HAMS-GPS : HAZOP Study for : MyCo.

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HAMS-GPS : HAZOP Study for : Project/Plant stage at HAZOP : Enter Project/Plant stage Hazop study Number: P and I Dwg. No. : Sop reference: Hazop-1a Node: SKO from AVU-1 and AVU-2 to ATF-MEROX Parameter : Design intention (Operation): Description of design intention: To remove S and Improve colour To remove S and Improve colour Existing controls: Units: Control Range: HAZOP GUIDE WORD LIKELY DEVIATION LIKELY CAUSES LIKELY CONSEQUENCES PRESENT CONTROLS THEIR LIMITATIONS RECOMMENDATI- ON FOR BETTER HAZARD CONTROL (1) NO (NOT OR NONE) No/Less Feed of SKO Source Problem. No controls exist Up to 8 m3/hr (Compressor Capacity) No Problem. If Less Unit Trips Auto. Below 8 m3/hr- >Damage to compressor L, LL Feed Alarms Exist.1. If Auto Trip fails-air Stops fully2. To Manually open Air Control Valve to continue to run MEROX at rduced rate.unit stopped below 7 m3/hr. RISK LEVEL: Risk level: NO DAMAGE and NO CHANCE Operability. SIL/LOP: Action by: (2) MORE OF More Feed of SKO More Production of SKO No Problem. Required Air Set Auto. Compr. Fails Standby Compr. Manually started None. None. RISK LEVEL: Risk level: NO DAMAGE and NO CHANCE Operability. SIL/LOP: Action by: Any other Observations observations 1. Before starting HAZOP, meeting was held with all senior officers and head of unit with briefing about HAZOP being undertaken. 2. Hard copies of P&ID s were available at the unit were referred to and fully made use of on HAZOP study. 17 July 216 Page 1 of 3

Hazop study Number: P and I Dwg. No. : Sop reference: Design intention (Operation): Hazop-1 Node: Parameter : Description of design intention: None Existing controls: Units: Control Range: HAZOP GUIDE WORD LIKELY DEVIATION LIKELY CAUSES LIKELY CONSEQUENCES PRESENT CONTROLS THEIR LIMITATIONS RECOMMENDATI- ON FOR BETTER HAZARD CONTROL (1) NO (NOT OR NONE) No/ less feed Feed pump trip, Fail Open CV-FC- 15 Fails or Stuck Mid way.no or less Fuel gas Interlock with Furnace to Trip. AL, ALL at 52 m3 Hr.By pass operated till FC Replaced.FSSS Exists Provide flow Transmitter and Indicator. RISK LEVEL: Risk level: MEDIUM DAMAGE and LOW CHANCE Operability. SIL/LOP: 1 Action by: (2) MORE OF More feed FC fails Pump Rpm Rises-> Pump trip-> Plant stops. AH, AHH existbypass operated till FC replaced None. RISK LEVEL: Risk level: NO DAMAGE and NO CHANCE Operability. SIL/LOP: Action by: Any other Observations observations Purpose is to reduce S content in Diesel from 1, and above to <5 ppm. Diesel is taken through Surge Drum to Filters-> Heat exchangers to heat up from 7 to 345 then sent to Catalytic reactor-r1 and R2 with mixed hydrogen 35, M3->Cold separator V13 -> 2-parts 1. Gas (Hydrogen and H2S) and 2. Diesel and Dissolved H2S.->Gas to RGC (Recycle gas compressor) via Amine wash through C12 (Rich Amine Column), Liquid part to stripper for recovery of H2S. 17 July 216 Page 2 of 3

1. Dr. Ram S. Hamsagar, Chairperson, BES,2. Mr. Sunil Hamsagar, Computer Operation and Report Generation,3. Unit Panel Operators. HAZOP team: Name, Designation, Department SIL Generalized View 4 Potential for fatalities in the community 3 Potential for multiple fatalities 2 Potential for major serious injuries or one fatality 1 Potential for minor injuries 17 July 216 Page 3 of 3

HAMS-GPS : HAZOP Study for : Recommendations only Node : Design intention (Operation): HAZOP GUIDE WORD LIKELY DEVIATION LIKELY CAUSES LIKELY CONSEQUENCES PRESENT CONTROLS THEIR LIMITATIONS RECOMMENDATI- ON FOR BETTER HAZARD CONTROL (1) NO (NOT OR NONE) No/ less feed Feed pump trip, Fail Open CV-FC- 15 Fails or Stuck Mid way.no or less Fuel gas Interlock with Furnace to Trip. AL, ALL at 52 m3 Hr.By pass operated till FC Replaced.FSSS Exists Provide flow Transmitter and Indicator. 17 July 216

HAMS-GPS : HAZOP Study for : Date: 3/7/215 5:17:28 PM Project/Plant stage at HAZOP : Enter Project/Plant stage ACTION REPORT Action By report only Design intention (Operation): Node: Description of design intention: None Hazop study Number: P and I Dwg. No. Hazop-1 Parameter : Sop reference: HAZOP GUIDE WORD RECOMMENDATION FOR BETTER HAZARD CONTROL Action by: Name, Designation, Department Action Date (1) NO (NOT OR NONE) SIL/LOP: 1 Provide flow Transmitter and Indicator. Process and Mechanical 25/7/216 Action taken: 17 July 216

HAMS-GPS : HAZOP Study for : Action By report only Summary of RBI-Matrix (conforming to European Process Safety Center's Standard) for selected Nodes: Number of Risk (Damage-Consequence) level areas Node: Num. Guide Words used HIGH MEDIUM HIGH MEDIUM LOW SAFE SKO from AVU-1 and AVU-2 to ATF-MEROX 2 1 1 2 2 TOTAL PERCENT 1... 25. 3 75. Applications of RBI-Risk Matrix: Following are the applications of an RBI-Risk matrix 1. As an indicator of the risk level of the installation, 2. To establish risk mitigation measures and evaluate their effects, 3. To compare units and processes on the basis of risk, 4. To develop trends of risk development of a unit over time and during its life cycle. SAFE : LOW : MEDIUM : MEDIUM HIGH : HIGH : 3 x 1 / 4 = 75. 1 x 1 / 4 = 25. x 1 / 4 =. x 1 / 4 =. x 1 / 4 =. 17 July 216

Action By report only HAMS-GPS : HAZOP Study for : Summary of RISK BASED INVESTIGATION (RBI) MATRIX Chance levels -----------> TOTAL % <----------------Damage level 1 3 1 3.. 25.. 75. TOTAL % 3 1 4 75. 25.... 1. RISK LEVELS TOTAL % HIGH MEDIUM HIGH MEDIUM LOW 1... 25. SAFE 3 75. Applications of RBI-Risk Matrix: Following are the applications of an RBI-Risk matrix 1. As an indicator of the risk level of the installation, 2. To establish risk mitigation measures and evaluate their effects, 3. To compare units and processes on the basis of risk, 4. To develop trends of risk development of a unit over time and during its life cycle. 4 1. 17 July 216

Observations only HAMS-GPS : HAZOP Study for : 17 July 216 Hazop study Number: Hazop-1 Node: Design intention (Operation): Observations Purpose is to reduce S content in Diesel from 1, and above to <5 ppm. Diesel is taken through Surge Drum to Filters-> Heat exchangers to heat up from 7 to 345 then sent to Catalytic reactor-r1 and R2 with mixed hydrogen 35, M3->Cold separator V13 -> 2-parts 1. Gas (Hydrogen and H2S) and 2. Diesel and Dissolved H2S.->Gas to RGC (Recycle gas compressor) via Amine wash through C12 (Rich Amine Column), Liquid part to stripper for recovery of H2S. Hazop study Number: Hazop-1a Node: SKO from AVU-1 and AVU-2 to ATF-MEROX Design intention (Operation): To remove S and Improve colour Observations 1. Before starting HAZOP, meeting was held with all senior officers and head of unit with briefing about HAZOP being undertaken. 2. Hard copies of P&ID s were available at the unit were referred to and fully made use of on HAZOP study. 1. Dr. Ram S. Hamsagar, Chairperson, 2. Mr. Sunil Hamsagar, Computer Operation and Report Generation, 3. Unit Panel Operators. HAZOP team: Name, Designation, Department

HAMS-GPS : HAZOP Study for : Over all Risk Levels 17/7/216 1:4:16 AM Risk Levels for HAZOP Count Remarks SIL/LOP Required Risk level: MEDIUM DAMAGE and LOW CHANCE 1 Medium Low Critical 1 Risk level: NO DAMAGE and NO CHANCE 3 Safe SIL Generalized View 4 Potential for fatalities in the community 3 Potential for multiple fatalities 2 Potential for major serious injuries or one fatality Note: Design team to check and ensure the SIL requirements for safety instruementation system and LOP for equipments safety as applicable are avaible. If not the SIL/LOP requirements to be provided. 1 Potential for minor injuries 17 July 216