Practical Modelling & Hazard Assessment of LPG & LNG Spills

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Practical Modelling & Hazard Assessment of LPG & LNG Spills UKELG 3 rd April 2012 Tony Ennis

Introduction Refrigerated or pressurised Release scenarios & release rate Vaporisation Gas dispersion Consequences Jet fire / Pool fire / VCE / BLEVE Ignition potential Comparison between LPG & LNG

Hazard Identification Based on assessment of potential types of leak Pipe sizes Joints Leak frequencies Published data Methodology PRA, HAZOP, HAZID etc

Modelling Modelling needs to reflect an appropriate range of scenarios Use engineering judgement to assess potential failure modes Based on equipment configuration Location Bunding, surface, congestion, confinement

Pressurised / cryogenic releases Pressurised storage Cryogenic storage Ambient temperature P = ~8 barg (LPG) High release rate Jet mixing Pool possible Flashing flow (long pipes) Temperature -50 C to -100 C P = atmospheric Lower release rate Pool formed Instantaneous and long term flash

Modelling

Gas dispersion Computer based models Statistical Affected by buildings etc in near field Ignition to LFL/2 isopleth Source term definition is critical Accuracy +/-30% at best

Key Factors Release rate / hole size Orientation Elevation Pipe length, fittings etc Pressure & liquid head Impingement Bund size if present Wind / Weather conditions

Release rate comparison (LPG) Hole size Pressurised (kg/s) Cryogenic (kg/s) 1 2.8 1.7 2 11.4 6.9 3 25.6 15.5 4 45.5 27.6 6 102.3 62.2 Based on horizontal release at 1m elevation, 15 C, 1m pipe, 5m liquid head

Distance (m)pipe Size (inches) Flammability range based on hole size Flammable ranges for Propane Releases 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Pressurised LFL Pressurised LFL/2 Cryo unbunded LFL Cryo Unbunded LFL/2 Cryo 200m2 bund LFL Cryo 200m2 bund LFL/2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Hole size (ins)

Hole Size (in) Hazard Area Hazard Area 20000 18000 16000 14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 Press LFL Press LFL/2 Cryo unbunded LFL Cryo unbunded LFL/2 Cryo bunded LFL Cryo bunded LFL/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 Area (m2)

Pool width (m) Cloud width Plume width 140 120 100 80 Press LFL Press LFL/2 Cryo unbunded LFL Cryo unbunded LFL/2 Cry bunded LFL Cryo bunded LFL/2 60 40 20 0 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 Hole size (in)

Hole size (ins) Jet fire to 6.3 kw/m² Jet fire to 6.4 kw/m² 250 200 150 100 Pressurised Cryogenic 50 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Distance (m)

Effect of weather conditions on jet fire

Cryogenic release Initial flash of material - heat transfer from ground / atmosphere Vaporisation rate falls as ground is cooled Hazard range large for 1-2 minutes then falls Sensible heat transfer from ground surface Ambient heat transfer dominates Size of bund is important Atmospheric conditions e.g. solar radiation Bund has negligible effect on pressurised release

Pool vaporisation (bunded)

Pool vaporisation (unbunded)

Modelling conclusion Bunded cryogenic release minimises size of flammable cloud for given releases Bunding of pressurised releases has negligible effect on the size of flammable cloud Jet releases can disperse faster than cryogenic liquid in some cases

LNG versus LPG (horizontal release) LNG storage temp -100 C, LPG -50 C LNG - longer hazard ranges (up to 2x) but significantly smaller area Similar jet fire hazard range LNG has higher mass flow for given hole size (approximately 2x LPG) LNG vaporises much faster

Comparison of 4 release Graphs to same scale for 4 liquid release, no bund, same conditions LNG at -100 C LPG at -50 C

Side view

Effect of weather Brief discussion

Weather conditions Normally model: D5: Typical UK conditions (~40%) F2: Worst case for dispersion D10 / D15: High wind speed Based on local conditions / weather data Appropriate temperatures

Pressurised

Cryogenic

Vertical propane releases Pressurised Cryogenic

Vertical cryogenic LNG..

Effects D5: Base case F2: Generally gives largest plume Stable atmosphere, low temperature, low wind speed D10 / D15: High wind speeds give thin and relatively short plumes Wind shear & turbulence break up plume

Hazard Assessment After modelling, assess the impact, extent & severity

Assessment Based on plant configuration Pipe sizes Credible loss of containment events Inventory Location issues Weather / wind direction

Possible outcomes Early ignition Open area Leak Jet Fire Sustained jet fire on pressurised storage Late ignition No congestion Late ignition + congestion BLEVE Flash fire VCE

Effects Event Jet fire Flash fire VCE BLEVE Effects Thermal radiation; long duration depending on inventory. High thermal flux in jet flame Thermal radiation; short duration Blast overpressure, flame; very short duration. Domino effects from blast Thermal radiation; short duration (depends on inventory). Vessel fragments & domino effects

Ignition Probability Vapour Release (te) Ignition Probability 1 0.6 10 5 100 15 1000 40 Approximate values for ignition of vapour clouds

Ignition / Explosion Risk Dependent on: Mass released Congestion / Confinement Ignition source presence Large release = high probability of reaching an ignition source Ignition sources => Off plot / uncontrolled Hazardous Area Classification?

Hazard Vapour cloud enters building or congested structure Ventilation rate? VCE volume? Ignition sources?

BLEVE Extended thermal radiation on pressurised storage Rupture of pressure vessel (petal failure) 100 te BLEVE ~20 sec duration Minimal overpressure large thermal radiation level

Mexico City BLEVE

Mexico City #2

Site Hazard Assessment Release sources Hazard ranges Impingement of jet or pool fire Size of cloud Congested / confined areas Potential for ignition Domino effects Feed results back into HAZOP / PRA

Typical site Plant Storage Offices Car Park Workshop Road

Congestion?

Comparison Pressurised Higher release rate for given hole size Faster flash of liquid released Jet fire & BLEVE Tends to disperse more easily (temperature) Release orientation important Invisible release Cryogenic atmospheric Atmospheric pressure, leak rate based on liquid head Flash rate depends on ambient conditions Pool fire, no BLEVE Slower to disperse Cold, dense cloud slumps to ground in many cases Visible release (condensation)

Conclusions Not always initially clear what the worst case will be Density relative to air Take into account geography of plant Look at realistic release cases Cryogenic generally lower hazard than pressurised Bunds have significant effect Need to carry out careful & detailed analysis LPG & LNG dispersion very different