Horn of Contention
United Nations Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
Trade ban effect on rhinos Black rhino numbers in Africa: 1970: 65,000 1980: 15,000 1992: 2,500 Javan and Sumatran species critically endangered Four subspecies extinct since 1977 (western black, northern white, mainland Javan and northern Sumatran)
Number of black rhinos in Africa 200000? C) Black rhino (all subspecies) 150000 Legal Asian markets closed 100000 CITES Ban 50000 0 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 Year
Number of northern white rhinos in Africa B) Northern white rhino 15000? 10000 CITES Ban 5000 15 rhinos 30 rhinos Extinct 0 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 Year
Number of southern white rhinos in Africa A) Southern white rhino 25000 20000 Market Reforms 15000 10000 Natal Parks Board successful breeding program CITES 5000 0 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 Year
Trade ban effect on rhino horn prices (wholesale prices of African horn) Year 1976 1979 1985 1992 Price (US$/kg) 17 35 (East Asia) 355 530 (East Asia) 1,159 (Yemen) 3,075 (Taiwan) 2011 30,000+ (Vietnam)
800 700 600 500 400 Pseudo hunting TOPS Moratorium 300 200 100 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
The market for white rhinos Year Live price (R) Trophy price 1982 1,100 6,000 1986 10,000 21,600 1990 48,500 80,500 1996 44,500 112,000 2000 176,800 210,000 2004 128,000 171,400 2008 275,000 450,000
Maybe dehorned is better than dead!
Rhino farming?
Argument for legal trade With strong property rights, owners and custodians can benefit directly from sales, reinvesting into protection and breeding The combined gradual effect of increasing supply and added protection can displace illegal market activity by making it far less profitable
Counter-arguments Market expansion: may negate price effect Laundering: undermines displacement effort Intensification: animal welfare concerns, health concerns, product differentiation?
Mitigation Consumer engagement (demand management) Certification and tracking Free-range production, standards
Four common misconceptions 1. Illegal trade always causes illegal killing 2. Trade fuels demand 3. It is always cheaper to obtain from illegal sources because poaching costs are low 4. Wild products are always preferred over farmed
Illegal trade causes poaching There are instances where illegal trade of existing stocks may satisfy demand and prevent future price increases, thereby reducing illegal killing (e.g. ivory and rhino horn stockpiles)
Trade/supply fuels demand No! Illegal trade meets demand no willing buyer, no trade Alligator data no correlation Legal trade could affect demand either way, depending on which market effect is greater: expansion or substitution
Poaching always cheaper Not true for sales of existing stockpiles With farming, increasing returns to scale Poaching costs increase as animals become scarce or better protected Rhino poachers fees are high!
Wild preferred over farmed Simplistic, not always correct Quality and certification may favour farmed Spectrum: Bear bile Tiger/lion bone Rhino horn Tiger skins
Other issues Profit motive? Bogus medicine? Demand reduction / culture change? Research / adaptive management Precautionary principle Precedents?
When do bans work? Short term Larger, visible products Strong and widespread public support (especially from consumers and local people on supply side)
When do bans fail? Long term, if demand persists (black markets and corruption move in) Low public support and high transactions costs (= low political will) Highly inelastic supply and/or demand (Gary Becker)
Why do bans fail? No incentives for local people devalues the resource at source except for criminals Illegal products can confer status! You can t centrally control a fundamentally decentralized problem!
WAR!
Some numbers to consider Since 2007, some 2,760 rhinos have been poached in South Africa This represents roughly 11 tons of horn With a retail value of 400 million All of that money financed criminals!
Consider We had and still have more than 11 tons of rhino horn in stockpiles Private producers can produce at least 2 tons per year, sustainably (8 times per lifetime) Capturing just a portion of the 400 million would have made a massive difference to rhino protection and conservation efforts generally
Concluding comments Supply side: Livelihoods are critical, so give local people incentives! Demand side: Engage with consumers, don t preach to them! Trade: Learn lessons from the War on Drugs! Are bans a long-term solution?
Thank you!! www.rhino-economics.com