Airside Expansion at Lambert Field: The Blues in St. Louis Tudor Masek December 6, 2007 16.871 Airport Systems Planning, Design, and Management
Overview Motivation Expansions at Lambert Trans World Airlines Traffic Collapse What Went Wrong? Airport Master Plan Local Tensions Financing The Road Ahead Conclusion 2
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Motivation STL traffic collapse in the new millennium 30.6 mil pax in 2000 13.4 mil pax in 2004 New 9,000 ft. runway at Lambert Field Cost just over $1 billion Friction with the local communities Why the mismatch of supply and demand? 5
Lambert-St. Louis Airport Passenger traffic soared in the 1970s Airport expanded terminal facilities, extends runways, and increased capacity by 50% to keep up with demand Boom continued in the 1980s and 1990s Master Plan calls for additional airside capacity Runway 11-29 construction Approved in 1998, broke ground in 2001, completed in 2005, opened in 2006 6
Trans World Airlines Hub in St. Louis since 1982 De-regulation hit TWA hard Had neglected to develop domestic network Sold to Carl Icahn in 1985 Bankruptcy in 1992 Icahn ousted in 1993 Karabu Deal Bankruptcy again in 1995 Short-lived turnaround in the late 1990s Third bankruptcy Acquired by American Airlines in 2001 7
The Blues in St. Louis.. American cuts service to Lambert-St. Louis Flights to Lambert cut in half in 2003 Lease renewed only for Concourse C in 2005 Passenger traffic through Lambert plummets History of Traffic at Lambert Field Operations Passengers Thousands 600 500 400 300 200 100 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 Millions Passengers 0 0 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Year 8
What Happened? So what went wrong at Lambert Field? Bad planning? Bad timing? Bad luck? Or was construction justified and within the scope of regional and national goals? Is runway beneficial despite decline in demand? Was the expansion project worthwhile? 9
Lambert Airport Master Plan Original Master Plan (1987-1993) called for rebuilding the entire airfield 4 new parallel runways rotated clockwise 10 degrees Construction to take place while operations continue! Master Plan Supplement initiated in 1994 Preserve Lambert s role as critical link in NAS Strengthen role as major economic asset hub Provide facilities to keep Lambert competitive Simultaneous independent IFR approaches 10
30R 30L 1310 ft 24 6 12L 12R 11
Traffic Forecasts & Assumptions Low (no hub): 26 mil annual pax in 2015 Assumes loss of airline hub connecting traffic, with eventual replacement by a new airline Middle (baseline): 42 mil pax in 2015 Assumes business-as-usual Was used for all the alternative comparisons High (new hub): 56 mil pax in 2015 Assumes either increased hubbing by existing carriers, new hub established by another airline, or higher-thanexpected regional economic growth 12
Multiple Airport System Option to develop Mid-America to relieve Lambert Lambert is 12 miles to the northwest of downtown Mid-America is about 19 miles to the southeast! Airline hubbing makes this option infeasible Threshold for secondary airport seems to be 10 to 12 million originating passengers per year Demand forecast for St. Louis region indicates only about 8.7 million originating passengers in 2015 13
Lambert Development Options Source: Leigh Fischer Associates, Master Plan Supplement Study, Lambert-St. Louis International Airport 14
W-1W Details New 9,000 x 150 $1.059 billion runway (11/29) 4,100 centerline displacement from 12L/30R 12,000 threshold displacement Average hourly runway capacity to increase from 97 to 131 Average taxi time to increase from 5.3 to 6.9 min per op Reduction of operational and passenger delays both at Lambert and in the National Airspace System 15
More Highlights Acquisition of almost 1,600 acres, including 2,300 homes, displacing about 5,680 people (City of Bridgeton) Moved 18.3 million tons of soil; soil neutral First automobile tunnel in the state of Missouri Noise impacts projected to decrease Improvement of air quality Injection of over $400m into the economy through contracts with 550 companies (80% local) employing 14,000 people 16
Master and Land Use Plan Source: Leigh Fischer Associates, Master Plan Update for Airport Expansion, Lambert-St. Louis International Airport 17
Land Acquisition Source: Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, Status Briefing for Society of Military Engineers, Nov 8 2004 18
Local Tensions Bridgeton sues the City of St. Louis (land use) Resistance from Bridgeton and interest groups Concerns about fair market price for land acquisition Requested real-time simulation (MPS assumptions) 19
Terminal Expansion Currently: 89 aircraft gate positions; ~1.5 million square feet Projected future need: ~110 total gates (2015) Site between runways can accommodate a satellite terminal with 150 additional gates positions Mid-field satellite terminal concept Demand driven development Source: Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, Status Briefing for Society of Military Engineers, Nov 8 2004 20
A B C E ANG Main D East 21
Project Financing Of the $1 billion cost of the project: Almost half of is for land acquisition Almost 40% is for construction itself The remainder is for management and consulting overhead Only about 1/3 of costs passed on to airlines Construction completed on time and on budget 22
Traffic Forecast vs. Actual Thousands Operations at Lambert Field Low Forecast Middle Forecast High Forecast Actual 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 Year Millions Passengers at Lambert Field Low Forecast Middle Forecast High Forecast Actual 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 Year Both Operations and Passengers are below the Low forecast! Runway completed but terminal expansion abandoned 23
What s Next? Delay reductions Lambert more attractive to new airlines Excess in capacity Renewed or increased hub operations? On-time performance rankings Lambert has performed better than O Hare On par with Dallas/Ft. Worth 24
Competing Hubs History of Traffic at Dallas/Ft. Worth International History of Traffic at O'Hare Operations Passengers Operations Passengers Thousands 1,000 70 900 60 800 700 50 600 40 500 400 30 300 20 200 100 10 0 0 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 Year Millions Passengers Thousands 1,000 80 78 76 950 74 72 900 70 68 66 850 64 62 800 60 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Year Millions Passengers On-Time Departures at STL, ORD, and DFW STL ORD DFW 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year On-Time Arrivals at STL, ORD, and DFW STL ORD DFW 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 25 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year
Conclusion Demand forecasts were over-optimistic, BUT The need for the new runway was not demanddriven but rather delay-driven Terminal expansion plans were (rightly) abandoned as traffic plummeted New runway was probably cheaper to build than it would have been 10 years later Runway 11/29 seems to have been justified and will likely be invaluable when traffic returns to STL 26
Questions? 27