Counter-Attack Statistics and Systems Daniel Hooper COUNTER ATTACK - STATISTICS In the modern Professional edition of rugby union, defence has become a major focus of all professional teams. With almost every team in the professional game now possessing a coach whose portfolio focusses entirely, or mostly on defence, we have seen a large increase in time spent on defence, and in the number of systems and structures used to defend. Defensive coaching roles have also found their way into the club and school systems, and defence is far more of a focus now, than at any other point in the sports history. The result of this is that defences, particularly in the first couple of phases of the game, have become incredibly organised as the roles players perform defensively are more easily organised earlier in the phase count. The game even now sees teams defend strongly for multiple phases, with high phase counts in attack, not necessarily equalling line breaks or points, and in some cases even results in teams losing ground with the more phases they accumulate in attack. Ultimately, due to the organisation, systems, and training time spent on Defence, Counter- Attack has presented itself as a vital attacking tool, particularly concerning line breaks. As shown below in Table 1.0 from the 2015 Super Rugby season, an average of 3.03 1 st Phase line breaks were made per match, with 1.66 (approximately 55%) of these 1 st Phase line breaks made from Counter-Attack situations (Restart Receipt, Kick Receipt, Turnover). Table 1.0 2015 Super Rugby Statistics Team Finishing Position Lineout Scrum First Phase Line-breaks (per match) Restart Receipt Kick Receipt Turnover Other Hurricanes 1st 0.7 0.8 0.2 1.2 1.0 0.4 Highlanders 2nd 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.8 1.2 0.1 Waratahs 3rd 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.1 Chiefs 4th 0.7 0.6 0.4 1.6 1.1 0.4 Brumbies 5th 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1 Crusaders 6th 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.8 1.3 0.5 Stormers 7th 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.5 Lions 8th 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.1 Bulls 9th 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.2 Rebels 10th 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.4 Sharks 11th 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.1 Cheetahs 12th 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.2 Reds 13th 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3 Blues 14th 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.3 Force 15th 0.4 0.4 0 0.3 0.3 0.2 Total/Average 0.55 0.56 0.17 0.74 0.75 0.26
Further to the statistics from Table 1.0 above, we can see further in Table 1.2 below, that in each Super Rugby game of the 2015 season, teams kicked 20.65 times per match. Add to this the fact that each team also conceded 19.55 turnovers per match, this equates to an average of 40.20 opportunities for teams to counter-attack per match in Super Rugby 2015. That s once every 2 minutes in a match. In comparison, teams were awarded 12.8 lineouts per game, 7.4 scrums per game, and teams won an average of 5.4 restarts per match. This equates to a total of 25.6 set piece attacking opportunities, provided teams can win their own ball at scrum, lineout, and restarts. Clearly, some of the kicks from teams will not have provided counter-attack opportunities (kicks gone well into touch, and not retrievable for quick throw ins), but equally, teams will not win all their own scrum feeds and lineout throws either. Therefore, we can deduce from the statistics that theoretically, teams have 1.57 times more counterattack opportunities, than set piece attacking opportunities. This would indicate as coaches, we should be spending plenty of training time on counter-attack, and equally time on ways to defend or minimise counter-attack opportunities. Anecdotally, and from personal experiences, plenty of time is spent at trainings working on 1 st phase or set piece attacking situations from scrum, lineout and restart, but how much time do teams at a club, school or other amateur level really spend on counter-attack? How much time do professional teams even spend on counter-attack compared to training time spent on attack from scrum, lineout and restarts? Table 1.2 2015 Super Rugby Statistics Team Position (pts) Turnovers Kicking Kick-offs Conceded (Incl Pens) per match Kick metres per match D C B A Long Short % % Hurricanes 1st 21.2 17.9 572.7 7.1 8.0 2.5 0.3 70.9 29.1 4.3 Highlanders 2nd 17.3 25.6 792.2 8.2 12.6 4.1 0.7 55.9 44.1 4.9 Waratahs 3rd 21.6 15.7 567.9 9.5 4.8 1.2 0.2 51.3 48.7 17.9 Chiefs 4th 22.1 19.4 666.5 7.0 9.3 2.8 0.3 51.7 48.3 14.3 Brumbies 5th 17.9 20.3 660.0 9.4 7.8 2.7 0.4 65.9 34.1 16.7 Crusaders 6th 19.4 22.9 746.0 9.6 10.5 2.7 0.1 52.6 47.4 13.5 Stormers 7th 19.3 21.4 635.4 8.8 10.2 2.2 0.2 63.1 36.9 9.7 Lions 8th 19.4 17.5 544.6 7.6 7.4 2.1 0.4 67 33 24.1 Bulls 9th 18.3 21.8 706.5 9.5 9.9 2.1 0.3 65.1 34.9 30 Rebels 10th 18.6 17.5 575.8 8.4 7.3 1.4 0.4 56.1 43.9 5.6 Sharks 11th 20.4 25.4 798.0 8.4 12.7 3.8 0.5 69.9 30.1 28.6 Cheetahs 12th 18.7 20.7 699.0 9.7 8.7 1.8 0.5 68.6 31.4 9.4 Reds 13th 19.3 21.7 704.8 8.6 9.4 2.9 0.8 62.2 37.8 18.9 Blues 14th 21.0 18.1 610.4 7.9 7.9 2.0 0.3 66 34 6.1 Force 15th 18.8 23.8 814.4 8.9 11.3 3.0 0.6 71.7 28.3 23.1 Short win % Total/Average 19.55 20.65 672.95 8.5 9.2 2.5 0.4 62.8 37.2 14.8
COUNTER-ATTACK SYSTEMS Despite looking somewhat chaotic and reactive at times, most elite and professional teams will be using counter-attack systems which we will look at below. In most cases, the Key Factors of Counter Attack are considered in these systems. The Key Factors for Counter- Attack can be broken down as follows; Commit the Defence initially by straightening. Support work back to give ball carrier options (and communicate in support). Move the ball to the Space that is created, this may include a kick to the space. Systems in use could be broken up into 3 categories for simplicity; Firstly, the Freedom method where teams/players have complete autonomy about how they counter-attack and are expected to play what they see when they receive possession from a turnover. This is a very individualised approach, but places trust in the instincts of the individual players. This method can work well for players with flair. Secondly, the Philosophy method where coaches may provide players with a broad idea of what they want on counter-attack, but without too much structure or detail in the roles players perform. An example of this method would be the common 2 pass philosophy, where teams are expected to quickly make 2 passes when they gain possession from a turnover. This method is far more common in ruck or set piece turnovers than it is on kick receipts, as the ball is moved quickly to space, and because the opponents were set deep in attack formation, teams can make easy metres with a 2 pass philosophy from these ruck or set piece turnovers. Further to this, some teams may have a philosophy where the second receiver in a 2 pass philosophy is a pre-determined player, usually one with strong attacking instincts. Often this will be the fullback, and the Wallabies have used Israel Folau in this type of role. This can be particularly effective in your own half, as the fullback is close enough to the attacking line to join as a 2 nd receiver, but also still has a great view of the defensive line and the space from the back. Some teams may take the 2 pass philosophy even further and ensure they always play the 2 passes in the same direction that the opposition were playing. The reason for this is that as teams fold in attack, they tend to be closer to the defensive line on the return side of a breakdown, whereas the attackers (who have just turned the ball over) will tend to sit deeper on the same way side of the ruck as they will have been deep in expectation of receiving the ball. Lastly, many teams will also use the 2 pass philosophy for kick returns. However, this can cause issues with the first Key Factor of Counter-Attack identified above (Commit the defence) as the 2 passes are made so early it allows the defenders chasing the kick to immediately drift off and cover the field, and the counterattack much more easily. Lastly, the Structure or Prescribed method is more and more common in the game now, particularly off kick receipts, with all players on the park given a role in the teams Counter- Attack. Teams may give players their roles based on the alignment between their general attack shape, and where the ball ends up. For example, if positions 2 and 6 always attack in the left hand side of the field, and the ball is kicked to the left hand side of the field, these players may be responsible for securing the ball in a breakdown in that part of the field. Equally the All Blacks have used a very structured counter-attack system over many years.
The system is further demonstrated below in Diagram 1.3. The All Blacks have usually had designated players responsible for getting to the first breakdown. In the All Blacks case this has evolved over many years where originally the 2 second rowers had the role of getting to the first breakdown, whereas now the 2 forwards whose attack the breakdown occurs in are responsible for getting to that breakdown, whilst all other forwards try to get back into their original attacking across the field. The All Blacks, as illustrated below, will also send their 2 centres to the far edge of the attacking line, which allows them time to get depth before the ball is shifted. This also means the open winger shifts into the middle of the field, rather than staying wide. The flyhalf performs a similar role to the centres in the All Black system, but acts more as an inside support player, which means he is near enough to be the first receiver on the next phase should a breakdown/ruck occur. Additionally, the All Blacks, and many other teams, have employed the ghosting tactics where retiring players actively look to impede those players trying to chase the kick through. Most teams using this tactic will try and get 2 of their own player s side by side and then communicate to their teammate in possession of the ball to run between them, making it very difficult for any defender to stop the attacker. Whilst some may question the legality of the tactic, because these players are retiring to get back behind the ball they will be unlikely to be penalised unless they dramatically change their line to obstruct players. Diagram 1.3 All Black Kick Returns
Lastly, the Queensland Reds during their successful Super Rugby era of the early 2010 s used a system in counter-attack of breaking the field up into many s and giving them coded numbers/phrases. Support players were then able to communicate to the ball receiver using these codes to give the ball receiver a clear idea of where the space was in counter-attack. In summary, it is important to have clarity as a coach and player regarding your application of roles and responsibilities in counter-attack. There are so many counter-attack opportunities in a game, as well as the fact that defences are much less organised in counter-attack situations, that to not have some sort of strategy, and to not train that strategy will be limiting your ability to score points. Hopefully this paper has shown that there are also ways to be creative about how you counter-attack, and it may not just be about attacking the space you see, but you can devise structures and strategies to best utilise the skillsets of your players, and to give them clearly defined roles and options.