WELL TEST HAZOP CAPABILITY STATEMENT

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Transcription:

WELL TEST HAZOP CAPABILITY STATEMENT

INTRODUCTION Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) is a hazard analysis method used to identify hazards and operational problems. The standard HAZOP methodology is process-based and may not cover all operational aspects of well testing. Surface well testing activities are typically more procedurally based and involves more manual intervention compared to process systems. ORS has developed a customized HAZOP approach for surface well test operations. 2

RISKS INVOLVED WITH WELL TESTING Well testing is commonly considered as a high risk activity due to: Simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) inducing risks for conflicting activities Temporary equipment and piping brought onto the rig First time of bringing hydrocarbons to surface; well behaviour, composition Potential interface issues between temporary installations and permanent rig installations, e.g. power and utility supply, PSV settings on pumps and equipment, emergency access and escape paths Multiple parties involved in operations; rig personnel, crane operator and deck crew, well test crew, coiled tubing crew etc. Flaring activities; heat radiation, drop-out from burner / flare causing contamination of the environment. 3

ORS APPROACH ORS has developed a customized HAZOP methodology to cover all aspects of well testing/well intervention activities with focus on: Identification of risks involved at all operational steps of the well test activity. Verification of primary and secondary barrier status and shutdown sequence at all steps of operation Equipment failure modes and preventive/mitigation measures in place Clarification of roles and responsibilities. Identification and risk assessment of potential SIMOPS Multidiscipline workshop to ensure communication between involved parties Familiarization of all parties with the risks involved at various steps of the operation 4

WELL TEST HAZOP METHODOLOGY Well Test project presentation Select Well Test activity step or node Select Hazardous Scenario/Guideword Select cause of hazard Yes Determine worst case consequence without control measures in place No Other causes? Hazardous event? Yes List preventive and mitagating control measures and verify barrier status Yes No Acceptable risk? No Risk rank Define recommendation(s) for further control measures or change in design/procedure Determine action responsible Yes No Other Hazardous scenarios? 5

EXAMPLES OF HAZARDS/GUIDEWORDS Guidewords Pressure (More, Less, Trapped) Flow (More, Less, Reverse) Temperature (More, Less) SIMOPS Instrumentation (Alarm settings, Trip points, Tanks levels) Leakages/Spill Biohazard/Illness (H2S, Radioactivity) Escape access Flaring (Heat radiation, Drop-out) Fire/Flammables Dropped objects Hand equipment (Personnel injuries) Hazardous scenarios Hydrate formation Carry over Slugging Emulsions/Foaming Gas blow by Pipework Erosion Rapid change of wind direction during flaring Loss of power and/or hydraulics Loss of utility systems Unintentional initiation of safety functions Extreme weather conditions Human error (HMI) 6

ORS CAPABILITIES ORS has extensive experience in facilitating HAZOPs for well tests/well intervention activities. ORS offers systematic and structured HAZOP facilitation. Planning Preparation Execution Review Reporting Pre-meeting with client to define: Scope of Work Nodes Deliverables Review of relevant documentation, presentation material Interactive workshop Facilitation Documentation Internal and client review of worksheets and identified actions Draft report for client review Final report 7

For more information, please contact: Morten Nilstad Pettersen mnp@orsconsulting.no +47 97 73 17 80 Johan Tengelin jte@orsconsulting.no +46 72 300 90 70