Ms. Peggy Gilligan Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20590 Subject: Petition for Rulemaking 14 CFR 121.333(c)(3) Dear Ms. Gilligan: Airlines for America (A4A), and the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) submit this joint petition for rulemaking to 14 CFR 121.333(c)(3) which states: Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(2) of this section, if for any reason at any time it is necessary for one pilot to leave his station at the controls of the airplane when operating at flight altitudes above flight level 250, the remaining pilot at the controls shall put on and use his oxygen mask until the other pilot has returned to his duty station. We would propose to change the language flight altitudes above flight level 250 in this regulation to read flight altitudes above flight level 410. There are a number of reasons that A4A and ALPA believe that this rulemaking is reasonable and needed: Safety is assured with a higher maximum altitude because of technological advances The current rule is not in harmony with ICAO International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) The rule restricts visibility and movement of Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDOs) The rule creates the potential for premature failure of mask materials The current procedures place pilots at increased risk of contracting transmissible diseases Safety is Assured with a Higher Maximum Altitude The current regulation dates from the age of propeller-driven air carrier transport aircraft, prior to the use of quick-don oxygen masks and the advances in today s aircraft design and construction methods and materials. Depressurization of commercial aircraft at altitudes above FL 250 is an extremely rare event and history demonstrates that unless a catastrophic failure occurs, it does not result in injuries or significant safety risks for passengers or crew. Recent studies indicate that the time of useful consciousness (TUC) ranges from three to five minutes at FL 250 and 16-17 seconds at FL 410. Response to a rapid decompression event is routinely practiced in simulator training and with today s quick-don masks, pilots are able to
place the mask on properly and start the flow of oxygen well under the TUC for this range of altitudes. Since 1996, US air carriers have experienced six (6) incidents of rapid decompression. There have been approximately 168 million operations during that period which results in an incident rate of one event per 28 million operations. Thus, the probability of a decompression during any given flight is less than 10-8. However, the probability of a non-catastrophic decompression during a given flight (1) which results in a cabin atmosphere capable of rapidly incapacitating a pilot (2) while only one pilot is at the controls and (3) the single pilot at the controls is incapable of putting on a quick-don oxygen mask within 5 seconds (as required by FAR 91.211(b)) is significantly less than extremely improbable (i.e., less than 10-9 ). It should be noted that the effects of catastrophic decompressions are clearly outside the scope of what FAR 121.333(c)(3) is intended to address. More recently, a review of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety information published since 2004 reveals only three (3) rapid decompression events in air carrier operations. These occurred either during climb out or when entering cruise flight. The flight crewmembers were able to quickly descend and there were no injuries in these events. These rapid decompression events occurred early in the flight profile with crewmembers at their stations. This further demonstrates the extreme improbability of such an event occurring when one crewmember is absent from their duty station. Harmonization with ICAO International SARPS According to ICAO International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), Annex 6, Operation of Aircraft, Chapter 4.4.5, Use of Oxygen, there is no requirement to routinely don the oxygen mask when above 25,000 feet MSL. The standard states, All flight crew members of pressurized aeroplanes operating above an altitude where the atmospheric pressure is less than 376 hpa [25,000 feet] shall have available (emphasis added) at the flight duty station a quick-donning type of oxygen mask which will readily supply oxygen upon demand. In conformance with the ICAO rules, Section 605.32(3) of the Canadian Aviation Regulations states, The pilot at the flight controls of an aircraft shall use an oxygen mask if (a) the aircraft is not equipped with quick-donning oxygen masks and is operated at or above flight level 250; or (b) the aircraft is equipped with quick-donning oxygen masks and is operated above flight level 410. It is noteworthy that the FAA permits foreign air carriers to operate in U.S. airspace using the ICAO standard cited above; foreign pilots are not required to wear quick-donning oxygen masks above flight level 250 in U.S. airspace when only one pilot is at the controls.
FFDO Implications The current regulations require that masks be donned above flight level 250 by the pilot remaining at a duty station whenever the other pilot leaves the flight deck. When a quickdonning oxygen mask is in place, the wearer s visibility and movement is greatly restricted. When a pilot leaves the flight deck, there are procedures in place to protect access to it from individuals with hostile intent. If the pilot remaining at the flight controls is a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO), he or she provides an additional measure of flight deck security. With the mask in place, however, it may be difficult for an FFDO to quickly and properly respond to a threat to the flight deck. The use of an oxygen mask in these situations may contribute to a degradation of aviation security responsiveness during an actual crisis situation. Failure of Mask Materials Despite their considerable expense, quick-don oxygen masks are not designed for routine, everyday use. The clear mask material and attachments are subject to excessive wear and tear that degrades the effectiveness of the mask when used during a rapid decompression. It has been demonstrated that with extensive, routine handling, oxygen masks tend to have problems with, and failure of the valves. Also, the integrated visors become scratched and visibility is impaired with repeated placement into and out of their containers. The current regulation creates the unintended consequence of prematurely wearing out this necessary safety equipment and thereby increases the risk that it may not be useable when it is needed in an actual emergency. Transmissible Disease The risk of transmissible disease arises due to the design of the aircraft oxygen masks, which precludes them from being properly disassembled and cleaned between uses. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) have stringent guidance and regulations for the operation and cleaning of respirators between multiple users. While aircraft oxygen masks are not defined as respirators, logic dictates that the health risks associated with the sharing of respirators would apply equally to the sharing of oxygen masks. Several types of diseases may be communicable through sharing of oxygen masks: Influenza According to the CDC, influenza is thought to be spread through coughing or sneezing of people infected with the influenza virus. People may also become infected by touching something with influenza viruses on it and then touching their mouth, nose, or eyes. Respiratory droplets, as well as airborne transmission are likely paths for transmission of the H1N1 virus. The H1N1 virus has been determined to have a life span of 2-8 hours on a hard surface. With current oxygen mask procedures, the risk of passing
this virus between pilots is quite high. Following are recommendations from the CDC website on ways to avoid H1N1 when wearing a facemask, neither of which the airline industry follows: Avoid re-using disposable facemasks and N95 respirators, if possible. Used facemasks and N95 respirators should be taken off and immediately placed in the regular trash so they do not touch anything else. After you take off a facemask or N95 respirator, clean your hands with soap and water or an alcohol-based hand sanitizer. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus bacteria (MRSA) MRSA is a deadly bacterium that has spread outside hospitals into the community; it now kills more people annually than AIDS. It is a rapidly spreading infection that can require amputation and even cause death. MRSA bacteria can live for weeks or months on a hard surface. Tuberculosis (TB) TB is also a worldwide pandemic. Two billion people are infected with the tubercle bacilli; 10% will become sick. TB is highly contagious and becoming multi-drug resistant. People can harbor the bacteria for years before it is triggered, and it can be fatal. Meningitis Meningitis is spread by exchange of respiratory and throat secretions. Bacterial infection is more severe and can cause brain damage, hearing loss, limb amputation, or death. CDC recommends that people not share eating utensils or water bottles to avoid transmitting the bacteria. This recommendation can be extrapolated to include oxygen masks since respiratory secretions will remain on them after use. Various bacteria Other, various bacteria found in the environment are becoming increasingly resistant to antibiotics, such as c. difficile or pseudomonas aeruginosa, which are opportunistic when a person s immune system is compromised. Pilot immune systems are constantly under assault from disruption of circadian rhythm, radiation, stress, pesticides and chemicals used in aircraft, foreign environments, etc. Mold According to oxygen mask manufacturers, mold growth can be a serious health risk because bacteria can quickly reproduce on the surface of a moisture-laden mask or cannula. Mold can be forced deep into the lungs during use and cause serious health problems. Disinfectant wipes are used in the airline industry, when available, to clean masks. They are somewhat effective against most viruses when they are reachable. However, as it relates to the oxygen mask, its effectiveness is limited due to the need to subject the mask to the wet solution for an adequate period of time. The microphone, where respiratory fluids accumulate, and the inside of the oxygen supply hose are completely inaccessible to the disinfectant. Compounding the problem is the fact that the active ingredient in many disinfectant wipes, benzalkonium chloride (BC), has been shown to be a factor in creating super bacteria that are becoming more resistant to antibiotics. Allergic reactions have also been reported with continuous long-term use
in sensitive users, especially on mucous membranes and unfortunately, the wipes are less effective against certain types of bacteria. Finally, there is also concern that the wipes have the potential to spread the pathogen to a wider area when wiping. Summary FAR 121.333(c)(3) should be amended to reflect the significant advances in aircraft and oxygen mask design and construction that have come into use since the regulation was first promulgated. Doing so would harmonize US regulations in with pertinent ICAO SARPS and with the oxygen mask-related practices of non-north American airlines operating in U.S. airspace. A change would also reflect the negligible risk associated with oxygen mask use, with or without two or more pilots on the flight deck, and it would result in a safer and more healthful working environment for airline pilots. It would provide an additional measure of flight deck security and protect the integrity and maintainability of quick-don masks so that they will be available when needed. Petition For the above-cited reasons, we the undersigned petition for a change to FAR 121.333(c)(3), Use of oxygen masks by flight crewmembers. Currently, the rule requires that when a pilot leaves his station at the controls of the airplane for any reason, when operating at flight altitudes above flight level 250, the remaining pilot at the controls shall put on and use his oxygen mask until the other pilot has returned to his duty station. We request that the regulation be amended to change the flight altitude requirement cited in this regulation from above flight level 250 to above flight level 410. We further request that the FAA grant an exemption from the current rule to all FAR Part 121 aircraft operators upon their request. This exemption is needed to enhance safety and security until such time as changes to FAR 121.333(c)(3) are finalized. Thank you for your consideration. Sincerely, Nicholas E. Calio President and CEO Airlines for America Captain Lee Moak President Air Line Pilots Association, International