Safety zones and other Land Use Planning tools to reduce acute environmental risks

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Safety zones and other Land Use Planning tools to reduce acute environmental risks John Skjelvik Beijing, 19. November 2014

Contents The Seveso II Directive and its requirements Various tools used Zoning and safety distances Risk-based approach to safety distances Actions to reduce distance Suggestions for China

The EU Seveso II Directive Adopted in 1996 to prevent major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances and the limitation of their consequences Background: Several large incidents (Seveso 1976, Bhopal and Mexico City 1984 and others) Requires that Member States impose Land Use Planning Policies/procedures to include consideration of major accidents

Article 12 of the Directive Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive requires that controls should be exercised on: The siting of new establishments Modifications to existing establishments New developments such as: Transport links Locations frequented by the public and residential areas in the vicinity of existing establishments, where the siting or developments are such as to increase the risk or consequences of a major accident Leaves it to the Member States on how to follow up this

Siting of new establishments Develop procedures for planning consultation for new Seveso II establishments Make suitable arrangements to coordinate Seveso II requirements & planning consultation prosedures If appropriate, define sones where Seveso II establishments may be permitted Define source(s) and type of technical advice Define to whom advice should be addressed

Planning Procedures

Enough distance important Policies should in the long term ensure enough distance between hazardous-incident-prone plants («Seveso II plants») and: Residential areas Buildings and areas of public use Major transport routes Recreational areas Other sensitive areas Uses of land which are not comptible should be separated by appropriate distances

The concept of «zoning» Countries should develop zones in the vicinity of Seveso II plants for: Emergency planning Land-use planning Information to the public on safety measures and how to behave in case of an accident No requirements in the Directive that these zones should be the same for all of the above

Example of zoning

The follow-up varies Variations in approaches between EU countries: 1. Developing distance tables based on historical experience, experts and depending on the type of the activity 2. Assessment of consequences of different event scenarios (consequence-based approach) 3. Assessment of both consequences and probabilities of occurrence of the different event scenarios (riskbased approach 4. Mixes of the above

Developing distance tables A simple approach Close to the traditional approach of the land-use planner Often highly based on expert judgement and historical data of accidents Take into account the type of industrial activity and/or the quantity and type of hazardous substances present Rely on expriences from operating similar plants Detailed design and safety measures are often not considered

Safety distances in Sweden Ini%al safety distances Plas%c industry Paper mill Non- organic chemical industry Oil refinery 200 meters 500 meters 1,000 meters 1,500 meters Safety distances between industrial and housing areas Industrial blocks Small industry area Industrial area Process industry 50 meters 200 meters 500 meters > 1,000 meters

Example from Germany A garden centre got a building permit some 250 meters from a chemical company The chemical company challenged this because chlorine is stored just 70 meters from the planned centre The European Cort of Justice decided that approval of a project should be decided on a case-by-case basis Not only risk factors, but also socioeconomic issues should be considered Safety distances should not be considered absolute Uncertain if the garden centre will be built

Consequence-based appr. Often used to define the «worst case» scenario Considers measures to protect people and environment from this to happen Defines safety distances and other measures based on this Criticized for not considering the likelihood for the worst case to happen Should also plan for «high frequency low impact» incidents

Risk-based approach Identification of hazards Estimating the probability of occurrence Estimating the consequences of the accidents Eventually integrate into overall risk indices Comparison of the calculated risk with acceptance criteria

Iso-risk lines

Societal risk

UK: a risk-based approach

Actions to reduce distance

Internal and external safety

Safety measures

Types of measures 1. Passive hardware measures Mostly to mitigate severity of accidents 2. Active hardware measures E.g. automatic shutdowns, alarms 3. Passive behavioural measures E.g. staying away from defined areas 4. Active behavioural measures E.g. evacuation 5. Mixed measures Combinations of the above

Mitigation and control

Suggestions for China Are there some safety distances in China today? If not, could it be helpful to establish some guiding distances for local authorities? How could they be developed? Should only be guidelines Each case should be considered separately If some clearly defined safety measures are implemented, distances could eventually be shortened