Nuclear Safety. Module 3 DEFENSE IN DEPTH. Reacu03.ppt. Slide!

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Transcription:

Nuclear Safety Module 3 DEFENSE IN DEPTH Slide! Reacu03.ppt

Defense in Depth The principle that multiple, redundant nuclear safety provisions are required to protect workers, the public and the environment from the radiological hazards ofnpp operations. Slide 2...pp<

Assumptions Inherent in Defense in Depth Safety Philosophy 1. People make mistakes 2. Design isn't perfect 3. Equipment fails Slide 3

Safety Culture Model,)(.. Legislative Frameworlc Slide 4 Reacsa03.ppt

Defense in Depth in Accident Management 1) Accident prevention 2) Accident mitigation 3) Accident management Slide 5

Defense in Depth in Accident Management 1) Accident prevention - quality design, procurement, construction, operations and maintenance for reliable systems - faults detected and corrected promptly - when systems fail, upsets prevented from escalating» automatic system response» unit placed in safe state by well-trained staff using approved procedures - standby safety support systems Slid. 6 Re."",Il3.ppl

Defense in Depth in Accident Management 2) Accident mitigation - shut down, cool, contain (via special safety systems, for serious process failures) - AIM procedures executed by trained staff Slide 7 Reacu.m.ppt

Defense in Depth in Accident Management 3) Accident accommodation - emergency response procedures executed by trained staff - public notifications and protective measures» eg, banning food & water, sheltering, evacuation, KI pills - Province, Municipalities and Federal Govt. respond per Nuclear Emergency Plans Slide 8 Re-c..03.ppt

Maintenance on Safety Related Systems O&M activities on safety related systems ccl!' impair or remove a layer of defense Then countermeasures are required to compensate for the increased risk - Example 1: Quiet mode operation to reduce probability of upset - Example 2: Synchronizing SG to class 3 bus to increase reliability - Example 3: Dedicated Operator when placing one liquid zone on manual control Slide 9 Reeaalappt

Why Use Approved Procedures? Extra layers of defense provided Technical and Operational reviews ensure that: - potential effects on other systems have been considered - barriers to releasing radioactivity are not compromised - procedures addressing systemfailures really do put unit into a safe state Slide 10 ReacuOO.ppt

Defense in Depth in Event Diagnosis Operator training (classroom, field, simulator, co-piloting) Diagnostic aids (eg, CSP display, PRAG) Independent diagnosis by 50s and 55 Monitoring critical safety parameters during recovery to ensure that unit is responding predictably, consistent with diagnosis Slidell

Placing an Automated Control System on Manual Control Observe similar constraints as designed into automated system Dedicate an Operator where appropriate, to simulate the 'undistraded' operation of the automatic controller--eg, controlling one liquid zone level Slide 12

Role oftraining & Qualification in Defense in Depth Equips staff to: - recognize when a layer of defense is jeopardized - performcritical O&M activities safely-eg, Instrument calibration Safety system testing Panel checks - identify equipment failures at incipient stage - execute emergency procedures safely Slide 13

The 5 Barriers between Fission Products and the Public 1. Ceramic fuel 2. Fuel sheath 3. HTS boundary 4. Containment 5. Exclusion zone Slide 14

Impact oflarge Scale Fuel Failures on the Five Physical Barriers At least 2 barriers breached (ceramic and sheath) In event of a LOCA, third barrier (HTS boundary) also breached In event of a dual failure, fourth barrier (Containment) also breached Slide 15

Classification ofsafety Related Systems Slide 16 Rea<:saOO.ppt

Examples ofactive and Passive Systems I.'lIl.Iftl~...'&~r"lI~iii~.'~ PHT Eledrical power 5051 Steam Gen./Boiler Mod.f!r.ux.. Process water Instrument air Backl4' heat sinks secondary cortrol area ArnJusgas PHT ModeraIor SDS2 Eel Cortainment Emergency Cooling Standby generators Cortainment venting Setback and stepback Emergency water Emergency power Secondary control areas Backwheal sinks Slide 17

Trip and Safety Margins f-------- Unsafe Umit Operating Parameter Value f------,.-- Trip Set Point Margin of safety Margin to trip f-----...'-- Operating Point Slide 18 Reacs&<:6.ppt