS RESTRICTED INFORMATION SUB-CHAPTER 15.3 PSA OF ACCIDENTS IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL SUB-CHAPTER 15.4 LEVEL 2 PSA SUB-CHAPTER 15.5 LEVEL 3 PSA: ASSESSMENT OF OFF-SITE RISK DUE TO POSTULATED ACCIDENTS SUB-CHAPTER 15.6 SEISMIC MARGIN ASSESSMENT SUB-CHAPTER 15.7 PSA DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

PAGE : 7 / 8 CHAPTER 16 - RISK REDUCTION AND SEVERE ACCIDENT ANALYSES SUB-CHAPTER 16.1 RISK REDUCTION ANALYSIS (RRC-A) SUB-CHAPTER 16.2 SEVERE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS (RRC-B) SUB-CHAPTER 16.3 PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED SITUATIONS SUB-CHAPTER 16.4 SPECIFIC STUDIES SUB-CHAPTER 16.5 ADEQUACY OF THE UK EPR DESIGN REGARDING FUNCTIONAL DIVERSITY SUB-CHAPTER 16.6 ANALYSIS OF EXTREME BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENTS CARRIED OUT IN RESPONSE TO FUKUSHIMA APPENDIX 16A COMPUTER CODES USED IN CHAPTER 16 APPENDIX 16B 4900 MW SAFETY ANALYSES USED IN CHAPTER 16 CHAPTER 17 - COMPLIANCE WITH ALARP PRINCIPLE SUB-CHAPTER 17.1 EXPLANATION OF ALARP REQUIREMENT SUB-CHAPTER 17.2 DEMONSTRATION OF RELEVANT GOOD PRACTICE IN EPR DESIGN SUB-CHAPTER 17.3 EPR DESIGN OPTIONEERING SUB-CHAPTER 17.4 REVIEW OF PSA RESULTS: COMPARISON WITH NUMERICAL RISK TARGETS SUB-CHAPTER 17.5 REVIEW OF POSSIBLE DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO CONFIRM DESIGN MEETS ALARP PRINCIPLE SUB-CHAPTER 17.6 CONCLUSIONS OF EPR ALARP ASSESSMENT

PAGE : 8 / 8 CHAPTER 18 HUMAN FACTORS AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS SUB-CHAPTER 18.1 HUMAN FACTORS SUB-CHAPTER 18.2 NORMAL OPERATION SUB-CHAPTER 18.3 ABNORMAL OPERATION CHAPTER 19 - COMMISSIONING SUB-CHAPTER 19.0 COMMISSIONING SAFETY REQUIREMENTS SUB-CHAPTER 19.1 PLANT COMMISSIONING PROGRAMME CHAPTER 20 - DESIGN PRINCIPLES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING SUB-CHAPTER 20.1 GENERAL DECOMMISSIONING PRINCIPLES - REGULATIONS SUB-CHAPTER 20.2 DECOMMISSIONING - IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE EPR CHAPTER 21 - QUALITY AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT SUB-CHAPTER 21.1 PROJECT ORGANISATION SUB-CHAPTER 21.2 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM