REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE SINKING OF THE YACHT "MEGAWAT" - 25 MAY 2005

REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE SINKING OF THE YACHT "MEGAWAT" - 25 MAY 2005 The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 25 th March, 2003 under The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000 The copyright in the enclosed report remains with the Marine Casualty Investigation Board by virtue of section 35(5) of the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000. No person may produce, reproduce or transmit in any form or by any means this report or any part thereof without the express permission of the Marine Casualty Investigation Board. This report may be freely used for educational purposes. 1

2 Published by The Marine Casualty Investigation Board 5th December 2006

CONTENTS PAGE 1. SYNOPSIS 4 2. FACTUAL INFORMATION 5 3. THE INCIDENT 7 4. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT 9 5. CONCLUSIONS 12 6. RECOMMENDATIONS 15 7. LIST OF APPENDICES 16 8. LIST OF CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED 42 3

SYNOPSIS 1. SYNOPSIS 1.1 On the 26 May 2005 the yacht "Megawat" sank following failure of the rudderstock. The craft was sailing from Dublin to Scotland in 20/30 knots of wind when a loud bang was heard, the steering failed and the craft began to take on water. The liferaft was deployed to allow transfer to another yacht "Quite Correct" which was in the vicinity. The liferaft failed to inflate. The crew were successfully transferred using the inflatable tender belonging, to "Quite Correct". The yacht "Megawat" sank in approximately 40 minutes. 4

FACTUAL INFORMATION 2. FACTUAL INFORMATION 2.1 Details of Yacht "Megawat" Official Number: 403578 Port of Registry: Dublin Registered Owner: Philip Watson Builder: Hanse Yachts, Yachtzemtrum Greifswald, Postfrack 3165, 17461 Greifswald Salinstrabe 22, 17489 Greifswald, Germany Model: Hanse 371 Length overall: 11.25m Breadth: 3.59m Draft: 1.98m Displacement: Crew on board: 5959 Kg (approx.) 3 persons: Mr. Philip Watson, Mr. Robert Cagney, Mr. Brian McDowell Design: Judel/Vrolijk & Co Date of build: Launched Dec 2001 History: Sailed approx. 14,000 miles RCD 1 Category: Category A Ocean 2.2 Details of Liferaft Manufacturer: Zodiac Model: Coaster SY6 AC Serial No: XDC-1CN55-L899 Original Packing Date: Dec 1998. Approval Authority: MM France Capacity: 6 persons Emergency Pack: RORC (Royal Ocean Racing Club) The liferaft was on hire from SOLAS Marine Services Ltd. 2.3 Description of Hanse 371 2.3.1 The Hanse 371 is constructed using fibre-reinforced plastic (FRP). The craft complies with Category A Ocean requirements of the Directive 94/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 June 1994 (RCD Directive), see section 4 for full details. 2.3.2 As a Category A Ocean the craft is "designed for extended voyages where conditions may exceed wind force 8 (Beaufort scale) and significant wave heights of 4 m and above but excluding abnormal conditions, and vessels largely self-sufficient". 1 EU Recreational Craft Directive 5

FACTUAL INFORMATION cont. 2.3.3 The rudder is of a conventional spade rudder design. The rudderstock is solid aluminium (AlMgSi 1 F32). The stock is supported by self-aligning upper and lower bearings. Appendix 7.1 contains the rudder stock construction drawing. The rudderstock was tapered over a distance of 105mm from a maximum diameter of 88mm to a diameter of 50mm. The rudder tube extends approximately 450mm above the line of the bottom shell and is fitted with a rubber gaitor to prevent water ingress. The taper and gaitor are clearly visible in the photo contained in Appendix 7.2. 6

THE INCIDENT 3. THE INCIDENT 3.1 Location of incident: South Rock Lighthouse vessel (off coast of Northern Ireland) 20 miles ahead bearing 14 degrees. Weather at time of incident: 20/30 knots SSE 1.5 ~ 2m swell Course: 20 degree Downwind under mainsail 3.2 At approximately mid-day the 25 May 2005 Philip Watson reported: "When surfing down one of the bigger waves at about 11 kn., there was a loud bang, like a pistol-shot. Helmsman Brian McDowell felt the wheel go "limp" and watched helplessly as "Megawat" rounded up sharply. I had been sitting in the companionway & Roger was lying down below. I asked Brian had the steering failed and he showed me, by spinning the wheel, that it had." Following the incident contact was made with the UK Coastguard. "The Coastguard answered immediately, received our lat/lon, and the information that we were in no immediate danger". At this stage the main sail was lowered and the crew of "Megawat" noticed that the "Quite Correct" had turned around and was heading back towards "Megawat". An hour earlier "Quiet Correct" had passed "Megawat" and was also enroute to Scotland. Following a further inspection Philip Watson noted that: "Water was well over the floorboards, and shoes etc, were floating about. The Coastguard was contacted again. At this stage Philip Watson spotted the rudder, with about half its stock attached, floating away from us". "Quite Correct" was now in attendance and it was decided a yacht-to-yacht transfer was too dangerous and transfer would be undertaken using the liferaft. "The liferaft was put into the water alongside the cockpit and sharply tugged the painter line to inflate it." This would allow transfer to "Quite Correct" by "hanging off" "Megawat" on a long painter. The liferaft painter was pulled and the raft failed to inflate. "Disappointment may not be quite the right word for what I was feeling when the hissing stopped after just 5 seconds, leaving about the right amount of CO2 for a life-jacket in the raft! We cut the hopelessly under-inflated raft away as it was likely to impede rescue." 7

THE INCIDENT cont. The crew of "Megawat" were transferred to "Quite Correct" by using its inflatable tender, which was stored inflated on the foredeck. A detailed narrative written by Philip Watson is reproduced in Appendix 7.3. 8

EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT 4. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT 4.1 OUTLINE OF THE INVESTIGATION The recovery of the rudder and liferaft were key to the investigation. The yacht had sunk in approximately 80 metres of water and the Marine Casualty Investigation Board did not consider recovery of the craft viable or necessary. Towards the end of June the rudder was recovered off Cambletown, Scotland and the liferaft was recovered off the coast of Northern Ireland. A review of the applicable legislation that applies to the craft, a review of the retrofitting of the autopilot system was undertaken and detailed technical examinations of the rudder and the liferaft were carried out. 4.2 RECREATIONAL CRAFT DIRECTIVE (RCD) In accordance with the RCD Directive manufacturers of recreational craft have to follow the "Conformity Assessment" procedure set out in Article 8 of the RCD Directive before placing a recreational craft on the market and/or putting into service in the EU. Manufacturers can adopt alternative routes to achieve certification, which are set out in Article 8(2) of the RCD Directive. The routes are based on the length of the craft and the intended operational environment. The Hanse 371 model was certified in accordance as category A Ocean. On the basis the craft was less than 12 meters in length the craft was certified using internal production control plus tests (module Aa) referred to in Annex VI of the RCD Directive. Copies of the Module Aa certification and EC Type Examination Certification are contained in Appendix 7.4. The RCD Directive sets out "Essential Requirements" for recreational craft (Annex I of the RCD Directive). The requirements include: Owners Manual Structure Stability and freeboard Buoyancy and flotation Flooding, and Steering systems For each "Essential Requirement" manufacturers are required to state the standard that has been applied to a particular "Essential Requirement". These requirements are required to be stated on the Declaration of Conformity, see Appendix 7.4 for details of the standards applied to Hanse 371. 9

EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT cont. In accordance with Annex I, A, 3.5 of the RCD Directive the craft is required to: "be designed so as to minimize the risk of sinking. Particular attention should be paid where appropriate to: cockpits and wells, which should be self-draining or have other means of keeping water out of the boat interior, ventilation fittings removal of water by pumps or other means." Due to the catastrophic failure of the rudderstock and deluge of water the electric bilge pump and manual bilge pumps fitted to the craft were insufficient capacity to control the flooding of the craft. No watertight bulkheads were fitted in the craft. 4.3 RETROFITTING OF AUTOPILOT SYSTEM The craft was retrofitted with a Simrad (formerly Robertso) model AP21 autopilot system. Full details of the system supplied could not be obtained. The retrofitted tiller arm was designed in two halves that clamped to the rudderstock using a keyway. Noonan Boats and Tony Brown Electronics fitted the autopilot system. The existing keyway was used as it extended a sufficient distance below the existing tiller arm and accordingly no machining of the stock was necessary, see photo in Appendix 7.2. The steering gear system is one of the "Essential Requirements" of the RCD Directive. Referring to the manufacturers Declaration of Conformity in Appendix 7.4 any changes which "touch the essential requirements" must be agreed with the manufacturer to ensure the continued validity of the manufacturers certification. It is important to note factory fitted autopilot systems have the standard tiller arm replaced by an "L" shaped tiller arm similar to the arm in Appendix 7.5. The European Commission were asked their opinion in relation to the retrofitting of equipment and the need for the continued validity of RCD certification. A copy of their response is contained in Appendix 7.6. 4.4 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF RUDDER STOCK Hanse Yachts, in agreement with the MCIB, sent the rudderstock to Fraunhofer Gesellschaft - AGP, Rostosk, Germany for detailed technical analysis, Appendix 7.7 contains a copy of their report. 10

EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT cont. 4.5 TECHNICAL EXAMINATION OF LIFERAFT Following the recovery of the liferaft ZODIAC International were requested to examine the liferaft to establish the reason for failure. A copy of their report is contained in Appendix 7.8. Also contained in Appendix 7.8 is an extract for the Liferaft log book retrieved from the liferaft. 4.6 ANTIFOULING "Megawat" was antifouled using the Awlgrip Gold system. The manufacturers advised the system is copper based and is not recommended on aluminium. Hanse Yachts advised similar corrosion has been found on other rudderstocks that were coated with copper based antifouling. The owners manual does not make any reference to the aluminium stock and does not contain a warning about the use of copper based antifouling. 4.7 DIAMETER OF THE RUDDERSTOCK The rudder stock diameter was determined in accordance with the American Bureau of Shipping Guide for Building and Classing Offshore Racing Yachts, Appendix 7.9 contains a copy of the designers original calculations. The calculations demonstrate the diameter of the rudderstock complies with the ABS requirements. 4.8 CARRIAGE OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT There are no regulatory requirements relating to the carriage of safety equipment on pleasure craft less than 13.7 metres overall other than the carriage of suitable "personnel flotation devices or lifejackets" in accordance with Merchant Shipping (Pleasure Craft) (lifejackets and Operation) (Safety) Regulations 2004. 11

CONCLUSIONS 5. CONCLUSIONS 5.1 RECREATIONAL CRAFT DIRECTIVE 5.1.1 Based on the EU Commission response it appears the owners of recreational craft that undergo modifications that relate to the "essential requirements" of the RCD Directive are required to have the modifications assessed for compliance with the RCD Directive. 5.1.2 Hanse Yachts did not produce the technical documentation described in paragraph 3 of Annex V of the RCD Directive. 5.2 RETROFITTING OF EQUIPMENT 5.2.1 The Declaration of Conformity issued by the manufacturer was invalidated as a result of the modification to the steering system. 5.3 RUDDERSTOCK FAILURE 5.3.1 The chemical composition of the rudderstock material corresponded to the specification stated. 5.3.2 The mechanical characteristics of yield point and tensile strength determined are about 10% above the upper limits of the strength class F32, which means the rudderstock had a reduced toughness leading to fast growth of any fissure present. 5.3.3 The rudderstock was roughly machined. A surface finish of 80mm is rougher than the surface finish achieved for sand casting and flame cutting. As stated in the test report in Appendix 7.7 80mm is "considered as very rough machine work". 5.3.4 The macroscopic findings indicate a fatigue fracture due to a V-notch (approx. 0.3mm) in the circumferential direction with unsymmetrical bending stress at the notch. It is unclear how the initial V notch defect was formed. There are two possible scenarios. 5.3.5 The defect was caused during manufacturing which resulted in a rough surface finish. 5.3.6 The retrofitted autopilot tiller arm was clamped to the rudderstock so the lower edge of the retrofitted tiller arm caught the top of the taper or a particle was present when the new tiller was clamped onto the rudderstock causing the initiating V-Notch defect. 12

CONCLUSIONS cont. The presence of an initial defect leads to rapid growth of a fatigue fracture. Final failure will occur when the original diameter of the rudderstock is sufficiently reduced to lead to failure. Aluminium does not have a fatigue endurance limit unlike steel. 5.3.7 The surface finish detailed on the designers drawing, see Appendix 7.1, was specified as "smooth" and the drawing specified no dimensional tolerances. On a constructional drawing the surface finish and dimensional tolerances should be specified in accordance with best engineering practice. "Smooth" is not a recognised engineering specification. 5.3.8 The exposed part of the rudderstock between the underside of the hull and the top of the rudder blade was corroded. The antifouling (Awlgrip Gold) was incompatible with the aluminium rudderstock. The manufacturers of Awlgrip have advised that Awlgrip Gold should not be used on aluminium components as it is copper based and causes corrosion if applied to aluminium. Hanse Yachts advised that this type of corrosion has been found on other Hanse Yachts. Continued corrosion of the rudderstock could eventually lead to failure. 5.3.9 The owners manual does not warn the owner about the use of copper based antifouling. 5.4 FAILURE OF THE LIFERAFT 5.4.1 The liferaft was on hire from SOLAS Marine Services Ltd. and was last inspected in January 2005 by SOLAS Marine Ltd. The Liferaft logbook recovered from the liferaft indicates "periodic controls" on 15 March 2001 and 11 January 2006. The CO2 bottle was refilled March 2001 as the liferaft was accidentally deployed by the owner. The liferaft was examined by SOLAS Marine Ltd each year to replace expired items such as flares, seasick tablets etc. SOLAS Marine Services Ltd state the liferaft was test inflated each year. ZODIAC servicing instructions state the liferaft shall undergo "periodic control" yearly after the first 3 years. 5.4.2 SOLAS Marine Services Ltd are not appointed ZODIAC Agents in Ireland and they do not have any ZODIAC servicing instructions. 5.4.3 The percussion head was found not to be tight. 5.4.4 During the course of the technical examination of the liferaft by ZODIAC International a new CO2 cylinder and percussion head were fitted and the liferaft was inflated successfully. 13

CONCLUSIONS cont. 5.5 CARRIAGE OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT 5.5.1 There are no requirements to carry any safety equipment on recreational craft less than 13.7 metres in length other than other than the carriage of suitable "personnel flotation devices or lifejackets" in accordance with Merchant Shipping (Pleasure Craft)(lifejackets and Operation) (Safety) Regulations 2004. 14

RECOMMENDATIONS 6. RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1 The Marine Survey Office should make a submission to the Recreational Craft Directive (RCD) standing committee: 6.1.1 To request a review of the RCD in relation to watertight arrangements in way of rudderstocks in the event of failure on category A and B recreational craft. 6.1.2 To consider an explicit statement in the RCD in relation to specification of dimensional tolerances and surface finishes for machined components. 6.1.3 To consider a requirement that Owners Manuals should clearly specify the specification of antifouling and highlight any special requirements. 6.2 The Maritime Safety Directorate should issue a Marine Notice to highlight the dangers of using copper based antifouling on craft with aluminium components. 6.3 The Maritime Safety Directorate should notify the relevant German Authority in relation to the lack of the technical documentation for the Hanse 371 model in accordance with paragraph 3 of Annex V of the RCD. 6.4 The Maritime Safety Directorate should publish a Marine Notice to clarify the situation regarding modifications to recreational craft and compliance with the RCD. 6.5 The Maritime Safety Directorate should issue a Marine Notice recommending non-solas/med Liferafts to be serviced only by authorised agents appointed by the manufacturer. 6.6 The Marine Survey Office should investigate the servicing of non-med liferafts and introduce legislation in relation to servicing if considered necessary. 15

APPENDICES 7. LIST OF APPENDICES 7.1 Rudder construction drawing 7.2 Photograph of rudder installation on sister craft 7.3 Detailed narrative 7.4 RCD certification 7.5 L shape tiller arm 7.6 European Commission response relating to retrofitting of equipment 7.7 Fraunhofer Gesellschatt technical report on the rudderstock failure 7.8 Zodiac International technical report on liferaft failure 7.9 Judel/Vrolijk rudderstock design calculations 7.10 Photograph of the "Megawat" 16

APPENDIX 7.1 Appendix 7.1 Rudder construction drawing 17

APPENDIX 7.2 Appendix 7.2 Photograph of rudder installation on sister craft 18 Photographs courtesy of the RNLI at Padstow.

APPENDIX 7.3 Appendix 7.3 Detailed Narrative 19

APPENDIX 7.3 Appendix 7.3 cont. Detailed Narrative 20

APPENDIX 7.3 Appendix 7.3 cont. Detailed Narrative 21

APPENDIX 7.4 Appendix 7.4 RCD Certification 22

APPENDIX 7.4 Appendix 7.4 cont. RCD Certification 23

APPENDIX 7.4 Appendix 7.4 cont. RCD Certification 24

APPENDIX 7.5 Appendix 7.5 L shape Tiller Arm 25

APPENDIX 7.6 Appendix 7.6 European Commission response relating to retrofitting of equipment 26

APPENDIX 7.6 Appendix 7.6 cont. European Commission response relating to retrofitting of equipmen 27

APPENDIX 7.7 Appendix 7.7 Fraunhofer Gesellschatt technical report on the rudderstock failure 28

APPENDIX 7.7 Appendix 7.7 cont. Fraunhofer Gesellschatt technical report on the rudderstock failure 29

APPENDIX 7.7 Appendix 7.7 cont. Fraunhofer Gesellschatt technical report on the rudderstock failure 30

APPENDIX 7.7 Appendix 7.7 cont. Fraunhofer Gesellschatt technical report on the rudderstock failure 31

APPENDIX 7.7 Appendix 7.7 cont. Fraunhofer Gesellschatt technical report on the rudderstock failure 32

APPENDIX 7.7 Appendix 7.7 cont. Fraunhofer Gesellschatt technical report on the rudderstock failure 33

APPENDIX 7.7 Appendix 7.7 cont. Fraunhofer Gesellschatt technical report on the rudderstock failure 34

APPENDIX 7.7 Appendix 7.7 cont. Fraunhofer Gesellschatt technical report on the rudderstock failure 35

APPENDIX 7.7 Appendix 7.7 cont. Fraunhofer Gesellschatt technical report on the rudderstock failure 36

APPENDIX 7.8 Appendix 7.8 Zodiac International technical report on liferaft failure 37

APPENDIX 7.8 Appendix 7.8 Zodiac International technical report on liferaft failure 38

APPENDIX 7.8 Appendix 7.8 Zodiac International technical report on liferaft failure 39

APPENDIX 7.9 Appendix 7.9 Judel/Vrolijk rudderstock design calculations 40

APPENDIX 7.10 Appendix 7.10 Photograph of the "Megawat" 41

CORRESPONDENCE 8. LIST OF CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED Correspondent Page No. Noonan Boats 43 MCIB Response 43 Mr. Philip Watson 44 MCIB Response 46 42

CORRESPONDENCE 8. CORESPONDENCE RECEIVED MCIB RESPONSE The MCIB notes the contents of this letter. 43

CORRESPONDENCE 8. CORESPONDENCE RECEIVED 44

CORRESPONDENCE 8. CORESPONDENCE RECEIVED 45

CORRESPONDENCE MCIB RESPONSE to the letter from Mr. Philip Watson dated 20th March 2006. 46

CORRESPONDENCE 47

48 CORRESPONDENCE

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50 CORRESPONDENCE

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52 CORRESPONDENCE

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54 CORRESPONDENCE

NOTES 55

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