Tullis Russell Machinery Safety Conference David Robinson - Process Control Manager
Contents 1. Introduction to Tullis Russell 2. Major Issues Confronting Tullis Russell 3. History of MPS on our Site 4. 61508 Internal Procedures 5. Example of Recent Upgrade to our Auchmuty No4 Paper Machine
Background Established 1809 Largest Independent Fine Papermaker in UK Operate on a 230 Acre Site in Fife, Scotland 530 Employees who are all Shareholders Operate a wide range of Machinery Oldest - 1958 Newest - 2006
Major Issues Today Health Safety and Welfare of our Employees Environmental Performance Legislation Becoming Increasingly Stringent. Energy Costs Combined Fuel Bill now Double 2002 Costs Price and Quality Competition From Far East now a major Issue
Making Paper Safely at Tullis Russell In Response to the PABIAC Document Making Paper Safely GAP Teams were set up for all Paper Machines within the Mills to identify areas of noncompliance. All Production Areas Were Included in the Projects Projects and Associated Costs Were Defined Overall Plans Created and Targets For Completion Set Reporting GAP Project Progress was routed through local Safety Committees to Central Safety Committees and Senior Managers Safety Committee
Making Paper Safely at Tullis Russell MPS endeavours to restrict Operator interventions Interventions are typically created by Breaks Accumulation - broke, debris, size & stock Fault finding Quality inspection
Making Paper Safely at Tullis Russell Sample Projects Fixed Guarding Improved Tail Feeding systems Dual Edge Cutters on the Wire Part Install Break Monitoring Cameras Install On Line Quality Inspection Systems Install Safety Related Control Systems
Making Paper Safely at Tullis Russell Basic Principles Applied Remove the Operator from the Danger Zone Completely if Possible. Implement Projects to Reduce Operator Interventions. Install Fixed Distance Guarding where Appropriate. Install Safety Related Control System as a Last Resort.
Improved Rope Runs and Pulley Arrangements Remote Points For Condition Monitoring Use of Paper Pickers/air lances Lubrication Points Piped out SRCS System with Key Exchange System/Standstill Monitor/Overspeed and Crawl
Single Nip Configuration Fixed Distance Guarding Easier Feeding Better Quality Fewer Breaks Fewer Interventions
Frequency - Paper Breaks 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04(ytd)
Breaks/1000Tonne 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04(ytd)
Minutes/Breaks 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04(ytd)
Downtime % 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04(ytd)
Making Paper Safely - SRCS Systems Issues Understanding the Requirements New Technology for Maintenance Staff New Procedures for Maintenance Staff Problems With Sensitivity of Systems Causing Nuisance Stoppages on Plant Operator Accessing Machinery using Key Exchange System. Re-Training Operators on new Procedures.
Making Paper Safely - SRCS Systems Benefits Removal of Operators From Danger Zones. More Aware of Risks Posed by Machinery. Sanity Check Time Before Making an Intervention. Focus Shifted onto Break Reduction and More Effective Tail Feeding Systems. Safer Working Environment.
Making Paper Safely In 2004 A decision was made to Implement a Site wide procedure for the Application of Safety Related Control Systems to our Existing Machinery and New Projects. The Procedure Should Ensure a Consistent Approach to the Application of Safety Related Systems. External Expertise from PILZ UK was used to Provide Training and Support to set up Procedure.
Making Paper Safely SEP 1-003 built on IEC61508 principles System Lifecycle Approach In Conjunction with a Risk Assessment the Procedure allows us to Examine Consequence of Dangerous Occurrence Frequency of Exposure, Possibility of Avoidance Probability of Failure Occurring Uses Risk graph method Safety Integrity Levels Issue Safety Requirements Specification to Vendors
Tullis Russell Engineering/Process
W3 W 2 W 1 C 1 Starting point for risk reduction determination C 2 F 1 P 1 P 2 a 1 1 - a 1 - - a F 2 P 1 2 1 1 P 2 3 2 1 C 3 F 1 3 3 2 F 2 4 3 3 C 4 b 4 3 Consequence Frequency of Exposure Figure (3) Risk Graph Possibility of Avoidance Probability
Personnel Environmental Asset C1 M inor injury (first aid treatment) M inor release contained on site < 10k (non reportable) < 1 day C2 Calibrating our Risk Graph M ajor injury (e.g. fractures, loss of sight, dislocation, injuries leading to unconsciousness or hospitalisation > 24 hours) M inor release offsite (reportable) C3 Single death in im m ediate area Release off site causing reversible damage requiring significant clean up C4 M any deaths Release off site causing permanent damage or requiring major clean up costs Table (4) Consequence M atrix 10k to < 100K 1 day to < 1 week 100K to < 1M 1 w eek to < 1 month 1 months 1M F1 F2 Exposure less once per shift Exposure more once per shift
Calibrating our Risk Graph P1 Personnel Environment al Asset Warning to Possible for operator to take Possible for operator to take permit escape action to negate or reduce action to negate or reduce affect of event P2 No prior warning Unlikely operator will be able of event to take mitigating action Table (6) Possibility of Avoidance Matrix affect of event Unlikely operator will be able to take mitigating action W1 W2 W3 Probability of occurrence [W] Very slight (less than once every 30 years) Slight (betw een once a year and once every 30 years) Frequent demand (at least once per year)
Example In 2004 Capital was approved to install a new Voith Calendar and Tail Feeding System. In Parallel to the Overall Engineering Design the Risk Assessments and Operating Procedures Were Produced. Visits to other Plants allowed us to Visualise Plant and Create Operational Procedures and Safe Systems of Work prior to Installation of Kit. From the Risk Assessments a SIL Level was allocated.
MPS RISK ASSESSMENT DEPARTMENT AUCHMUTY A4 Activity Changing calender doctor blades ASSESSOR 0 DATE 01.12.04 SSOW No. A4 Calenders 3 Likelyhood of occurance / contact with hazard Frequency of exposure to the hazard Degree of possible harm taken into account the worst case Number of persons exposed to the hazard Almost immpossible 0.033 Annualy 0.5 Scratch/ bruise 0.1 One/two persons 1 Highly unlikely 1 Monthly 1 Lacerations / mild effect 0.5 Thre / seven 2 1.5 Weekly 1.5 Break minor bone or 2 Eighjt/ fifteen 4 Unlikely ilness 2 Daily 2.5 Break major bone or 4 Sixteen/ fifty 8 Possible ilness 5 Hourly 4 Loss of one limb eye 6 Fifty/plus 12 hearing loss (permanent) Even chance 8 Constant 5 Loss of two limbs eyes 10 Probable (permanent) Likely 10 Fatality 15 Certain 15 Score 10 1 10 1 Revised score 0 1 1 1 Copy No. 1 RISK RATING Score 100 CONTROL MEASURES Fixed close fitting guards at the back side. Fixed guard below the bottom roll of nip 2 to prevent access between the nips. Fixed distance guard before nip 1 to prevent access between the nips and from the ingoing nip 1, but allow access to tear off wraps and clean stamps. Interlocked gates as per the cylinders at the front side, allows operation in "hold to run" mode only and an interlock on the frame gate between nip 1 and 2 which when open does not allow the calenders to operate in any mode. REVISED RATING SCORE 0.0165
P2 = No Possibility of Avoidance W2 Slight Possibility (1-30 Years) C2 Consequence = Major Injury C 1 W3 W 2 W 1 Starting point for risk reduction determination C 2 F 1 P 1 P 2 a 1 1 - a 1 - - a F 2 P 1 2 1 1 C 3 F 1 P 2 3 3 2 3 1 2 F 2 4 3 3 C 4 b 4 3 Figure (3) Risk Graph Frequency more than once per Shift
With Calendar safety gates CLOSED, an alarm will operate audibly and visually for 20 seconds and visually only, for a further 10 seconds, prior to a 5 second 'permit to start' window being available to the operator. An operator s indicator will show that a start-up sequence has been initiated from the Calendar section, and will flash when the 'permit to start' window is available to the operator. Failure by operator to start-up the Calendar section on Crawl or 'Hold to run' within the 'permit' period will result in cancellation of the window, and require this prestart sequence initiation again. With Calendar safety gates OPEN, an alarm will operate audibly and visually for 2 seconds and visually only, for a further 2 seconds, prior to a 5 second 'permit to start' window being available to the operator. Only the 'hold to run' function will be available to the operator. Crawl and Run functions will both be disabled. Attempting to operate these functions will result in cancellation of the 'permit to run ' window, and require this 'prestart' sequence initiation again. An operator s indicator will function as above. Failure by operator to start-up the Calendar section within the 'permit' period will result in cancellation as above. ALL 'prestart' timers will be safety monitored, as per MPS requirement. This prestart system shall operate to Category 2 according to EN954-1. (SIL 1 according to EN61508) Overspeed of Crawl, Run, Maximum m/c speed, and non-retained, 'hold to run (forward and reverse ' if applicable), Calendar section surface speeds will be safety monitored. Any Overspeed detected will shut down the Calendar in a safe manner. Overspeed 'threshold' settings will be set on commissioning, due to unknown drives electromechanical factors.
Summary of Safety Requirements Distance Guarding will Protect Operators from coming into contact with Moving Parts Access to Protected Area is by means of a Solenoid Key Exchange System with Access only Possible When Equipment under Control is at Standstill, Main Contactor Open and Section Not Isolated. A 20 Second Pre-start alarm will Sound followed by a 5 Second Permit to start Window. All Other Machine Sections Are locked out from Starting at this time. Emergency Stop will be a Regenerative Stop until Standstill is Achieved the Power will be Removed From Drive. With Gates Open the Crawl Function is available only on Hold to run at 15 M/Min. Deviation from 15 M/Min will stop the drive. System Should be Designed to Meet SIL2 or Better
L1 L2 L3 PE Control Desk E-Stop Drives PLC Drive Safety PLC Key release System Spd Monitoring Motor Audiovisual Alarm
SRCS Next Steps Fully Implement Supporting Procedures Control of Contractors Software/Hardware Change Procedures Technical Training and Authority (Competence) Levels Auditing our Performance Environmental Performance Protection