FATAL INCIDENT AT AN INTERMEDIATE PIGGING STATION OF AN LPG CROSS-COUNTRY PIPELINE

Similar documents
Safety in Petroleum Industry

Veriforce TG CCT 661OP. Training Guide

International Process Safety Workshop Essar Steel, Surat 29 th 30 th November Explosion in 1 st Ammonia Scrubber

Working Environment Safety Assessment

DSEAR- Storage, Use and handling of gas cylinders guidance.

SAFETY MANUAL PURGING, VENTING & DRAINING PROCEDURE TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION SCOPE DEFINITIONS PROCEDURE...

SFC KEY INTERLOCKS & PROCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

"Although a good start with a good project, others are as much a hostage of the "human factor".

School of Chemistry SOP For Operation Of Glove Boxes

CONTENTS. 9. Opening of gas systems containing H 2 S. 1. Introduction. 8. Protection of Personnel.

Gulfstream Natural Gas System

ANNEX AMENDMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR FIRE SAFETY SYSTEMS (FSS CODE) CHAPTER 15 INERT GAS SYSTEMS

Efficient Pigging of Gathering Lines. Energy Management Workshop for Upstream and Midstream Operations

Responding to Natural Gas Pipeline Emergencies

Pipeline Pigging and Hydrostatic Test

COSASCO 3600 PSI SINGLE ISOLATION SERVICE VALVE (FR) MAINTENANCE

ARGUS MODEL C PIG VALVE

Dri-Line Mk3 Monnier Compressed Air Drain Trap

WHEATLEY Series 822/820 Swing Check Valve

IMCA Safety Flash 10/11 September 2011

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL PROCEDURE

Irrigation System Winterization and Pressurization Procedures

ISO INTERNATIONAL STANDARD. Small craft Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) systems

Class 1 (Explosive) Hazmat: The Hazardous Materials Table. Hazard Classifications Used in Hazmat Table, Column 3

GUIDELINES ON SAFE HANDLING AND STORAGE OF COMPRESSED GASES CHEMICAL MANAGEMENT CENTRE

MST21 Stainless Steel Balanced Pressure Thermostatic Steam Trap

CPX EMERGENCY STANDBY MANIFOLD INSTALLATION, OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE MANUAL

API MPMS Chapter 17.6 Guidelines for Determining the Fullness of Pipelines between Vessels and Shore Tanks

Tri-Safem Model I1 Regulator. INSTRUCTIONS and PARTS

Safety. April 2018 Supersedes all previous publications 2018 Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP

Full Internal Relief Valves Instruction Manual

PNEUMATIC STOPPERS OPERATING MANUAL. Type F G H - FOG

TSS21 Sealed Thermostatic Steam Tracer Trap

Optimizing Gas Supply for Industrial Lasers

WW-720. Pressure Reducing Control Valve

INSTALLATION, OPERATION, AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL WELKER FILTER DRYER

EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS

Pilot Check Valve: Metal Body Type

There are three fuelling systems which use LNG/CNG and which may be found in vehicles today:

Prepared by a Joint Working Group of the International DME Association and the World LP Gas Association

EASTERN ENERGY SERVICES PTE LTD. 60 Kaki Bukit Place #02-19 Eunos Tech Park Singapore, SG Singapore Telephone: Fax:

TP1 and TP2 Temporary Cone Shaped Strainers

AVM7 Stainless Steel Thermostatic Air Vent

GUIDANCE IN-SERVICE INSPECTION PROCEDURES

Health and Safety Executive. Key aspects of HS(G) 253. Andrew Hall HID CI 1G. HM Specialist Inspector (Mechanical)

LIQUID OXYGEN. General. Health Effects. Safety Considerations

Type 1367 High-Pressure Instrument Supply System with Overpressure Protection

Learning from Dangerous Occurrences in the Chemical Industries

WW-720. Pressure Reducing Control Valve

Transferring and Storage

A Continued Worker Safety Issue

SA Control Valve types: BM, BMF, BX, SB, NS, KA, KB, KC (Normally open) BMRA, BMFRA, BXRA, SBRA, NSRA, KX, KY (Normally closed)

VACUVENT Valve functions - benefits - flowpath - VG series - Sewage

LP-GAS BLEVES RESULT IN FIRE FIGHTER FATALITIES

Dri-Line Mk2 Spirax-Monnier Compressed Air Drain Trap

INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN CASE STUDY OF RAPID BLOW DOWN ON OFFSHORE PLATFORM

Guidance on Safe Entry into Inert Confined Spaces (Inert Entry), including Training, Procedures and Life Support Equipment

BTM7, BTS7 and BTS7.1 Stainless Steel Thermostatic Clean Steam Traps

1. Preface Important Safety Notes Brief Product Information Product Working Principle Installation Guidelines...

DW Module 8: Distribution Answer Key

Oil & Gas Hazard Alerts: Past, Present and Future. J.D. Danni Safety and Occupational Health Specialist (Oil & Gas) OSHA - Region VIII

WW-730. Pressure Sustaining/Relief Control Valve

Date Issued: January 2012 Revision Date: December 2012 Review Date: December 2015 Revision #

Blowout during Workover Operation A case study Narration by: Tarsem Singh & Arvind Jain, OISD

Lockout/Tagout Training Overview. Safety Fest 2013

M45 ISO Ball Valve DN25 to 150 Installation and Maintenance Instructions

Case History. Kinetics Controls & Innovation Ltd

COSASCO 6000 PSI SINGLE ISOLATION SERVICE VALVE (FR) MAINTENANCE

Juler Group. Presents. Hydrogen Sulfide (H 2 S) Safety. Juler Group Juler Group Incorporated

CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE USE OF SEA WATER IN FIREFIGHTING. Prepared and Presented by Lenny Naidoo (Chief Fire Officer), Engen Petroleum Company

GUIDANCE IN-SERVICE INSPECTION PROCEDURES. Status: Issue: 01 Date: 05/12/07

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER CR&CF RISK UNIT Compressed Gas Safety Standard

Standard Operating Procedure

TA10A and TA10P Steam Tracing Temperature Control Valves Installation and Maintenance Instructions

OXY Integral. INTERCON ENTERPRISES INC Tel: Fax: Internet:

Process Safety Management Of Highly Hazardous Chemicals OSHA 29 CFR

Fig 12, Fig 14HP, Fig 16, Fig 16HP and Fig 16L Strainers

Chemicals that will cause mutations to germ cells of humans that can be transmitted to Mutagenicity

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET HIGH SPEED DIESEL

New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission CFR 49 Part 192 Regulations. MINIMUM Pipeline Safety Regulations

When you complete this module you will be able to: Describe procedures needed to enter into, or work safely in confined spaces.

USER INSTRUCTIONS. NAF Duball DL Ball Valves. Installation Operation Maintenance. Experience In Motion. flowserve.com

SEMS II: BSEE should focus on eliminating human error

--- III. itti A. on_ coo. & EP Department DOCUMENT NO: WOC-HSE-ST Section H005 Hydrates

MANUAL GAS MANIFOLDS

S1, S2, S3, S5, S6, S7, S8, S12 and S13 Separators Installation and Maintenance Instructions

COMPRESSED AIR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

Material Safety Data Sheet. Helmar Crystal Kote Picture Varnish Gloss

Pipeline Integrity Valve Spacing Engineering Assessment (CDN) Grande Prairie Mainline Loop 2 (Progress Section) NPS 36

IPG IGNITION GAS PILOTS BACK-LOADED GAS

Fig 1, Fig 12, Fig 13, Fig 14HP, Fig 16, Fig 16HP and Fig 16L Strainers

GAS SUPPLY DESIGN GUIDE

Pipeline Flooding, Dewatering and Venting Dr Aidan O'Donoghue, Pipeline Research Limited, Glasgow, Scotland

Spiratec ST14, ST16 and ST17 Sensor Chambers and sensors

TD45 Thermodynamic Steam Trap Installation and Maintenance Instructions

GAS COMPRESSION SYSTEM

Manual Actuated Boiler Blowdown Valves

TECHNICAL DATA. System water supply pressure enters the priming chamber of the deluge valve (A.1) through the 1/4 (8 mm) priming line, which

Residential and Small Commercial

Type S301 & S302 Gas Regulators INTRODUCTION INSTALLATION. Scope of Manual. Description. Specifications. Type S301 and S302. Instruction Manual

Transcription:

FATAL INCIDENT AT AN INTERMEDIATE PIGGING STATION OF AN LPG CROSS-COUNTRY PIPELINE Narration: S/Shri Hirak Dutta, ED, OISD, Rajesh Uprety, Additional Director (Pipelines), OISD & YVN Sharma, DGM, HPCL, Vizag 1.0 THE INCIDENT : As part of pipeline maintenance program, cleaning pigging was being carried out in an LPG cross-country pipeline with a pig train consisting of cup pig, brush pig and magnetic pig, which was launched from preceding station and received in the Scrapper Receiving Barrel at IPS after three days. During the process of the pig retrieval from the barrel it was found that the pig was stuck in the barrel and there was huge quantity of pig residue (muck) in the barrel. After depressurization and manually cleaning the pig residue by using water jets etc., efforts were made to pull the pig out of the barrel, when the trapped pig suddenly came out from the receiving barrel with a great force and hit the persons standing in front of the barrel. The impact of the force was such that it broke the compound wall and the metal structure of the pedestal of the pig trolley. 2.0 OBSERVATIONS : Dia 10 FLOW TEE Entrapped LPG 38 Kg/cm 2 GATE VALVE A Receiving Barrel at IP 2 3941 NECK 356 Dia 16 2976 Pr Gauge Drain and vent pipe B Barrel Door C Pig came out from here Note: All Dimensions are in MM Stucked coupled PIG X Pig debris SCHEMATIC DIAGEM OF SCRAPPER RECEIVING STATION (IPS) Cleaning pig (consisting cup pig, brush pig and magnetic pig) was launched in the LPG line which reached the next IPS after three days. 1

3.0 ANALYSIS The Scrapper Receiving Barrel was isolated by closing the barrel body valve at A (API-6D Gate Valve) and depressurization was carried out from the vent at B. The barrel door at C was opened and it was observed that the pig was stuck inside the barrel and there was lot of pig residue present in front of the pig. The debris was removed by water flushing. After water flushing the pig was being pulled out. During this operation, the coupled pig (three pigs were tied together) came out with a great force and hit the persons standing in front of the barrel. The impact of the force was such that it broke the compound wall and the metal structure of the pedestal of the pig trolley. Due to the impact of the pig, there were two fatalities. In addition, three other persons suffered injuries - one of them suffered major injury. As may be seen, from the schematic diagram, that LPG was trapped between the valve A and the pig at X, due to the presence of magnetic pig and the high iron content the residue got solidified which acted as sealant, thus not allowing LPG to escape from the open barrel door. Thus, actually, only the portion between the pig and the barrel door was depressurized, while the portion between the valve and the pig remained pressurized with LPG at a pressure of 38 Kg/cm 2. Further during the day as the temperature soared, it might have further increased the pressure of the entrapped LPG in the rear portion of the barrel. As soon as the pig residue was manually cleaned, the entrapped LPG, which was at a high pressure of > 38 Kg/cm 2, propelled the coupled pig out of the open barrel door with a huge force. It is worthwhile to mention that the iron content (Iron sulphide) present in the pig residue was pyrophoric iron in nature, which when exposed to air, is oxidized to iron oxide with the liberation of heat. This reaction between iron sulphide and oxygen being exothermic generated considerable amount of heat; resultantly the pyrophoric iron become incandescent. While the front portion of the pig was being cleaned with water jet, air crept inside the barrel between the barrel valve and the pig resulting in the formation of a combustible mixture. The heat liberated from pyrophoric iron ignited the mixture and there was explosion inside the barrel which acted as propellant & forced the pig at a high speed to escape the barrel through the open door. The pig came out of the barrel with a huge force & hit the persons standing in front of the door which resulted in the fatalities. The pig residue samples collected indicate 5400 ppm of Sulphur & 90.99% iron. This indicates formation of Iron sulphide. 2

7.0 ROOT CAUSE 1. Pyrophoric iron in contact with air liberated heat which resulted in explosion of LPG-air mixture inside the barrel resulting in propulsion of pig at a very high force/ speed. The persons standing in front of the open door of the barrel were hit by the pig which resulted in fatality & injury. 2. Sudden release of entrapped LPG at high pressure (38 Kg/cm 2 ) might have propelled the pigs out of the barrel. The rise in temperature during the day might have further increased the pressure of entrapped LPG. 3. Draining of entrapped LPG inside the barrel between barrel valve & pig could not be done due to absence of drain or vent in that location (in the neck portion of the barrel). 8.0 INADEQUACIES 1. Inadequate system / approach with regard to evaluating / reviewing the pigging philosophy proposed by the consultant was one of the reason in this accident. 2. Scrapper pigging was not carried out since last about 8-9 years as a result of which lot of muck got accumulated in the line. As a fall out of this intelligent pigging was also not carried out and therefore, the health of the pipeline could not be ascertained. 3. Use of coupled pig i.e. tying all the pigs together for pigging operation. 4. Use of magnetic pig without ensuring minimum iron content in the pipeline. 5. The design of the scrapper barrel was not proper first, the total length of the barrel was on higher side and secondly, there was no provision of drain/ vent in the neck portion of the barrel. 6. Absence of standard operating procedure (SOP) for pigging. 9.0 LEARNINGS: The learnings are as follows: 1. Health assessment of the LPG pipeline must be carried out since the pig residue indicated considerable high iron content (90.99%) indicating metal loss due to internal corrosion. 2. Pigging must be done regularly and the residue must be analysed to ascertain the health of the pipeline. 3

3. An additional vent & drain point with pressure gauge shall be provided in the neck portion of the barrel to drain the Hydrocarbon. 4. Pig train must not be used with all pigs in tied condition. This is not a standard practice. 5. Magnetic pigs should be used only when it is ascertained that the iron content is nominal. 6. SOP has to be prepared for pigging operation and it must be displayed at all the IP stations. 7. SOPs must be properly explained to all the operating crew. 8. While receiving the pigs, it shall be ensured that proper venting has been carried out between barrel body valve and the pig so that the barrel is free from any Hydrocarbon. 9. While receiving the pig it shall be ensured that no person is standing directly in front of the barrel. 10. The set pressure of the PSV to be reviewed and brought down nearer to the MOP. 11. CCTV camera to be provided at all the unmanned stations. 4

VIEW OF COUPLED PIG THROWN OUT OF THE RECEIVER BARREL 5