Good Intentions: The Real Effect of the Rise of Sports Agents on. Professional Athletes

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Good Intentions: The Real Effect of the Rise of Sports Agents on Professional Athletes Introduction With the rise of players rights in the last few decades through player unions and collective bargaining agreements, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of strikes and lockouts that have occurred in the big four professional sport leagues in the United States. There are many reasons for the advent of these work stoppages, but they can at least partially be attributed to the team owners of the leagues pushing back. Previous academic studies have demonstrated that sport lockouts and strikes have a negative impact on the national economy. Previous papers have also looked at the shift in power between the owners and players and how work stoppages tend to favor the owners. The effect of the National Labor Relations Board and National Labor Relations Act on professional sports in the United States has also been documented. There is a lack of research on what part sports agents play in this whole situation though. The present research seeks to further explore the causes and effects of these lockouts and strikes and to analyze the shift in power from the players to the owners with these work stoppages as well as investigate the role of sports agents in resolving work stoppages and creating the collective bargaining agreements. Prior Work While there has not been a lot of empirical work done on this topic, much has been written to illustrate the issues: Play Ball: What Can Be Done Be Done to Prevent Strikes and Lockouts in

Professional Sports and Keep the Stadium Lights On, (Baumann, 2012), goes into depth on what effects have been caused by professional sports being under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Baumann shows the timeline in each league from the creation of the players association onward with the resulting strikes and lockouts. Federal Jurisdiction in Sports Labor Disputes, (LeRoy, 2012) further expands upon the relationship between the National Labor Relations Act and labor disputes in professional sports. LeRoy also goes in depth on the subject with regard to the Sherman Antitrust Act. Professional Sports League Commissioners Authority and Collective Bargaining, (Parlow, 2010), takes an in-depth look into the power that commissioners wield in the big four sports leagues and discusses the collective bargaining process as it relates to work stoppages. The Effects of Strikes and Lockouts on the Strength of Professional Sports Leagues, (Horowitz, 2010), is an interesting piece that demonstrates through various metrics how leagues suffer as a result of work stoppages as well as illustrating how players are normally the worse off of the two groups after a strike or lockout. The Economic Consequences of Professional Sports Strikes and Lockouts, (Coates & Humphreys, 2000), and The Economic Consequences of Professional Sports Strikes and Lockouts: Revisited, (Baade, Baumann, & Victor Matheson, 2006), both present a detailed analysis of the negative economic impacts caused to cities in the United States that host professional teams when those leagues experience a work stoppage. The second paper by Baade, Baumann, and Matheson is actually a paper written several years after the former in response to some of the results of the first paper after reviewing more data that was collected. The following two papers also provide some background information on work stoppages in professional sports and collective bargaining, but go in a different direction than this paper

aims to go. Labor Pains: The Effects of a Work Stoppage in the NFL on its Coaches, (Lattinville, Boland & Speyer, 2010), focuses more on the effects to the coaches of teams during work stoppages in professional sports, especially since the coaches do not have unions. Finally, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons From the NFL and NBA Lockouts of 2011, (Grow, 2012), focuses on why the players unions for the NBA and NFL decided to dissolve during negotiations to resolve the work stoppages of 2011 and why union dissolution will continue to be used by the players in the future as a bargaining chip. Thus, there is currently a very small body of work focusing on this niche aspect of labor law and sports business. Certain topics such as collective bargaining have been discussed at some length, but a focus on sports agents and their role in collective bargaining and dealing with work stoppages is neglected. This paper will aim to cover those areas which are currently lacking. Background of stoppages in the U.S. Over the history of American sports, there have been 21 lockouts and strikes in the 4 major professional sport leagues in the United States of America. Eight of those have come from Major League Baseball (5 strikes, 3 lockouts), four from the National Basketball Association (all lockouts), five from the National Football League (3 strikes, 1 lockout, 1 lockout/strike), and four from the National Hockey League (1 strike, 3 lockouts). Even more noteworthy is the fact that these strikes and lockouts are becoming ever more prevalent as the financial stakes continue to rise. The National Hockey League had its inaugural season in 1917, yet all 4 of its lockouts and strikes have come in the year 1992 or after. The National Basketball Association had its first season in 1946, however all 4 of its lockouts have come since 1995. The National Football

League was founded in the year 1920, but the first of its 5 lockouts and strikes did not happen until 1968 and 3 of them have occurred since 1982. The National Football League also had a referee lockout in the year 2012, which will not be discussed in length in this paper, caused a huge uproar among fans and plenty of controversy due to shoddy refereeing by the replacement officials who fumbled away several games with blown calls. Major League Baseball is the oldest existing professional sports league in the United States founded in 1869, but the first of Major League Baseball s 8 lockouts and strikeouts did not occur until over a century later in the year 1972. These often dramatic and highly publicized strikes and lockouts over the last few decades have been a major source of turbulence for professional sports in America and are the biggest obstacles to continued league growth. Each league has had at least one lockout/strike that was extremely damaging to the league. The 1981 Major League Baseball strike led to the cancellation of 713 games that season and the 1994 Major League Baseball strike led to the cancellation of the entire postseason that year. The 1998-99 and 2011 National Basketball Association lockouts both lasted for over 5 months and ended with shortened seasons that year. The 1982 National Football League strike forced the league to shorten its regular season to just 9 games per team that season. Last, but certainly not least, the National Hockey League has suffered through 3 debilitating lockouts over the last 2 decades, with the 1994-95 and 2012-13 lockouts leading to seasons being cut almost in half with only 48 games per team in each season, and the 2004-05 lockout led to the unprecedented consequence of having to cancel the entire season. One cannot begin to discuss these lockouts and strikes without first going into some detail about the collective bargaining agreements that govern these leagues. The National Football League created its first collective bargaining agreement in 1968 as a direct result of the 1968 strike/lockout and almost 50 years after the inception of the league. The National

Basketball Association had its first collective bargaining agreement put into place in 1970, which was 25 years after the creation of the league but was not the result of a lockout or strike, as the first lockout would not come for another 25 years. Major League Baseball made its first collective bargaining agreement in the year 1968 as well, shortly before the National Football League s agreement was written, and this was the first collective bargaining agreement created in professional sports. Baseball s collective bargaining agreement came a century after the formation of the league, but all 8 of its major strikes and lockouts came after it was implemented. The National Hockey League was the latecomer to the collective bargaining process, with its first collective bargaining agreement employed in 1995, almost 80 years after the founding of the league and as a direct result of the 1994-95 lockout which led to a shortened season. The collective bargaining agreement is the contract that exists between the owners of all of the teams in the leagues and the players associations that represent the athletes in each league. These contracts can be set up for as few as a couple of years all the way up to as many as 10 years. Generally the collective bargaining agreements do not extend beyond 10 years as factors affecting the teams and leagues such as the changing economy and legal background can change substantially over a decade rendering the agreement somewhat obsolete. Lockouts can occur when these collective bargaining agreements are not renegotiated as they near the end of their contract life or if the two sides cannot come to an agreement on the terms of the new contract. For the big 4 professional sport leagues in the United States, the collective bargaining agreements are the authority on issues such as how the league revenues will be split up between the players and owners, salary caps for the teams, rules for drafting players and on free agency, and even disciplinary rules and regulations regarding how players can be traded. All these points must be negotiated by both sides and lately the splitting of league revenues has been a source of

contention between the players and owners. This issue will be discussed in great length later on, especially how the owners have been gaining the upper hand in the latest collective bargaining agreements with huge gains in terms of the league revenue splits. The collective bargaining agreements are essential not only for deciding how revenues will be divvied up, but also in ordaining how the league will run and how players will be treated during their playing days and after retirement. Methodology This paper will take an in-depth look into the disturbing trend of increasingly occurring lockouts and strikes. What are the causes at the root of this problem that were not there before the last couple of decades or is this an issue that has been a long time coming? What are the short-term effects and what are the long-term effects of a lockout on the leagues, the teams, the players, and the owners? How are profitability, revenues, ticket sales, and public perception affected and to what degree? Is irreparable damage done or are there steps that can be taken to rescind the negative light that these leagues have come under? Another trend of interest is how these lockouts and strikes have gone hand in hand with a considerable shift in power from the players to the team owners, even as the star power, wealth, and fame of the players continues to grow exponentially. This paper will look at the causes and effects of this power shift and whether it is positive, negative, or neutral for the future of these leagues. The final main point of this paper will emphasize the role of sports agents both as negotiators during the collective bargaining agreements as well as counselors during the lockout and strike process. Are sports agents a necessary part of the solution that makes this legal puzzle

fit together or are they part of the problem that continues to propagate as the complexity of the law surrounding sport grows? So now we come back to the integral question of why these lockouts and strikes have occurred and why they are occurring with increasing frequency. First we have to look at the rise of the power of the players. When these professional sport leagues first came into being, the players had little to no power to control their fate. They had no agents back then, there were no unions to lobby for their best interests, and they had no legal knowledge of their rights or worth. This changed with the advent of the player s union for each league. The Major League Baseball Players Association was founded in 1966 and helped negotiate the first collective bargaining agreement for professional baseball 2 years later. The players association and that first collective bargaining agreement also played a big role in the well documented case of Curt Flood, the St. Louis Cardinals player who protested being traded to the Philadelphia Phillies without his consent. Flood was upset with the trade, but most likely would have eventually accepted it were it not for a meeting with the head of the players association Marvin Miller who told Flood that the players association would fund a lawsuit backing him against baseball s reserve clause and lack of free agency. The case Flood v. Kuhn (the commissioner of Major League Baseball) ended up going all the way to the Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of Major League Baseball and the reserve clause. Although Flood and the players union lost the case, it served as a notice to the players that they could fight for their rights and also led to the 10/5 Rule (also known as the Curt Flood Rule) which gave more power to veteran players in vetoing a trade they did not want to happen. The rise of the players association and collective bargaining agreement definitely led to a rise in the power of the players and to them fighting for their rights, and it was in the year 1972 that the first strike occurred in Major League Baseball, which was just 6 years

after the creation of the players association and just 2 years after the implementation of the first collective bargaining agreement. The National Basketball Association Players Association was formed in 1954, which makes it the oldest of all of the professional league players associations although it did not gain recognition from the team owners for another 10 years. The players association played a key role in growing the salaries and power of basketball players over the next few decades, and basketball did not see its first labor dispute until 1995. The National Hockey League first attempted to create a players association in 1957, but this attempt failed and the organization disbanded as the owners successfully killed it by trading away all players associated with the union. The National Hockey League Players Association was successfully founded in 1967, 10 years after the first attempt. When the association first formed, it successfully gained concessions for the players and in return agreed that the players would not strike unless the owners went back on the agreement. The first labor dispute did not occur in hockey until 1992, which coincided with the end of the long reign of Alan Eagleson, who had presided as executive direction of the National Hockey League Players Association since its inception in 1967. The creation of the National Football League Players Association in 1956 was the direct result of the angst of the players in the league, who for the first few decades that the league existed had almost no rights. The players had to attend training camps and exhibition games without compensation and without being under contract, and were routinely traded or blacklisted from the league if they protested the unfairness of something to the team owner. Two players from the Cleveland Browns and a former Notre Dame football-player-turned-lawyer were responsible for the creation of the players association, and it made tremendous gains in its first decade of existence. The National Football League Players Association secured a minimum wage salary, compensation for exhibition gains, medical and hospital coverage, pension plans,

and health insurance early on for the players. The NFLPA later went on to declare itself an independent union in 1967, and this coincided with the first labor dispute in the National Football League, the 1968 strike/lockout. It is important to note that the players associations gained the upper hand early on in their existence against the owners with the constant threat of an antitrust lawsuit, since antitrust laws exist to promote free and fair practices in the marketplace and prevent anything that gives an unfair advantage to one firm over its competitors. However, professional sport is different from other industries in that it essentially is a monopoly. If the players of the National Basketball Association are unhappy with the league then they would have to play in a different country, as no other professional avenue exists within the United States. In the same manner, if the owners of the teams are unhappy with the players and lock them out then the league comes to a screeching halt as there is not a reserve supply of equally well known and talented players waiting to fill in for the locked out players. It is not like the automobile industry where replacement workers are readily available. Each side thinks that they have a huge amount of leverage over the other side, which emboldens each side to hold firm on their stance. In reality, they do both have leverage over the other and that is why when these two sides come to a head it results in a major lockout or strike. But what is the real issue behind the collective bargaining agreement process that professional sport leagues have used? The answer is that these agreements expire every few years unless they are renegotiated in time. For decades the players made gains on the owners through the power of their agents and player associations, but now the owners are finally hitting back. As player salaries have grown exponentially, it has become increasingly difficult for the owners to run a profitable organization, or so they say. This has led to the owners demanding

more of the revenues that the leagues are garnering and scaling back on player salaries in order to allow the owners a better chance at being profitable. These demands have obviously not set well with the players and have resulted in the latest slew of lockouts. But these latest lockouts have impacted the players more harshly then the owners because owners of professional sport teams are exceedingly wealthy individuals who earn money through countless other ventures and do not rely on their team to be able to keep up their lifestyle. Players on the other hand often rely on their salary almost entirely in order to provide for themselves and their family. This has allowed the owners to essentially wait out until the players give in and concede to the owners will. More on these effects and others will be discussed later on in the paper. So the issue stands that the collective bargaining agreements in professional sport leagues expire every few years unless they are renegotiated in time, which has not been happening in recent years. This is because the collective bargaining agreement process that these leagues use currently falls under the National Labor Relations Act and its Board which enforces the law. The National Labor Relations Act was created in 1935 and gave workers the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike, but it does not apply well to professional sport leagues because of the profound damage that comes about from strikes and lockouts. It is not in the best interest of the owners, the players, the stadiums, or the fans to have labor negotiations come to a heated dispute and then a standstill every 5 to 10 years. It is much more disruptive in these sport leagues than it is in other industries where other workers can be found or workers can find other places of employment. The owners and players essentially need each other and the current process of collective bargaining is not succeeding. One potential way to solve this issue is if the leagues adopted a negotiation model more like the Railway Labor Act of 1926 and its National Mediation Board. This idea will be discussed in length later on, but essentially it allows a lockout

or strike only as a last resort and would not allow the collective bargaining agreement to expire like it does not every few years. Instead the collective bargaining agreement simply has to be amended, and the league continues to function exactly as normal during the negotiating process. This means that no games are lost and no ill will is derived from the fans and everyone goes about their normal business until the agreement is agreed upon by both sides. So the causes of lockouts and strikes boil down to this. When leagues first formed the power resided almost completely with the owners, which prompted the players to seek out players associations and collective bargaining to increase their compensation and rights. Then the owners hit back in response with lockouts and demands for more of the revenues and these conflicting sides have not been easily resolved with the current collective bargaining process. As long as both sides hold the belief that they deserve more and that they have leverage over the other side and as long as strikes and lockouts are readily available weapons to use in the negotiating process, then nothing will change. It is important to consider the rise of sports agents as it coincides with the rise of player salaries and other benefits. There is no doubt that the initial influx of sports agents was a blessing to professional athletes who could finally have leverage in the ongoing struggle between the owners and the players. This premise is supported by the numbers that go with it. Player salaries have skyrocketed over the decades since sports agents have first come into the league. Players have also benefited from other benefits negotiated for them by their agents in the collective bargaining agreements such as pensions, minimum salary levels, and health and safety issues. However, like most things in life, we believe that the benefits for the players from the agents may have reached a plateau. The industry as seen as a glamorous one and is extremely

competitive to break into, but more and more professionals are clamoring to become sports agents. Once you factor in the personal motivations of agents, it is possible that we have reached the point where sports agents might actually be having a negative impact on the potential career earnings for the players that they represent. Current levels of earnings have already been established, so even if agents were to go back to a lesser level of presence, it is unlikely that salaries would significantly decline. However, humans are motivated by what benefits themselves more than what benefits others, and this affects sports agents just like it affects everyone else. We believe that sports agents are motivated by self-interests when negotiating on their clients behalf during lockouts and strikes and especially during collective bargaining negotiations. The average career of athletes in certain sports can be as little as two years, but an agent can excel in his profession for decades. This makes the meaning of time significantly different for the two parties. We hypothesize that an agent would be much more likely to dig in during the negotiations for the long haul in order to gain better terms for the players in the long run. If this means that the lockout will last an entire year that is ok with the agent because he will more than make up for the lost year with increased earnings for his players in the future which directly leads to him having more earnings in the long run. This will negatively impact the players that he is currently representing though, since they are missing out on valuable playing time during a small window of opportunity that they have when they are at the peak of their physical abilities. If athletes do not capitalize on their performance during that peak time, then it will severely hamper their ability to earn over the rest of their career. We have developed several hypotheses for this paper that we are going to test via surveying over 5,000 sports agents from around the world:

H1: Agents work to strengthen the players positions on issues that benefit the agents themselves (such as maximum salaries and rookie wage scales) more than positions that do not necessarily benefit the agents (such as pensions and safety issues). H2: The superior legal and negotiation expertise of agents, in comparison to the players alone, extends the duration of work stoppages. H3: The negotiating power of sports agents negatively affects the overall career earnings of the players that they represent. H4: The frequency of player work stoppages will increase as the involvement of agents in collective bargaining negotiations increases. H5: Professional sports agents in the United States of America use work stoppages as a bargaining chip versus a last resort more frequently than sports agents outside of the United States of America. H6: The amount of benefit that agents provide to a player that they represent in a labor negotiation during a work stoppage increases as the tenure of the player increases. We will be testing these hypotheses with the email survey that we developed which runs different situations and scenarios for the agents to choose from. We will analyze their responses and determine whether or not they truly are motivated by self-interests above all else and if this does negatively impact the clients that they are charged with representing. Data collection is presently ongoing and to date the response rate has been very high, assuring sufficient data for statistical analysis, the results of which will be reported shortly.

References Baade, Robert; Baumann, Robert; and Matheson, Victor, "The Economic Consequences of Professional Sports Strikes and Lockouts: Revisited" (2006). Economics Department Working Papers. Paper 74. Baumann, Alexandra (2012). Play Ball: What Can Be Done to Prevent Strikes and Lockouts in Professional Sports and Keep the Stadium Lights On. 32 J. Nat l Ass n Admin. L. Judiciary. Coates, Dennis & Humphreys, Brad R. (2000). The Economic Consequences of Professional Sports Strikes and Lockouts. Working paper. University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Grow, Nathaniel, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons From the NFL and NBA Lockouts of 2011 (January 2, 2012). 15 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 473 (2013). Horowitz, Daniel Gregory (2010), The Effects of Strikes and Lockouts on the Strength of Professional Sports Leagues, Undergraduate Thesis, Department of Marketing, The University of Ohio. Lattinville, Robert H., Boland, Robert A., and Bennett Speyer, Labor Pains: The Effect of a Work Stoppage in the NFL on its Coaches, 20 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 335 (2010) LeRoy, Michael H., Federal Jurisdiction in Sports Labor Disputes (January 18, 2012). Utah Law Review, Vol. 2012, Fall 2012; Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 13-18.

Parlow, Matthew J., Professional Sports League Commissioners Authority and Collective Bargaining (April 22, 2010). Texas Review of Entertainment & Sports Law, Vol. 11, p. 179, 2010; Marquette Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 10-23.