The Structural Causes of Japan s Low TFP Growth

The Structural Causes of Japan s Low TFP Growth Prepared for a seminar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, April 27, 2016 Kyoji Fukao (Hitotsubashi University) 1

Motivation Although Japan had largely resolved the problem of banks nonperforming loans and firms damaged balance sheets by the early 2000s, productivity growth hardly accelerated, resulting in what now are two lost decades. This presentation examines the underlying reasons of Japan s low TFP growth from a long term and structural perspective using a industry level database and micro level data. 2

Motivation (Contd.) Japan s catch up in labor productivity stopped around 1990. The main reason is the slowdown in Japan s TFP growth from 1990. US dollars in 2012 prices 70 60 50 40 30 20 Labor Productivity Level: US Japan Comparison 10 Source: OECD.Stat 0 1947 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 United States, gross value added per hour worked, US dollars in 2012 prices Japan, gross value added per hour worked, converted into US dollars in 2012 prices using 2012 PPP (106.0 yen/dollar) Japan, gross value added per hour worked, converted into US dollars in 2012 prices using market exchange rate of 2012 (79.8 yen/dollar) 3

4.5 4.0 3.5 Motivation (Contd.) Both the manufacturing and the non manufacturing sector are responsible for the decline in macro TFP growth after 1991. TFP level of the manufacturing sector assuming that the TFP growth rate after 1991 had been the same as the average annual TFP growth rate in 1970-1991. Manufacturing 3.0 2.5 Non-manufacturing (market economy) 2.0 1.5 1.0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 4 Notes: TFP values are on a value-added basis. The non-manufacturing sector (market economy) does not include imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings. Source: JIP Database 2013.

Motivation (Contd.) According to recent work by Jorgenson, Nomura, and Samuels (forthcoming), Japan s catching up to the US in terms of TFP stopped in many sectors. 2.0 1.8 1.Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery (US) 1.6 1.4 1.2 (Japan) 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 (Productitivy Level in the U.S. in 1955=1.0) 0.0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 14.Primary Metal 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 3.Construction 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1.8 16.M achinery 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 11.Chemical Products 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 17. Computer and Electronic Products 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 18. Other Electrical Machinery 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 19.Motor Vehicles 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 27.Communications 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2.5 29. Wholesale and Retail 1.6 33.Medical Care 1.2 34. Other Service Source: Jorgenson, Nomura, and Samuels (forthcoming). 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 5

Structure of the Presentation 1. Slowdown of TFP Growth in the Manufacturing Sector 2. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution 3. Increase of Part Time Workers 4. Policies Needed for Productivity Growth 6

1. Slowdown of TFP Growth in the Manufacturing Sector Productivity Dynamics in the Manufacturing Sector From 1990 onward, the within effect steadily declined and the negative exit effect expanded (that is, productive factories were shut down, while less productive factories remained). These two trends reduced TFP growth in the manufacturing sector substantially. Decomposition of TFP Growth in the Manufacturing Sector 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% -0.5% (Annual Rate, %) Within effect Reallocation effect Entry effect Exit effect Annual TFP growth rate -1.0% 1981-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 7

Why Did the Within Effect Decline? In the manufacturing sector, the TFP growth of large firms has actually accelerated. Small and medium sized firms (SMEs) have been left behind (Fukao and Kwon 2006). Possible reasons: (a) SMEs left behind in R&D and internationalization (in Japan, the R&D intensity of SMEs is much lower than that of larger firms) (b) decrease in technology spillovers from large firms. TFP Growth by Factory Size (Annual Growth Rate, %) 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 Average TFP growth Top quantile in terms of sales Second quantile Third quantile 8

Hollowing Out Problem Japan s leading export industries, such as automobiles, have relocated production abroad. And probably because of this and other factors such as restructuring at large assemblers, buyer supplier relationships in the automobile industry in Japan have become more open (Ikeuchi et al. 2015). trillion yen 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Imports, Exports and Production Abroad of Transportation Machinery Imports Exports Production abroad 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 9

Why Was the Exit Effect Negative? There is a statistically significant negative correlation between the industry level exit effect and industry level gross output growth by Japanese multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Asia. MNEs have higher productivity than non MNEs (Fukao 2012) and many of them have relocated, or are relocating, production activities abroad. Overseas Production and the Exit Effect at Home Exit effect: 1990-2003 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% Motor vehicles 20% 30% 40% Glass and its products Motor vehicle parts and accessories -0.2% -0.4% -0.6% -0.8% -1.0% Pharmaceutical products Gross output increase by Japanese MNEs in Asia: 1990-2002/Total gross output in Japan: 1990 Miscellaneous electrical machinery equipment Household electric appliances Beverages Electronic data processing machines and electronic equipment Electronic parts Communication equipment -1.2% 10

The large negative exit effect appears to be mainly concentrated in industrial districts in prefectures such as Kanagawa, Tokyo, and Osaka. The closure of productive factories, most of which are owned by R&D-intensive firms, potentially reduced geographical spillovers to SMEs in these districts (Belderbos et al. 2013). 1.50% Decomposition of TFP Growth in the Manufacturing Sector: By Prefecture, Entry effect 1.00% 1997-2007 Exit effect Reallocation effect Within effect 0.50% TFP growth 0.00% 0.50% 1.00% 1.50% Shizuoka Aichi Fukushima Tochigi Hiroshima Saitama Nagano Shiga Yamanashi Kyoto Yamagata Niigata Gifu Gunma Fukui Tokushima Wakayama Ibaraki Kumamoto Mie Miyagi Toyama Kagoshima Ishikawa Nara Aomori Shimane Saga Iwate Miyazaki Akita Yamaguchi Nagasaki Kanagawa Tottori Kochi Ehime Hyogo Kagawa Okinawa Fukuoka Osaka Oita Hokkaido Okayama Chiba Tokyo 11

2. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution Comparison of the sources of labor productivity growth in Japan and the United States after 1990 shows that Japan s labor productivity growth was lower than that of the US because of Japan s slow ICT capital deepening and lower TFP growth. (Jorgenson, Nomura, and Samuels 2015 report similar results for the period 1991 2012.) On the other hand, non ICT capital deepening and labor quality improvements were swifter in Japan than the US. Japan-US Comparison of Sources of Labor Productivity Growth (annual rate, %) Japan: 1990-2010 US: 1990-2007 Labor productivity growth 1.8 2.4 Contibution of ICT capital deepning 0.4 0.8 Contibution of non-ict capital deepning 0.5 0.3 Contribution of labor quality improvement 0.5 0.3 Contribution of TFP growth 0.4 1.1 Sources: JIP Database 2014 and EU KLEMS ISIC Rev. 3, March 2011 Update. 13

2. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution (Contd.) ICT capital deepening in Japan was much slower than in the US in all sectors. The slower ICT capital deepening in distribution and total manufacturing, excluding electrical machinery, probably is an especially serious problem. The reason is that these are ICT intensive sectors and the main engine of the ICT revolution in the US. In the US, the TFP growth rates of these sectors accelerated from the mid 1990s. Japan-US Comparison of Contribution of ICT-Capital Deepening to Labor Productivity Growth by Sector (annual rate, %) Japan: 1990-2010 US: 1990-2007 ICT goods and services 1.0 1.7 Total manufacturing, excluding electrical 0.4 0.6 Production of other goods 0.1 0.3 Distribution 0.2 0.7 Finance and business, excluding real estate 0.9 1.4 Personal services 0.1 0.2 Market economy 0.4 0.8 Sources: JIP Database 2014 and EU KLEMS ISIC Rev. 3, March 2011 Update. 14

2. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution (Contd.) In distribution and total manufacturing, excluding electrical machinery, TFP growth in the US after 1990 was much higher than in Japan. Japan-US Comparison of TFP Growth by Sector (annual rate, %) Japan: 1990-2010 US: 1990-2007 Each sector's labor input share in the total market economy in Japan (1990-2010 average, %) ICT goods and services 6.4 6.5 5.0 Total manufacturing, excluding electrical 0.3 1.1 21.0 Production of other goods -1.2-1.1 18.8 Distribution 0.7 2.4 25.8 Finance and business, excluding real estate -0.3-0.4 13.9 Personal services -0.6 0.5 15.6 Market economy 0.4 1.1 100.0 Sources: JIP Database 2014 and EU KLEMS ISIC Rev. 3, March 2011 Update. 15

2. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution (Contd.) It appears that the ICT revolution did not happen in Japan simply because Japan has not accumulated sufficient ICT capital (Fukao 2013). ICT Investment-Gross Value Added Ratio in Major Developed Economies: Distribution Services 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 UK US Italy Germany Japan 4.0 2.0 0.0 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Source: EU KLEMS Database, Rolling Updates. 16

2. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution (contd.) We can point out many important structural impediments to ICT investment in Japan (Fukao, Ikeuchi, Kim, and Kwon 2015). 1. One of the main contributions of the introduction of ICT is that it allows firms to save unskilled labor input. However, because of the high job security in Japan, it may be difficult for firms to actually cut jobs. 2. Young and growing firms tend to be more active in ICT investment. However, because of the low entry and exit rates in Japan, firms that have been around for 40 years or more have a majority of market share in most industries. 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1.6 0.6 6.7 4.2 3.7 3.4 0.2 0.3 1.3 0.4 0.1 1.6 8.9 3.2 5.2 3.7 7.9 12.5 91.1 91.0 90.6 98.2 83.1 80.3 75.9 73.6 66.2 59.6 Primary industry Sales Share by Firm Age Group Chemical, metal and petroleum Machinery Other manufacturing Construction Electricity and gas 4.3 4.1 1.1 3.6 3.2 5.1 3.1 0.6 2.0 4.1 3.7 4.5 11.3 8.8 5.6 4.0 16.2 23.3 10.0 26.6 34.2 Wholesale Retail Finance and insurance Real estate 56.9 53.7 40.5 33.3 Transportation Communication 58.3 20.3 Public services 33.3 31.0 57.4 60.5 Other business services Other household services Established after 2002 Established in 1997-2001 Established in 1975-1996 Established before 1974 17

2. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution (contd.) 3. In Japan, the market for business process outsourcing (BPO), which includes outsourcing of ICT processes, is not well developed (METI 2014). Access to efficient vendors of ICT services is a key factor for smaller firms procuring ICT input at a reasonable price. Moreover, because of the life time employment system, ICT experts in Japan tend to prefer working in large firms (NISTEP 1993). These two factors make ICT input more expensive for smaller firms. Group Number of employees ICT input / VA (%) Median Median Group_EMP1 (largest) 1,783 3.8 Group_EMP2 472 2.8 Group_EMP3 201 2.2 Group_EMP4 89 1.9 Total 307 2.6 Source: Fukao, Ikeuchi, Kim, and Kwon (2015). The underdevelopment of the BPO market in Japan is closely related with the rigidity of the labor market. Since it is difficult for Japanese firms to lay off workers, Japanese firms hesitate to restructure costly internal business process divisions. Moreover, even when they restructure such divisions, they often relocate workers in such divisions to affiliates or firms in the same business group and procure business process services from the firms to which they transferred former employees. Because of these constraints, Japanese firms cannot procure business services from the most productive vendors, reducing the benefit of BPO and keeping the BPO market underdeveloped (Fukao, Ikeuchi, Kim, and Kwon 2015). 18

2. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution (contd.) 4. The supply of ICT software experts in Japan is much smaller than that in the United States (Arora, Branstetter, and Drev 2011). 5. The scarcity of ICT software experts and the less developed market for outsourcing of ICT processes likely make ICT input prices in Japan more expensive for smaller than for larger firms. Moreover, such small firms are much more prevalent in Japan than in the United States in most sectors. All industries Retail Japan United States Japan United States Firm size (No. of employees) 2006 2006 2006 2006 (a) 1 to 4 1,574,110 5% 6,262,490 5% 625,195 11% 1,101,567 4% (b) 5 to 9 1,993,335 6% 7,274,534 6% 415,987 7% 1,569,985 6% (c) 10 to 19 2,736,690 9% 8,794,210 7% 628,979 11% 2,064,520 8% (d) 20 to 49 4,188,269 13% 12,260,057 10% 669,467 12% 2,942,955 12% (e) 50 to 99 3,166,835 10% 8,868,873 7% 341,953 6% 1,870,352 7% (f) 100 to 249 4,144,598 13% 10,497,066 9% 422,022 8% 1,638,001 6% (g) 250 to 499 2,794,966 9% 6,762,233 6% 339,030 6% 929,095 4% (h) 500 to 999 2,573,958 8% 6,063,319 5% 353,124 6% 794,140 3% (i) 1000+ 8,935,484 28% 52,125,133 44% 1,780,906 32% 12,524,996 49% Total 32,108,245 118,907,915 5,576,663 25,435,611 Note) Japan: Establishment and Enterprise Census for 2001 and 2006, USA: Business Dynamics Statistics Source: Fukao, Ikeuchi, Kim, and Kwon (2015). 19

3. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution (contd.) 6. In addition, ICT input prices in Japan are higher than in the United States. Japan US ICT Service Price Comparison for 2012 Relative price: Japan/US Telephone call (within city) 1.62 Telephone call (400 km) 3.56 Minimum charge for telephone line (business use) 0.99 Telephone call (international ) 9.54 High-speed digital leased line 4.05 International leased line 7.94 Minimum charge for ADSL internet connection 1.09 Cellular phone call charge (one minute) 3.56 Cellular phone monthly fee (packaged plan) 2.92 Packaged software (average cost to purchase 100 sets of Windows Vista, Word 2007, and Excel 2007) 2.27 Outsourcing of payroll accounting 2.56 Source: Fukao, Ikeuchi, Kim, and Kwon (2015). The original data are from METI, The Survey on Foreign and Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial Intermediate Input 2012. 20

3. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution (contd.) 7. In order to avoid changes in corporate structure, employment adjustment, and training of workers, Japanese firms tend to choose custom software rather than packaged software, making ICT investment more expensive and network externality effects smaller, because each firm uses different custom software. 21

3. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution (contd.) 8. ICT capital and intangible assets are close complements. The contribution of intangible investment to labor productivity growth in Japan is the lowest among the major developed countries. Japan invests a lot in R&D but very little in non R&D intangibles. Contribution to the growth in output per hour: 1995 to 2007 (annual rate, %) 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 Austria Belgium TFP Labor composition Tangibles Intangibles Labor productivity growth Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Sovenia Spain Source: Corrado et al. (2012) and Miyagawa and Hisa (2012). Sweden United Kingdom United States 22 Japan

300.00 290.00 280.00 270.00 260.00 250.00 240.00 230.00 220.00 Source: Results of PIACC, OECD Skills Outlook 2013. 70 GDP per working hour in 2014: Converted into US dollars using 2010 PPP 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Literacy proficiency among 16 65 year olds According to the PIACC, average labor quality in Japan is quite high. But GDP per working hour is much lower than other developed economies. Moreover, in the PIACC, many workers indicate that they do not have the opportunity to use their skills in their job. Japan does not seem to use its high quality labor efficiently. Source: OECD.Stat

3. Increase of Part Time Workers Many firms increased the percentage of part time workers in total workers and do not provide intensive training in the case of part time workers. This change reduced training expenditure substantially. 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Percentage of Part-Time Workers by Sector 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Non manufacturing (non market economy) Non manufacturing (market economy) Manufacturing Primary sector 25

The percentage of non regular employees is increasing among young male workers. Most aged male workers are not regular employees. 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Labor Force Paticipation Rate by Age and Status in Employement: Male (%, 2013) 0 15 19 20 24 25 29 30 34 35 39 40 44 45 49 50 54 55 59 60 64 65 69 70 Regular employees Non regular employees Other Source: Labour Force Survey. 26

Most female workers work as non regular employees. 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Labor Force Paticipation Rate by Age and Status in Employment: Female (%, 2013) 0 15 19 20 24 25 29 30 34 35 39 40 44 45 49 50 54 55 59 60 64 65 69 70 Source: Labour Force Survey. Regular employees Non regular employees Other 27

Why is the percentage of part time workers increasing so rapidly in many industries in Japan? It seems that firms are increasing the number of part time workers in order to maintain the flexibility of employment levels. Given the decline of the working age population and economic stagnation, most firms cannot expect their need for employees to steadily increase, as was the case during the high speed growth era. At the same time, areas in which individual firms have a competitive advantage over their rivals are changing quickly and Japan s comparative advantage as whole is also changing over time. Given the high job security provided under traditional employment practices, increasing the reliance on part time workers is almost the only way for firms to keep both the level and the mix of employment flexible. 28

Increase of Part Time Workers and Accumulation of Human Capital In order to examine whether firms employ part time workers simply to take advantage of lower wage rates or to gain more flexibility in their workforce, Fukao et al. (2006) estimated both the marginal productivity of part time workers in comparison with that of regular workers and the compensation of part time workers in comparison with that of regular workers, using employer employee matched data at the factory level. They found that the productivity gap between part time workers and regular workers is larger than the wage gap. This means that firms pay a premium to part time workers in order to obtain flexibility of employment. Such behavior by firms is quite rational in the context of slow economic growth and Japan s system of high job security. However, at the same time it may also be creating a huge economic loss by reducing human capital accumulation. 29

4. Policies Needed for Productivity Growth Since the 1990s, some core characteristics of Japanese firms, such as tight customer supplier relationships and the life time employment system, have become obstacles to their TFP growth in an environment shaped by globalization and slow/negative growth in the working age population. 31

4. Policies Needed for Productivity Growth (Contd.) More rapid restructuring of firms left behind in innovation and internationalization, through M&A and other measures. Promotion of entrepreneurs and startups. Promotion of startup of domestic establishments by Japanese multinationals through improvement of regional logistics, FTAs, reduction of corporate taxes, etc.) Hollowing out problem also hampers real wage increases in Japan. Promotion of ICT and intangible investment. It seems that this problem is closely related to the rigidity of Japan s labor market. Restructuring of the labor market (improvement of social safety net, enhancement of labor market liquidity, reduction of unfair gaps between regular and part time workers). 32

References Arora, A., L. G. Branstetter, and M. Drev (2011) Going Soft: How the Rise of Software Based Innovation Led to the Decline of Japan s IT Industry and the Resurgence of Silicon Valley, Global COE Hi Stat Discussion Paper Series, No. 199, Hitotsubashi University. Belderbos, Rene, Kenta Ikeuchi, Kyoji Fukao, Young Gak Kim, and Hyeog Ug Kwon (2013) "Plant Productivity Dynamics and Private and Public R&D Spillovers: Technological, Geographic and Relational Proximity," CEI Working Paper Series 2013 05, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. Fukao, Kyoji (2012) The Structural Causes of Japan s Two Lost Decades : Forging a New Growth Strategy, Nikkei Publishing Inc., Tokyo (in Japanese). Fukao, Kyoji (2013) Explaining Japan s Unproductive Two Decades, Asian Economic Policy Review, vol. 8(2), pp. 193 213. Fukao, Kyoji, Ryo Kambayashi, Daiji Kawaguchi,Hyeog Ug Kwon, Young Gak Kim, and Izumi Yokoyama (2006) Deferred Compensation: Evidence from Employer Employee Matched Data from Japan, Hi Stat Discussion Paper Series, no. 187, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. Fukao, Kyoji, Ikeuchi Kenta, Young Gak Kim, and Hyeog Ug Kwon (2015) Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution? RIETI Discussion Paper Series 15 E 043. 33

Fukao Kyoji and Hyeog Ug Kwon (2006) Why Did Japan s TFP Growth Slow Down in the Lost Decade? An Empirical Analysis Based on Firm Level Data of Manufacturing Firms, Japanese Economic Review, vol.57(2), pp.195 228. Ikeuchi Kenta, Kyoji Fukao, Hiromichi Goko, Young Gak Kim, and Hyeog Ug Kwon (2015) Empirical Analysis on the Openness of Buyer Supplier Relationships and Productivity in the Japanese Automobile Parts Industry, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 15 J 017 (in Japanese). Jorgenson, Dale W., Koji Nomura, and Jon D. Samuels (2015) A Half Century of Trans Pacific Competition: Price Level Indices and Productivity Gaps for Japanese and U.S. Industries, 1955 2012, RIETI Discussion Paper Series RIETI Discussion Paper Series 15 E 054. 34

図 2:1 次サプライヤーの取引先完成車メーカー数 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 5 8 社 2 4 社 1 社 30% 20% 10% 0% 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 出所 : 納入マトリックス Source: Ikeuchi, Fukao, Goko, Kim and Kwon (2015) 35

図 3: 品目種別部品メーカー 1 社あたり納入先完成車メーカー数の平均値 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 全部品エンジン部品電気電装部品駆動伝動部品懸架制動部品車体部品 3.0 2.5 1989 1993 1997 2001 2004 2007 2010 出所 : 納入マトリックス Source: Ikeuchi, Fukao, Goko, Kim and Kwon (2015) 36

図 5: 取引先完成車メーカー数別自動車部品メーカーの TFP 指数 ( 対数 1988 年取引先完成車メーカー数 =0) 0.350 0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 5 9 社 2 4 社 1 社 0 社 0.050 0.000 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 出所 : 工業統計調査と納入マトリックスの接合データ注 ) 自動車部品製造業に属する工場の全要素生産性 (TFP) の平均値完成車メーカーとの取引がない企業の工場の TFP の 1988 年における平均値を基準とした指数 Source: Ikeuchi, Fukao, Goko, Kim and Kwon (2015) 37